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ABSTRACT

A DISABILITY THEOLOGY OF LIMITS FOR RESPONDING TO MORAL INJURY

By
Lisa Nichols Hickman
August 2018

Dissertation supervised by Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, Ph.D.
This dissertation names the phenomenon of Moral Injury (MI) as a pressing
moral, theological and ecclesiological issue. With an eye toward support to veterans and
their families, this dissertation situates MI within the field of disability studies, in
particular, the work of Deborah Creamer’s “limit model” of disability and then, with a
theological turn, offers a helpful corrective to Creamer’s model by probing Dietrich
Bonhoeffer’s view of “limit” (German: grenze) and offering a “crucial limit model of
disability” as a response. To accomplish this task, first, I review the development of MI
as a category and differentiate MI from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). I
identify psychiatric and psychological themes developed by scholars such as Jonathan
Shay, Brett Litz, William Nash, Everett Worthington and Diane Langberg. In addition, I
outline key theological themes developed in the scholarship of Rita Nakashima Brock,
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Gabriela Lettini, Robert Meagher, Warren Kinghorn and Brian S. Powers. Second, I
situate MI in the world of disability studies through the notion of finitude while at the
same time acknowledging the confines for MI in current models of disability: the medical
model and the social model. Creamer offers a helpful alternative in her “limit model”
however, weaknesses in her constructive model necessitate revision. Third, I propose
Bonhoeffer as a helpful conversation partner to bolster Creamer’s account of “limit” by
using themes he develops in Creation and Fall regarding the limits of humanity, theology
and Christology that speak to human finitude. In response to those limits, Bonhoeffer
proposes a mode for the flourishing of human life by means of “the orders of
preservation” and later, his “mandates of creation” providing both parameters and
restrictions for moral agency. These will be assessed with an eye to how life might be
structured for veterans returning from war with their moral code eroded. Fourth, this
study will conclude with implications of a revised limit model for veterans with MI – for
the individual, for society, and for the work of the church in a world broken by war.

v

DEDICATION

For my grandfather Robert Lee Nichols
Pro scientia et sapientia.
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THE VETERANS’ CREED
I am [former rank] [first and last name],
A veteran of the United States [branch of service],
As one of my nation’s fittest and finest, I answered my nation’s call to duty.
I mastered the weapons of war and became expert in defense and security – and I make
no apology for my skills.
I am a warrior and have seen and done things that many may not understand.
I have proudly served my country with honor and dignity.
I am one in fifteen – a seven-percenter – a member of a team spanning the nation –
veteran brothers and sisters, bonded by our common values and experiences.
I now stand ready to serve my veteran teammates.
I will help them face and conquer their enemies, including the demons from within.
I will never abandon an injured veteran teammate.
If they need support – I will carry them. If I cannot carry them – I will call for help.
When I struggle with my own pain, my veteran teammates will support me; and I will
reach out of the darkness and grasp their helping hands.
I will never quit.
I will never give up.
I will never accept defeat.
I am… a United States veteran.
-

x

Judge John C. Reed, III

A true war story is never moral.
- Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried

xi

Chapter 1
Moral Injury: The Signature Wound of a Generation
I am [former rank] [first and last name],
A veteran of the United States [branch of service],
As one of my nation’s fittest and finest, I answered my nation’s call to duty.
- The Veterans’ Creed1
1.1

Introduction: Statement of the Problem and Preliminary Hypothesis
The lament of Jeremiah, “they have treated the wound of my people carelessly”

(Jeremiah 6:14, NRSV)2 reverberates today as United States veterans return home from a
decade of war, ridden by PTSD and moral injury, only to discover lethargy and
complacency in societal response. The seriousness of soldiers’ wounds, to body and
spirit alike, demand ethical, social and theological responsibility. Failure to address the
seriousness of these wounds results in distress, depression and even suicide for the
soldier. Statistics may describe a portion of the reality; however, statistics cannot measure
suffering. The suffering of soldiers and the repercussive suffering in the wider circles of
their lives (family, work, faith, civic responsibility) is difficult, if not impossible, to
assess. The emerging interdisciplinary field of moral injury describes a wound created by
social suffering and moral distrust where a soldier’s sense of what is morally right is
compromised. Current research reveals a differing presentation of symptoms for moral
1

Written by Judge John C. Reed, III, The Veterans’ Creed is key to his work with veterans in the Mercer
County Veterans Court. See: Sandy Scarmack, “Their own court helping veterans going through criminal
justice system,” The Sharon Herald, February 17, 2015, www.sharonherald.com/news/local_news/theirown-cour-helping-veterans-going-through-criminal-justice-system/article (Accessed October 14, 2016).
2
Jeremiah 6:14 (NRSV). Jeremiah 6 is a difficult text of judgment foretelling a time when God will purge
Jerusalem and then begin anew with a few who remain and are righteous. In verse 14, God speaks in
judgment of people whose falsity keeps them from God. Their inability to attend to the wounds of the
surrounding community is a part of that judgment, as well as their proclamation of ‘peace’ when no peace
yet exists.
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injury other than Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).3 Scholars formally recognized
PTSD as a critical diagnosis in 1980 after years of response to varying types of war
neuroses.4 In 2009, a group of scholars led by Psychiatrist Brett Litz introduced the
terminology ‘Moral Injury’ to describe a different category of symptoms related to moral
formation, moral emotions, moral response to crisis, and the disabling effect of shame
when there is an inability to contextualize events that occurred.5 Litz and his team make
clear through their literature review, clinical research and analytical assessment:
We are doing a disservice to our service members and veterans if we fail to
conceptualize and address the lasting psychological, biological, spiritual,
behavioral, and social impact of perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing
witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations, that is,
moral injury.6
The loss of a meaningful and moral worldview creates a shattering of moral identity both
within the soldier and beyond the solider to the outside world. Moral injury may be
situated, therefore, within the larger field of trauma studies and can be considered a
paradigmatic example of the manifestation of moral trauma within an individual. While
the precise contours of the newer field of moral injury are under discussion, what is clear
is that moral injury has a disabling effect on the soldier and their surrounding circles.
And yet, moral injury as a particular form of disability has not been studied nor

3

Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Why distinguishing a moral injury from PTSD is important,” Stars and Stripes,
March
9,
2015,
https://www.stripes.com/opinion/why-distinguishing-a-moral-injury-from-ptsd-isimportant-1.333520#.WNwIzxSjxEc (Accessed March 30, 2017). Please note, a more comprehensive
comparison of PTSD and Moral Injury and their unique characteristics will be discussed in Chapter Two.
4
Matthew J. Friedman, Paula P. Schnurr and Annmarie McDonagh-Coyle, “Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder in the Military Veteran,” Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 17:2 (June, 1994): 265.
5
Brett Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, and Shira
Maguen “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy,”
Clinical Psychology Review, 29 (2009): 696. The importance of this paper in the academic discourse on
moral injury will be discussed more fully in Chapter Two.
6
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 697.
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addressed. The field of disability studies7 has asked, wrestled and responded to many of
the questions raised by moral injury.
Responding well to the particular problem of moral injury requires a robust
description of the contours of the presenting injury both within the veteran’s inner being
and beyond the veteran as that injury affects his or her relationship with the world. The
complications arising from the experience of moral transgression and the inability to
“contextualize”8 the experience creates a disruption between self and world. This conflict
between one’s moral center and “morally challenging experiences”9 creates a clash of
value systems that carry the potential for “long-lasting pscyho-bio-social impairment.”10
The terminology Litz and his team use to describe the potential impairment reveal the
possible impact between the self within and the world beyond.
How then do we address the seriousness of this moral injury avoiding the
carelessness the prophet Jeremiah laments? Given the clinical scholarship based on the
presenting symptoms, a first response might be to medicalize the moral injury and treat it
as pathology to be healed. However, describing that injury only as a wound to be
medically treated carries several dilemmas: moral injury becomes a problem to be solved,
patients with visible injuries receive prioritized care, medical treatment is unable to
7

Scholars in the field of disability studies utilize a variety of titles for “disability” to capture nuances of
personal narrative, embodied conditions, social construction, historical and political implications, and
cultured difference. Some of these titles include “dis/ability studies,” “ability studies,” “(dis)-ability
studies,” “crip studies,” and “disability studies.” See for example: Linda J. Rogers and Beth Blue
Swadener, eds., Semiotics and Dis/ability: Interrogating Categories of Difference (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2001); René R. Gadacz, Re-thinking Dis-ability: New Structures, New
Relationships (Edmonton, Alb.: University of Alberta Press, 1994); and Dan Goodley, Dis/ability Studies:
Theorising disablism and ableism (London: Routledge Press, 2014); and also, Robert McRuer, Crip
Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (New York: NYU Press, 2006). For the purposes of
this dissertation, I am using the largest spectrum of the term “disability studies” as a starting point for
cross-disciplinary conversation with moral injury.
8
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696.
9
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696.
10
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696.
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plumb the depths of moral emotions, and the issue of moral injury is depoliticized. First,
medicalization turns moral injury into a problem to be solved rather than a person in need
of wholistic healing of body, mind and spirit. Veteran Tyler Boudreau explains, soldiers
turn “automatically into mental patients instead of wounded souls.”11 Second, some
might argue that medicalizing moral injury will place the wounded solider with the
invisible wounds of war at a disadvantage to others whose wounds are more noticeable.
Theologian Robert Meagher explains, “Those who come back without a scar – silent,
hollowed out, shadowed, and overlooked until they take their agony out on themselves or
others – rarely find recognition, much less healing.”12 Third, when that invisible wound is
observed, many consider treatment of the injury as simple as a medical solution to be
assessed, diagnosed and treated therein neglecting the depth of the injury within the
veteran’s moral emotions. The inner experience of shame and guilt and their outward
manifestations of “anger and decreased empathy”13 are difficult to assess and treat solely
within a medicalized environment. Finally, a medical diagnosis has the potential to
confine the moral injury to the soldier alone rather than considering the greater societal
context. Veteran Tyler Boundreau explains, “A diagnosis has a tendency to depoliticize a
veteran’s disquietude and turn it into a mental disorder.”14
If medical assessment alone is not enough to treat moral injury, is it possible that
a social analysis could help restore the wound? Certainly this is a step veteran Tyler

11

Tyler Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” The Massachusetts Review, 52:3/4 (2011): 749.
Robert Emmet Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War (Eugene, OR: Cascade
Books, 2014), 1.
13
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699.
14
Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 750.
12
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Boudreau argues for when he implies re-politicization over and against the tendency to
depoliticize. He makes clear:
What’s most useful about the term “moral injury” is that it takes the problem out
of the hands of the mental health profession and the military and attempts to
place it where it belongs – in society, in the community, and in the family –
precisely where moral questions should be posed and wrangled with. It
transforms “patients” back into citizens, and “diagnoses” into dialogue.15
Describing moral injury only as a wound to be medically treated, neglects the societal
entanglement that creates moral injury. Moral injury is not simply a “psycho-bio”
condition, but also a “social” one.16 Litz and his team of scholars recognized the medical
(psychological/biological) component as well as the socio-political dimension (social)
that has qualities of both physical impairment as well as societal disabling.17 The move
toward a more ‘social’ analysis of moral injury initiates substantive conversation. When
soldiers become “citizens” and not just patients, when moral injury becomes repoliticized, and when we move beyond therapeutic-medical-reductionism toward a more
complex social analysis, it is then possible to: invite criticism of the Just War tradition,18

15

Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 750.
See: Jeffrey P. Bishop, “Biopsychosociospiritual Medicine and Other Political Schemes” Christian
Bioethics, 15:3 (2009): 254–276. Bishop argues that societal structures create unjust effects on human
being through biopsychosociospiritual structures that cause harm and malfeasance (273).
17
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696.
18
See for example: Tobias Winright, Can War Be Just in the 21st Century, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
2015) and also Robert Emmet Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War (Eugene,
OR: Cascade Books, 2014). And also, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Cian O’Driscoll, and John Williams, eds.,
Just War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013). To
be clear, the long tradition of “just war theory” originating with Augustine is outside the scope of this
dissertation. However it should be noted the multiple and complex ways in which wars can be unjust
whether the originating propulsion to war is unjust (jus ad bellum) and the mechanisms through which the
war is carried out (jus in bello). Just war tradition considers the following regarding the jus ad bellum
criteria: just cause, right authority, right intent and last resort. The just war tradition considers the
following regarding the jus in bello criteria: proportionality, double-effect and discrimination. In addition,
recent scholarship considers a third realm regarding jus post bellum exploring the ethics of justice and
restoration after the conclusion of a conflict. See for example: Eric Patterson, ed., Ethics beyond War’s
End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012).
16
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probe the complexity of the soldiers’ “contextual realities”,19 de-clinicize the injury as
solely cognitive,20 and re-conceptualize healing as social rehabilitation rather than a
solely individualized event.21 The cumulative effect of these positive elements of a social
analysis is that “It pulls moral transgressions that are not necessarily traumatic out of the
mental health profession and into society, into the living room, and makes these notorious
‘invisible wounds’ all our problems, not just the problems of the VA.”22 In other words,
moving the responsibility of moral injury from the shoulders of veterans to the shoulders
of society redistributes personal guilt to be shared across society.23
Despite these benefits and the soul-searching societal conversation they invite,
describing moral injury solely through a social analysis carries its own restrictions. A
social analysis, while it complicates the dynamics of politics, power and possible
oppression at play in an assessment of moral injury, neglects several key factors such as:
the profundity of moral emotions such as anxiety, shame, fear and guilt,24 the alterations
in identity due to those “global evaluations of the self,”25 the inability to assess the
fluidity of moral injury across varying contexts (ie. a veteran may experience the
complications of moral injury within a church or household, but not suffer the same
distress within a cadre of military veterans), the questions of agency (ie. is the moral
agent free to act or caught within a complex and/or unjust system) and finally, the
19

Tobias Winright and E. Ann Jeschke, “Combat and Confession: Just War and Moral Injury” in Can War
Be Just in the 21st Century, ed. Tobias Winright (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2015), 175.
20
Winright and Jeschke, “Combat and Confession,” 174.
21
Winright and Jeschke, “Combat and Confession,” 184.
22
Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 754.
23
Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 753.
24
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699.
25
Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. Here, Litz draws on the work of Helen B.
Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York, NY: International Universities Press, 1971), 30. Lewis
speaks of a global evaluation of self: “I did this thing” which is a different moral emotion and process than
guilt which focus on the action done: “I did this thing.”
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ambiguity of moral injury. Moral injury isn’t always a moment of combat but what Tyler
Boudreau describes as “…dull. It’s going to be a man with a shovel or a farmhouse
search. It’s going to be a hug.”26 Boudreau uses this description to show the complexity
of agency within distorted power systems leading to ambiguity in what might appear
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in any given situation. In addition, a social analysis neglects certain
nuances of responsibility. In some instances, a veteran needs the burden of responsibility
broadened from her shoulders to bear the enormous complexity and ambiguity of a moral
crisis in which she finds herself. In other instances, a veteran needs to claim as their own
certain moral actions and seek atonement rather than accepting the passivity of a broader
societal spectacle.27 A social analysis acknowledges the complicity and complexity of
institutional sin and its potential to wreak havoc on individual bodies creating what
Sharon V. Betcher deems “social flesh”28 that goes beyond medical diagnosis or
treatment.

However, the profundity, identity, fluidity, ambiguity, complexity,

responsibility and passivity are not fully accounted for within a social assessment. Even
taking the step toward a social diagnosis of the wound, as helpful as naming that reality
is, can still prevent this particular wound of moral injury from being fully understood.

1.2

Moral Injury and Disability

26

Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 754.
Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 753.
28
For more on the concept of the “assemblage” of “social flesh” see Sharon V. Betcher, “Of Disability and
the Garden State,” Religious Studies News, (March, 2013).
27
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Drawing moral injury alongside the field of disability studies29 is provocative for
two reasons. First, ‘disability’ is often a liability in military culture – not simply the
diagnosis, but the very word and its implications. Second, the field of disability has
wrestled with questions akin to those being asked by scholars of moral injury regarding
the medical and social components of disability. While “medical” and “social” models of
disability are helpful for naming particular realities those with disabilities face, the
medical model does not incorporate the power at play within the social construction of
disability. And, the social model of disability cannot fully describe the “fluidity”30
through which certain disabilities present or recede in varying social contexts. The social
model understands disability as contextual within a particular world, but consider, for
example, whether a person would be considered deaf within a deaf community. In
response to this critical issue of “fluidity” across social contexts in disability studies,
Deborah Creamer suggests the need for an alternative model to compensate for the
inadequacy of these two standard models and allow: greater fluidity across social
contexts, deeper questions regarding the human condition, as well as broader exploration
of theodicy.
Creamer’s work critiques the medical and social models of disability and
develops a proposal for a “limit model of disability.”31 Just as the social model builds
upon and expands the medical model of disability, the limit model advances the social
model to demonstrate how the disabling that occurs within certain worlds generates
29

For further introduction to the discipline, see key texts: Lennard J. Davis, ed., The Disability Studies
Reader (New York: Routledge, 1997). And also: Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, eds., Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities (New York: Modern
Language Association of America, 2002).
30
Deborah Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 93.
31
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31.
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certain questions relating to God, self and humanity.32 To be clear, Creamer does not
abandon the two alternate models in full; instead, she acknowledges their strengths and
weaknesses and takes additional steps forward. Creamer’s work invigorates study of
disability by acknowledging the unavoidable limits of human embodiment, demonstrating
how confrontation with limits invites questions, and naming the equalizing power of this
assertion for all humanity. Creamer’s work is important because it addresses the real
“limits” that studies in disability probe and pursuits in theological method quickly meet.
Creamer critiques “static” conceptions of disability where people are seen “either”
disabled “or” not.33 Instead, disability for Creamer is “fluid” depending in part on
functionality across various contexts. Because of this fluidity there is “ambiguity in
perception” therefore people cannot be easily categorized.34 Identity, Creamer argues, has
a complexity greater than the current medical and minority (social) models engage.35 A
“limit” in Creamer’s assessment is any place where a person moves from ability to a
disability. She explains:
From the limits perspective, sin might now be redefined as an inappropriate
attitude toward limits as we both exaggerate and also reject our own limits and
the limits of others. Disability might be understood as limits that are not
accommodated by the environment. Rather than minimizing the experiences of
disability, this perspective allows us to identify areas where our limits become
disabling due to physical or social barriers, relocating sinfulness. It also
identifies prejudices we hold about limits – that is, how we see some limits as
“natural” (we cannot fly) and others as “defective” (I cannot run) – and offers an
opportunity for a critical reexamination of such views. Moving away from such
prejudices, we might instead explore the relationship between limits and
creativity, or wonder what the existence of limits tells us about the nature of
32

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31-33.
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31.
34
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 6.
35
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 7. To be clear, Creamer uses the term “minority model” as
an alternative to the “social model” of disability. Her reason for this choice is to demonstrate the
oppression that occurs when a larger social group deems who is in the majority and the minority (25-26).
33
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humanity. Through this new lens, questions may also be raised about images
and understandings of God.36
Limits, then, create a space for the varied spectrum of “embodied experience”37 rather
than simplistic measures of “either/or”38 that can minimize disability benefits, prevent
treatment and affect social perceptions. Acknowledging limits creates an equalizing
measure of human experience, where all people at various moments in time and in
diverse contexts encounter limits.39 When that limit is encountered and a moment of
recognition regarding changing ability or agency occurs therein is the experience of
disability.40
For Creamer, this sense of “limit” is an integral part of being human, not simply
for those who currently experience a disabling condition. Her understanding of “limit” is
overwhelmingly positive: limits are unsurprising,41 limits are intrinsic to existence,42 and
limits are good – not evil.43 In developing this position, Creamer erases some of the
negativity associated with limits and disablement and expands “limit” to suggest a

36

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 33.
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31. An important reference regarding limits, embodiment
and human vulnerability is: Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need
the Virtues (Chicago, IL: Open Court Press, 2001). For MacIntyre, the notion of limit is an inherently
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particular theological anthropology that touches all humanity.44 She uses the “limit-ness”
of human experience to offer a third way beyond the operative “medical” and what she
calls social “minority” models of disability. For Creamer, the “medical” model of
disability misses the larger social implications of societal constructions that have
implications for power, prejudice, oppression and socio-political stigmatization.45 The
social “minority” model of disability functions to address these implications and offers a
clear socio-political depiction of the way society fails to meet the physical and vocational
needs of disabled persons. Creamer’s articulation of “limit-ness” as a model for both
disability and theology clarifies the bias in both the medical and social models that
presume “normal” bodies as the standard. A “limit” model creates a space for what
Creamer calls a “threshold”46 where one might experience distinct levels of ability and/or
disability in varying contexts. In addition, a limit model reveals a fundamental aspect of
human experience whereby encountering varying thresholds raises deep questions
regarding human beings before God.47 To summarize Creamer, an important clarifying
note is necessary. Creamer’s “limit model of disability” might better be understood first
and foremost as a “contextual model of disability” (differing from the all-pervading
“social model”, in order to provide for changes in agency and ability across varying
social contexts for which the standard “social model” does not account). Then, emerging
from that “contextual model of disability” is the ongoing encounter with limits: my
agency is limited in this context and my abilities are limited in this context. Those
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encounters, then, raise questions – as those limits are reached – regarding the limits of
God, my self, and those around me.
Creamer’s model serves as an important first step in describing the particular kind
of disabling experience moral injury constitutes that have heretofore gone unrecognized.
Before proceeding, it is vitally important to acknowledge the risk of drawing moral injury
into conversation with the area of disability studies. Veteran and author Tyler Boudreau
makes very clear his perspective: “Moral injuries are not about benefits or blame.
They’re not about treatment or medications. They’re not about disability.”48 In fact,
veterans react quite strongly to the stigmatizing label of “disability” and its implications
for being a part of a special needs population even though, ironically, a disability label
might provide future benefits to the morally wounded soldier.49 Psychologist Jonathan
Shay was one of the first to advocate for articulating the ‘disabling’ effects of moral
injuries’ wounds, “When the injury invades character, and the capacity for social trust is
destroyed, all possibility of a flourishing human life is lost.”50 The language of disability,
for a veteran, can sound overly medicalized thereby creating an assymetrical power
dynamic where a dependent ‘victim’ is in need of a more powerful person who may offer
strategies for healing the impairment. Or, the language of disability, for a veteran, can
sound overly socialized because a diagnosis carries socio-political stigmatization. As
much as the language is loaded for veterans that is precisely the point and the burden
shared by scholars of disability. Creamer’s determination to claim the language of
48
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“limit” is to address these very issues. Tyler Boudreau, though arguing against disability,
yields toward the argument Creamer is making when he writes, “When we talk about
moral injuries, we seek a deeper understanding of our humanity.”51 Creamer addresses
“limits” because our encounter with limits and our threshold of ability or disability in
their presence raises the deepest of questions regarding our shared humanity.
However, there are inadequacies in Creamer’s assessment. Limits, for Creamer,
are positive: she describes limits as unsurprising, intrinsic and good. This is not unlike the
veteran or scholar who advocates the strength of moral injury as the retention and
awareness of morality. Even a moral injury maintains a remnant of decency and hope in
the moral goodness and moral codes operative within a broken world.

However,

comprehending the depth of a veteran’s moral injury requires journeying to a level
beyond Creamer’s “unsurprising, intrinsic and good” to the complexity of the moral
emotions of anger, wrath, shame and lament. In order to create a greater space for those
moral emotions within Creamer’s model, this dissertation recovers Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s
view of limits (German: grenze) in Creation and Fall as a necessary refinement to
Creamer’s “limit model.” While Creamer moves from the “contextual” to the theological
by examining first the changes in agency across varying contexts, and then, asking
theological questions regarding the limits encountered; Bonhoeffer does the reverse.
Bonhoeffer pursues the exegesis of a Biblical text, Genesis, to ponder the theological and
anthropological reasons for the existence of limits.

Then, he takes that exegetical

analysis toward a practical application across contexts as he suggests “the orders of
preservation” as a way of maintaining agency and ability across social contexts even
51
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when limits are encountered. The retrieval of Bonhoeffer’s pastoral and practical
response to limits will better facilitate an adequate description of moral injury and
thereby create a space for a deepened response to the moral emotions and the moral
demands evidenced in this injury.
Particularly important for refinement within Creamer’s model is the complexity of
“limit” when affected by both individual and institutional sin.

Creamer’s account

recognizes the limit of human finitude; Bonhoeffer’s theology in conversation with
Creamer will develop the implications of finitude and shame in the face of limits.
Responding well to the moral injury of veterans, as ethicists, theologians and civilians,
requires better understanding the transgression of moral limits a veteran experiences and
the subsequent shame and soul-shattering repercussions of this injury. Responding well
means medical treatment, when necessary, and social accountability beyond latent
acceptance, but also an identification of human limits and divine limitations within a
crisis of moral authority across fluid moral worlds. Responding well requires the church
to consider the theological resources available to address this moral wound, to make
those resources available to those in need, and to deepen the space for suffering within
those resources when necessary.

1.3

Toward Cross-Disciplinary Scholarship for Moral Injury
Defending this thesis, requires three key steps: first, a thick description of moral

injury and its history will be presented drawing on the work of psychiatrist Jonathan
Shay, psychologists Brett Litz, William Nash and Everett Worthington, as well as
theologians Rita Nakashima Brock, Gabriella Lettini, William Kinghorn, Robert Meagher

14

and Brian S. Powers.

Critical to the history and definition of moral injury is

distinguishing the presenting characteristics of moral injury as significantly different
from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). After reviewing the historical development,
noting several key themes in the scholarship is necessary to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the field. Within this developing field key themes echo questions scholars
address and wrestle with in the world of disability: the predicament of physical
experience and the heightened tendency toward medicalization of the predicament rather
than grappling with a greater sense of embodiment, the problem of societal complacency
in understanding the experience and moral grief of veterans, and the limits of theological
reflection across fluid social contexts regarding questions of war and its aftermath. These
lingering themes and concerns are important to address because they reverberate with
medical, social and theological themes regarding the limits of questions raised in the field
of disability.
Second, situating moral injury within the field of disability studies is critical for
naming the particular disabling implications of moral injury on the veteran and within the
veteran’s context. The study of disability necessitates reflection on various forms of
embodiment and how bodies are accepted or rejected within varying social contexts.
Creamer’s rejection of “either/or” claims of disability toward a more equalizing and fluid
model of disability are key to her presentation of a “limit model” of disability.
Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of her model will then demonstrate both the
promise of her model as well as the need for further refinement.
Third, drawing on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s depiction of limits within his accounts of
creation, sin and redemption will deepen and further define Creamer’s limit model
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creating a space to assess moral injury that goes beyond physicality and sociality. The
assertions Bonhoeffer makes regarding limits create the space for a particular theological
response when a moral world is transgressed.

Bonhoeffer proposes “the orders of

preservation” as the particular location in which Christology intersects his theological
anthropology. An analysis Bonhoeffer’s “orders of preservation” will then allow the
reader to understand how a moral world can then be rebuilt, through Bonhoeffer’s
mandates of creation, to attend to the spheres of life of church, family, culture and
government building on what Christ has preserved in the face of fluid and changing
limits. This dissertation will conclude by determining the implications of a limit model of
disability for veterans experiencing moral injury.

Strengths and weaknesses of a

“revised” limit model will be explored along with its implications for soldier, society and
spiritual life within the church.
Characterizing moral injury as a transgression52 of limits provides a helpful
resource for moving beyond restrictive views of moral injury as a wound that can be
treated medically through particular treatment, or as a socially inflicted lesion from the
collapse of a particular moral world. Instead, a robust description of limits initiated by a
conversation with the disability theology of Deborah Creamer and strengthened by the
theological anthropology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer can help moral injury in our veterans be
tended to in a socially serious and theologically astute manner. As the contours of moral
injury and its ramifications for veterans continue to be nuanced, a keen definition of what
moral injury precisely is will deeply affect our understanding. Even more so, drawing on
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the work of disability studies and its transformative work in the body politic53 will assist
those in the field of moral injury provide liberating advocacy and integrity for those in
crisis.
Veteran war reporter and author, David Wood calls moral injury “the signature
wound of this generation.”54 And yet, because of the shame and guilt intrinsic to moral
injury, calculating its reach across veterans55 is difficult even when the human cost of its
effects are “incalculable.”56 “Incalculable” is a helpful descriptor for considering the
impact on soldiers and society of moral injury for several reasons. First, recent statistics
depict a pressing need: of the 30,000 suicides that occur in the United States each year, 1
in 5 of these suicides is a veteran.57 While there is much debate over certain statistics and
how they are calculated, what is most clear is the cry of individuals for help.58 Second,
moral injury is not necessarily immediately present upon return from war. Veteran Karl
Marlantes describes in his reflection, “What It Is Like to Go To War,” a period of being
‘fine’ for ten years after Vietnam before he questioned his moral code and its
reverberating effect on his life.59 Because of the delayed reaction, reliable statistics
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regarding particular generations of veterans and the wars they fought in are difficult to
obtain. Third, it is impossible to calculate the human cost of moral injury on marriages,
parenting, extended familial relationships, friendships, the work force and ongoing
societal impact across generational lines over time. Psychiatrists David Berle and
Zachary Steele studied the psychological effects of returning from war on family systems
by measuring changes in relationships, roles, responsibilities within the family, the
rearing of children and issues of anger and violence. In all areas, they found substantive
distress and difficulty in finding both proactive and reactive help to assist the family
dynamics.60 Fourth, the possibility of moral injury affecting journalists, contractors and
other civilians privy to war zone contexts will even further exacerbate the impossibility
of assessing human cost and obtaining adequate statistics.

Former Journalist Chris

Hedges, for example, speaks to the trauma he experienced over twenty years while
covering wars in Latin America, the Middle East and the Balkans, when he explains:
It so upends the moral and physical universe that when you step outside the war
zone you just cannot relate, you cannot function… I did it for 20 years and what
happens when you cannot extract yourself from it is early death, whether that is
through drinking, substance abuse, or a heart attack.61
In addition, statistics regarding Moral Injury do not include repercussions on individuals
outside the armed forces affected by warzone suffering, perhaps including Moral Injury.
Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, Edward Wasserman reminds:
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While the coverage of veterans is a major improvement in the media’s
approach from what it was in the late ‘60s and ‘70s, it has come alongside the
virtual disappearance from coverage of civilian suffering.62
Perhaps this incalculability, in all its fuzziness, void and shame is what makes it so
difficult for churches to provide pastoral, theological and liturgical support to veterans
and their families.

The National Congregation Survey, completed in 2012, is a

comprehensive study of 1300 American religious institutions including mosques,
synagogues and churches assessing their individual and collective impact. Question #465
of the National Congregation’s Survey reveals the neglect of religious institutions in
responding to veterans and their families. The question asks, “Within the past twelve
months have there been any groups or meetings or classes or events specifically focused
on the following purposes or activities? Support for veterans and their families?” Of
1330 congregations analyzed, 967 churches said ‘no’ with a percentage ranking 72.7% of
the nation’s churches failing to respond to this pressing need. Of those interviewed,
27.3% or 363 institutions (of the 1300) offered support.63 For churches to meet their
neighbor in need, adequate theological and pastoral support is critical to implementation
of initiatives and facilitation of group support, for the ultimate resurrection of despairing
spirits. Given that 2.7 million Americans have been deployed since 2001,64 theologians
and ethicists must address the spiritual and moral needs even when the task seems
incalculable.
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As noted above, it is my intention in this dissertation to construct a revised and
deepened “limit model” of disability that can provide helpful pastoral resources and
theological nuance to the individual veteran in distress due to moral injury. Drawing
moral injury into the field of disability studies is not intended to “disable” the veteran, but
to better enable those persons who have experienced moral injury to articulate the limit
reached in the soldier’s psyche that surpasses bodily injury and societal neglect to better
determine the help they need and deserve. Even more so, drawing moral injury into the
field of disability helps to create a deeper conversation regarding the precise nature of
what moral injury is and its consequences for how we understand human agency and
subjectivity and to provide an appropriate response to assist the person in need. In
addition, considering moral injury in relation to broader reflection on human limitations
and finitude provides a foundation for recognizing how anthropological, theological, and
Christological convictions can inform our understanding of this complex moral
experience.
1.4

Methodology of the Study
Given the pressing needs surrounding veterans struggling with moral injury,

psychologists Brett Litz and Shira Maguen encourage a cross-disciplinary conversation
regarding moral injury in a journal article entitled “Moral Injury and Veterans of War” in
the PTSD Research Quarterly driven by their highly esteemed clinical and scholarly
work with veterans in Boston and San Francisco. Litz argues that more work is needed to
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address the “many unanswered questions that need further development”65 and to work
across disciplines to mobilize and capitalize on various disciplines to respond to the many
layers of human and societal need. Collaboration is needed “across disciplines that
integrate leaders from faith-based and spiritual communities, as well as other
communities from which individuals seek support.”66 In light of that challenge, this
dissertation intentionally engages literature in the fields of moral injury, theology and
disability studies. The methodology needed to accomplish this task is fourfold.
The first step is to create a working definition of moral injury by examining
scholarship from a range of disciplines (Psychology, Psychiatry, Disability Studies,
Theology) surrounding moral injury to determine a working definition of moral injury
and its presenting characteristics. While Litz and his team of scholars do not specify the
range of disciplines to be included, the paper clearly specifies the field of Theology as a
helpful resource.67 In addition, it should be noted Litz and his team consider crossdisciplinary work essential both for research as well as for long-term recovery.68 Crossdisciplinary work such as this both allows an illumination of new areas of understanding
across disciplines and also challenges each discipline to consider where its breadth of
scholarship has not yet touched on particular issues. This interdisciplinary conversation
can then acknowledge the shadows of neglect, name the strengths of particular accounts,
and discover structures that aid restoration. A keen eye will be focused to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of theological scholarship in moral injury.
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The second step in the working methodology of this paper is to draw alongside
the discourse on moral injury contemporary understandings of disability, particularly
from a theological perspective. Doing so will require a critical assessment of historical
reflection on disability in the field of theology, including the work of Augustine,
Aquinas, Calvin, Kierkegaard and Luther. Then, engagement with current models of
disability informed by scholars such as Eiesland, Yong, Reynolds, Haslam, Betcher and
Garland-Thomson will allow an assessment of critical themes and neglected areas. Much
work in the theology of disability has been particularly informed by liberation theologies
of disability.69 While a liberatory method is not the central thesis of this project, my
working methodology will rely on scholars like Jennie Weiss Block,70 Nancy Eiesland
and Sharon V. Betcher who have used this method to successfully nuance new
conceptions of disability when past perceptions have proved to be anything but liberating.
Of particular interest to this study is the current project of Deborah Creamer who
proposes a “limit model of disability” as an alternative to prevailing medical and social
(which she calls “minority”) models of disability.71 The key step in this methodological
move is to have a robust conversation between the fields of disability studies and moral
injury with the aim of more successfully naming and defining exactly what moral injury
is and, in particular, to understand its disabling effects on the injured veteran. Looking
keenly at Deborah Creamer’s model will help us to better analyze the way in which moral
69
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injury is partly constituted by a transgression of limits that occurs within a moral code.
Developing her analysis will prove to be a helpful step forward for drawing moral injury
into the realm of disability, but there will prove to be inherent inadequacies in her model
that will need to be addressed. While Creamer suggests limits are natural, intrinsic and
good,72 nuancing the depth of response and reaction to those limits will be an important
step for creating emotional and moral space for the wounded solider to then engage a
conversation regarding limits.73 Essential to understanding Creamer is to comprehend
her “limit model of disability” as more akin to a “contextual model of disability” where,
within those varying contexts different levels of agency and ability are experienced. As
the “limits” of those contexts are encountered, questions are raised regarding God, self
and other by the agent experiencing the disabling limits.
The third methodological step important to this project will be to resource, assess
and draw into conversation the biblical theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer who engages an
extensive conversation on limits in his work Creation and Fall. The historical and
critical retrieval of his work requires an eye to the nuances of the German language, the
context of the theological discussion at the time that necessitated his reflections, and the
dogmatic theological method central to his work that conceives Scripture as a key place
of divine revelation. In addition, Bonhoeffer’s conceptualization of limit gives rise to a
Christological account as well as a theological anthropology and divine theology.
Particular care will be taken to compare and contrast Creamer and Bonhoeffer in these
areas with attention paid to the Christological emphasis Bonhoeffer suggests creating a
72
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threefold schema for anthropology, theology and Christology in the face of limits. This
historical review is essential to understanding Bonhoeffer’s development of the human
person in the face of limits. These implications will then be drawn into conversation with
Creamer’s disability theology of limit and its implications for moral injury.
The final methodological step in this project will be to allow the conversation
across these three areas to construct a new model of disability, “the crucial limit model,”
that takes into account Bonhoeffer’s resources for deepening Creamer’s model. The new
model will inform possibilities for our understanding of moral injury, its psychological
and theological treatment, a theological assessment of the issues, and possibilities for
societal engagement of moral limits and their implications. At stake in this conversation
are the demands for practical and pastoral theology that the theological nuances will
construe. This four-fold methodology provides an overarching schema thereby allowing
critical reflection on moral injury and the very real limits veterans face in the midst of
particular moral contexts and their presenting crises. This cross-disciplinary conversation
will contribute to a deeper understanding of what moral injury is and how it must be both
respected and addressed within our society and among our churches. Jonathan Shay
reminds us moral injury affects character that in turn affects social trust. Societal care for
moral injury will attend to the injury, the injured character, and the injured social trust.
1.5

Overview of the Chapters
To accomplish the task outlined above, Chapter two will provide an overview of

the emergence of the field of moral injury engaging contemporary scholarship from the
fields of Psychology and Theology. Key to defining moral injury well is distinguishing
moral injury from PTSD, so lingering on the distinctions between the two will be a
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necessary step at this stage. Specific themes and concerns within the field of moral injury
will be analyzed with links hinted at here for their helpful dialogue with disability
particularly themes related to medicalization and socialization. Moral injury will be
presented here as a problem of “limits” within a moral world that have an anthropological
and theological dimension.
Chapter three will draw moral injury into conversation with the field of disability
studies by first overviewing historical Christian models of disability. Current models of
disability will then be assessed including the work of Nancy Eiesland, Amos Yong,
Molly Haslam and Sharon Betcher. Three possibilities exist for drawing moral injury and
disability into conversation together: defining moral injury as a disability, using the
framework of disability for moral injury, or drawing the two together through the
theological engagement of finitude. This chapter will conclude with an examination of
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s account of finitude for disability.
In chapter four, dominant models in the field of disability including the medical
and social models will be presented and analyzed alongside their implications for moral
injury. A third model of disability, the “limit model” proposed by Deborah Creamer, will
be addressed in more depth more thoroughly addressing the strengths and weaknesses of
her model.
The analysis and assessment of those models provides a starting point for chapter
five that explores Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Creation and Fall as a resource for building on,
adapting and expanding Creamer’s model to address particular limitations within her
construct. While Creamer begins with varying contexts and the disabling limits
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potentially experienced across those contexts and then raises questions about the
experience of those limits; Bonhoeffer does the reverse.

Bonhoeffer begins with a

theological analysis of “limit” based on his exegesis of the Biblical text of Genesis and
the questions those limits raise regarding a theological anthropology and agency, and
then he moves later in his theological work to describe the effect of those limits across
varying contexts and the potential for functioning in the midst of those limits. While this
reversal is important, to compare and contrast their work, an additional benefit
Bonhoeffer brings to the conversation is the notion of shame. He, thereby, creates a more
robust exploration of human emotion in the face of limit over and above the sense of
“goodness” Creamer’s model names. Bonhoeffer’s view of limit will be presented by
situating his view of limit within Protestant thought on limits as both a result of human
sin and human finitude. The unique contributions Bonhoeffer makes to these ongoing
conversations will be highlighted. While Creamer proposes implications of “limits” for
anthropology and theology, Bonhoeffer does as well but adds a Christological component
to limits. Here it will be made clear the precise claims Bonhoeffer makes regarding limits
as well as depicting become the foundation for his Christological formation regarding his
concept of the orders of preservation. Care will be taken to contextualize how these
orders of preservation build on his view of limits and how they were a response to a
robust theological and societal conversation in his time. Finally, attention will be given
to how Bonhoeffer’s later work on the mandates of creation builds on his limit model and
the orders of preservation to create structures across the varying contexts of church,
marriage, family, culture and government for an individual to thrive.
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Chapter six will offer a construction of this crucial limit model of disability.
Strengths and weaknesses of this revised model will be analyzed. Care will be taken in
this chapter to show the benefits of the limit model that transcend the medical and social
models, while at the same time, understanding keenly the ongoing issues that will need to
be refined within the limit model to better name, evaluate and support moral injury.
Chapter seven will engage an application of the crucial limit model of disability
through Jon Paul Lederach’s conception of the moral imagination. Using the contexts of
a county Veterans’ court and Brian Doerries’ “theatre of war” project, we will explore the
possibility of engaging the crucial limit with moral imagination for individual soldiers
and societal institutions. We will conclude with an assessment of future work to be done
in the areas of theology, moral injury and disability, as well as in further cross-discipline
conversations as encouraged by Brett Litz, to build on the crucial limit model of
disability.
The Veterans’ Creed begins: I am [former rank] [first and last name], A veteran
of the United States [branch of service], As one of my nation’s fittest and finest, I
answered my nation’s call to duty.74 The aim of this dissertation, in drawing moral injury
into conversation with the field of disability and theology, is not intended to ‘dis-able’ or
stigmatize any soldier or veteran. Instead, the hope is to enable soldiers and societies
alike to have a deeper conversation about human limits before God in a broken and
complex world with the hope of preserving our “fittest and finest” and allowing the
potential for human flourishing to unfold even after great trauma and suffering have been
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endured. This work is essential, as one young veteran of two wars, now a senior at
Georgetown University, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, explains: “It is our job, as a country, to
understand what broken means.”75
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Chapter 2
Moral Injury: Psychological and Theological Perspectives
I mastered the weapons of war and became expert in defense and security
– and I make no apology for my skills.
I am a warrior and have seen and done things that many may not understand.
I have proudly served my country with honor and dignity.
I am one in fifteen – a seven-percenter – a member of a team spanning the nation –
veteran brothers and sisters, bonded by our common values and experiences.
-The Veterans’ Creed76
2.1

Emergence of the Field of Moral Injury
Shell shock. War neurosis.77 Soldier’s Heart. Insanity. Nostalgia. Irritable

Syndrome. Battle Fatigue.

Combat Stress Reaction. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.

Combat Veteranitis.78 Psychiatrists, journalists, pastors and family members have
strained to name symptoms presented upon return home from war. All attempts to
diagnose and treat the range of behaviors resulting from the pressures and crises
encountered in the arena of war fail to encapsulate the damage inflicted on body, mind
and spirit. Historian Ben Shephard documents the struggle to name and define varying
neuroses in his 2003 account A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the
Twentieth Century.79 Drawing upon accounts recorded in diaries, official records,
doctor’s reports, journals, medical papers, conversations with soldiers, and newspaper
articles, Shephard explores the relationship between professional psychiatrists and
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soldiers since World War I through the Gulf War culminating in his assessment that
treatment beyond current ‘medical’ options are needed that would more systemically
address the trauma endured by the individual soldier.80 His account acknowledges the
difficult relationship between the landscapes of deployment and home; mortal combat
and morale,81 coping mechanisms and presenting symptoms;82 readiness for war and
recovery in its aftermath; repression of grief and its expression,83 perception of well being
and the daily struggle to cope.84 Shephard states his goal clearly: “There is a compelling
reason to take a much wider look at what has happened in the past: we are making a mess
of this problem today and need to learn the lesson that, in treating the aftermath of war,
good intentions are not enough.”85 Even in Shephard’s robust account of the history of
“shell-shock”86 and critical account of societal response87, Shephard’s twenty-first
century publication fails to name “moral injury” as a presenting category of symptoms.
While these studies recognize a depth and complexity of veterans following a
war, “moral injury” is a complex and relatively new term that describes a particular set of
symptoms. We will see how scholars and psychologists strive to define the contours of
the presenting indicators as well as to define the boundaries within which Moral Injury
can best be described. Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, Psychologists Brett Litz, William
Nash, Everett L. Worthington and Diane Langberg and theologians Rita Nakashima
Brock, Gabriella Lettini, Warren Kinghorn, Robert Meagher and Brian S. Powers agree
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regarding many of the major dimensions of moral injury but will offer subtleties
concerning the nuances of moral agency, critical repercussions and healing response.
Their differences are not cause for concern, but an invitation to think specifically
regarding the interplay of agent, event, moral code and aftermath of the presenting injury.
For the purpose of understanding notable developments in the history of identifying
moral injury, it will be helpful here to note briefly key figures and dates before they are
discussed more fully later in the chapter. Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay developed essential
themes for the conceptualization of ‘moral injury’ during his twenty-year tenure in
Boston working for the Veterans Improvement Program (VIP) as a psychiatrist for the
US Department of Veterans Affairs.88 To be clear, however, Shay did not ‘name’ moral
injury; he provided the themes but not the terminology. In 1991, Shay discussed “the
betrayal of what is right” as a component of PTSD in an article entitled “Learning about
Combat Stress from Homer’s Illiad” in The Journal of Traumatic Stress. This article
described a decade’s worth of work at the Boston Clinic with veterans from Vietnam.
Three years later, Shay developed this article to a full book: Achilles in Vietnam. When
these were written, Shay understood a moral component (“the betrayal of what was
right”) to what was then diagnosed as PTSD:
Vietnam Veterans with severe PTSD often report the following combat
experiences: a leader's betrayal of "what's right," blunted responsiveness to any
emotional, social, or ethical claims outside a tiny circle of combat-proven
comrades, grief and guilt for death(s) in this circle, lust for revenge, renunciation
of ever returning home, seeing one's self as already dead, berserking,
dishonoring the enemy, and loss of humanity.89
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While Shay did not coin the term immediately in his either the 1991 article in The
Journal for Traumatic Stress nor the 1994 book Achilles in Vietnam, scholars credit his
clinical and academic work as introducing the moral component to symptoms initially
described as PTSD and then later named by other scholars as Moral Injury. For Shay,
moral injury is something that happens ‘passively’ to a soldier while a person in authority
over them commits an act that is a ‘betrayal of what is right.’90 Shay sees this kind of
injury, resultant of a failed moral relationship between a leader and his troops. Shay sees
these themes developed in both of the ancient texts the Illiad and the Odyssey and uses
them to discuss contemporary wartime issues.91
After Shay, it is psychologist Brett Litz and his team of scholars including Nathan
Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva and Shira
Maguen, who are credited with the terminology of ‘moral injury.’92 Their 2009 paper
90
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entitled, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and
Intervention Strategy” in the Clinical Psychology Review

93

is viewed as an influential

early study on moral injury that served to broadly introduce the terminology and invite
further research across disciplines.

In their view, moral injury results from the

perpetration of a morally injurious event by the individual himself, rather than
victimization as a bystander to a person in higher authority.94
Their article, seen as a seminal moment in the field, accomplishes two things.
First, the scholars name “morality” as a component to mental health and the risks of war
that had heretofore overall gone unnoticed in the studies of mental health, veterans and
presenting psychosocial symptoms; a noticeable absence of attention.95

Second, their

clinical assessment both assimilates and academically presents the beginning threads of
scholarship and clinical work noticing the presence of morality as a potential place of
injury. For example, they drew on a paper entitled “When They Come Home:
Posttraumatic Stress, Moral Injury, and Spiritual Consequences” by Health Science
Specialist Kent D. Drescher and professor of Psychology David Foy published in 2008 in
Reflective Practice: Formation and Supervision in Ministry identifies ‘moral injury’ as an
one who is morally injured and the need for society to grieve those wounds? If the phenomenon of ‘Moral’
Injury is greater than a soldier’s morality, does the language of “morality” do justice to the depth of
complexity involving social complacency, stressed morality and theological struggle? The language of
injury carries with it the potential for a balm, a medication, a technological aid, or a bandage that can
contain the trauma and aim toward healing; what happens when that is not possible? The language of
morality carries with it the potential for a return to the center, a moral code; what happens when that is not
possible? The inadequacy of the language, attested to in Ken Drescher’s study, is a modest indication of
the inadequacy of our ability to understand the depth, despair, shame and inability to function that a
morally injured veteran experiences and that can only be spoken of with language that is theological.
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entity of its own other than PTSD that can have profound physical and social
consequences.

Just after the release of Litz’s introduction of moral injury as a

preliminary model, Theologian Rita Nakashima Brock convened a “Truth Commission
on Conscience in War”96 at the Riverside Church in New York City in the Spring of 2010
to address her assessment of the pressing societal need for truth in wartime across varying
parties and to preserve moral conscience within the military.
Each of their attempts could well fit within the American Academy of Religion’s
2016 Call for Papers to address and explore what has become a new and pressing need:
“Moral Injury is an emerging concept which attempts to engage the impact of making
difficult moral choices under extreme conditions, experiencing morally anguishing events
or duties, witnessing immoral acts, or behaving in ways that profoundly challenge moral
conscience and identity and the values that support them.”97 Given this sweeping
definition, several questions readily emerge. How does societal complacency affect
soldiers and their moral worlds? What is the role of religious institutions in critiquing the
systems of war while supporting soldiers in their humanity? Do we as a society err too
easily in responding with militarization rather than seeking alternative routes for
addressing conflicts?

What support systems are in place for combatants who have

returned to society? What structures of support are effective for upholding soldiers and
their families in the long journey home to normalcy? While the intricacies of these
questions and their answers are beyond the full sweep of this dissertation, we can see in
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the claiming of these questions the intricacies of both morality and injury. How is
morality shaped prior to war, during war, and upon return home from war when a
complacent society questions the morality of a soldier faced with situations beyond their
comprehension? What dynamics are at play in creating particular injuries: societal
complacency, church teaching, the crisis of war, the judgment of outsiders? With the
hope of highlighting the exponential intricacies, scholars at the American Academy of
Religion explain further, “Moral Injury is a wound of moral subjectivity within a social
context.”98 As difficult as it is to describe the “what” and the “how” of Moral Injury, the
pressing concern is the “who,” the moral subject. Psychiatrist Brett Litz explains, “An
individual with Moral Injury may begin to view him or herself as immoral, irredeemable,
and un-reparable.” 99 Litz recognized the shame within deeply affected the world beyond.
The emergence of moral injury as a field of study with clinical significance and
cross-disciplinary implications invites further exploration.

To accomplish this it is

necessary to examine the scholarship of moral injury in both the fields of Psychology and
Theology to comprehend how clinicians and theologians understand and respond to
moral injury.

Once that framework is presented, themes from both fields will be

extracted in order to explore physiological, sociological and theological concerns and
their implications for scholarship and response. A closer consideration of these themes, in
turn, allows us to see what is missing in the scholarship, what is needed in the field, and
what actions might forward societal response to our wounded veterans. This chapter thus
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underscores the need for the present study that aims to bring moral injury into
conversation with disability, through the scholarship of Deborah Creamer and the
scholarship of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in order to develop a ‘revised limit model of
disability’ for moral injury.

2.2

Scholarship: Psychiatry and Psychology on Moral Injury
Prior to his introduction of the thematic issues of moral injury (Shay) and the

formal introduction of the terminology by Litz and his team of scholars in 2009, scholars
such as Psychiatrist Matthew J. Friedman recognized and sought to respond to “PostVietnam Syndrome”100 as a distinctive form of PTSD. His work may be viewed as an
early form and foundation of contemporary conceptions of moral injury. In his work on
PTSD (prior to the formation of moral injury), Friedman advocated an assessment of the
psychiatric expense of war, praising efforts such as the National Vietnam Veteran’s
Readjustment Study completed and published in 1988 for its “rigorous evaluation.”101
Friedman is well aware of the difficulty that statistics, stigmatization and zooming in on
specific moments of time pose for studies such as these. First, statistics struggle to
measure the difference and the effects of current presentations, historic episodes, and/or
lifetime manifestations102 of a psychiatric illness like PTSD. Second, veterans struggle
beneath the stigmatizing consequences of self-profession of a psychiatric illness
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considering the “Scarlet P” effect of a diagnosis.103 Friedman determines the more likely
a person is to have a mental health diagnosis, the more likely that person is to have a
distorted view of the possibility of stigmatization.104 Soldiers perceive they will be
viewed as “a failure, a weakness, and as evidence of an innate deficiency of the right
stuff.”105 Third, statistics fail to take into account in a significant way the variables of
“emotional sustenance,”106 variances in structures of social support for each soldier, and
stressors that can be either circumstantial or complex and long-standing.107 In keeping
with Friedman’s advocacy for reduced stigmatization, this dissertation will argue that
reduced stigmatization is a central goal for scholars in the field of disability studies and a
constructive resource for returning veterans.
Friedman’s work precedes overt discussion of moral injury; however, his pursuit
is prelude to the discussion that follows. The notion of moral injury emerges from
Jonathan Shay’s work at that Boston Clinic over two decades with veterans and his
scholarly engagement with the ancient texts of The Iliad and The Odyssey to explore the
questions and themes that arose during critical work with his clients. In this section, we
will overview the work of Shay, as well as, Kent Drescher, Brett Litz, William Nash,
Everett Worthington and Diane Langberg to understand their definitions of moral injury,
the context of their study, nuances and themes in their scholarship, and their suggestions
for healing and repair once moral injury is recognized.
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The definition of Moral Injury offered by the scholars carried the intent to
“stimulate a dialogue”108 and so it did. They defined moral injury as “Perpetrating,
failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held
moral beliefs and expectations.”109

The dialogue that definition initiated was a

conversation with Jonathan Shay who necessitated a “person in authority”110 as the one
who violated the moral code while an innocent soldier stood by his side. Litz and his
team preferred a broader, and some would argue a less “political” definition of moral
injury. Litz credits the early work of Psychiatrist M.J. Friedman for describing a “postVietnam syndrome”111 characterized by moral conflict and guilt to begin the
categorization of moral injury. The clinical prevalence of moral injury today can be
attributed to the complex interplay between: lengthy wars requiring long and multiple
deployments, the unconventional tactics utilized on both sides, the ambiguity of the
enemy, the incapacitation of prudent actions and moral judgment amid unusual wartime
strategies, all perhaps exacerbated by ongoing familial and situational stress on the life of
the soldier.112 Litz and his team of researchers continue to advocate for DSM, APA and
even the Pentagon’s recognition of moral injury because of the “longstanding pyschobio-social impairment”113 on the soldier and reverberating effects on their family systems
and workplaces. The subsequent moral injury when either an act of commission or an act
108
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of omission transpires in a highly charged scene results then in an “inability to
contextualize”114 the occurrence within existing moral frameworks. In this particular
study, Litz et al. have focused on “acts of commission”115 highlighting the performance
of atrocities and killing, rather than attending to instances of omission wherein the soldier
bears witness to either the morally inept actions of others or perpetrations of cruelty and
human suffering that they are unable to respond to in the instance. This is important to
note, in light of Shay’s definition of moral injury, as necessitating a moral authority
outside one’s self who fails. Rather than emphasizing Shay’s definition, Litz and his
team are less interested with the impact of authority and focus more on the actions of a
soldier and the possibility a soldier might become morally injured by the actions of his or
her peers. For Shay, authority matters. For Litz, personal agency is key.
2.2.1
2.2.1.1

Review of Key Authors
Jonathan Shay
Since his 1994 publication of Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the

Undoing of Character, psychologist Jonathan Shay continues to be a key voice in the
field of Moral Injury. Shay utilizes the Homeric epic The Illiad to illumine issues related
to combat trauma, rage and the berserk state by reexamining the ancient narrative in light
of Vietnam.116 While ‘moral injury’ as such is yet unnamed in Shay’s work at this stage
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in 1994, his insights begin to reveal a distinction between moral injury and PTSD.
Twenty years later in an article entitled simply “Moral Injury,” Shay made clear the
distinction that he knew by instinct in Achilles but had not fully articulated.
Jonathan Shay defines moral injury as: “a betrayal of what is right by a person in
authority in a high stakes situation.”117 Shay’s definition of moral injury requires a
person in authority to fail morally, deeply affecting the moral worldview of the soldier
underneath the moral agent’s leadership; this then is not simply a failure in one’s own
moral code. For Shay, moral injury is constituted by three key elements: the betrayal of
“what is right”, the failure in morality of a respected authority, and the existence of a high
stakes situation.118 This triptych depicts three scenes: first, the landscape of a moral code;
second, a person in authority who fails morally; third, the greater context of a high stakes
environment. The presence of each of these components in that triptych is vital and
necessary to Shay’s definition and each, together, contributes to the overriding despair,
potential for suicide and possibility of interpersonal violence that occurs within moral
injury and can be even more damaging than repercussions of PTSD.119 The difference
between PTSD and moral injury in Shay’s definition can be distinguished by the presence
of those three components in that painting (moral code, moral authority, morally complex
high stakes situation). It is interesting to note one nuance Shay hints at regarding the
failure of moral authority. In his work with the Homeric texts, Shay sees elements of
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leadership in the Homeric military that United States military culture would ascribe to the
greater fiduciary of the state rather than an individual leader.120
Shay’s wisdom and experience in this area is extensive. He worked as the sole
psychiatrist at a Boston VA Clinic for over twenty years. After his work with Achilles in
Vietnam, the MacArthur Genius Foundation awarded him a grant for his ongoing
initiatives and success. Even more so, Shay continues to advocate for policy changes,
better practices and shifts in institutional culture to better address the weaknesses he sees
in the field of moral injury regarding the need of military leadership to be “expert, ethical
and properly supported.”121 Ultimately, Shay’s voice and perspective remain optimistic
regarding the potential for recovery in those who have been morally injured. A triad of
steps are suggested by Shay for ongoing clinical work to make progress with both
soldiers and the greater society: recognize the need, empower the victim and create
supportive

clinical

teams

adept

at

handling

the

potential

transference

and

countertransference that can occur within a therapy setting.122 As a physician, Shay’s
concern is for the clinical diagnosis, care, treatment and recovery of the wounded soldier;
however, it should be noted that religious care both through theological reflection and/or
liturgical practices are not suggested by Shay as elements essential to recovery.

2.2.1.2

Kent D. Drescher and David W. Foy
Psychologists Drescher and Foy published one of the first non-clinical studies on

the topic of moral injury in 2008. They define moral injury as:
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Disruption in an individual’s confidence and expectations about their own or
others’ motivation or capacity to behave in a just and ethical manner brought
about by bearing witness to perceived immoral acts, failure to stop such actions,
or perpetration of immoral acts, in particular actions that are inhumane, cruel,
depraved, or violent, bringing about pain and suffering of others or their
death.123
The loss that occurs for a veteran with moral injury, according to Drescher and Foy, is a
“disruption in moral directedness and moral expectancies.”124 These inward
repercussions move from “a stressor” to “a disorder” when there becomes a noticeable
change in life’s functioning and flourishing for the individual soldier, manifesting in
significant outward consequences.125

Drescher and Foy understand both the physical

and emotional stressors of war. In addition, they elaborate on the traumatic stressors that
may occur through natural, unintentional or intentional means. In their clinical practice
they have seen the noticeable effects of PTSD: re-experiencing past traumatic events, the
presence of avoidance techniques to prevent that re-experience and the tendency toward
hyper-arousal.126 However, they note seven characteristics in veterans beyond those three
characteristics of PTSD that indicate a need to describe Veterans’ clinical experience in
terms of Moral Injury rather than PTSD. These include: differences in ethical standards
that previously existed, effects on spirituality and views of God, shame and its aftermath
of alienating behaviors, pervasive unhappiness and unease, reduced levels of trust in
individuals and institutions, behaviors that escalate, and poor care for one’s self with the
potential to harm.127 In the face of trauma, soldiers with PTSD and moral injury often
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manifest “negative religious coping”128 even though there are a few veterans who
occasionally seek spiritual means for growth, recovery and meaning making after war.129
In order to equip clergy, military chaplains and clinicians with resources for this
newly attributed category of moral injury, Drescher and Foy draw on standards of
response130 utilized by relief workers in the aftermath of disasters to help those tasked
with responding to veterans who might have moral injury.

These skills include:

providing resources to reduce ‘arousal’ from possible stressors, increasing circles of
support and decreasing isolating tendencies, encouraging enjoyment in pleasurable
activities that are healthy, addressing and re-directing beliefs that have become warped
by trauma and its aftermath, working to rebuild the “moral compass”131 of the veteran,
and finally, reducing the severity of re-experiencing symptoms by teaching cognitive and
behavioral coping strategies.132 Shay, in contrast, offers less of a systematic response and
more of an existential one questioning if recovery is even possible.133 The best treatment,
according to Shay, is one that begins with the soldiers’ own self care with the first step of
establishing “safety, sobriety and self-care.”134 The steps that follow are not a cathartic
release of all held within, but instead, the slow construction of a personal narrative.135
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The personal narrative aims to rebuild the ruins of character and the shattered136
fragmentation of consciousness.137 The personal narrative must, in order to heal, find a
trusting community of listeners138 who listen, refrain from judgment, and respond with
emotion.139 And who then bear witness on behalf of the soldiers as they continue to
“hear, believe and retell”140 so that the soldier’s personal narrative shapes the beginning
of a sociopolitical movement.141 That sociopolitical movement challenges an adult’s
everyday sense of safety. “What is right”142 is questioned by the listening audience. The
language Shay relies on here draws from Homer’s use of themis as the normal
expectation of what is societally right and Nussbaum’s use of “the fragility of goodness”
to describe the “cloak of safety”143 adults take for granted in daily functioning.144 The
sociopolitical effect of the soldier’s narrative is to remove that cloak of safety inviting
discomfort and a greater “communalization of the trauma.”145 The difference between
Shay and the work of Drescher and Foy is the divide between the veterans’ personal work
and the practice of the psychotherapist. Shay places a mantle upon the shoulders of
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veterans to secure their own safety and self-care, while Drescher and Foy see that as the
primary work of the therapist.
Drescher and Foy pave the way for what will become the substantive clinical
study published in 2009 by Brett Litz and his team of scholars. Drescher and Foy are
helpful in deepening the connection, that Shay begins, between the fields of moral injury
and trauma studies, providing early distinctions between PTSD and moral injury, noticing
dynamics at play in the provision of spiritual care for soldiers disenfranchised with
classical conceptualizations of God, and considering the potential of “memory” as a
possibly redemptive source for healing.146 Drescher and Foy conclude their paper with
the provocative naming of memory as a potential source for healing by drawing on the
work of theologian Miroslav Volf. By way of his work,147 they consider the potential of
memory to be either destructive causing further damage or constructive and aiding
redemption.148 Their connection to memory poses an interesting question regarding what
bodily functions moral injury most disables. Is moral injury a psychiatric injury? An
injury to the core of morality, and if so, where does morality reside – in body, mind or
spirit? Or is moral injury a wound to the memory? Determining the location and
manifestation of this wound will be key to diagnosing and treating moral injury, as well
as to understanding its ‘disabling’ effects.

146

Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 100.
See for example: Miroslav Volf, “Love’s Memory: Redemptive Remembering,” in 2002 Princeton
Lecture on Youth, Church and Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2002). Volf argues
for a construct of “redemptive” rather than destructive remembering. For Volf, memory is linked to
conflict and reconciliation and can lead either to obstacles and bitterness or to justice and hope. A
redemptive memory is linked the biblical narratives of Exodus and the cross, both of which are shaped by
restorative memories.
148
Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 100.
147

45

2.2.1.3

Brett T. Litz
Professor of Clinical Psychology at Boston University and clinician for the

Veteran’s Affairs Healthcare System in Boston, Brett Litz continues to be both prolific
and on the prophetic edge of research and response to Moral Injury. With over 300
publications in academic journals and three books in the field, Litz was on the cutting
edge of recognizing and defining moral injury and remains influential in shaping
response to the crisis within military culture today. He has worked with many key
scholars and clinicians in the field including Kent D. Drescher, David Foy, and William
P. Nash. In 2009, he chaired the team of scholars that published an early article on Moral
Injury entitled, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and
intervention strategy” in The Clinical Psychology Review. Most recently, in 2015, Litz
published a book length strategic practicum for clinical response to soldiers returning
from war entitled Adaptive Disclosure: A New Treatment for Military Trauma, Loss and
Moral Injury along with scholars Leslie Lebowitz, Matt J. Gray and William P. Nash
where moral injury is one of a triad of crises that must be addressed upon a soldier’s
return home including: the governing fear of life-threatening events, the grief and loss of
other’s lives lost, and the guilt and shame of moral injury.149
The operational definition, for Litz and his colleagues is that “morals” are “the
personal and shared familial, cultural, societal, and legal rules for social behavior, either
tacit or explicit…fundamental assumptions about how things should work and how one

149
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should behave in the world.”150 Difficult emotions such as guilt or regret, shame or
embarrassment, even cynicism and despair, are markers. While moral injury creates an
“inability to contextualize;” the injury does not shield the veteran from conflicting moral
emotions. These moral emotions invite the individual to probe their moral code.151 Guilt
and shame are the operative emotions within moral injury; however, Litz argues here that
shame is the more devastating consequence of moral injury. Guilt often prompts “the
making of amends”152 and carries less risk for behaviors that are anti-social. Shame, on
the other hand, has the tendency to draw the individual into an inward spiral fueled by
“global evaluations of the self”153 as well as causing increased isolation due to “toxic
interpersonal difficulties.”154
The moral emotions of guilt155 and shame are an area, according to Litz, that
could use further research. He notes the attention of psychologists to the most lifethreatening of injuries,156 rather than to lingering emotions such as guilt and shame.
Litz’s account of guilt and shame is better understood through considering the way in
which it coincides and differs from Paul Ricœur’s work on these emotions. For example,
in The Symbolism of Evil Ricœur aims to understand “moral evil” by suggesting a
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threefold pattern of experience: defilement, sin and guilt.157 Defilement, for Ricœur, is a
pre-ethical stance where one feels defiled, dirty and discouraged by the crossing of a
certain taboo. That taboo is beyond rationality and requires a ritualized act to purify the
symbolic stain gained in its transgression.158 The experience of defilement creates a
palpable terror within the recipient that does not differentiate between the ethical (moral
code transgressed) and the physical (changed bodies due to natural causes.)159 Standing
between defilement (an external category for Ricœur) and guilt (an internal one), is the
category of sin that places a human being before God160 with both an external and an
internal trajectory. Sin bears a twofold repercussion: first, sin severs and disconnects an
agent from something of importance.

Ricœur calls this the “negativity” of sin.161

Second, sin carries a “positive” repercussion when it serves to remind the agent of
something of consequence that is still there.162 Finally, there is guilt. Ricœur tends to
place the actual moral transgression within the category of sin; while guilt is the inward
subjective experience of that transgression. 163 Guilt can lead to a sense of scrupulousness
that is institutionally paralyzing, personally isolating, and ultimately a stumbling
block.164. For Ricœur, guilt leads toward a binding paradox when one recognizes, like
the Apostle Paul, the inability to stop sinning while also becoming aware of one’s
culpability. This leaves the agent at an impasse.165 For Litz, guilt is less of an “impasse”
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and much more of a “motivating”166 emotion that doesn’t paralyze but instead offers a
passageway to something new. The experience of guilt, for Litz, motivates a person to
make amends, engage in less risky behavior, and to review and assess specific past acts.
For Litz, guilt is a “motivating” emotion and shame, in contrast, causes paralysis,
withdrawal, self-harm and avoidance.167 The notion that guilt can function positively is
thus intriguing, and an advantage of Litz’s conceptualization rather than Ricœur’s.
The intervention strategy offered in response to this preliminary model of moral
injury, with its focus on shame, is an eight-step process. Given Litz’s recognition that
guilt motivates, while shame stagnates, one can appreciate his attempt to motivate the
veteran experiencing shame to do the following steps including: connection (strong
therapeutic relationship),168 preparation of the patient for difficult therapeutic content,169
consideration of exposure time recognizing the pain of addressing harmful
experiences,170 “examination and integration”171 of key events in a veteran’s narrative,
conversation with a “benevolent moral authority,”172 “reparation and forgiveness,”173
reconnection with individuals and institutions,174 and finally, vision for the road ahead.175
In this eightfold schema, Litz explores the possibility of a spiritual path once therapy has
ended that might open up a transcendent dimension to a veteran’s life experience. For
Litz, spirituality is “an individual’s understanding of, experience with, and connection to
166
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that which transcends the self.”176 Transcendence, then, is “not being defined by the
[morally injurious] experience, and correcting the wounds by not succumbing or being
that construction of the self through subsequent mindful and purposeful existence moving
forward.”177 The success of intervention depends on the possibility of a veteran’s ability
to navigate the difficult moral emotions of a morally injurious experience and integrate
them into a new construct of self who is able to “contextualize, justify and accommodate
acts”178 within a redefined moral framework.
Litz clearly outlines basic concepts, assumptions, treatment and pressing needs in
the field. Concepts at play in this discussion are themes of morality, moral behavior in
times of distress, the emotions of guilt and shame, and the complicated relationship
between self-condemnation and self-forgiveness.179 Shame and its aftermath appear in
this study to have a more damaging and longer-lasting effect then guilt alone and its
precisely this difficult to diagnose and treat emotion that invites the salutogenic treatment
Litz aspires to in his work.

Medical sociologist Aaron Antonovsky advocated

salutogenesis as a course of treatment committed to understanding the dynamics that
contribute to the rebuilding of health rather than focusing research solely on the root
causes of a disease. Treatment, for Litz, will then build on that health to foster “equally
intense real-time encounters with a countervailing experience.”180

Reaching that

experiential encounter will only be possible through an eight-fold treatment plan: foster
connection, prepare and educate, determine a modified exposure component to the
176
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treatment, examine and integrate, encourage dialogue with a benevolent moral authority,
seek restoration and forgiveness, foster reconnection, and plan adequately for the long
term commitment to health and restoration.181 Assumed within this treatment plan is that
moral injury acknowledges an “intact moral code”182 that has been transgressed through
an experience of profound dissonance.

To proceed, Litz et al. advocate for the

development of a psychosometric scale to better assess and diagnose moral injury, an
epidemiological and salutogenic response, and most importantly, additional controlled
trials to intervene on behalf of soldiers struggling with moral injury to be studied and
assessed so further research can be shared.183
Having presented the need for a psychometric scale that can be used clinically for
the diagnosis and response to Moral Injury, Litz joins a team of scholars led by William
P. Nash who create a Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) that allows psychometric
evaluation. The scale developed by the scholars is intricately linked to the definition of
Moral Injury initially presented by Litz: “Perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness
to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.”184
Eleven questions are ranked on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree) with
nine of the questions probing violations of belief systems and two of the questions
exploring perceptions of trust.185 Questions include such moral inquiry by asking “I saw
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things that were morally wrong” and “I violated my own morals by failing to do
something I should have done.”186 It is interesting to note that while Litz’s definition of
Moral Injury does not necessitate the injury being caused by a person in authority, as
Shay does, this study still includes these kinds of questions in the psychometric scale by
prompting response to these kinds of questions: “I feel betrayed by leaders who I once
trusted”, “I feel betrayed by fellow service members who I once trusted”, “I feel betrayed
by others outside the U.S. military who I once trusted” and “I trust my leaders and fellow
service members to always live up to their core values.”187 Even though scholars
presented the MIES index as a preliminary possibility, early results proved valuable and
worthy of note. For example, soldiers with a higher MIES score also had concomitant
higher scores on anxiety and depression scaled while also scoring lower on scales that
measure social support and positive affect.188
Litz’s work culminates in a recent book length publication entitled Adaptive
Disclosure: A New Treatment for Military Trauma, Loss and Moral Injury published in
2015 that addresses a triad of concerns for returning soldiers: trauma, grief and morality.
Litz suggests the military culture does a solid job in responding to “life threatening
experiences” that can evoke trauma and fear, but needs to do a significantly better job in
addressing grief and moral injury.189 Key elements of a bettered response would include
attention to brevity (acknowledging the real time constraints of soldiers and their
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families)190, complexity (acknowledging the depth and number of elements involved)191,
the phenomenology of trauma in wartime192, the problematic language of injury (veterans
shy away from medicalizing language like “treatment”193 and finally, the capacity to
contextualize, integrate and “adapt” traumatic wartime experience into one’s life
narrative.194 One can see in Litz’s approach in 2015 retains components of the
intervention strategy proposed in 2009, but offers them in a streamlined fashion with the
eight-steps condensed into a more workable timeline based on a soldier’s commitments
and realistic possibilities for clinical treatment. Litz’s expertise in military trauma, early
intervention and mental health across the lifespan of a veteran clearly add to the depth
and extent of scholarship in Moral Injury.
2.2.1.4

Worthington and Langberg
Professor of Psychology Everett L. Worthington and Diane Langberg, a private

clinician, provide an assessment of self-condemnation as a presenting factor in moral
injury and its concomitant cry for self-forgiveness in their 2012 article “Religious
Considerations and Self-Forgiveness in Treating Complex Trauma and Moral Injury in
Present and Former Soldiers” published in The Journal of Psychology and Theology. We
see here in their work a desire to attend seriously to a framework of spirituality from a
Psychological perspective with a focus on self-forgiveness. Their definition of forgiving
the self as “a coping strategy for stresses arising from self-condemnation”195 implicitly
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begs the theologian to join the conversation with psychologists to create a more robust
space in which theologies of forgiveness, reconciliation and atonement might engage the
conversation within Moral Injury.196 Self-condemnation arises in a failure to meet one’s
own expectations for morality in a given situation and as a stress emerging from a
perceived wrongdoing.197 The authors outline a helpful description of what does not
constitute self-forgiveness in the face of moral injury:
It is easier to tell what self-forgiveness is not than what it is. It is not letting
oneself off the hook irresponsibly, accepting oneself and moving on with life,
finding someone to blame such as one’s parents, spouse, commanding officer,
the President, Osama bin Laden, God, or life.198
To counterbalance the definition constituted in absentia, the authors then suggest two
kinds of self-forgiveness: decisional self-forgiveness and emotional self-forgiveness. The
definitions of these are worth lingering on in full:

“Decisional self-forgiveness is making a decision to act toward yourself without
malice, self-blame, and self-condemnation and to treat oneself as having at least
equal worth as do others. Emotional self-forgiveness is the emotional
replacement of unforgiving emotions toward the self with positive emotions
toward the self like self-empathy, self-sympathy, self-compassion, and selflove.199
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Forthcoming are two works from Worthington that will develop a theology for selfforgiveness that will address the simultaneous injuries of God, others and self by
describing the merciful moral repair that occurs by God’s grace and initiative working in
conjunction with the sacrificial love of Christ, whereby creating social repair between
societal neighbors and psychological repair for one’s self.200
Together the scholars suggest a six-step plan to facilitate self-forgiveness201 by
doing the following steps: “receive God’s forgiveness, repair relationships,202 rethink
ruminations, REACH emotional self-forgiveness, rebuild self-acceptance and resolve to
live virtuously.”203 Within this schema, “REACH” stands for: “Recall the hurt without
blame, Emotional replacement, Commit publicly to the forgiveness experience, Hold on
to forgiveness when doubts arise.”204 Both of these schematics occur with keen attention
to the present reality – that is “deal with oneself” – by “dealing with one’s past” and
“dealing with one’s future.”205 As simple as this may sound to ‘orient’ one’s self within
the past, present and future, those who have worked with moral injury make clear that a
feature of its impairment is the rupturing of time and history.206 A true sense of
disorientation happens by the severing of the individual from a future that might induce
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hope because of a past that keeps presenting and re-presenting itself creating a
recapitulation of the past traumatic moral event.
Repairing a “right relationship to God”207 is essential to the moral repair they
envision in attending to a condemned self. One must wonder though, if a conversation
with Protestant theology might aid their work. In suggesting “the person must make a
commitment to live as virtuously as possible so that a repetition of the failure does not
occur;”208 their suggestion could be perceived at first glance as an invitation to works
righteousness, rather than a theology of grace.

We will see in our exploration of

Bonhoeffer in chapter five an invitation to the responsible action of a moral agent. That
responsibility is held within the framework of two key elements: first, reality is complex
and living responsibility is always bound with complications, and second, the cost of
discipleship in response to God’s grace is living virtuously and faithfully in return.
Worthington and Langberg could deepen their theological reflection with conversations
in Catholic and Protestant theology to provide complexity to the positive psychology they
espouse. For example, they write, “In positive psychology, the commitment to virtue for
self and others is called eudaimonia…. Expression of those virtues is encouraged to build
positive families, workplaces and communities.”209 Bonhoeffer will offer a model for
living, different than the virtues, which will build on Catholic models of natural law and
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Protestant models of grace and the divine command as he focuses on the orders of
preservation and the mandates of creation.210
Worthington and Langberg are to be heralded for their work that begins to bridge
the fields of Psychology and Theology and deepens the conversation regarding selfcondemnation, trauma, and self-forgiveness. Though a singular publication, this article is
worthy of note here, for the conversation it invites. Worthington is considered a leading
researcher, not in the area of Veteran’s affairs, but in the psychology of forgiveness.211
The REACH model he and Langberg propose has proved helpful for other victims of
trauma including addiction and abuse; its proposal here is for helpful impact on soldiers
who have experienced warzone trauma. Because Moral Injury is nascent with less than a
decade of serious scholarship, this article serves to extend the conversation even though
its scope is limited.

2.2.2

Critical Analysis of Psychological Discourse
As we see the progression of Moral Injury from a presenting category of

symptoms differentiated from PTSD to a substantive diagnosis, three strands of inquiry
demand further analysis. These include questions related to morality, injury and
210
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disability. The review of the Psychological literature reveals a need to attend more
deeply to the concept of morality, to avoid taking the word “injury” for granted but offer
instead a foundation for the concept that builds on a clear account of morality, and to
better situate moral injury as a certain form of disability within the field of disability
studies in order to distinguish the disabling effects of a morally injured agent. The
following section will attend to these questions.

2.2.2.1 The Problem of Morality
First, a critical review of sources raises questions about whether suitable depth
has been given to the conceptualization of morality.212 Moral Injury became its own
diagnosis apart from PTSD as psychologists became aware of an injured morality, a
deeper more abstract dimension, than the presenting physicality of PTSD and its
recurring symptoms, notably fear. While this distinction is clear, there has not been
sufficient analysis regarding how morality is constructed, sustained, disabled, and then
reordered within the psychological literature on moral injury.213
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good against the bad achieved by an action (59-86). At stake here is a twofold loss: neglect of the agent
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Nussbaum’s account of moral luck, and in turn Aristotle’s response to the Stoics, to make
sense of the effects of “betrayal” on an otherwise “good person.” Litz explores moral
emotions, but neglects deeper work on moral choices, and particularly moral choices
amid complex contexts. Litz’s focus is on the aftermath of morality, shame and guilt,
rather than the preceding factors.

In this section we will analyze Shay and Litz’s

explanations and assess their weaknesses. This will lead us to the problem of “injury”
and how a robust concept of morality can better describe what precisely is injured, and
how.
In his prophetic article “Learning about Combat Stress from Homer’s Iliad”
published in 1991, Shay has not yet distinguished Moral Injury from PTSD and thereby
including within the diagnosis of PTSD injuries that can be both moral and
philosophical.214 The Iliad describes what Shay deems “a moral disintegration”215 of
Achilles who, as the story began, had a “broad moral horizon”216 but after a series of
events including the swiping of a medal of honor from Achilles by Agamemon finds that
morality shattered and fixated toward “a single point of revenge.”217 The combat stress
that crumbles Achilles moral code is what Shay calls “the betrayal of ‘what’s right’.”218
While Shay does not outline a definitive definition of morality, he does strain to find a
word outside of The Iliad’s original language to describe what has been lost. “What’s
right”, for Shay, encompasses “normative expectations, convention, moral order, that

and extraction from the context (182). A thorough review of moral injury requires ethical theories that
attend justly to both.
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which is fitting, ethics, commonly understood social values.”219 Even Homer, it appears,
speaks about morality and a moral code through relationships rather than rigorous
definitions or abstract concepts. So, Shay reaches beyond the Homeric language, to
ethicist Martha Nussbaum’s use of the word nomos220 which points to laws and customs
that exist between authorities and citizens constituting obligations and rights that should
normally be followed.221 Shay postulates three consequences that occur when nomos is
threatened. First, a shattered nomos leads to the inability to act with virtue since morality
has been subjected to vulnerability, and perhaps even been crushed.222 For Shay, this is
an important point for combat veterans, which is all too often neglected in their after
care.223 Further study should explore what Shay implies in this statement regarding the
link between morality and virtue.224

Second, Shay laments the lack of options for

reconstruction when nomos has been lost. It is to this end that Shay has devoted his career
and service.225 And third, Shay describes the spirits of soldiers who are “numb, incapable
of pleasure, tortured by a pervasive sense of taint.”226
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Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 563.
Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 403.
221
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 403. Nussbaum relies on Euripides’ Hecuba to unpack the
fragility of nomos. After presenting Hecuba’s view of nomos as stable within a society and the very
structure of our internal being because of their “incorruptibility” Nussbaum proceeds to recognize Hecuba’s
fragility and vulnerability. Upheaval, within a society, can upset nomos and cause instability institutionally
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“Virtue” is an undefined concept by Shay in this article on Homer’s Illiad. In Achilles in Vietnam Shay
offers further development regarding his notion of virtue when h explains the loss of human virtue in
veterans who have reached the “berserk” state leading them to be “like gods.” Virtue and values are lost in
this state. Shay makes an interesting analysis when he explains that virtues such as generosity and courage
are “meaningless to a god.” Virtues, for Shay, are related to mortality not from “being God.” See: 85-86.
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Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 574. To be clear, Shay implies this lament
in this section when he outlines the consequences for a soldier of dehumanizing the enemy.
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Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer’s Iliad,” 574. Interesting to note how Shay’s three
descriptions parallel Ricœur’s in reverse: defilement (tortured by a pervasive sense of taint), sin (incapable
of pleasure – remember, Ricœur’s description of sin as being a negative state where one is cut off, as well
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Again, in his 1994 Achilles in Vietnam, Shay dives into a brief foray with morality
appearing to be satisfied with Nussbaum’s account of moral luck. Moral luck is a
concept, dating back to Aristotle, that Nussbaum finds helpful to describe the effect of
situations beyond our control on the character of a “good person.” For Shay, moral luck
is connected with the situation of betrayal outside of our control by a moral authority.
For Aristotle, moral luck is helpful for distinguishing between notions of justice and
morality when a moral agent finds herself in a context outside of her control, where
“involuntary” factors affect one’s moral agency.227 He explains,
It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a.) under
compulsion or (b.) through ignorance; and that (a.) an act is compulsory when
its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent, who is really
passive, contributes nothing to it: for example, when a ship’s captain is carried
somewhere by stress of weather, or by people who have him in their power.228
Aristotle engaged in a hearty debate with Stoic Philosophers, for example Epictetus
regarding whether or not virtue was sufficient for happiness. Aristotle argued no, since
virtue can be subjected to moral luck and involuntary situations. Epictetus argued yes,
since he believed the wise person could be immune to misfortune by staying calm in the

as a positive state where one remembers the good, i.e. pleasure), and guilt (numb – again, Ricœur describes
guilt as an impasse).
227
While Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary contexts where luck
and morality might intersect, other ethicists make different distinctions. For example, some might consider
the distinction between “constitutive luck” (that which constitutes a person’s natural character by genes,
dispositions, gifts and birth), “developmental luck” (that which develops a person’s character through
mentors, teachers, opportunities, habits, and/or lack thereof), and “resultant luck” (that luck we have as a
result of our actions over time.). See, for example: Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1979) particularly, chapter three on moral luck.
228
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. By Harris Rackham (London, UK: Wordsworth, 1996):
1110a,2-4. Aristotle distinguishes between “voluntary,” “involuntary,” and “non-voluntary” moral
circumstances. In response, there are three types of choices: deliberate choice, deliberation and wishful
thinking. The person who is virtuous makes deliberate choices to choose between the extremes and find
the mean. While the courageous person may fear, they exhibit a confidence in directing their fear toward
the sake of the kalos (beautiful). Herein, that person finds the mean between cowardice and rashness. See
also: Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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midst of the turmoil.229 We will return to this conversation in the debate to follow as we
explore Martha Nussbaum’s conceptualization of moral luck in her work The Fragility of
Goodness.
Shay is drawn to Aristotle and Nussbaum’s conception of “moral luck” rather
than the Stoics.230 He makes clear, “Greek tragic poets confront us with a harrowing
dimension of social existence.”231 That haunting dimension is the possibility of “social
betrayal”232 that can destabilize human character, societal conventions233, and have
catastrophic consequences for “human relatedness.”234 Subjected to such betrayal, the
veteran according to Shay does not exhibit calm in the misfortune, but may go berserk in
the face of “catastrophic moral luck”235 that can occur within war zones. Nussbaum’s
exploration of moral luck seems concerned ultimately with this question:

Can an

interaction with a situation of bad moral luck devastate and cause the demise of an
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It is worthy of note here that Vietnam veteran James Stockdale, imprisoned for four years in North
Vietnam as a prisoner of war, held close to Stoic philosophy to persevere. He details this in his
autobiography: James Stockdale, Courage under Fire: Testing Epictetus’s Doctrines in a Laboratory of
Human Behavior (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1993). This book is a collection of essays given as The
Hoover Lectures on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. In this he relied first and foremost
on a basic teaching of Epictetus to his students that you can never be “victim” to another, a person can only
a be a “victim” to himself. Marcus Aurelius taught this as well: “Take away the complaint, ‘I have been
harmed.’ And the harm is taken away.” Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book 4.7. From The Thoughts of
the Emperor M. Aurelius Antonius, trans. George Long in 1862 (Oxford, UK: Benediction Classics, 2012).
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Elizabeth Agnew Cochran offers a helpful analysis of early Stoics versus Roman Stoics in her work,
“Faith, Love and Stoic Assent: Reconsidering Virtue in the Protestant Tradition” Journal of Moral
Theology 3:1 (2014): 199-227. Here, she distinguishes between Aristotles’ view of the virtues as “a
multiplicity of interconnected moral qualities” versus the Socratic and Stoic view of virtue as unified, and
able to be pursued through phroenesis. However, she distinguishes a separate strand of Stoicism, affiliated
with the Romans, wherein virtue is an “assent”, much like the Protestant view. Nussbaum’s ethic stands
more in keeping with the Roman view of Stoic assent.
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otherwise good person?236 Morality then creates a link between a person of character and
their actions and repercussions. Shay explains,
Prior to Agamemnon’s betrayal of “what’s right” and the death of Patroklos,
Achilles possessed a highly developed social morality. This was reflected in his
care for the welfare of other Greek soldiers, respect for enemies living and dead,
and a reluctance to killy prisoners. Achilles’ moral unluckiness, his tragedy,
was that events – simply what happened – created the desire to do things that he
himself regarded as bad.237
Eliciting from Shay’s discussion here on “Moral Luck”,238 one can deduce these
affirmations regarding morality: morality is formed by societal conventionality and
stability, ie. themis; positive interactions with themis create a steadiness of character that
produces positive and wise actions; negative interactions with themis, particularly in the
form of bad moral luck, destabilize the individual, their choices, their relationships and
their sense of stability within a given society. MacIntyre criticizes Aristotle for such an
account that does not take interest in the historicity and contextuality of a given situation
and instead focuses on abstract conceptions.239
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For contemporary scholarship on moral luck, see: Neil Levy, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free
Will and Responsibility (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); Robert J. Hartman In Defense of
Moral Luck: Why luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness (New York, NY: Routledge
Press, 2017); and also Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). In chapter one, she struggles with the “agent regret” that can occur
damaging self and virtue in the fight against oppression. She calls this “regretting the self one is.” Here,
the virtuous agent must struggle in response to bad “moral luck” and this may take the form of either anger
or “agent-regret.” In chapter two, she wrestles with the question of moral damage and its affect on human
flourishing. How does a virtuous agent “carry on” when there are clear boundaries of possible morals and
the inability to flourish within a particular system? For Tessman, systems of oppression and injustice are of
particular importance as one considers the possibility of virtue amid the need for liberation.
239
See: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. MacIntyre criticizes Aristotle here for his “ahistorical character
of his understanding of human nature.” And adds three additional criticisms: First, Aristotle’s teleology
presupposes a refutation of metaphysical biology. Second, his framework assumes the polis without a
critical and distanced eye. Third, Aristotle is not particularly interested in looking at conflicts, which might
be the very crucible in which the virtues are learned (162-164). It should be noted that in later editions of
After Virtue, MacIntyre backtracks on these critiques. See for example the introduction to the 3rd edition of
After Virtue.
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In her work The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum provides a
comprehensive study on Greek interpretations of “moral luck” questioning whether a
person’s character is dependent upon circumstances that surround them, or solely
independent. This exploration of vulnerability, to a world of factors beyond one’s own
control, is essential for considering morality, injury and potential disability.

Greek

tragedies allow deep exploration into that vulnerability and the complexity of human
suffering in a tragic world and their counterpoint story to human self-sufficiency.
Through these tragedies the Greek tradition asked compelling questions of human agency
and contingency amid “moral luck.”240 Unlike Plato, who maintained indifference
between moral luck and character, Aristotle and other Greek poets engaged a hearty
dialogue on the porous relationship between the two.241 Nussbaum’s probing scope of
moral luck, ethics and the potential for eudaimonia are critical for understanding human
agency and contingency, but even more so, the Greeks’ pursuit of reason led them to the
“limits of reason.”242 She explains,
We must ask…how it works to order a life… The Greeks characteristically, and
appropriately, link these ethical questions very closely to questions about the
procedures, capabilities, and limits of reason. For it is their instinct that some
projects for self-sufficient living are questionable because they ask us to go
beyond the cognitive limits of the human being, and, on the other hand, that
many attempts to venture, in metaphysical or scientific reasoning, beyond our
human limits are inspired by questionable ethical motives having to do with
closedness, safety and power.243
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Cambridge University Press, 1981).
242
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 8.
243
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 8.
241

64

These limits are confronted in a myriad of ways, described here as the limit of knowledge
and reason. These limits of reason are reached amid all the contingencies of life for
example, when love, courage, and virtue set forth in the world with “a stance of openness
towards the world and its possibilities”244 but then meet vulnerability and betrayal.
Limits, in some sense, are part of the very character of love, courage, virtue and morality.
For Nussbaum, the fragility of goodness is a robust acknowledgement of the power of
moral luck to override character and its aim for eudaimonia, the good, flourishing life.
Within the body of scholarship on Psychology and Moral Injury presented by
Shay, Litz, Drescher, Worthington and Langberg, it is Litz’s ground-breaking 2009
article, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and
intervention strategy” that best presents a framework for defining morality. Litz offers
several paragraphs on morality as he and his team lay out basic concepts building his
argument regarding moral injury, moral repair and the need for strategies of intervention
beginning with the definition:
Morals are defined as the personal and shared familial, cultural, societal, and
legal rules for social behavior, either tacit or explicit. Morals are fundamental
assumptions about how things should work and how one should behave in the
world.245
Drawing on Kohlberg, Freud, Eisenberg and Miller, Litz and his team argue that morality
is a key aspect of human development where primitive drives are transformed toward
pro-social behavior. Persons in the trajectory of a human’s development have the
possibility of shaping moral development through positive teaching and modeling as well
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as through punishment when norms are transgressed.246 Litz explores the nuances of
“moral emotions” such as the negative emotions of embarrassment, shame and guilt as
well as the positive emotions of pride and gratitude.247 When those negative moral
emotions are at play, they reveal a moral code that still remains intact despite the trauma
it has experienced. In response to those emotions, the task of the therapist is not to
excuse, deny or accommodate what has transpired within the morally injurious event.248
Instead, Litz and his team argue for a “new synthesis” that expands the view of morality
for one’s self249 and one’s world within the complex context of that event.250
While Litz aims to offer a constructive framework in which to contemplate
morality as a polyvalent term with many nuances and implications, other scholars too
easily assume a predetermined definition of morality.251

This assumption creates a

myriad of problems. First, without a working definition of morality, as well as
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elaborating distinct nuances, morality becomes an abstract and assumed term leaving its
implication to the hearer’s discretion. Standards for determining moral choices may need
to be revisited in light of changing war codes in the twenty-first century. Second, implicit
in the readings is the knowledge that military codes allow moral choices otherwise
unacceptable in other social settings. Thereby, morality is constituted by certain choices
and behaviors varying across social spheres.252 How then does one determine what
crosses the immoral line within a military code of ethics? While it is beyond the scope of
this dissertation to assess military codes of ethics, what is worthy of note is the shifting
boundaries of morality across social contexts and then back again.253
In the literature review of psychology and psychiatry, we see two areas of focus:
first, Jonathan Shay’s account of betrayal and how moral luck can factor into the moral
injury of a person with good character; and second, Brett Litz’s summary of moral
emotions, particularly guilt and shame, following the consequential act that can create
either a pathway (through guilt) or an impasse (through shame). Further work on moral
injury must question whether both accounts are sufficient to describe the injury at hand.
Morality, then, is clearly both a critical theme as well as a lingering key question. How
are we to understand ‘injury’ – that is, what is injured and how it might be repaired – if
morality is still yet undefined and unsupported in a substantive way by scholarship other
252
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than Shay’s reference of Nussbaum (nomos and moral luck) and Litz’s brief mention of
Kohlberg and Freud?

2.2.2.2 The problem of Injury
The second obvious but essential critical theme is that of ‘injury’.254 The Latin
etymology of the word “injury” denotes a negation “in-“ of that which is right “jur/jus.”
Thereby Shay in his 1991 prophetic article elaborating on a moral dimension to PTSD by
describing the injuries to a veteran inflicted by “the betrayal of ‘what’s right’” pointed
quietly to the etymology of “injury” even before it was deemed distinct from PTSD. His
account then, in a sense, conflates morality and injury into that phrase so crucial to his
scholarship: “the betrayal of ‘what’s right’”.

What is injured, for Shay, is that

constellation of nomos (societal convention) that is brought to the test when confronted
with an authority and a moral agent within a crisis situation.
The element of betrayal by a person in authority, as has been made clear, is
critical for Shay but not for Litz.

The problem with simplifying the disagreement

between these two strands of scholarship into a betrayal by an authority (Shay) versus a
betrayal by an individually acting moral agent (Litz) is that it neglects the greater scope
of the crisis situation. Neither Shay nor Litz delineate societal complacency and social
complexity into their sphere of definition for the extreme conditions at play in the crisis
situation. Both the person in authority and the individual moral agent are not acting
alone, but within a greater script and scope that they cannot control nor change. Too
254

Stoic philosophers, such as Marcus Aurelius, had a very matter of fact attitude toward an injury.
Aurelius said: "Reject your sense of injury and the injury itself disappears." Marcus Aurelius, Meditations,
trans. by Meric Causubon, Book IV, paragraph 7 (1906). An alternative translation reads: “If not man shall
think himself wronged, then is there no more any such thing as wrong.”
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much of an emphasis on the debate between who caused the injury – the authority or the
agent – neglects the critical question of society’s role in causing morally injurious
wounds. Catholic Social Thought acknowledges the reality of social sin and its systemic
and exponential effect on individual realities. In The Compendium of the Social Doctrine
of the Church, written in 2004, it states:

The consequences of sin perpetuate the structures of sin. These are rooted in
personal sin and therefore, are always connected to concrete acts of the
individuals who commit them, consolidate them and make it difficult to remove
them. It is thus that they grow stronger, spread and become sources of other
sins, conditioning human conduct. There are obstacles and conditioning that go
well beyond the actions and brief life span of the individual and interfere also in
the process of development of peoples.255
Jonathan Shay, in agreement with such sentiment, would argue that social sin prevents
the hearing of trauma narratives.256 It is ironic that society injures but then cannot bear
witness to the trauma that injury produces and instead works as a whole to “deflect, deny
and forget.”257
Injuries, that negation of what is right, have a locus of causation (authority, agent,
larger societal activity) as well as a locus of infliction. Some agent causes a negation of
what is right that has an effect of marking, changing, afflicting, disturbing, negating what
had otherwise been deemed whole. When Litz, et al., discuss the effect of that causation
255
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upon an infliction, they pose the question for the soldier asking, “Are they at risk for
developing long-lasting psycho-bio-social impairment?”258 Implied within this question is
an assumption regarding the locus of the infliction.

The injury, for Litz, has

psychological dimensions, biological dimensions and social dimensions. It should be
noted that this turn of phrase does not include, but certainly assumes, moral impairment.
And, it could be argued that a fifth dimension existential be included within the locus of
impairment given Litz’s belief that part of the effect of a moral injury is the damaging
effect upon the individual’s life narrative. This discussion, regarding the locus of the
infliction, is critical for moving forward toward healing and begins to draw us into the
conversation that disability scholars have engaged. Is the infliction located within the
body, a medical injury? Is the infliction located within the social body, A social injury?
Is the infliction located within the body of something more transcendent drawing us into
the limits of human perception and understanding, perhaps even, the body of God?259
Jonathan Shay makes clear the difficulty in locating the injury as well as the
critical necessity for treatment in understanding the injuries’ location when he writes:
For mental health professionals the Achilles story —betrayal of "what's right,"
shrinkage of the moral and social horizon, grief and guilt for the death of a
special comrade, renunciation of ever returning home, seeing one's self as
already dead, berserking, dishonoring the enemy— is not a bad injury check-list
when developing a Veteran's combat history over time.260
In other words, the healer must look beyond the obvious injuries toward something
deeper and perhaps more ambiguous. For Shay, what is the ultimate injury greater than
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the obvious checklist of injuries, is the paralysis that can occur when a veteran is unable
to tell, own and integrate their story of that “betrayal of ‘what’s right’” into their sense of
self.261
The lack of a story and its coherence within an expanded sense of self and world
is the ultimate injury, one that is ultimately existential demanding an expansion of Litz’s
“psycho-bio-social” locus of the injury into a larger “psycho-bio-social-moral-existential”
location for what is injured. Such an expansion enlarges the injury from the soldier’s
body alone to the societal body, and, from the societal body to the body of God and the
limits of human understanding. In later chapters, attention to Warren Kinghorn’s work
on moral injury and Stanley Hauerwas’ scholarship in disability will reiterate the need for
narrative that is larger than a singular person and held together within the context of a
larger story-formed community.

2.2.2.3 The Problem of Disability
The third critical theme to be explored after an analysis of morality and injury is
the relationship between moral injury and disability. Friedman describes a “Scarlet P” 262
effect of a mental health diagnosis263 and so we can begin to imagine the stigmatizing
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fear of a “Scarlet D” effect of a disability given the potential “psycho-bio-social-moralexistential” injuries at play in a morally injured veteran.264 Some might argue, in hopeful
protection of veterans from that stigmatization, that moral injury is not a disability but a
normal response to extremity and the presentation of an intact, though damaged, moral
code. But when, one must ask, does the crisis of moral authority have ramifications to
the point of disabling for the veteran’s interiority, intimate relations, and institutional
life? While the issue of a veterans’ disabling, or not, by moral injury may be both
political and controversial, as this study proceeds, it is my argument that the scholarship
on disability is absolutely essential to the questions being asked in the field of moral
injury.

These are questions related to impairment, medicalization, unjust social

structures, liberation from those systems, and the acknowledgment of limits and the
existential questions they raise about human life and finitude. In chapter three, we will
bring moral injury into conversation with the field of disability offering possible insights
to both fields while also clearing outlining possible risks in so doing.

2.3

Scholarship: Theology and Moral Injury
If we are to have more than the “good intentions”265 to which Shephard alludes

then we must reflect on the interplay between the human condition, social conventions,
moral formation and their vulnerability and fallibility in the face of power and crisis

in psychotherapy with male veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Psychotherapy 47:3 (Sept.
2010): 296–305, and Garcia HA, Finley EP, Lorber W, et al, “A preliminary study of the association
between traditional masculine behavioral norms and PTSD symptoms in Iraq and Afghanistan veterans,”
Psychology of Men and Masculinity 12:1 (2011): 55–63.
264
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situations.

Understanding that interplay necessitates a broader framework for

comprehending and assessing morality, a deeper probe for analyzing injury by assessing
its causation and infliction, and a higher call to decrease stigmatization by searching the
scholarship of disability.

Given these three critical themes in the scholarship on

Psychology and Moral Injury, it is now worthy of note to assess the scholarship from the
perspective of Theology and Moral Injury by looking to the work of Brock, Lettini,
Kinghorn, Meagher and Powers. Rita Nakashima Brock makes clear the need to draw
Moral Injury into the realm of Theology in her book Soul Repair: Recovering from Moral
Injury after War when she states, moral injury is concerned with “souls in anguish, not a
psychological disorder.”266

2.3.1

Review of Key Scholars

2.3.1.1

Rita Nakashima Brock
In the field of moral injury, Rita Nakashima Brock may be credited with being

deliberate about the relationship between moral injury and Christian faith, theology and
ethics. Brock, former Professor of Theology and Culture at Brite Divinity School, has
awakened theologians, pastors, lay leaders and religious scholars to the pressing issue.
Brock makes clear, “To be morally injured requires a healthy brain that can experience
empathy, create a coherent memory narrative, understand moral reasoning and evaluate
behavior.”267

Brock’s work champions the testimony of countless veterans from
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Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, war reporters, psychiatrists, parents and family members
to rally support for those struggling. To best understand their work it is important to
contextualize the development of the “Soul Repair Center” at the Brite Divinity School in
Fort Worth, Texas and the accompanying book Soul Repair which documents the
testimony and theological struggle of the soldiers with whom they have worked. Then,
further influential works of Brock will be explored as well as the trajectory of future
endeavors. To be clear, Rita Nakashima Brock is the scholar at the center of this
discussion; however, she pairs with key partners including Gabrielle Lettini, Professor of
Theological Ethics and Studies in Public Ministry at the Graduate Theological Union, as
well as Colonel Herman Keizer, the founding co-director of the Soul Repair Center.
The collective work of Brock, Lettini and Keizer calls the attention of
theologians, churches and culture to the burgeoning need of returning soldiers who in the
desolation of war have questioned God, self and neighbor in struggling with religious
structures, second-guessing their own humanity, and questioning the undergirding moral
codes of a civilized world. Their work with The Soul Repair Center of Brite Divinity
School to offer education, research and support in the field of Moral Injury began in the
winter of 2008 after viewing the Emmy nominated film “Soldiers of Conscience.” Brock
and others address how religious communities might offer strength, guidance,
discernment and repair to soldiers wrestling with religious issues before, during and after
war.268 Brock began to explore in coursework and with graduate students the presence
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and relevance of Truth Commissions at various points in history.269 Within two years of
the initial viewing of that movie, Brock and a team committed to the cause offered the
first “Truth Commission on Conscience in War” (TCCW) on March 21, 2010 at the
Riverside Church in New York City. Here, veterans shared testimony regarding their
actions in the warzone and the emotional aftermath that followed.270 This event coincided
with the publication of Litz, et. al, provocative essay in 2009 “Moral injury and moral
repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy” which added to
the interest and relevance of the event. Along with Litz, Brock became a central figure
in the emerging movement that championed the needs of soldiers and urged an
appropriate societal response.
The irony surrounding their clarion call is, as Brock notes, that our culture should
know the human impact of war and its potential for moral injury because war stories and
its aftermath are as old as the Illiad and Bhagavad-Gita, as close as our Bibles in the
Hebrew Psalms, and played on our movie screens and captured in novels like Full Metal
Jacket, American Sniper, The Hurt Locker and Catch-22.271 In fact, it was seeing the
2007 documentary Soldiers of Conscience that crystallized in the two scholars the need to
269
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respond from their disciplines and create a Truth Commission on Conscience in War
where fourteen testifiers, seventy-five truth commissioners and over five hundred
laypeople gathered at Riverside Church in New York City gathered on March 21, 2010 to
hear four hours of testimony regarding conscience and its complexities in wartime. The
following day, the commissioners and testifiers gathered to create an agenda of next steps
that resulted in the formation of the “Soul Repair Center” at Brite Divinity School in Fort
Worth, Texas. In addition, several statements were released including this one addressed
to the clergy:
To Religious and Community Leaders: In working with members of the Armed
Forces and veterans, religious and community leaders must educate themselves
and their members about the consequences of the physical and psychological
wounds of war and the needs of those who struggle with lingering wounds. They
must learn to listen to veterans about how to reintegrate them into their
communities while not falsely valorizing or demonizing them or leaving them to
suffer invisibly and in silence. They must, especially, educate themselves and
their communities in how they can support those who suffer moral injury.272
This clarion call to clergy and community members is still waiting to be fully heeded.
The question remains: what theological framework can encapsulate reflection and
practice? The Garden of Eden is a metaphor central to Brock and Lettini’s work in Soul
Repair: Recovering from Moral Injury After War.

Veteran Kevin Benderman first

provides the image central to the book in an introductory reflection:
[I found out] we were in the area of Iraq that was supposed to the Garden of
Eden, the cradle of civilization where mankind began. I had to ask myself,
“Why am I carrying around an M16 in the Garden of Eden?”273
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Lettini and Brock return to the image of the garden at the end of their book,

274

after

presenting and reflecting on the witness and testimony of four soldiers’ recruitment,
deployment, moral injury and initiatives for soul repair. Given Lettini and Brock’s
theological background, one might expect a stronger theological foundation to their
scholarship here. However, their clear concern is rallying public understanding and
advocacy in support of soldiers in crisis. To that end, the structure and testimony of this
book serve to open the dialogue they envision rather than provide lengthy theological
reflection. Their concluding reflection on the garden highlights the presence in Genesis
3:24 of the “He drove out the man; and at the east of the garden of Eden he placed the
cherubim, and a sword flaming and turning to guard the way to the tree of life.275 The
presence of this fiery angel276 is the opportunity that awaits veterans willing to engage the
moral struggle upon return from battle. The key themes from the Garden of Eden story
linger in light of this angel: dangers of good and evil exist in the garden, clear boundaries
were stated to protect that knowledge, and in light of the serpent the morality test failed.
The angel appears to prohibit a return, so it seems, to that original state. Beyond the gate,
the authors note, “are fratricide, war, empire, slavery, misogyny, and myriad forms of
oppression.”277 Moral injury then stands before, “our moral conscience [which] takes up
that fierce flaming sword and guards what is left of our moral identity. To reenter the
Garden, humanity must face that fierce angel. Unless the struggle is attempted, there is
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no way back and no way to know what remains in the garden behind the gate.”278 The
authors’ make clear at this juncture that the healing journey of the wounded soldier is not
the soldier’s alone. Their clarification is worth taking full note:
The attempt to regain entry requires accepting responsibility for what we have
done, but doing so may cost people their lives if they have to go back alone.
Societies that launch wars, believing that weapons of death and destruction are
noble, good, and lifesaving, or that wars are holy, do so dishonestly, without
wisdom or the capacity to take moral responsibility for the harm they do, not
just to their enemies, but to all they send into the maws of killing. We should
not expect those who return to have to face that angel alone.279
Brock and Lettini’s honorable work in placing the moral load of this injury on the
shoulders of the social body and not just the soldier’s should be noted and applauded. At
the same time, the concerns they introduce invite further theological engagement, and this
dissertation will take an important step forward in that conversation by addressing human
limit.
Brock devotes her scholarship and the stewardship of her time to practical efforts
such as The Truth Commission on Conscience in War, the efforts of the Soul Repair
Center, and new initiatives such as advanced training seminars on Moral Injury,
Community and collective healing.280 Prior to her 2013 book Soul Repair, Brock was a
prolific author of theological works including Casting Stones: Prostitution and
Liberation in Asia and the United States (1996), Proverbs of Ashes: Violence,
Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us (2002), Journeys by Heart: A
Christology of Erotic Power (2008), Saving Paradise: How Christianity Traded Love of
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This World for Crucifixion and Empire (2009), and Saving Paradise: Recovering
Christianity's Forgotten Love for this Earth (2012). Brock’s scholarship continues to
hone in even more fully on the topic of moral injury. We see the beginning of this
chapter in her scholarly life with the 2012 publication of an essay, “Moral Injury: The
Crucial Missing Piece in Understanding Soldier Suicides.” In 2013, she presented her
findings to a gathering of religious chaplains at Montreat Conference Center in a highly
acclaimed slide show and presentation.281 In 2015, after Op-Ed contributor David Brooks
of The New York Times wrote “The Moral Injury” wherein he conflated PTSD with
Moral Injury282, Brock quickly responded with a clarifying statement.283 A pinnacle
moment occurred for gaining recognition in the field of moral injury when Rita
Nakashima Brock and a team of scholars, psychiatrists, theologians and even thespians,
were invited to host a week-long lecture series at the Chautauqua Institution in the
summer of 2016.284 In 2017, Brock resigned from her positions at Brite Divinity School
in Theology and as co-director of the Soul Repair Center to begin work as the Moral
Injury and Recovery Program Developer for the Volunteers of America a position in
which she works more exclusively with matters of moral injury. Also in 2017, Brock
introduced a fuller description of her vision for the community’s role in healing from
moral injury with a second essay, “Sophie’s Choice: Why Healing from Moral Injury Is a
Community Process.” In September of 2017, in conjunction with The Braxton Institute
this work will continue in Princeton, New Jersey as a team of scholars, therapists and
281
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community practitioners are trained in a communal restorative process. Just released is a
compendium of moral injury in sacred texts which Brock contributed to alongside Joseph
McDonald entitled Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts (Studies in Religion and
Theology) published in May, 2017.

In this work, Brock writes the foreword for

McDonald and a team of scholars who wrestle with moral injury in the sacred texts of
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and even mainstream American Civil Religion
and then ask whether these texts continue to perpetuate trauma or offer visions of
restoration. The conviction of the contributing authors is that moral injury is an emerging
area of trauma studies, seen particularly in returning veterans, but not confined solely to
the context of warfare.285
Brock furthers the conversation regarding Moral Injury, in part, by doing justice
to the self-evident themes of morality and injury. Her voice demands attention to the
thread of morality that cannot be neglected when tending to soldiers’ returning to war.
As noted above, consider the recent op-ed piece by David Brooks in The New York
Times who in an attempt to call attention to Moral Injury apart from PTSD instead
conflated the two by saying, “Most discussion about PTSD thus far has been about fear
and the conquering of fear. But, over the past few years, more people have come to
understand PTSD is also about exile — moral exile.”286 In response to this Op Ed essay,
Rita Nakashima Brock wrote a letter to the editor that deserves full quotation here:
David Brooks captures the anguish of post-traumatic stress disorder well. But
he does a disservice to those with PTSD when he tries to collapse it into moral
285
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injury. Natural disasters are a major cause of PTSD, though rape is the cause
most likely to provoke it. Moral injury is a response of the ‘formerly’ moral
agent to violating one’s own moral code. It can be experienced without PTSD,
and results in a loss of faith or meaning, shame, grief and isolation. Committing
an atrocity has the worst effect because it violates even the military moral code
for soldiers, but just surviving when others do not can lead to profound guilt.
Only one-fourth of Afghanistan and Iraq war veterans receive treatment for
PTSD, but many more endure moral injury alone in a society oblivious to their
suffering. Mr. Brooks is right: Veterans require more from us than a thank-you,
and we would be better people if we were willing to hear harrowing things and
to offer a caring presence on their journey of rebuilding a moral identity.287
According to Brock, good soldiers typically have a strong moral identity upon entering
the military. She claims, “most people capable of such a commitment also have empathy
for others and deep moral values.”288 Her argument goes on to suggest that as those
morally strong soldiers are then trained in the military there is an “absence of discussion
about the moral impact of military training and its implementation in combat.”289 So
good soldiers experience disconnects between competing moral worlds – their moral
worlds before, during and after combat. The impact of this disconnect, Brock argues,
should be a consideration when exploring the rise of soldier suicides. Her concern is that
too much emphasis has been given to the “squishy statistics”290 of soldier suicides, at the
real cost of understanding the contributing factors. For Brock, a contributing factor is the
neglect of moral discussion, even in the “spiritual fitness”291 components of military
training.
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Brock is helpful in briefly laying out a process of moral formation where virtue,
character, and the capacity for moral action become engrained in neural pathways292
through community formation, mimicry and unfolding ethical identity across time. This
formation is shaped by everything from linguistic patterns of a given culture, to the
narratives of religious traditions, to moral reasoning taught in various institutions
(education, religious institutions, military formation). Difficulties arise for the moral
agent when there is a conflict between systems in the shifts from one moral world to
another and back again. Military training relies on tightening the neural pathway toward
patterns of immediacy and programmed response to threat; however, those tightened
neural patterns become unraveled upon return home and so repair is needed for the
damaged neural patterns of moral formation. Brock believes the repair process is not for
the soldier alone, but should be a community process for forming new moral pathways
since morality is never individual, but always a social process.293
The resultant injury, from that disabled morality, is multi-faceted. Brock adds
several dimensions to the analysis of that injury as she suggests the injury doesn’t just
affect an individual, but is societal.294

Because of that a moral injury can have
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repercussions across generations of an injured community.295 Healing from that injury
requires, of course, the reconstruction of a moral identity, but that is not the work of the
soldier alone.

Instead, it is the collective responsibility of the community to work

together toward healing and the recovery of empathy,296 Brock makes clear: “Moral
injury recovery is a collective responsibility. When we individualize moral injury as a
personal failure, we lose the nature of moral conscience as social,297 as what enables
ethical relationships.”298
Brock, acknowledging military culture and the shame associated with such labels,
is reluctant to associate moral injury with “disability.” However, Brock describes a
“slow burn”299 component to moral injury as the injury kindles and then explodes.300
While PTSD is damage to the amygdala and hippocampus in the limbic sphere of the
brain resulting from a fear response to an outside threat, moral injury is not a brain injury.
In fact, Brock argues that moral injury requires a healthy brain particularly in the
prefrontal cortex where empathy and moral assessment occur.301 Brock cares about
moral formation and understanding the thick narrative and societal systems that create
the “seven deadly sins” in 2008 the focus was on the social dimension of sin with this list: polluting,
genetic engineering, gathering riches, drug dealing, seeking and providing abortion, practicing pedophilia,
and causing social injustice. These differ substantially from the original list: gluttony, fornication, greed,
pride, despair, wrath, vainglory and sloth.
295
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and guide ethical behavior. Given Brock’s argument here, it will be important to address
how moral injury is a particular kind of disability even though it differs from the
disabling done by PTSD to the brain.302 As this dissertation proceeds to draw moral
injury into the field of disability it is important to note how Brock’s account of morality
as a social construct coincides with arguments in Disability scholarship concerning the
need for a social model of Disability.
Despite the excellent efforts of Rita Nakashima Brock, theologians were at first
slow to respond to the cry for thinking theologically about moral injury even though this
field invites reflection on many areas of theological concern: creation and fall, sin and
salvation, moral agency in a fallen world, atonement and redemption, prayer and lament,
confession and reconciliation, liturgical practices and the Sacraments. The reasons for
this neglect are uncertain, but at least four seem plausible. First, partly because of the
conflation between PTSD and MI, as well as perhaps due to the terminology of “injury”,
one possible reason for theological neglect is the medicalization of the problem. Such
thinking categorizes moral injury as a medical, rather than a theological, problem.
Second, theological denominations struggle against each other and within their own ranks
in conversation regarding the morality of war and peace. Ecumenical work exploring
twenty-first century concerns with Just War theory will be important for contextualizing
moral injury within warfare and twenty-first century challenges.303 Third, given the
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complexity of war and its aftermath, ecumenical work assessing societal rituals for return
after war will be crucial.304 And finally, recent theological work addressing moral injury
has been timely, but perhaps jumps from need to practice, without lingering in the
theological space necessary to shape and define those particular practices.305

This

criticism is made cautiously and with great respect for the theologians at hand that in
seeing the magnitude of the issue, and the paucity of church response, 306 have offered
steps forward through particular actions. The desire for a robust and astute theology is to
increase the capacity of the institutional church to better attend to the personal needs of
each veteran and their family. “I have a feeling of intense betrayal,” war veteran and
divinity student Michael Yandell reveals, “and the betrayer and the betrayed are the same
person: my very self.”307

Yandell describes his experience of returning from war and

dealing with the moral ramifications in terms of a landscape where “everything was laid
flat.” 308 The task of theology is to reanimate that “flat” moral landscape by providing
dimension, perspective, points of orientation and capabilities for faithfully navigating an
asperous new moral world. This is a significantly different problem than addressing the
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issues presented by PTSD: moral injury, instead, is a problem of disabled morality,
human limits pressed to the extreme in crisis situations, and the spiritual dimensions
provoked.

2.3.1.2

Warren Kinghorn

Warren Kinghorn, professor of psychiatry and pastoral theology at Duke University
Divinity School, provides a theological account of moral injury with a desire to push
beyond “unhelpfully limiting”309 psychological constructs of moral injury. Kinghorn is
grateful for the work of Shay, Litz and others for providing “critical analysis of the
relationship between combat trauma and the moral agency of the acting soldier”310 that he
believes the empirical literature neglected prior to the work of Shay and Litz partially due
to the rise of PTSD as a diagnosis in 1980.311 Kinghorn argues Moral Injury needs a
robust conversation with a Christian account of Moral Theology in order to “rescue moral
injury from the medical model and the means-end logic of techne.”312 Moral injury, for
Kinghorn, can not be subjected to, nor solved by, the technical arts of medicine. To
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accomplish this task, Kinghorn begins by outlining the ways in which the concept of
human agency is helpful.313 Then, Kinghorn sets forth his argument for why a “medical
model” is problematic for the discussion.314 Finally, he presents his case for why moral
injury must be embedded within the embodied narrative of the Christian story and healed
through community practices.
With an eye toward locating a person within a larger story, Kinghorn begins with an
account of human agency. Later this grounding will prove helpful for two reasons:
seeing the person and not the medical need, and, grounding that person in a larger
narrative. So, Kinghorn provides three arguments explaining why human agency proves
helpful for diagnosing and tending to the trauma that has at its center an active self, rather
than a passive situation solely inflicting the trauma.

First, an emphasis on the

individual:315 the trauma has at its center an acting person who exhibits agency within the
complexity of a larger social matrix.316 Second, the social: the complexity of that social
matrix is all too often overlooked within the “sound-bite”317 conversations of American
political consensus and conversation. Within the greater reality at play, an individual is
an “embodied, relational, responsible self”318 functioning within an eco-system greater
than one’s self. And third, the martial: a discussion of human agency beckons Christian
ethicists beyond abstract discussion of Just War toward the impact of war on individual’s
lives and agency; here it must always be remembered the concrete impact of the war
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becomes embodied within the person.319 Kinghorn describes a morally injured soldier as
a “truthful sign of moral incoherence.”320 Clinical Psychology and their focus on agency,
for Kinghorn, is a helpful prompt for Christian ethics.321 However, Kinghorn offers an
“appreciative theological critique”322 by suggesting locating agency solely within a
medical model is unhelpful and suggests the Christian narrative provides “a thicker
contextual account of proper human ends.”323
Kinghorn suggests the medical model is unhelpful for several reasons. First, a
medical model tends to distance and disassociate the relationship between the diagnosed
injury and “the experiencing self.”324 Second, a medical model can fall prey to the
possibility of politicizing wounds.325 And third, the medical model is subject always to
the problem of techne, that is, the logical fallacy that suffering can be tended to and
amended by “the means-ends logic of technical rationality.”326 Kinghorn suggests a twofold problem: the inability to ‘judge’ moral norms and an absent teleology. Both of these
conditions keep moral injury within the realm of technology.327
Kinghorn’s assessment of the strengths of agency, his critique of the medical
model and his longing for a teleology beyond technology are all aimed toward a new and
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robust narrative that allows suffering to have a telos other than despair.328 For Kinghorn,
technology has at its root the Aristotlean concept of techne where a particular application
is utilized within a certain situation toward a particular end. Assumed in this concept is
that better techne must be gained when a situation can no longer be met by the existing
technology. Kinghorn criticizes medicalization in acknowledging that while responding
to the pressing need with an eye toward the reduction of suffering, these technologies of
psychotherapy and pharmaceuticals are utilized without considering alternatives beyond
these means.329

Implied in Kinghorn’s response is a longing for theology, which is

never used as an instrument of technology, but instead is entrusted to the spirit with the
hope of reducing the suffering, but even more so, transforming the suffering toward a
redemptive end.
Kinghorn comes to the conclusion that the clinical disciplines are ultimately only
partially equipped to address the pain of our injured veterans.

However, “Faith

communities, unlike the clinical disciplines, are able to embrace thick and particular
conceptions of human flourishing and human failing and are, thereby, equipped much
more robustly than the clinical disciplines to facilitate the healing of morally injured
veterans.”330 To accomplish this task, knowing the teleological end of importance for the
individual veteran, will take an institutional commitment to soul search, purge and re-
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order. Kinghorn makes clear churches must do three things to make this accommodation:
first, “renounce the privilege of ignorance”331 about current wars and the militaryindustrial complex that encourages them; second, “renounce generalizations” that protect
institutions and individuals from complex discussions regarding topics not easily divided
into “pro” and “anti”332; and third, once those have been renounced, turn to the full
embrace of “the war-torn bodies among them” by hearing the lament of the soldier in
their midst rather than the generalization in the media.333 Christian communities bear the
possibility for Aristotle’s vision of the “right ordering” of humanity different than an
ordering toward the alleviation of distress alone. While that may sound dismissive of our
soldiers’ plight, Kinghorn aims for “desire of God and to God’s good creation”334 that
alone can happen within a Christian narrative. This ordering allows for the depth of
patience amid suffering, confession alongside the reality of sin, and forgiveness in the
face of guilt our veterans demand.
Situating the veteran within a story where suffering is not the end but is instead a
lament calls deeply our willingness to give up control in exchange for the desire for God
and for the good creation God intended.335 Doing so creates the space for a particular
habitus within the faith community. Essential to that habitus is the patience of a Holy
Saturday where lingering in the uncertain middle336 of suffering calls attention to the
persistent intrusion of “death into life”337 and does not move too quickly to resurrection
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hope. Resources are available within the Christian community not just for the worship of
Easter, but for the lingering in lament through liturgy, prayer, scripture and worship.338
Alongside patience, penitence is an essential component to what theology and
worshiping communities can offer beyond psychotherapy.

Even within a just war

framework, all actions that occur within war are “things to lament, not to celebrate.”339
Kinghorn acknowledges historical frameworks wherein penitence was “to some degree
communal, where war comrades would experience penitential requirements upon their
return home and would be able to transition together, within the context of the larger
community, into full liturgical and social participation in church and community.”340
Even more so, there were particular points when a given community participated in active
social reflection and “collective ownership of the wartime violence conducted in its
name.”341
Finally, the third element of liturgical space alongside patience and penitence are the
embodied practices342 of a given community.343
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instrumental” invitation to the veteran, so the veteran does not become the focus but
instead becomes assimilated into the “embedded context of Christian community”344
participating then in its rich life of faith-shaped practices. The inherent possibility within
patience, penitence and practices points the solider beyond the alleviation of suffering
toward a teleological greater good that Kinghorn argues may only come from within a
faith community.
Consideration of Kinghorn’s account raises several questions. First, Kinghorn
raises the critical question regarding the teleology of suffering. Clearly, he is concerned
with an over-reliance on technology aimed toward a particular end.345 The underlying
question he invites the reader to struggle with is whether suffering is always a negative
experience. Suffering, perhaps, could offer a meaningful contribution to a flourishing life
if allowed a telos of redemption.346 Second, in discussing the jus in bello paradox of
moral injury, whether or not we can address moral injury without discussing war’s moral
justifiability, Kinghorn writes that soldiers become visible “signs of the moral
incoherence.”347 One wonders here about the almost sacramental tone of such language.
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If sacraments are visible signs of God’s invisible love and grace,348 what would we deem
the reverse when a beloved constituent of God’s creation becomes a visible sign of moral
incoherence and societal injustice? Kinghorn would do well to offer further exploration
of the Protestant sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion, rather than penitence
alone in this discussion. In Baptism, our “flourishing” and our “failing” die and are
raised again to new life through Jesus Christ.

In Holy Communion, the moral

incoherence and societal injustice of our societal matrix is broken open and forgiveness is
poured out again and again.349

If soldiers’ bodies have become an almost ‘anti-

sacramental’ sign, is it possible to imagine the fullness of our sacramental practices
offering education, transformation and reversal?

Third, the scholarship of Bernard

Verkamp350 indirectly notes the possibilities and implications of a modern day penitential
practice, encouraged by Protestants and Catholics, and perhaps even, embraced by the
larger society, for returning warriors. Kinghorn makes reference to Verkamp’s account of
manuals and rituals outlining penitential demands that existed from 600 CE to 1200 CE.
For example, Verkamp outlines instructions from Theodore of Tarsus for the solider to
refrain for forty days from partaking of communion and even from attending church, and
348

Certainly there are distinctions between Roman Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox views on
communion. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will simply take note here of two views that shape the
connection between the inward grace and the visible sign. The Catechism of the Catholic Church notes,
“"the sacraments are efficacious signs of grace, instituted by Christ and entrusted to the Church, by which
divine life is dispensed to us. The visible rites by which the sacraments are celebrated signify and make
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dispositions," Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. (Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls, 2000), n. 1131. The
Presbyterian Church states, Sacraments are “signs and seals of the covenant of grace” Westminster
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The social significance of Holy Communion and its symbolism of what is broken in contemporary
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then, easing back into these societal practices.351 St. Basil believed in an even lengthier
time of absolution suggesting three years until the reception of Holy Communion.352
What specific practices353 would be mandated today?354 Kinghorn notes by way of a
footnote practices outlined in the Old Testament for practicing penitence355 such as the
rites of purification, appropriation of booty, construction of monuments, ritual
processions, and corporate laments.356
And finally, the language of “medical model” and “social contexts” in Kinghorn’s
account points toward the fruitfulness of a conversation between Kinghorn’s work and
theological reflection on disability. Kinghorn appreciates the language Shay uses to
carve out the space needed to describe moral injury as a disability, “when the injury
invades character, and the capacity for social trust is destroyed, all possibility of a
flourishing human life is lost.”357 Disability studies has wrestled with the same questions
regarding the inadequacy of medicalization and the inability of a broader social matrix to
fully encompass issues raised in disability.
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“Souls in anguish”358 is the starting point, according to Rita Nakashima Brock, for
drawing moral injury into the field of Theology. Kinghorn, instead, looks to the end, the
telos of human flourishing making meaning out of suffering within the context of a
healing, penitential community. As we turn to the work of Robert Emmet Meagher, we
will engage his efforts to address the complexity of the landscape in between as he
explores the question: how can moral injury exist if wars have passed the Just War
criteria? While it is beyond the bounds of this study to fully assess and critique Just War
theory, his account is essential for probing theological assumptions for moral injury.

2.3.1.3

Robert Emmet Meagher
In his book, Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War, Theologian

Robert Emmet Meagher questions the legacy, the legitimacy and the limits of Just War
theory, particularly as it relates to questions of moral injury.

Meagher is both an

academic and activist. Killing from the Inside Out is a follow up to his 2006 work
Herakles Gone Mad: Rethinking Heroism in an Age of Endless War. Meager works
directly with wounded veterans and participated in the highly acclaimed National Truth
Commission on Conscience in War. Killing from the Inside Out is an exposition of
Christianity’s complacency in suggesting the possibility of war “without” – “war without
sin, war without criminality, war without guilt or shame.”359

The lie Christianity

promised was war without losing one’s soul.360 Perhaps Meagher is too overstated in
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suggesting Just War theory concludes there can be war without consequence,361 but he
makes a compelling argument that moral injury is inevitable unless we reject Just War
theory. In so doing, Meagher makes a compelling argument that the philosophical and
theological framework of Just War contributes in a significant way to the moral injuries
of soldiers today in providing “moral” justifications for potentially immoral wars. To
understand his work it is necessary to comprehend his conceptualization of moral injury
and then consider a brief history of Just War Theory he reviews and then critiques.
Meagher defines moral injury as “the violation, by oneself or another, of a
personally embedded moral code or value resulting in deep injury to the psyche or
soul.”362 This seemingly simple definition contains five elements that interact over time
and space, particularly in moments of crisis and stress. These components are:
-

an act (violation)
a person (either self or other)
a pre-existing state (moral code or value)
a change (result), and
an impairment (damage to the psyche or soul).

As we continue to dig deeper into the phenomenon of moral injury, two things will
become clear. First, there is an interaction of these five elements over the course of a
lifetime that is not by definition linear. And second, scholars and soldiers alike will
disagree on what constitutes the exact nature of each of these elements.
361
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The complex interaction between these elements does not occur within a
particular boundary, but can unfold over a lifetime as distance, space and conscience
allow moments of reflection. Meagher notes the reflection of Timothy Kudo who was
unable to process actions that occurred during war because “We were simply too busy to
worry about the morality of what we were doing.”363 In the essay, Kudo questions which
is more difficult to endure upon return from war: “the ethical damage” or “the physical
injuries we sustain.”364 For Meagher, the internalized ethical damage that has different
contours than a physical injury is the impetus behind the name of his study “Killing from
the inside out.”365 His fivefold schema assists in delineating the arenas of morality and
the affective injuries all of which interplay within real limits.
While Meagher maintains the language of injury for the purposes of his argument,
his fivefold schema furthers the conversation in suggesting the limits of human agency
(actions), humanity itself (person), and morality (moral code) when limits are met in
these three areas in a moment of critical change, a permanent consequence results. The
paradox at the heart of moral injury is that “injury” is realized because of a hyper
“clarity” – an acute awareness within a critical moment of a limit. Meagher explains,
“Captain Kudo, far from succumbing to moral confusion, has come to a moral clarity.”366
If that is the case, clarity has not been injured. Instead, clarity reveals a limit reached and
then transgressed.
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The second trajectory of Meagher’s book, Just War Theory, explores the history
behind the tradition’s attempt to provide moral clarity prior to and during war. Before
exploring the impact of Augustine and Ambrose on crafting a theory of Just War,
Meagher begins in Ancient Greece to explore the beginnings of the “Western way of
war”367 through the ancient Greek epics of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey.368 Meagher’s
purpose for exploring these epics is not simply to recount the stories, nor to draw on
Homer’s account as someone who “understands,”369 but instead to explore the
relationship between the rituals of sexuality and warfare.370 War, according to Meagher,
is not unlike necrophilia371 and the dynamics of foreplay, erotic hunger, rape, raging
desire, fury, climax, and longing again.372 Meagher explains the use of the Greek word
meignumi which means “to join” or “to mingle.” He writes meignumi was “used to
denote both intercourse in battle and intercourse in bed.” The Greek twins Hypnos
(sleep) and Thanatos (death) followed both.373 Meagher’s chapter on Ancient Greece is a
strange prelude for the Just War Theory to follow, but does raise interesting questions
related to the moral injury he presents in the first chapter. The ancient Greeks understood
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sleep and/or death followed the fury of war, but what happens when the morally injured
live in the disorienting twilight between the two?
Meagher also probes the Greek tragedies for insights into the relationship between
human agency and responsibility374 drawing on excerpts from Oedipus the King and
Christian Scriptures.

Meagher uses the example of Oedipus to question whether

accountability is necessary if someone “sinned” without intentionality or knowledge.375
Sophocles makes the claim that Oedipus is accountable for his actions, because the
actions are what remain at the end for all to see. Even if an action is unintentional or
done without full knowledge, Oedipus and others are to be held to judgment. The Greeks
understood actions with grievous consequences as “pollution” (miasma) in need of
“purification” (catharsis).376

Polluting crimes may be acts of commission, acts of

omission (or done without full knowledge or intention) and also, what Meagher deems
“metaphysical crimes” that can just “happen to you.”377

Meagher turns here from

Ancient Greece and Rome378 to the early Christian scriptures to unpack the relationship
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between agency and accountability described by Jesus in the Gospels. Meagher argues
these scriptural injunctions are difficult to “challenge”379 because of their foundational
nature. And yet, Meagher goes on to wonder about the impact of texts like Matthew
15:17-20 where “pollution” that occurs through sinful acts are only able to be determined
by God who alone sees the work of the hands as well as the intentions of the heart.380
Meagher believes distinctions such as the questions of internal intent, even the act of
forgiveness given by Jesus to his killers who said “they know not what they do”, become
entry points for the development of Just War Theory since “all sin, even the murder of
God, can be forgiven.”381

In this exploration of human agency and accountability,

Meagher poses the question by asking if “purity of heart” is perhaps even more
dangerous for the development of Just War Theory.382
Prior to the conversion of Constantine, Meagher makes the case that Christian
pacifism383 was widely accepted given the nonviolent orientation of Jesus and the

of God. In so doing, we relinquish any control of our own and yield to the stark dependency we have on
God alone. At stake here for Herdt is the possibility of division, alongside hypocrisy, how do we go
through the habitual process of “putting on virtue” while at the same time being ever newly transformed by
the grace and mercy of God? She advocates no division, but a singular mystery amid the ordinary
processes of life. In her chapter on Augustine, she is concerned with two aspects of his legacy. First, the
inner wrestling between Christian mimesis (that tries on virtue) alongside the problematic that creates for
virtue and formation. In addition, she wants to transform how the tradition has understood his disposition
toward the splendid vices and retrieve them as possibilities for formation today (45-46). For Herdt,
Aristotle tries to make the distinction between virtue and hypocrisy by his acknowledgement of the inner
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James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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beatitude “Blessed are the peacemakers” (Matthew 5:9).384

Meagher suggests that

pacifism was more supported through Christian scripture than the argument for clergy
celibacy.

However both killing and sexuality were seen as “polluting” actions

undesirable for the holiest Christian life.385

While there were movements prior to

Constantine to legitimize Christian violence through proof-texting, the general consensus
supported the pacifist nature of Jesus who discredited use of force. Those who took the
oath of military service to the Roman army repeated the words to the sacramentum
swearing allegiance to the emperor.386 Christianity transforms the sacramentum from an
oath made to the great “high priest of the Roman state religion”387 to the language of the
holiest element of Christianity: the sacraments of Baptism and Communion where wholly
other oaths and promises are made.
The conversion of Constantine and his subsequent profession of faith radically
challenged all prior assertions, particularly those related to war and killing. Meagher
explains, “Until the fourth century a Christian empire was an oxymoron. Now it was a
challenge. However unthinkable it was to imagine a Christian army, it was even more of
a stretch to entertain the idea of a nonviolent empire.”388 How would theologians provide
justification for killing in the name of the empire? Meagher credits Ambrose of Milan
and Augustine of Hippo with doing just that. Ambrose extrapolated on the courage of
384
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Moses, Joshua and David who discovered strength in battle for justice. For Ambrose, the
dimension of “justice” proved decisive as to whether or not a battle proved disgraceful:
“fortitude without justice is the source of wickedness. For the stronger it is, the more
ready it is to crush the weaker, whilst in matters of war one ought to see whether the war
is just or unjust.”389 Wars fought for the justice of God and/or for the just defense of
one’s civil life were proper and acceptable. Both Ambrose and Augustine found liberal
freedom in scriptural interpretation, far from literal readings, even when those
interpretations appeared ridiculous.

Consider for example, Meagher urges, how

Augustine’s exegesis of the famous Gospel text “turn the other cheek,”390 transformed
these words, so now, “these precepts pertain rather to the inward disposition of the
heart.”391 So, Augustine subjugates the physical demonstration of turning the other cheek
to the internal disposition of peace and charity, even if the outward action is anything but
charitable. For Augustine, this exegetical move was made possible by both an exegetical
approach to scripture that the spirit gives life, and the letter of the law kills, but also by
his understanding of the brokenness of the world given its fallen state.392 Meagher argues
a growing gulf between agency and accountability occurred as theologians sequestered
“inward disposition” as a validation for committing heinous acts of war for the empire
Even stranger than these exegetical moves, Meagher argues, is the belief of
Augustine that “killing in war could be dispassionate, free of anger, hatred, range,
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revenge, and thrill.”393 Here are the roots of a war “without” consequence, a war without
even the consequence of a wounded soul or a moral injury. Both Ambrose and Augustine
legitimized war, but only with the mandate of a sovereign authority.394 Meagher describes
the church at this time as having “a pacifist lump in their throat”395 that allowed the
institutional church to send their young men to war without subjecting their own selves to
its horrors.

Christianity aided and abetted sending young men off with “a clear

conscience” given the legitimizing moral authority of the governing power.396 Upon
return, the pollution of war required penance, perhaps even the possibility of abstinence
from the sacramentum of the church,397 even though the sacramentum of the military
oath prevailed.
Medieval theologian Peter Abelard echoed Augustine and Ambrose in accepting
inner disposition as primary over evil deeds. Abelard argues, “God alone pays attention
not so much to the deeds that are done as to the mind with which they are done [and] is
truly thinking about the guilt in our intention.”398

The pinnacle of Medieval

Christianity’s attitude toward war concludes with Thomas Aquinas who famously listed
three conditions for war’s acceptance and overall justice:
1.
2.

Declaration of war by a legitimate sovereign authority;
For the sake of a just cause;
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3.

Always done with right intention – toward peace, punishing evil, and/or
uplifting the good.399

It is useful here to compare these three petitions for “authority”, “rightness” and the “high
stakes” pursuit of peace and punishment of evil with Shay’s three petitions for the
qualification of a moral injury: “Betrayal of what is right by a person in authority in a
high stakes situation.” In his acclaimed book Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and
the Undoing of Character, Shay does not engage a conversation with either Just War
Theory nor with Ambrose, Augustine, Abelard or Aquinas. However, the language is
strikingly similar. Is Shay’s definition of moral injury a blatant or latent reminder of the
power and perseverance of this long-standing legitimizing theory of war? Meagher notes
the the discrepancy between the presumption of just war theory and a concern for those
who experience moral injury: “with the Thomistic doctrine of just war in place, the
church had little to say that was helpful to those who returned from a sanctioned war in
moral pain.”400 And, with practices of penance in slowly growing disregard during the
medieval period, public penance and the possibility of healing turns inward to “phantom
pain”401 now invisible to others causing grief to remain that no longer has an outlet nor an
end.
Meagher is clear in his assessment: Just war must die.402 And, the church must
do an “autopsy” to understand how the good news of the gospel became perverted
through a legitimizing empire. While Meagher notes solitary voices of dissent with a
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hope for a retrieval of pacifism, the systemic norm still avows Just War.403 Though the
theory of Just War in its totality is one that Meagher would like to disarm, even more so,
contemporary warfare in the age of machine guns and civilian arenas, no longer matches
the rules of proportionality and fair play that Just War espouses.404 Because the church
continues the lie of Just Warfare theory, soldiers, citizens and societies are prevented
from entering the potential spiritual journey of the dark night of the soul to wrestle with
warfare’s demons and corrupting pollution.405

Souls and societies instead languish

without the spiritual resources necessary to engage the deepest questions of humanity, sin
and Christian faith. Meagher makes the bold claim that Just War must die and the pursuit
of pacifism must be reignited, however, he does little to offer constructive discourse on
healing from moral injury. This neglect comes with a cost. Meagher lays out well the
interconnectedness between hyper-masculine sexuality, Just War and moral injury. And
he sets forth the complacency and interconnectedness of church and state in espousing
criteria for war that are just, and even in the overlapping arenas of the sacramentum –
those pledges to emperor in the court, and through Christ at the communion table.
Because of these intersecting spheres of life – government, family, sexuality, work,
military, personal faith, institutional church, and civic life – healing from moral injury
requires more than the death of a theory, and even more so new life within every sphere
of life that has been harmed by its legacy.
2.3.1.4

Brian S. Powers
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While Robert Meagher argues that the conceptualization of an “inward
disposition” allowed soldiers in a Christian empire to go to war, Theologian and Veteran
Brian S. Powers looks not within, but outward toward “disordered goods” as a cause of
moral injury.406 Powers’ explanation of “disordered goods” is based on an Augustinian
framework wherein the agency of humanity can be radically redirected by the powerful
tug of external forces that can further distort our own values. Moral injury then is
relocated from a problem lodged within the soul of a soldier to a systemic societal
problem. Powers critiques Shay and Litz for failing to name the “twisted and
distorted…axiological universe of the military endeavor.”407 These larger forces distort
the potency of human agency. Powers understands examines agency in light of the
Augustinian conception of “human willing;” human willing becomes morally injured
when it becomes distorted by the outward tug of forces beyond its own will. In so doing,
Powers radically redefines moral injury beyond the conceptualizations of Shay, Litz and
Meagher.

Powers contends that moral injury is “the realization that one’s moral

orientation, to which one commits his or her willing, is aligned toward a ‘good’ that is
ultimately false.”408 Such a definition introduces wholly new language and concepts
involving orientation, the will, alignment and falsehood. Instead of an inward hurt of a
moral code, Powers’ definition redirects thinking toward “pursuit of distorted and
poisoned moral goods.”409 Powers pushes us to consider social forces at play in moral
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injury to comprehend the way in which moral injury is “socially constituted” not solely
by a soldier’s actions, but by the larger “axiological universe”410 of social dynamics.
To make the Augustinian viewpoint perfectly clear, Powers extrapolates the
“moral autonomy”411 suggested by Pelagius that is wholly other than the enslavement to
original sin presented by Augustine. Original sin, foreign to Pelagius, exists congenitally
for Augustine.412 Human will, the center point of agency, is not capable of a truly
morally good choice because it is bound to sin. Augustine believed Pelagius too highly
prioritized agency. Pelagius differs from Augustine in presuming that human agency is
able to will the good, despite human tendencies toward sin.413

The will then, for

Augustine, is not a place of fully free choice, but instead “a modality in which human
agency takes place.”414 While Pelagius believed the will could overcome and act
independently both on its own accord as well as outside of socially conditioning
factors,415 Augustine argued otherwise. Humans no longer have the ability to “will
rightly”416 or to pursue “that which is truly good.”417 Instead, we tend to pursue “tribal
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goods”418 based on a distortion of the social good that happens through original and
institutional sin.419
Augustine paints a fascinating picture as he foretells Adam’s fall in the Garden of
Eden with a description of celestial angels who run astray. With their wills oriented
toward “disordered goods” they dismiss the goodness of God and pursue their own “tribal
goods.”420 Sin then, for Augustine, is both the responsibility of an individual whose will
has gone astray, and also the collective responsibility of a larger matrix with the
potentiality to distort perceptions of value and goodness.421 Powers draws on his military
experience to describe the particular way in which individual willing is subjected to the
larger system of military authority, wherein individual agency yields to a larger
hierarchy. Powers makes clear a subtle distinction between the “unraveling of agency”
that occurs through trauma422 and the “co-opted willing” of military life.423
These shifts in orientation regarding the nature of moral injury as “co-opted
willing” toward a systemic “disordered good” creates, according to Powers, three
strategic benefits. First, Powers argues this shift allows a more unified treatment of
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“acute and diffuse” moral injury.424 Second, Powers suggests this shift better understands
codes of ethics within military life where there are “limited moral choices”425 rather than
a broad array of possibilities. A soldier’s moral choice is not unraveled, flattened or
fragmented by their own choice, but by being co-opted within a larger system.426 Powers
understands this betrayal of authority in a much broader, more institutional, sense than
Shay’s personalization of betrayal. Finally, Powers argues the binary nature of “good”
and “bad” is removed by the shift, providing some necessary “breathing room” for the
veteran to contemplate the matrix within which one had to make the moral choice.427
Powers’ argument succeeds in balancing human responsibility as a willing personal agent
alongside the matrix of limited choices and distorted goods within the military complex.
Applying Augustinian theology to moral injury provides several helpful conduits
to explore.

Augustinian notions of original sin complicate clear and easy

conceptualizations of ‘morality’ that can too easily pervade in public discourse.
Acknowledging the larger matrices of systems and their tendency toward or against
morality is helpful recourse in understanding the locus of an injury as larger than a
veteran’s soul. A consideration of “goodness” and the “goods” we pursue adds, perhaps,
a sixth dimension to Meagher’s five-fold paradigm of moral injury that neglects a
trajectory to outward goods. Powers’ inclusion of the pursuit of “distorted goods” adds a
helpful nuance to previous definitions.
2.3.2

Critical Analysis of the Theological Discourse
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Scholars, Pastors, Psychiatrists and Sociologists have certainly navigated the
terrain of Moral injury laying out its dimensions, scope, repercussions and demands for
treatment and support. Within the depth and breadth of their thoughtful attention, key
lines of argument emerge from the theological reflection that build and expand on themes
presented in the concerns presented by the psychological scholarship. Those themes of
morality, injury and disability are revisited here with further critique. Before turning in
the following chapter to models of disability and the work of Deborah Creamer, in this
section I will highlight three concerns evidenced in the theological scholarship on Moral
injury: the predicament of medicalization and physical embodiment; the problem of
societal complacency; and the theological questions raised when limits are encountered
across fluid contexts. These lingering areas of focus are important to address because
they reverberate with medical, social and theological repercussions regarding the limits of
war and its aftermath on human individuals.

2.3.2.1

The Problem of Embodiment and Medical Connotations
A critical concern in the scholarship on Moral injury, as well as its all too

simplified conflation with PTSD, is a critique of the hyper-medicalized approach to
treatment when presenting symptoms are described. The medical world can all too easily
disintegrate into mechanized views of the body that separate muscle, breath and flesh
from morality, soul and life.428 Lost in this hyper-mechanized account are many deep
issues: for example, a robust conceptualization of what it means to be human, an
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understanding of trauma and its encodement into the body,429 a probing conversation
regarding the limits of technology, and a deep reflection on the proper aim of the medical
craft. Kinghorn is clearest in his critique of “the medical model and the means-end logic
of techne”430 whereby psychiatrists and psychologists are the soul care-providers to the
morally injured. The assumption of their work is an absolute end to suffering without
questioning if there is any meaningful suffering possible.
Conversation partners Kinghorn engages in this discussion range from Aristotle to
Joseph Dunne and Gerald McKenny to wrestle with the question: can suffering be healed
by medical technique?431 Kinghorn argues that a psychological approach such as Litz’s
assumes suffering must end. But with a turn to theology and the Christian narrative,
there can be a redemptive turn within suffering that provides meaning and sense-making
amid trauma. To make this point clear, Kinghorn turns to the work of philosopher Joseph
Dunne who questions scientific assumptions in the practices of psychotherapy and
medicine by reappropriating Aristotle’s thoughts on techne and phroenesis. In simple
terms, Aristotle describes techne as the ability “to make” and phroenesis as the ability “to
act.”432 Making, for Aristotle, is directed toward “an end other than itself”433 while acting
does not, phroenesis then is its own end. With techne, there is always a final product in
mind as the technician “fixes his gaze and increases or releases the tension
accordingly.”434 This begs the question then, to what exactly is the gaze fixed? Dunne
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argues against easy technical solutions to what appear to be technical problems and
invites alternative teleological ends to be considered.435
Theologian and Bioethicist Gerald P. McKenny builds on the work of Aristotle
and Dunne as he questions assumptions of modern bioethical claims to minimize
suffering and maximize choice.436 The problem with bioethics today is an avoidance of
analyzing these deeply held beliefs that prevents an articulation for alterative potential
values for suffering. If the relief of suffering is removed as the teleological end of
medical treatment, what could be imagined as another potential telos? While Kinghorn
briefly explores Aristotle, Donne and McKenny, perhaps an additional helpful
conversation partner would be Michel Foucault and his analysis of “bio-power.”437
Foucault argues that “bio-power” is operative through an overriding narrative presenting
a normative view of human life and ability. Under this narrative, human being itself
becomes a means to an end, with the end being a social conceptualization of normalcy.
Bio-power operates within a perception that it expands choices and therefore limits
suffering, but because bio-power is a tool used toward societal ends, instead it increases
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suffering and limits choices.438 Bio-power aids political structures and societal norms, at
the expense of human lives for example, in suggesting disability must be eliminated
because it causes suffering instead of imagining alternative narratives and medical
possibilities.439
In addition to Foucault, Kinghorn would benefit from conversation with
Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s and her work “Giving the Body Its Due,”
where she argues for a new metaphysics of the body to replace the “imbalance created by
Cartesian dualism.”440

This new metaphysics would replace the objectified,

disassociated, compartmentalized and thoroughly dissected view of the body that
dominates Western medical treatment suggesting all “injuries” may be treated by medical
applications, pharmaceutical products and the latest technological advancements and
suggests instead a new metaphysics is needed in the twenty-first century.441 Trauma in
the old metaphysics is subjected to the rationality of cognition as if “the body [was] drone
to an all-powerful, rational mind”442 rather than a metaphysics with a deeper sensibility of
embodiment and full-bodied humanity. Stress in the body is treated by anti-anxiety
medications, rather than attention to grief that becomes “fossilized” within the layers of
the body.443 Sheets-Johnstone articulates poetically, “The way to health in present-day
Western medicine is not by invocation but by ingestion.”444 Over time, disease became
disassociated from the larger body and reduced to isolated locations within a materialist
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conceptualization of the body rather than understanding the nexus of disease within the
wider systems of the body. In the face of this compartmentalization, Sheets-Johnstone
argues for a “corporeal turn”445 in medicine that rights the imbalance, gives the body its
due, and honors the truth of experience that becomes embedded within a body.
Sheets-Johnstone invites deeper reflection on embodiment with an eye toward
“giving the body its due” and self-reflection on medical models that err on mechanized
views of the body. Is it possible that theology and Christianity, perhaps at times, have
maintained mechanistic views of death? This is the question asked by Kent Drescher:
The development of moral injury in the psychological literature can be
interpreted as suggesting that the medicalization of psychological trauma—
embodied in both the diagnosis of PTSD as a mental illness, as well as in the
treatment of PTSD as a fear-based disorder—is a simplification of what it means
to survive a traumatic event. The construct of moral injury points to the need for
much more complex conceptualizations of suffering in the wake of trauma,
including traumatic acts that one may have perpetrated. Morally injurious
trauma of this type presents survivors with the inescapable task of
accommodating death into their life narrative. In the dominant cultures of
medicine and Christianity, death is something to be conquered, not something
that is permitted to remain. But it does remain for many who have survived
trauma, and psychotherapies and theologies that fail to make room for this
remainder will prove too shallow to accommodate the depths of human
suffering.446
What becomes embodied in Drescher’s account is not only the morally injurious event,
but the encounter with death itself. For Sheets-Johnstone, this encounter with death, as
well as encounters with situations of ongoing anxiety producing stress, result in the
fossilization of trauma within the body creating a “tonic immobility”447 where a chasm is
created between the body and its ability to heal itself.
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encounters, there is a “continually aborted grief”448 that creates a space for the
recapitulation of past traumatic events in daily life. Medical treatment is not the answer
for this embodied grief, instead, the corporeal turn may only occur through ritual.449
Ritual allows what German poet Rainer Maria Rilke calls “the life…unlived”450 of our
bodies to gain life, voice, expression, credence and honor. Reclaiming the “living sense
of the body” which has been suppressed through western medicine will allow healing and
greater sense making.451 Instead of progressive fragmentation and isolation of pain within
the body, corporeal reflection realized in ritual, will bring completion to the “continually
aborted grief.” In addition, the cultural history enfleshed and embedded within our
bodies will bear witness to a story greater than our own choices.452 Our bodies, by means
of this corporeal turn, will be recognized for the greater societal trauma embedded in
sinew, heart, mind and spirit.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone looks beyond western culture for insights on disease,
healing and trauma; her book includes essays from a multiplicity of global perspectives.
Japanese philosopher Yasuo Yuasa proposes a wholly other body scheme than the typical
Western Cartesian dualism.453 Yuasa envisions four circuits that are not self-sufficient
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systems, but instead are integrated in ways we can only begin to understand. They
include: the neurophysiological, the kinesthetic, the psychological and the emotionalinstinctual.454 In this schema, knowledge is gained through the body not by way of the
intellect. Even more so, the four-fold schema works together to produce a certain “kienergy” that can be disrupted when there is trauma to one portion of the quartet. Is it
possible then, for us to imagine, a disruption to the moral code embedded in one of these
four circuits within the body? And if so, what exponential effect might that disruption
have on the larger systems and the ki-energy, as Yasua, suggests?
Recognizing the challenge to traditional medical, and even psychological,
treatments, a 2016 team of scholars, of which Drescher is a part, suggests several
alternative therapies. With an eye to complementary and alternative medicine (CAM),
these scholars remain committed to “holism, empowerment, access, legitimacy, and
health, as opposed to sickness.”455 Their study assumes a disconnect within traditional
treatments and argues for alternative therapies including: Adaptive Disclosure (AD),
Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR),
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy
(MBCT). In light of these advances, the team of scholars advocates a support mechanism
other than these “alternative” treatments. Despite their turn away from medicalization
and the metaphysics of Descartes, these avenues for treatment are still not enough. They
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suggest spiritual care through ongoing pastoral counseling as a necessary component to
the success beyond any of these treatments alone.456
Sheets-Johnstone, Kent Drescher, Yasuo Yuasa, and the team of scholars in the
2016 study led by Marek Kopacz identify the inability of a purely “medical model” to
address the wound behind moral injury.

According to Sheets-Johnstone, medical

treatment needs a “corporeal turn” to reclaim a metaphysics of the body. Kent Drescher
argues space must be made in treatment for the narratives of death experienced in realtime and then embedded for all time within the body. And, the scholars led by Marek
Kopacz identify the inability of medical and psychological treatment alone to tend to the
many dimensions of moral injury, spiritual care (Reiki, prayer, rituals, etc.) is a necessary
complement to any medical treatment.

In conclusion, let this be perfectly clear: a

medical approach is insufficient for diagnosis, treatment and ongoing support of the
morally injured veteran; their injury is deeper than any medical art can heal.

2.3.2.2

The Problem of Social Dimensions
Just as Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone prompts a shift in thinking

beyond standard medical practices for moral injury to include larger considerations of
embodiment, theological reflection prompts a shift from seeing the soldier and his or
wounds as a singular, individual concern, but a more complex societal and institutional
one. This shift raises serious matters: the often unjust social forces at play in creating the
military457, the social distortion of “goods” pursued,458 the greater moral injury latent
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within the larger society, the glaring lack of society’s inability to mourn and grieve war
and loss, and the institutional sin of social power.459 These sizeable, consequential and
hyper-complex topics should shoulder some of the ‘injury’ our veterans feel; but all too
often, soldiers are left paralyzed by these greater structures at play in society.460 While
the literature in review has addressed several critical themes, three additional notes will
be addressed here regarding socially constituted bodies, social trauma461 and social grief.

Social Injustice and Socially Constituted Bodies
A discussion of moral injury must attest to social forces that shape the military;
forces often based on class, race and social location. For some, voluntary enlistment
Soldiers,” National Priorities Project, February 18, 2009, http:’’nationalpriorities.org; and, for a historical
perspective see: Sara Turner and John Bound, “Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the
G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans,” Journal of Economic
History 63, no. I (March 2003): 145-77.
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provides a paycheck, identity and career where otherwise impossible. Recently, J.D.
Vance wrote in his biography Hilbilly Elegy of the Marine Corps as his only escape from
the poverty that entrenched his family system and limited his future possibilities.462 Rita
Nakashima Brock’s opening chapter of Soul Repair “I Became a Soldier” frames the
social injustice of military service. For example, she notes:
“The numbers are significant: almost three-fourths of U.S. troops in Iraq were
from towns where per capita income fell below the national average. Military
recruiters, drive by quotas, work in offices found in poorer areas of cities, and
new Army recruits come primarily from lower to middle class communities,
southern states, and black, Hispanic and Asian communities, according to
official U.S. Army data…. In neighborhoods with high crime levels or in
unstable or abusive families, military service may offer greater safety and what
one man termed, ‘three hots and a cot.”463
Theologian, veteran and Dean at Boston University Pamela Lightsey spoke eloquently of
the classism, racism, and sexism rampant within military recruitment in a 2016 lecture at
The Chautauqua Institution in a week whose overarching theme was moral injury.464
Lightsey draws on Judith Butler’s concept of “socially constituted bodies”465 to describe
the poor, young,466 uneducated,467 racially divided body of military enlistees. War is not
462
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the only violence these enlistees face, Lightsey claims, they face “national violence”468
against them when the institutional sins of racism and classism injure them. She argues,
“We enter the military as “socially constituted bodies” and the moral injury faced in the
military can have rippling effects across social contexts for generations. Lightsey notes
the ongoing and continually unfolding social constitution of bodies: bodies are shaped
socially prior to military engagement and they are shaped further by the social structures
of the military and the call of service there.469
Lightsey provides, to what she deems the nascent field of moral injury, the
“complicating inquiry” of “social contexts” to complicate the landscape and language of
the unfolding discussion. She explains that, “Our social interactions help shape who we
are, help shape our thoughts about our world, and how we comport ourselves daily. This
also means our perspectives about war are also impacted by our social contexts and also
differ based on those contexts and our experiences in this world…. We can not talk about
moral injury unless we acknowledge social context has some impact as well.” Lightsey is
not only a veteran, her son Dweylon serves as well. Their stories are featured in Brock’s
Soul Repair470 and Lightsey serves on the Board of the Soul Repair Foundation. Her
lecture’s title may be named the “honorable discharge to dishonorable conditions”;
however, her focus reveals the dishonorable structures of society revealed before, during
and after military life that comport and distort human bodies, minds and souls.
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Social trauma
Rita Nakashima Brock acknowledging the forces both Powers and Lightsey
recognize are at play in our social fabric, adds an interesting twist to the social
implications for moral injury in her current work, by suggesting larger trauma systemic in
societal structures that have gone undiagnosed, untreated and whose latent grief and
power have a gravitational pull we can only begin to imagine. Brock’s background in
trauma studies and her own familial history informed and directed her desire to draw
theology into conversation with moral injury, in so doing, she greatly furthered the
conversation and created both “The Soul Repair Center” as well as “The Truth
Commission on Conscience in War.” To further the conversation now, Brock believes a
reckoning with larger systems of moral injury is key to addressing individual injury. She
writes:
When an entire community has experienced moral injury, it must process its
suffering or it can over-determine its identity and erupt as mistrust, toxic
relationships, and suspicion of outsiders. Communities that fail to address moral
injury can also inflict it by losing themselves in a victim identity and being
unable to see their own power and responsibility or the harm they cause. Akin
to a low grade fever, moral injury saps the energy for human flourishing, and it
can erupt as a full-fledged life-threat when ordinary activities and life tasks fail
to repress its invisible suffering….When and how it emerges in a life or a
community is dependent upon how social and cultural meaning systems and
taboos are enacted and how moral failures and traumas are processed.471
While it may seem counter-productive to divert attention from individual trauma toward
larger communities of the morally injured, Brock’s argument is clear. To address moral
injury at the micro level, it must be addressed socially on a macro level. Doing so will
require discernment and recognition, but even more so exploration of both the meaning
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systems and how traumas are grieved and processed within communities as a whole.472
Jonathan Shay argues for a “communalization of the trauma”473 that disrupts social
conventions that work all too often to “deflect, deny, and forget trauma narratives.”474
As we continue to work through the Veterans’ Creed written by Judge John Reed
for recitation at the Mercer Country Veterans’ Court, it should be noted that implied
within the creed, though not explicitly stated, is an acknowledgement of shared trauma by
the veterans. When the creed is recited at each session of the Veterans’ Court, certainly
the creed itself has meaning, but perhaps there is also an implied stress and grief that goes
unnamed, but is understood amid the camaraderie.

Social grief
Political Theologian John Kiess invites a shift in thinking from complacency
about war’s mentality to grief about war’s moral complexity and tragedy. In his purview,
a soldier’s private pain cannot be separated from a greater societal context. Just as
standard medical models cannot diagnose and treat moral injury, current models do not
exist within society for “giving grief its due.” Instead, a soldier is left to deal privately
with personal pain rather than engaging in a larger societal ritualization of weeping,
grieving, mourning, and perhaps, healing. To make this argument, Kiess draws on
Augustine and the “politics of mourning” he expresses in his theological thinking.475
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Kiess finds it surprising that Augustine critiques the Roman culture of his day for
failing to grieve476 because Augustine is well known for his “misgivings about mourning
in the face of loss.”477 For example, Kiess points to the shame Augustine articulates in his
own Confessions about the tears he shed over the death of his mother, “I closed her eyes;
and there flowed a great sadness on my heart and it was passing into tears, when at the
strong behest of my mind my eyes sucked back the fountain dry, and sorrow was in me
like a convulsion.”478 Certainly, shame in crying as a response to the death of his mother
is not in the same realm as tears shed and shame embodied over a morally injurious
situation, however, the shame Augustine experienced in his deeply personal grief
regarding his mother is helpful for our reflection. The act of grieving, first of all,
demonstrates a particular way that loves may be ordered479 wherein love for human life
does not exceed love for God.480
Second, Augustine considers grief as formative in the development of moral
judgment.481 When these are considered together, we must then ask what a “rightly
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ordered grief” looks like in a society, as well as, considering what wrongly ordered grief
might activate. While Augustine criticized the Roman society for a failure to grieve,
Kiess is certainly at work offering that critique of our society today. If, as Jonathan Shay
suggests, “Moral injury is the “betrayal of what is right by a person in authority in a high
stakes situations” could this definition be extended beyond the war arena, to the high
stakes situation of a society welcoming a soldier home? If so, could we then extend
Shay’s definition to suggest the person in authority is the greater society, who in
neglecting to grieve and mourn what has been lost at war, inflicts a moral injury upon the
confused soldier who questions the moral judgment of the greater societal landscape?
Several Augustinian scholars have argued that “rightly ordered grief” becomes a
place of moral formation and effects the development of virtue over time in individuals
and in the institutions of society.482 Public grief then becomes a critical element of
citizenship, when neglected, causes the loss of virtue and the diminishment of moral
formation. Kiess describes Augustine’s Rome as “a society whose craving for spectacle
and love of glory leaves it fundamentally alienated from reality and incapable of
acknowledging loss.” This wrongly ordered grief represents an incapacity to grieve
disallowing Roman citizens from coming to the truth about a need for social and political
reform and the fragility of their eroding community.483
What we need to remember from Kiess’ work regarding the failure of a society to
grieve is this: Our work “Entails coming to see how the effects of individual injuries are
not self-contained, but rupture the deeper relationships and bonds of trust that are a
482
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precondition for everyone’s flourishing.”484 While the problem of moral injury could be
placed on the shoulders of the individual soldier, a key theme that needs further
exploration is the societal responsibility for war: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post
bellum.485 Key to this societal responsibility is the active work of grief, which Kiess
describes as “the slow work of reconstituting the moral boundaries that violence has
disrupted.”486 When society loses the inability to grieve, as well as the inability to
reconstitute those violated moral boundaries, chaos and blame ensues. Consider, for
example, Vietnam Veterans who were treated like moral outcasts upon return home.
Mahedy notes “Like Pontius Pilate, like Lady Macbeth, the American people washed
their hands of the war assuaging their own consciences by treating the veterans as moral
outcasts.”487
From these discussions further by Brock, Lightsey, Powers, Kinghorn, Kiess and
others, it is clear that social structures, conditions and injustices must be explored for
their effect in causing, contributing to and sustaining moral injury. For the soldier who
feels the weight of the trauma alone on her shoulders, this social analysis is absolutely
necessary. However, like the medical social, the social model is not enough to describe,
analyze and begin to mend moral injury. Ultimately, social creation of moral injury is
certainly an element of the problem, but not the whole. The medical model addresses
wounded bodies, the social model probes the social constitution of our bodies and our
failure to grieve the effects of that social constriction, but further questions remain.
484
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These further questions drive this study to probe “the limit model of disability” for
furthering the understanding of moral injury and appropriate responses.

2.3.2.3

The Problem of Shifting Limits across Contexts
Author and veteran Tyler Boudreau describes a fascinating quandary in his article,

“The Morally Injured” as he outlines what he calls an “unremarkable” trip to a farmhouse
in Iraq. His story is worthy of note because it points to a problem difficult to pinpoint,
but one important to our unfolding conversation – the problem of shifting limits across
varied contexts – and the consequences of those shifts in our consideration of moral
injury. His story unfolds like this:
The search itself was conducted flawlessly: I watched from my vehicle as the
marines knocked on the front door. A man answered and, through an
interpreter, they politely explained that we needed to search the premises for
weapons and bomb-making materials. They asked him if he’d mind stepping
outside with his wife and children while we looked around. The man was
cooperative and amiable. There was no shouting or pushing. The marines wore
friendly smiles. They stepped gently through the house and were careful to
replace anything they moved. Outside, other marines chatted playfully with the
kids and gave them pieces of candy. When the search was complete and nothing
was found, we thanked the man and apologized for the inconvenience. It was
over. Not a shot was fired, not a drop of blood or a tear was shed, and yet, as we
withdrew from that farmhouse and roared off into the night, I felt something
inside me begin to hurt. What can I call that hurt?488
Boudreau’s vignette is helpful in suggesting a form of moral violation that does not begin
with overt violence. Certainly the scene reveals an imbalance of power across cultures,
but that imbalance is only notable when we recognize the shift in limits across social
contexts. In another scenario, this vignette might be acceptable. But in this context, the
acceptable limits have shifted, provoking discomfort for Boudreau.
488
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For Boudreau,

stepping over the limits of the household violated his sensibility of power and its unjust
force and affect on a local family. In this moment, Boudreau’s agency was disabled.
The previous sections of critical analysis explored a medical problem – the
problem of embodiment – within the literature of moral injury, as well as a social
problem – the problem of disabling social systems in creating moral injury. Here, we
tend to a slightly different nuance that occurs socially, but across varied contexts, for
moral injury. Brian S. Powers aids in this discussion when he speaks of “disordered
goods.” In so doing, he acknowledges a morality that is perfectly ‘able’ when ordered
toward the good, and the right and the just within a society. But, when by means of
Augustinian original sin, those goods become “disordered” and “false”489 the shift in
context creates a disablement that had not previously been there. In this broken and
disfigured world, the agency of a soldier becomes subject to what Powers deems “a
limited horizon of choice.”490 When choices become limited in varied horizons and
contexts, agency that might be perfectly able and capable in certain contexts is suddenly
disabled and violated. Interaction with such a limit evokes feelings of guilt and shame
similar to the grief a victim of trauma might experience.
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Here, then, is a key insight. The scholarship of moral injury fails to recognize and
address the role of shifting morality and agency across varied social contexts. Robert
Meagher makes strides forward in his book Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and
Just War as he describes shifting rules of morality and coordinating limits in the varied
contexts of sexual mores, the war arena and even theological reflection and the church as
issues of ‘just war’ are discussed and negotiated. While his work is a difficult read,
particularly in his descriptions of necrophilia491 and its relationship to war, he draws
closer in the field to naming certain ‘abling’ and ‘disabling’ aspects of agency across
varied social contexts.
As we consider the need for the present study, this issue of varied limits
experienced and/or transgressed across varied social contexts will be important. This will
be evidenced as we soon examine a hypothetical soldier, Arthur Rowanberry, upon return
home from battle. In the context of the war arena, he is a hero. As he returns home, to
his own local farm, all that he has experienced more and more disables him. What made
sense in one arena, no longer makes sense at home. The question remains, what will
Arthur Rowanberry do with this new knowledge? And, how will he now live?

2.4

Veteran Rowanberry and the Need for the Present Study
Theologian and Social Ethicist Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon argues in his essay

“Moral Injury as Inherent Political Critique: The Prophetic Possibilities of a New Term”
that the embodied knowledge gained through moral injury must bear witness and
mobilize the veteran toward a cultural self-critique. He makes clear: “Moral injury is not
491
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to be thought of only as harm incurred but as burdensome knowledge embodied that
concerns one’s self and one’s culture and society. In some cases, such experiential
knowledge can and should form a a politically engaged social ethic.”492 WiinikkaLydon’s approach provides the veteran experiencing moral injury an “active” and
mobilizing response to their existential crisis rather than a “passive” victimized one. In
so doing, he nudges the solider to find meaning in their injury that will lay claim upon an
unjust society, such a claim, according to Wiinikka-Lydon is a “prophetic insight.”493
Wiinikka-Lydon’s argument is fruitful as it recognizes the “epistemological
crisis”494 at the heart of moral injury. While Wiinikka-Lydon’s acknowledgement of a
missing piece in both the psychological and theological scholarship of moral injury is an
important starting point, I would argue that a few steps are necessary between the
awareness of that “epistemological crisis” and the ensuing pursuit of social justice. First,
while Wiinikka-Lydon’s does well to shift the language to “epistemological crisis,” that
language does not honor the deep questions of embodiment internalized by moral injury.
The shift moves us from our bodies, to our minds, recapitulating the Cartesian dualism
that divides rather than integrates. His reason for suggesting the shift is “to see moral
injury not as a disability but as indicative of destabilizing knowledge, or at least, its
potential.”495 The problem with dismissing “disability” as onerous or oppressive is
precisely the reason disability scholarship emerged in the first place.

Owning and

embracing one’s disability as a first step toward epistemological knowledge can deepen
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embodiment within one’s own body and strengthen a liberation ethic toward our societal
body. Even more so, claiming disability not as a curse, but as a generative source of
knowledge regarding our body, the social body and the very body of God can be
liberative and a compelling beginning for a social ethic. Disability, as reclaimed through
the voices of excellent scholars and academics, is a unique and generative source of
“destabilizing knowledge.”
The additional step to add between Wiinikka-Lydon’s “epistemological crisis”
and an ethic of social justice is a theological lingering on the prophetic insights gained
from the crisis. For example, Wiinikka-Lydon draws on the work of anthropologist
Veena Das and her terminology of “poisonous knowledge”496 to describe the experience
unwanted instruction gained through violence – both intimate and societal violence.497
The rich terminology of poisonous knowledge urges deeper theological reflection perhaps
through Rita Nakashima Brock’s exploration of the Garden of Eden or Brian S. Power’s
exposition of original sin and disordered goods. While this theological reflection is
beyond the scope of Wiinikka-Lydon’s excellent essay that succeeds in moving the
scholarship on moral injury forward toward political critique, the loss and its potential for
theological reflection should be noted and amended.
The theological neglect, though I believe Wiinikka-Lydon truly values theology
as insight for epistemological knowledge, may be seen in the following statement:
“Moral injury can be thought of as a form of epistemological crisis born of the experience
of political violence where the knowledge from wartime experience undermines one’s
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moral, political, and social worldview….sustained through political relationships and
power struggles both at home and in the war theater.”498 Here, Wiinikka-Lydon confronts
the moral, political and social limits provoked by moral injury. But two limits are
missing from this list – first, the limits of embodiment and second the limits of theology.
Perhaps the need for further study can best be articulated through considering a
veteran himself. Take for example, the fictional character of Arthur Rowanberry who
returns to his hometown farm after years of war described by author Wendell Berry in his
short story “The Long Walk Home.” At his best, one can imagine Veteran Rowanberry
reciting the Veterans’ Creed embodying both the best and most difficult facets of service
to which it attests:
I mastered the weapons of war and became expert in defense and security – and
I make no apology for my skills. I am a warrior and have seen and done things
that many may not understand. I have proudly served my country with honor
and dignity. I am one in fifteen – a seven-percenter – a member of a team
spanning the nation – veteran brothers and sisters, bonded by our common
values and experiences.
At worst, one can imagine as Berry does Rowanberry’s disquieted change: “From a man
in the light on the outside of the world, he was transformed in the twinkling of an eye into
a man in the dark on the inside of himself, in pain, and he thought that he was dead.”499
Our society is in crisis as we welcome home the living dead, the many Arthur
Rowanberry’s of our day.

Tending to their despairing spirits must go beyond

medicalization and societal judgment and complacency. In the face of this pressing need,
theologians, psychiatrists, activists and veterans are working to respond in order to
prevent the twenty-two suicides a day by veterans who succumb to the despair of moral
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injury.

Certainly, Jonathan Shay’s lifetime of psychiatric treatment is a legacy of

listening and healing, but he would argue, this is still not enough. Certainly, Rita
Nakashima’s Soul Repair Center at the Brite Divinity School offers resources not
available at local VA hospitals, not providing therapy, but offering networks of resources,
reflection, and most importantly, relationships.500 And consider the program encouraged
by Camillo Bica, a U.S. Marine Corps Vietnam Veteran, in his documentary Thank You
for Your Service where he argues for a “Behavioral Health Corps” that could attend to the
wounds of spirit not able to be treated by current VA hospitals.501 The efforts of Shay,
Brock and Bica are highly admirable in both their care for individuals in despair and in
their labors to shout to a society all too unwilling to hear the depth of that despair and
their complacency. What is needed are ongoing studies building on their efforts to further
define the landscape of the problem, to listen deeply to untold trauma and to create
institutional structures that respond to the pain.

Doing so will require an

acknowledgement of disability, neither as a political term, nor as one that is pejorative;
but instead, a recognition of disability’s claim and liberating potential. Perhaps most
needed, is sustained theological reflection that can equip the church and academy to
embrace a community of people who are still standing at the cross on Good Friday where
all morality has imploded and a new frontier must be navigated. This new frontier must
explore new landscapes of human embodiment, new rituals for grief and mourning across
society, and ultimately, must raise new theological reflection on the questions about God,
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self and humanity in the face of moral injury.502 Imagining Arthur Rowanberry living
into the prophetic critique Wiinikka-Lydon proposes requires several steps beyond
epistemological knowledge: first, a claiming of disability and its liberatory potential;
second, a wrestling with theological ramifications; and third, a living into a social ethic
that is prophetic and transformative of political structures and sin.
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Chapter 3
Disability Theology: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

I will help them face and conquer their enemies, including the demons from within.
I will never abandon an injured veteran teammate.
If they need support – I will carry them.
- The Veterans’ Creed503
3.1

Introduction
In chapter two we reviewed the psychological and theological scholarship on

moral injury: highlighting underdeveloped accounts of “morality” and “injury,”
questioning the potential of “disability” as a possible framework in which to gain insight
into moral injury, and examining questions of embodiment in an overly medicalized
world, social entanglements amid personal suffering, and notions of shifting limits and
the questions raised of self, God and other in the face of those limits. In this chapter, we
will continue to develop the conversation between moral injury and disability recognizing
the risks and potential of engaging that exploration. In so asking, we will investigate
what moral injury might gain from disability scholarship as well as what moral injury
might lose. Moving forward will require the recognition that the definition of disability
changes at different points in the scholarship depending on the locus of emphasis in the
schema.

To accomplish this task it will be necessary to do the following: outline the

notion of disability as problematic to the field of moral injury, consider why moral injury
needs to wrestle with the scholarship on disability, explore why disability needs to reflect
on moral injury, and then, consider three possible options for moving forward in the
503
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conversation.

After presenting these arguments, we turn to a review of historical

accounts of disability in the work of key theologians, describing themes and tensions
present in their accounts, continue with a review of contemporary Christian accounts of
disability that adopt three different frameworks: a liberation framework, a framework of
social analysis, and frameworks of theological doctrines and their implications. Finally,
we will focus more closely on selected themes and questions probed by these scholars
and consider their implications for moral injury. The study in this chapter will lay the
groundwork for chapter four, where we will probe three working models of disability (the
medical model, the social model and the constructive “limit model” presented by
theologian Deborah Creamer as an alternative) and assess their strengths and weaknesses
for providing exploratory frameworks for moral injury. We will see in this thorough
overview how contemporary scholarship on disability, as a whole, rejects notions of
disability as shameful, terminal, judgmental and dismissive; and instead, views disability
as provocative and full of potential – not in an instrumentalizing way, but in a
humanizing recognition of flesh, world, and the transformation that can occur between
the two.

3.2

Disability as Problematic Terminology for Moral Injury
Disability is a taboo word in the field of moral injury. For veterans like Tyler

Boudreau, the language stigmatizes and fails to honor the complexity of the injury
experienced; here, disability is shameful. For Psychiatrists like Brett Litz and Jonathan
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Shay, who might honor the disabling conditions of moral injury,504 the language of
disability yields to clinical methods, needs addressed and problems solved. Without the
clinical diagnosis and treatment, “disability” deems a veteran incapable in various
spheres of life.505 In this case, disability is terminal. For politicians, who perceive the
disabling language of moral injury as a critique of authority,506 disability is judgmental.
For some theologians, the language of disability is a dismissal of other forces at work.
Veteran Tyler Boudreau and Theologian Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon provide two compelling
examples of rejecting “disability” because the language is shameful, terminal, judgmental
and dismissive; consider, for example, Boudreau’s critique:
Moral injuries are not about benefits or blame. They're not about treatment or
medications. They're not about disability. They are about our society and our
moral values. A moral injury is not inherently the same thing as a war crime,
though clearly the two ideas overlap. But when we talk about war crimes, we
seek justice; when we talk about moral injuries; we seek a deeper understanding
of our humanity. We seek healing, in some spiritual sense.507
Boudreau’s experience in Iraq and subsequent moral and theological reflection is
honorable and worthy of sustained examination for its soul-bearing witness, and perhaps
even more so, its subtle reframing of how we configure moral injury. As we proceed
forward with the argument in this chapter, it will be important to keep Boudreau’s
reactive critique to the language of disability in mind. He argues moral injury is not a
disability; instead, moral injury is about society.

However, the notion of societal

infliction of disability is precisely one of the helpful frameworks the field of disability
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can offer moral injury. In addition, he argues moral injury is not a disability; but does
take us to a deeper exploration of our humanity. Disability theory certainly intends that
same exploration. The place where his assumption is correct is in his recognition that
disability, in its current scholarly presentation, does not tend toward critical reflection on
moral values.
As we proceed forward in our arguments here, we will move forward toward a new
form of a moral framework of disability that encompasses the disabling which occurs
across moral worlds when different limits are transgressed and shame ensues. Before
outlining exactly how that task will be accomplished, it is worth nothing one more
rejection of “disability” by Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon.

While Boudreau reacts to the

language of disability, he recognizes the social entanglements of moral injury and the
deep questions raised regarding human nature and the need for spiritual healing.
Wiinikka-Lydon has a similar reaction to the language of disability, but adds another
dimension to moral injury not as social entanglement, nor a spiritual barrier, but as an
epistemological framework. He writes,
A key way to do this, I argue, is to see moral injury not as a disability but as
indicative of destabilizing knowledge, or at least, its potential. What is referred
to as a moral injury may often be the felt result of experience and so is
something that requires engagement that might not be best understood as
healing, but instead, as a form of epistemological conversion or reconfiguration.
Such experience will give rise to moral dissonance that disturbs one’s
worldview and ethos, disturbs their entire moral subjectivity.508
Wiinikka-Lydon’s critique assumes that disability prevents “destabilizing knowledge”
and resists its potential to bear witness to political systems and prophetic insights.509 The
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combined reactions of Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon dismiss the field of disability as
not offering insight into social implications, not asking deep reflections into the nature of
humanity, and not providing an epistemological framework through which to engage
experience.

As we move forward in this chapter, we will examine the disability

scholarship of historical and contemporary theologians who wrestled with exactly these
kinds of questions. For example, we will see in the contemporary work of Nancy
Eiesland an analysis of the social structures that create disability, a clear rejection of the
assumption that disability cannot prompt a liberatory ethic. In the historical review, we
will see the existential questions raised by Soren Kierkegaard regarding self and God in
the face of disability. And, as we examine the scholarship of Deborah Creamer, we will
see her rejection of the assumption that disability cannot cause an “epistemological
conversion,” instead, we will learn from her how disability presents new knowledge as
various limits are confronted. Perhaps, Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon provide firstperson accounts and scholarly reflection that caution us to proceed carefully.

3.2.1

Why Moral Injury Needs Disability
Before turning to a historical review of various Christian scholarship on disability,

at this juncture it is important to consider what the scholarship on disability might offer
moral injury, as well as the reverse. In a recent essay, “Why Theology Needs
Disability,”510 Tim Basselin suggests a rapprochement between two distinct disciplines.
Basselin understands here the problem with the notion that theology might need
International Journal of Christianity and Education 20:1 (March 2016): 49-66. He argues that
epistemological constructs of disability must be very careful to not stigmatize and therefore create
hierarchies of superiority. Dong so minimizes real improvement to the lives of those who are disabled.
510
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disability. Claiming disability as a need for theology all too easily falls into the trap of
minimizing and instrumentalizing disability. His essay so starts with a quote from
disability scholar and Theologian Thomas Reynolds, “Employing disability for mere
theological gain is to be vigilantly guarded against.”511 The same critique is important in
both directions as we consider the relationship between disability and moral injury. Yes,
moral injury needs disability, but not at the expense of utilizing disability solely as a
means to an end. Basselin draws on a multitude of disability scholars whose work will be
reviewed in full later in this chapter under current scholarship on disability.

We

introduce these scholars briefly here in considering Basselin’s argument but will consider
them in depth later in the chapter.
Reynolds critiques “the cult of normalcy” which is evident in our fixation and
reliance upon autonomy.512 It is this challenge to autonomy where, Baseelin argues,
theology might gain strength and direction. However, before pushing forward Basselin
pauses, wisely, to confess our own complacency within disabling structures of thought
and societal interaction. He draws on two scholars in the field of disability and theology,
Nancy Eiesland and Helen Betenbaugh, to make two claims. First, alongside Eiesland,
he claims the true meeting of theology and disability, with an eye to justice, will shake
theological foundations of the church by setting aside claims to wholeness and perfection
that are deeply engrained into church life and theology without question.513 Second,
along with Betenbaugh, he contemplates the possibility of living an “Easter life” in a
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“Good Friday body.”514 Such a claim begins to push back on assumptions of wholeness
and perfection by embodying bodily brokenness as an everyday reality. This claim
rejects assumptions of abelism inherent in church structures and doctrines. Theology can
gain from reenergizing our understanding of the kind of dependency and vulnerability
Eiesland, Betenbaugh and the L’arche communities witness to and live within. Herein,
there are new paths of openness to the power of God configured and “perfection”
(Matthew 5:48) is radically redefined as perfection in vulnerability and dependency, not
in perfected bodies. Working within such a framework allows the possibility of the
“transvaluation” theologian Frances Young sees occurring within the L’arche
communities.515
Basselin concludes by demonstrating that a renewed relationality reframes and
reconstructs theology. He looks to the work of Amos Yong who reimagines the doctrines
of creation, the Holy Spirit and soteriology within his book Theology and Down
Syndrome.516 The doctrine of Creation takes new life when we move from linking fallen
humanity to particular disabled bodies, to widening that stance to see the fall within
social structures.517 Soteriology is reframed by understanding a more communal sense of
salvation.518

The Holy Spirit is revisioned by seeing “multiple forms of corporeal

flourishing,” instead of a societally dictated singular form of flourishing as a societal
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norm.519 Basselin succeeds in showing the breadth and depth disability scholarship can
bring to the norms and assumptions of theology. Can we imagine the same to be true, that
moral injury needs disability as well? If so, categories within moral injury addressing
questions of embodiment, social structures, systemic injustice, moral codes, diagnosis,
treatment, and shame might be deepened by further engagement with the scholarship of
disability.
In addition to Basselin, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson offers further reinforcement
regarding the importance of disability as a particular source of knowledge. GarlandThomson presents here a series of “counter-eugenic arguments”520 to conserve the
category of disability. She sees disability as a “generative resource”521 rather than a
problem or liability. She believes disability has the potential to “gather us into the
everyday community of embodied humankind.”522 In so arguing, Garland-Thomson
deepens the commitment of Tyler Boudreau to more fully comprehend the humanitarian
effects of moral injury and their potentially disabling repercussions.

For example,

Boudreau offers this lament as his first person account of moral injury progresses:
And the only way Americans can fathom the meaning of this term, "moral
injury," is to acknowledge the humanity of the Iraqis. The two ideas are
inseparable. What I've found most difficult for people to grasp (and for a while
this was hard for me, too) is the full range of "moral injuries" sustained in
Iraq.523
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While we’ve acknowledged Boudreau’s initial resistance to the framework of disability,
we can see in this account the potential (to be clear at this point the language is used with
necessary caution) mutual disabling of soldiers and societies.
According to Garland-Thomson, disability, in our culture, has the potential to
create what Malu Fontes calls “strangers in their own land”524 and certainly we see that
possibility in Boudreau’s reflection on the Iraqis in the aftermath of war. Julia Kristeva
portrays the cultural dissonance that continues to reverberate by saying, “the disabled
person opens a narcissistic identity wound in the person who is not disabled.”525
Garland-Thomson recognizes the exilic and narcissistic identities found in the personal
and cultural experience of disabling conditions.

She aims to create positive

comprehensions of disability by counter-posing her conception of the “inherent
dynamism of flesh” against other stereotypes. She proceeds to define disability as “the
transformation of flesh as it encounters the world.”526 In this pilgrimage of life, our
bodies are dynamic, fluid and constantly in transformation.527 We are pliable beings, so
much so, Garland-Thomson argues that “disability is perhaps the essential characteristic
of being human.”528 Perhaps, scholarship in moral injury can only move forward with
further reflection on that essential category of being human, and if so, incorporating
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Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s insight that disability is an essential aspect of our
humanity as it transforms over time and space. Certainly we understand Boudreau’s
caution regarding the language of disability, his goal first and foremost is “to get the idea
of ‘moral injury’ out there.”529 We proceed with caution here, guided by Boudreau, to not
overly sentimentalize Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s account of disability. And yet, just
as Boudreau invites us to probe our collective humanity and the impacts of our actions
across space and time; so too does Garland-Thomson prompt an account of
transformations that occur through our daily interactions in this world.
To protect and conserve disability, according to Garland-Thomson, several things
must happen: disability must be seen as a resource, perhaps even, as a place for making
meaning in the world.530 With this argument Garland-Thomson indirectly addresses the
concern of Wiinikka-Lydon who subtly dismisses disability as a category for
epistemelogical knowledge.

According to Garland-Thomson, disability provides a

setting for human beings to develop character and voice that the dominant culture needs
to preserve and to hear, an “epistemic resource” that generates knowledge and “minority
ways of knowing” and perceiving the world.531 Likewise, disability must be seen as an
ethical resource.532 She looks here to Michael J. Sandel who says disability moves us
from aesthetic resource to ethical resource.533

Such a shift to the ethical from the

aesthetic initiates a conversation about the problem of suffering. She understands our
culture wanting to all too quickly eradicate suffering and to solve the problem. However,
529
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if we listen carefully and cautiously we might hear how “suffering expands our
imagination about what we can endure.”534 Garland-Thomson sees the work of eugenics
as an act of control – one that want to manipulate the future. Disability counters that by
calling the individual radically into the present moment and also, to what she deems “an
open future”535 untethered by other narratives and expectations. Narratives of normalcy
are then halted, and the invitation to living with the unfolding (rather than the fixing) of
disability is initiated. The conservation of disability for moral injury would then reject
notions of shame, terminal illness, and judgment inherent in the literature of moral injury
and its perspective toward disability seen so far.

3.2.2

Why Disability Needs Moral Injury
Having examined moral injury’s need for attention on the scholarship of

disability, the reverse is important to explore for a moment as well. Is it possible that
academic consideration of disability may benefit from the scholarship on moral injury?
Inviting that conversation encourages a deeper probe of disability’s avoidance of moral
reflection and a long history of subtly linking disability to morality with divisive and
judgmental repercussions. In the Hebrew Bible, two schools of thought inform reflection
on disability. First, there are laws informing the Priestly writer’s account of disability as
unacceptable because it was deemed unclean. Often these accounts have an underlying
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assumption linking morality to the imperfect body. Second, there is a counterpoint called
the Holiness Code that allowed space for varying abilities though not always to the
degree one might hope. One reason disability needs moral injury is to understand texts
such as these that quietly link morality to disability thus causing injuries to body, mind,
spirit and society.

First, Sarah Melcher implicates why disability studies needs deeper

reflection in the area of morality because of the possibility of sustaining injuries from
moral judgments and the shame thus inflicted by those stigmatizing opinions. Second,
Judith Abrams expands that discussion as she compares and contrasts Priestly views of
holiness versus the Holiness school in Old Testament literature. Disability needs the
scholarship of moral injury to help unravel hidden linkages of morality with ideas of
bodily perfection and wholeness.
Sarah J. Melcher’s essay “Visualizing the Perfect Cult: The Priestly Rationale for
Exclusion” examines the world of Leviticus and its desire for “holiness.”536 She notes
two distinct writers of Leviticus, the first who wrote chapters 1-16 known as the Priestly
Torah, and the second who wrote chapters 17-26 known as the Holiness Code. The first
writer restricts holiness to the Priesthood.
desirable but unattainable.537

The second writer suggests holiness is

Both seem to suggest that perfection is the norm for

embodiment with flawlessness as the ultimate ideal (Hebrew  תָּ ִמיםtamim).538 Because
God’s displeasure is connected to physical imperfection, those with imperfect bodies are
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typically excluded from the community. One public sign of that was the mark of sara’at,
a stigmatizing tattoo of moral failure.539 Leviticus is a complex text that includes the
exclusive text of Leviticus 21 as well as the inclusive text in 19:14 that states: “You shall
not revile the deaf or put a stumbling block before the blind; you shall fear your God: I
am the Lord.”540

Melcher implores us to consider what Leviticus 19 lived out in

community in contemporary society might look like as new ideas of holiness and bodily
imperfection become embodied in our worshiping and liturgical life.541
Sharon Betcher deepens this insight in her article “Rehabilitating Religious
Discourse: Bringing Disability Studies to the Theological Venue,”542 with an analysis of
Judith Z. Abrams work Judaism and Disabilities: Portrayals in Ancient Texts from the
Tanach through the Bavli. Abrams sheds light on what has been a troubling conundrum
for Biblical scholars: how can Leviticus 21:16-24 exist within the same book that creates
the so-called “11th commandment”543 of Leviticus 19:14? The answer to this is in the
difference between the Priestly school’s view on disability and the Holiness school. The
Priestly school had a strong tie to the temple and was concerned with the priesthood’s
ability to be holy within the confines of the temple. The Holiness school had a larger
frame of reference in making a “sanctuary” out of the greater land extending the temple’s
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space to the Promised Land.544 Here, those with disabilities are to be respected before
God and treated righteously even if those injuries have moral connotations. Can we
imagine the same to be true, that disability needs moral injury as well? Models of
disability currently addressing questions of embodiment, social structures, systemic
injustice and contextualized limits might be deepened in future scholarship by further
engagement with the scholarship of moral injury to reveal hidden assumptions that link
bodily imperfection to morality. As this study progresses, we will see how early models
of disability (i.e., the medical model) were an attempt to offer a corrective to overly
moralistic views of disability whether overt or assumed in the scholarship.

3.2.3

The Disabling Effects of Moral Injury
Psychologist Jonathan Shay articulates the particular disabling effects of moral

injury on the life of a veteran and the society that surrounds them. In a lecture series at
Chautauqua, in the summer of 2016, Shay made the following five claims: first, moral
injury disables a person’s ability to “show up to an appointed time and place in a crowd
of people one doesn’t know well.”545 Second, moral injury disables a veteran’s ability to
“experience words as trustworthy”546 and in so doing, to not automatically discount
words and statements as deceitful jargon. Third, with this failure of words, moral injury
544
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disables a veteran’s ability to “see the possibilities in persuasion, negotiation,
compromise and concession essential to democratic functioning.”547 This element
cements the inability of the veteran to function as an individual within a society making
clear then the larger ramifications of the scope of moral injury. The soldier experiences
only deceptions and lies making it impossible to live within this social context. Fourth,
moral injury disables “the possibility of winning a struggle without killing and of losing a
struggle without dying.”548 And fifth, perhaps most destructively, moral injury disables a
soldier’s ability to “see the future as real.”549

Here, we encounter the “despair”

unaccounted for in veteran’s who do not fit the model of Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder.550 Shay has long argued the inability of PTSD to include the depths of despair
experienced by some veterans and the disablement of trust as a presenting clinical
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condition. Even more so, Shay recognized prior to many headlines the inability of a
diagnosis of PTSD to account for the rise in suicides among veterans.551
Shay outlines convincingly the disabling effects of moral injury; however, these
disablements do not easily fit into either the medical or the social models of disability
which will be outlined in full in chapter four. In addition, it might be argued that these
disabling factors do not easily fit into the definition of moral injury Shay posits as: “the
betrayal of what is right by a person in authority in a high stakes situation.” Before
exploring the problem of assessing moral injury within a medical or social model of
disability, it is important to explore the relationship between Shay’s definition of moral
injury and its relationship to the five disabling conditions Shay witnesses in his clients.
His argument is that when betrayal, crisis and person in authority converge creating the
impact of moral injury then the fivefold disablement affects: personal presence, the
experience of words, civic discourse, the sense of what is possible and future hope. The
agency of a person so entrapped in the web of betrayal, crisis and authority becomes
disabled beyond a physical condition, or even societal function.

The depth of

disablement while affecting functionality within a society points toward something
deeper that involves the hope of words, the hope of discourse, the hope of a future, the
hope that struggle might lead to something other than death.552
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Shay’s outline of the contours of disabling conditions speak to something deeper
than a medical account: there is more here than an impaired body. And, Shay’s outline
points toward something deeper than social implications: there is something more here
than a body unable to function within a given social context. In fact, one is reminded
here of Thomas Reynolds’ definition of disability:

disability is “a range of

physiologically rooted social performances, a series of moments defined by relationships
between human beings. In a basic sense, the distinction between ability and disability is
built into the fabric of communal life.”553 As we look to construct a revised limit model
of disability, I would suggest that such a model should illumine the despair, lack of trust,
and inability to imagine a future that Shay recognizes across the depth and breadth of his
patients.

3.2.4

Forwarding the Conversation between Disability and Moral Injury
Certainly we witnessed in Tyler Boudreau a reflexive retort to identifying moral

injury with disability unequivocally. Both Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon invoke caution
in moving forward with the argument; and to be clear, this caution is taken seriously with
respect to veterans, their experience, and their return to society. As survivors of trauma
and with all too many stigmas placed upon them, denying their voice and narrative would
be antithetical to healing. And so it is with great carefulness, alongside the scholarship
outlined in the previous section by Jonathan Shay, I suggest the notion of disability as
helpful terminology through which to address questions of embodiment, medicalization,
553
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social grief, shifting limits and theological issues within moral injury.554

Three

possibilities are evident to continue this discussion. First, it would be possible to wholly
equate moral injury as a disability. Doing so, I believe, would negate the experience of
individuals on both sides of that conversation. As we proceed forward to overview key
moments in the historical scholarship on disability, I believe we will see the risks
inherent in this equating as we explore the themes and tensions evidenced in that
scholarship.555 For example, we will see how early notions of disability too easily
created a simplistic morality creating a dichotomy between sinner and saint that would
have disastrous consequences for those who are morally injured.
Second, one could use the scholarship of disability as a framework through which
to perceive insights into struggles and questions raised within the scholarship of moral
injury. As we explore the contemporary scholarship on disability through the lenses of
liberation accounts, social analysis and doctrinal insight and implications; we will address
possibilities that disability offers moral injury that have not yet been advanced in the
scholarship. Still, there is a risk in applying the framework of one field to that of another
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without due caution. The analysis that follows the contemporary review will demonstrate
risks and promises inherent in applying frameworks across disciplines.
Finally, there is a third option as moral injury and disability are drawn together in
conversation. Perhaps, both moral injury and disability draw us into deeper reflections of
what it means to be human, and to have real limits, before God. The theological
anthropology that conversation initiates is one that begins with finitude and ends with
wonder. In between there is a myriad of emotions that include despair, shame, anger and
suffering. Such an anthropology acknowledges human existence functioning within a
spectrum where changes occur to body, morality and ability over time through a
multitude of encounters. Some of those encounters are the shattering encounters of
trauma that implode and explode all previous accounts of what it means to be human.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson leans into this kind of theological anthropology with her
conceptualization of “disability is the transformation of the flesh as it encounters
world.”556 So too does Deborah Creamer with her account of disability as an encounter
with limits. Both Creamer and Garland-Thomson provide accounts of finitude in the face
of limits that offer helpful insight both to moral injury and disability. However, their
accounts do not go deep enough into issues of shame, despair, trauma and suffering, nor
do they attend to moral problems and possibilities in the face of limits.

To that end, this

study aims to provide a “revised limit model of disability” that can draw disability and
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moral injury together into a deeper conversation about human finitude in the face of
limits.

3.3

Historical Christian Scholarship on Disability
A review of the historical Christian scholarship on disability will help us to

understand early ideas about the category and the definition of disability as a lens through
which to gain insight into the theological anthropology of what it means to be human in
particular times and places from Ancient Greece to the modern era. The scholars we will
engage, chosen as a sampling from different eras, are wrestling with ideas of deviance
and perfection for individual bodies within the body of greater societies that have
perceptions of worth, functionality and normalcy based on how deficient or sufficient the
capacities of a certain body are at that time. To be clear, the scholarship is often
disjointed, sporadic and episodic for two reasons. First, the topic of disability is not the
first and foremost idea addressed within their work. And second, there is not a larger
collective of disability scholarship as a sustained conversation to which they are
contributing.557

At best, we will encounter conceptions of disability as divine
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revelation.558 At worst, we will explore the implications of the gods’ “displeasure”559
where disability is seen as a disorder of the gods.560
As these theologians struggle to make sense of differing bodies we often see a
tendency to lean toward language informed by simplistic views of normalcy and
functionality as convenient and perhaps, repercussions of the episodic nature of the
scholarship. Perhaps it is precisely this tendency toward too easily making catastrophic
judgments to which Boudreau rightly reacts. In investigating the literature we will begin
to see additional strains of thought develop around the areas of interest to this study, and
we will note tensions that arise as we note particular understandings of morality,
disability and injury.

We will also see periodic consideration of matters such as

embodiment, social constructs and limits within certain contexts. To be clear, it would be
anachronistic, as Brian Brock argues, to suggest that any of these scholars have a
developed theology of disability.561 And so their work must be engaged with caution and
care, while probing it for insight into social concepts of the day and scholarship that
either mitigated the status quo or highlighted it.

3.3.1

Scholarship through 500 CE: Societal Disorder or Soteriologial Reordering
Throughout this chapter we will explore themes and tensions in the historical

scholarship from Plato through Karl Barth. In the historical scholarship prior to 500 CE,
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we see discussion that claims disability is a disordering that occurs by the God and has
social repercussions for the civitas. In turn, theologians pushed back on the language of
disorder with soteriological claims of divine restructuring of human life. The tensions
here are clear: is disability ultimately discordant to the point that true harmony will only
be experienced in the resurrection? Or, does disability actually reverse societal contagion
of corruption and stereotypes by calling humanity to deeper levels of relating beyond the
surface?

Here, we will explore briefly the work of Plato, Aristotle, Tertullian, the

Cappadocian Fathers and Augustine.

3.3.1.1 Plato and Aristotle
Disability, in ancient times, was viewed as “disorder” by the gods.562 Because of
this, care for the vulnerable and infirm was quite limited. At best, wounded soldiers
received care in the valetudinaria.563 During this time, a person’s value was always
connected to his or her social value and ability to contribute virtuously to the public good.
Aristotle’s famously succinct account states: “Let there be a law that no deformed child
shall live”564 reflected an extant view of the fourth century B.C.E. world in which he
lived.
For Plato who lived and wrote in the fifth century B.C.E., human physicality
consisted of the intellect, the soul and one’s physical body. Together these three are
562
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ordered toward a teleological end of health and harmony. Socrates’ argument in Book IV
of The Republic reveals a theological anthropology based on domination as preferential to
disorder: "to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation
of dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it
about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature."565 Within the right
workings of a city, that normative health (Hygeia) does not stand in isolation; but instead,
is a part of a larger hold aimed toward overall order. The right order of a body is a
constitutive piece of the larger right ordering of a city. Right ordering leads to harmony;
disorder yields disharmony.566 When there are perceived societal failures of physical
and/or rational ability there is a failure of order that has societal repercussions.
Philosopher Thomas Joseph Kiefer argues this disorder has a twofold consequence: first,
justice is not possible for that individual and second, entrance into the ideal city of The
Republic is improbable.567
Such arguments allowed Plato to make difficult decisions regarding abortion,
eugenics and infanticide. The best progeny was desirable for the right ordering of the
city, on a philosophical level, as well as for the right protection of the city on a practical
level.568 Disabled infants and fetuses were disposable goods for Plato. Kiefer suggests
three reasons why:

disablement prevents human dignity,569 physical disablement
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prevents societal functioning570 and, intellectual disability does not allow the necessary
education, particularly in morality, vital to the ideal571 city.572
Platonic teaching carries weight regarding those with intellectual disabilities
because reason is linked to value and growth in virtue. Without paradigmatic “reason” a
person with intellectual disability in Platonic society is ranked lower on the scale of
human being.573 Physical disability prevents the specialization aimed toward in The
Republic where order is preserved through specified tasks driven by fully functioning,
non-disabled workers. Any disruption in this aim disorders justice, harmony and the
desired order.574 Corruption in either physical or intellectual abilities hinders moral
formation toward civic virtue. Thus, Plato’s political philosophy subjugates varying
abilities as it fosters civic order and justice.

As archaic as this view may sound,

sociologists Freund and Maquire argue that its stigmatizing presence lingers in societies
today as disabilities pose threats to “social order.”575
While Plato’s arguments regarding physical and intellectual disability appear to be in
a more formative stage, Plato offers more extended thought on what might be deemed the
forefather of moral injury as he explores the concept of a “just soul”576 going to battle. If
the right ordering of humans within a city are aimed toward the protection of The
570
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Republic, what happens when those who have put their minds, bodies, morals and lives in
service to the city become injured in body, mind, morality or spirit and can no longer
assist in the right ordering of the city? Plato’s account of Socrates’ service to the
Peloponessian war demonstrates an attunement to the reality and sacrifice of service
through deployment, the war arena and homecoming. While Plato celebrates the
resilience of Socrates,577 he also laments the difficulty soldiers had in returning to the
ordinary spheres of life.578
Plato is at his best when he explores the psychological depth a soldier must embody
and navigate, for example, in the alignment of a just soul and its proper application in
combat. Plato highlights the fact that Socrates does not come undone in the midst of
wartime service, his resilience and sense of justice carry him through, though the struggle
is real. Plato establishes the resilience of Socrates (who serves despite his disagreement
with the premise for war in the first place)579, even amid the losses he faced, against the
context of the needs of the larger city.580 And yet, is the fact that Socrates does not “come
undone” a helpful model or ideal for soldiers today? Plato highlights the sound mind and
body of Socrates, one might argue, to such an uncommon measure that it becomes an
archetype of wholeness rather than a helpful portrait of a soldier changed by war. In so
doing, he maintains wholeness as ideal rather than corruption inciting civic disorder.

3.3.1.2 Tertullian
577
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With Greco-Roman views in the background, the early church fathers wrestled
with new views of embodiment in light of the incarnation. Tertullian, writing in the late
second, early third century of the Common Era, viewed the body as the stage where the
natural and the supernatural worlds interacted. In light of the incarnation, all bodies, not
just disabled bodies, were in need of redemption. Theologian Charlotte Radler explains,
Tertullian “creates a reordered soteriological structure that classifies flesh, filth, and
dishonor as curative.”581 Tertullian challenged the view of Plato and Aristotle who did
not condemn the termination of newborns with disabilities nor fetuses when he wrote:
But to us, to whom murder has once for all been forbidden, it is unlawful even to
destroy the fetus in the womb whilst the blood is still forming into a human
being. Prevention of birth is premature murder; nor does it alter the question
whether one takes away a life already born, or destroys one which is in process
of formation. That also is a human being, which is about to become one, just as
every fruit exists already in the seed.”582
And Tertullian took issue with contemporaries such as Marcion who deemed all flesh as
deviant, and instead, posited a view of fleshly existence that carried “salvific power.”583
For Tertullian, order and disorder in the body became a place of divine interaction. In a
treatise on the patience of Job, he illumined how that interaction takes shape within the
trajectory of a real person’s life and struggle:
Thus did that hero who brought about a victory for his God beat back all the
darts of temptation and with the breastplate and shield of patience soon after
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recover from God complete health of body and the possession of twice as much
as he had lost.584
Tertullian advances the conversation by taking emphasis away from divine favor or
disfavor and offering instead a more reciprocal interaction between the human and the
divine. At stake though, for Tertullian, is his overly positive emphasis on the total return
to health that appears to conflate disorder with revelation. Views such as his will become
problematic as Christianity will grow to interpret and preach scriptures pertaining to
disability in ways that problematize the disabled person and hope for miraculous cures
such as Job’s.585 Despite this weakness, Tertullian’s view on disability is shaped by his
understanding on redemption and salvation before God, not before the needs of a city
such as Plato.

3.3.1.3 The Cappadocian Fathers
The Cappadocian fathers, writing in the fourth century C.E., argued for
philanthropy toward disfigured adults. Basil the Great envisioned a new city for social
outcasts and laid out instructions for life together in his work “The Long Rules” where he
saw theoria always going hand in hand with philanthropoiea. Gregory of Nazianzus
argued in his Oration 14 for philanthropy in cities and appealed to all humans as being
created in the image of God.

Finally, Gregory of Nyssa saw decomposition as a

fundamental transformation of the human being over time as a common nature to us all.
He wrote two particular homilies that addressed the disfigured and the poor. Gregory of
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Nyssa advocated for the utility and functionality of all people, even when disabling
conditions were present, "The hand is mutilated but it is not insensitive. The foot is
gangrenous but always able to run to God. The eye is missing, but it discerns invisible
goodness, nonetheless, to the enlightenment of the soul if we want to be received by them
[the lepers] in the eternal dwellings, let us receive them now."586 For Gregory of Nyssa,
these words implied the possibility of the person with disability to pass on the beauty of
their inward spirit, even past the outward disfigurement that kept them at bay in society.
Some scholars describe this affect as “reverse contagion.”587 The reversal is twofold:
first, perceived contagion is reversed in the eye of the beholder; second, the unusual
choice for the word “contagion” (the Greek μεταδίδωμι) had the first connotation of
compassionate sharing.588 So, the reversal became not just a changed perception; but
instead, an actual gift to the caregiver who crosses normal societal boundaries. Their
work stands in contrast to the traditional views of their day; but we will see as scholarship
continues to develop (even in the sporadic and episodic, rather than sustained
investigation) that for every step forward toward normalizing disabled bodies within the
social spectrum, there will soon be a step back.
3.3.1.4 Augustine
While the Cappadocian fathers offered steps forward for compassion in reversing
societal perception, Augustine’s work does not advance their consideration. At best, his
work is often paradoxical when disability themes are explored; and at worst, his work
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heralds images of perfection and beauty that are damaging to disabled bodies. Much of
his work focuses on a view of perfection, for example, the idea that in the resurrection a
person will be restored to his youthful vitality. In answering that question, he may have
been responding to the text from 1 Corinthians 15:35: How are the dead raised? With
what kind of body do they come?589 For Augustine, the dead will be raised into perfect
bodies with perfect symmetry and proportionality590 expressive of his summation: “for all
bodily beauty is the harmony of parts” (omnis enim corporos pulchritude est partium
congruentia).591 Here, a conflation of ancient aesthetics alongside Christian teaching
appears to infuse his views on the resurrection.
One wonders if Augustine’s hope for the resurrection had to do with his own
physical condition of weakened lungs,592 which he describes in Confessions:
The pains in my chest made breathing difficult and my lungs would not no
longer support clear and prolonged speaking.593
And, along with the weakened lungs, Augustine knew the disabling effects of aging as
bodies change and transform over time and space. He described his condition later in life
as, “full of complaints, coughing, phlegm, bleary eyes, besieged with various aches and
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pains.”594 Augustine’s vision of old age for himself is interesting in that this excerpt
appears to show his self-focus amid his changing condition, but the broader context of the
quote reflects his equating of his old age with a changing world. “The world’s like a
man;” Augustine argues, “he’s born, he grows up, he grows old…The world has grown
old; it’s full of troubles and pressures.”595 This insight is interesting to read in light of his
views on the resurrection where he sees the fall of Rome as an aging world that is
perishing like our bodies.

Christ offers a vision “to put you together again when

everything else was going to pieces”596 where youth will be renewed, like the wings of
eagles as depicted in Psalm 103:5 and Isaiah 40:31. The implication is that resurrection in
Christ will free the body from the disintegration and fragmentation of aging bodies in an
aging world.
Brian Brock speaks well to Augustine’s view of the resurrection, “the perfect
individual pattern hidden in humanness from conception will be expressed in its fullness
in the resurrection.”597 At best, this view expresses the potential for full imaging of the
imago dei; at worst, it would be possible to read into this view a highlighting of
perfection that becomes problematic for those disabled in this life. Despite the risk this
perspective might overly exalt perfect bodies, Augustine maintains a “principle of
diversity” where he sees that each person will maintain his or her uniqueness in their
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individual identity,598 even if ironically, quirks in bodies will be changed and
transformed599. One must wonder the implications of Augustine’s views for moral injury.
Certainly perfection and return to an individual’s primary pattern offers hope for those
damaged by an “aging world,” and yet, such a view dismisses disabled bodies in need of
change. We will return to this discussion later when we discuss contemporary theologian
Brian S. Powers who addresses Augustine’s notion of disordered goods in that aging
world and the effect of that disordering on human agency and willing.600
These brief thoughts on Augustine give insight into his views on resurrection,
bodily life and an “aging world.” Over and above this schema, it is important to note
Augustine’s view of the Trinity and how it might impact our notions of disability and
moral injury. An important addition Augustine makes to Trinitarian thought is revealed in
the second half of De Trinitate wherein he compares the inner life of the Trinity to the
inner life of a human being. Knowledge of God begins with exercitatio mentis (an
exercise of the mind) that bridges the life of the soul to the life of the Trinue mystery.
With his description of a “psychological trinity”, Augustine adds a new dimension to
Trinitarian theology by combining the inner-workings of – memory, understanding and
will.601 Human beings, through their memory, understanding and will, may begin to
perceive the Trinitarian nature of God.602 Care should be taken to not reduce Augustine’s
Trinitarian theology to the psychological trinity alone;603 and yet, we must question the
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extent to which his assumptions of sound memory, sound understanding and sound will
affect perceptions of those human beings whose memories, rationality and will are
disrupted and even disabled. Augustine knew the divine trinitarian love must be realized
in history through the Easter mystery and the salvation narrative begun at the incarnation.
For Augustine, Trinity points always toward an outward soteriology – not an inward
psychology.604 Rationality, central to Augustine’s conception of the Trinity, as well as
his construction of the human being605 created in the image of God will be a legacy that
future scholars in the field will have to wrestle with as intellectual and moral impairments
are considered.

3.3.2

Scholarship from 500 to 1500 CE: Corpus Infirmitas and Wounds of Christ
In the medieval era, Thomas Aquinas and Julian of Norwich advance

conversation of disability beyond questions of disordered society and ultimate harmony
in the resurrection, bearing witness to vulnerable bodies. Aquinas advocates a theology
of baptism in relationship to his understanding of the innate vulnerability in the corpus
infirmitas and the need for divine protection. Julian of Norwich critiques the culture of
her day by inviting vicarious suffering with the wounds of Christ, and disabled humanity,
to better understand the love of God and the pain Jesus suffered. This interlude in
scholarship is a refreshing pause between the disordered civitas of the Greeks and the
moral judgment during the Reformation.
offers a helpful corrective and reminder here on Augustine’s Trinitarian work. He argues that to only focus
on the psychological image of the Trinity in Augustine is to miss his bigger project which is to draw
believers into the “Christodramatic” narrative and the dynamism of life in the Trinity.
604
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3.3.2.1 Aquinas
By the time of Aquinas, this legacy of rationality is a given in the tradition dating
back to Aristotelian views. Given the high priority placed on rational thought by Thomas
Aquinas,606 one would imagine a system of thought within his work setting aside those
with intellectual impairments from the possibility of a telos of a flourishing life.
However, while Aquinas addressed physical “impairment” throughout his work –
recognizing all human souls as impaired in various forms – most of his corpus is focused
more to the concerns of spiritual and moral impairment.607 Miguel J. Romero helpfully
explains that Aquinas posits what might be called a “theology of bodily weakness” where
all humans are subject to decay over time.608 At baptism we are drawn into life with
God, and through the transformation that occurs over a human being’s lifetime in that
corpus infirmitas, our baptism grounds us in that love and life of God as seen in this text
from Aquinas on Baptism:
The spiritual regeneration effected by Baptism is somewhat like carnal birth, in
this respect, that as the child while in the mother’s womb receives nourishment
not independently, but through the nourishment of its mother, so also children
before the use of reason, being as it were in the womb of their mother the
Church, receive salvation not by their own act, but by the act of the Church.609
Aquinas affirms that in the grace given at Baptism a child receives salvation through the
Church prior to any intellectual or rational achievement. In the same way, those with
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intellectual impairments receive the same act of grace. Because those who are impaired
in wisdom and rational thought through intellectual disability are not, by themselves, able
to separate themselves from the love and grace of God, John Berkman claims a Thomistic
viewpoint where these individuals are actually “sacramental icons of heavenly life” since
they are never separated from the love of God.610
Throughout his work, Aquinas addresses amentia (profound cognitive
impairment) and the amens (the imbecile). He maintains a lovely “grammar of grace” for
those with amentia.611 Lack of reason does not affect a human being’s capacity for
relationship to God, although it may prevent that human being from fully and properly
bearing God’s image.612 Likewise, amentia does not impede the grace-filled infusion of
supernatural virtue.613 Someone with amens is related to God by way of ordination and
origination. Aquinas’ view of resurrection life is that there is continuity between our
bodies however that continuity is through the soul. In that resurrection moment,614 the
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“glorified” soul overflows into our body and perfects and glorifies its bodily
operations.615

Until that moment of glorified resurrection, Aquinas maintains the

virtuous courage and humility of those who bear earthly bodily impairments although he
hopes for transformation in resurrected life.616
Aquinas’ account of the resurrection and its implication for those with disabilities
is much in tune with his intellectual forebears,617 but stands in contrast to prominent
views in the Greco-Roman world. For example, Candida Moss points to the story of
Oedipus who believed he would maintain his disabling blindness in the afterlife, and to
Virgil’s The Aeneid that assumes disabling wounds from the scars of battle would be
preserved in the afterlife as well. Her examples point to the presence of bodily continuity
from this life to the next.618 The Jewish view of the afterlife began to reshape these
beliefs by suggesting that bodies would be created anew in the resurrection. Worthy of
note here is the implication for theologians in their accounts of disability: wrestling with
impairment raises questions regarding the self, the other, and God as bodily limits are
encountered. These three spheres of life necessitate discussions of disability that are not
just medical, but social, and even eschatological.
conflicting accounts from the scars of Jesus preserved after the resurrection in his encounter with Thomas
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615
John Berkman, “Are Persons with Profound Intellectual Disabilities,” 93.
616
Miguel J. Romero, “Aquinas on the Corpus Infirmitas,” 122.
617
See: Candida R. Moss, “Heavenly Healing: Eschatological Cleansing and the Resurrection of the Dead
in the Early Church” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Dec. 2011): 9911017. She explains how Pseudo-Justin Martyr argued the resurrection of the body would lead to bodily
perfection suggesting if Jesus can do this much on earth, “How much more will he do” through healing in
heaven. Pseudo-Justin Martyr saw the transformation of this world into the kingdom of God happening
eschatalogically in the here and now. That transformation would be completed, perfectly, in heaven.
Irenaeus tended to agree seeing the dead rising and the walking of those who had been limp as practically
synonymous. These views show the troubling conflation of sin and disability both in scripture and the
early church, perhaps, one might call this an “exegetical model of disability.” Augustine culminated these
views emphasizing the substantiality of resurrection where we become “more embodied” but we would
find the strength of our youth and the loss of all that deforms. He envisioned a perfect aesthetic in heaven.
618
Moss, “Heavenly Healing,” 997.

168

3.3.2.2 Julian of Norwich
By the fourteenth century, amid the political justice system of the medieval blood
sanction619 as convicts were beaten and bloodied to the point of disablement, the mystic
Julian of Norwich sought spiritual understanding of suffering, wounds and even blood.
She sought knowledge of “every kind of pain, bodily and spiritual . . . every fear and assault
from devils.”620 In a society fearful of pain, Julian prayed for infliction. In a society fearful
of disablement, Julian prayed to be wounded. In a society fearful of bloodshed, Julian prayed
her bleeding would draw her closer to the redeeming love of Christ.
When she was thirty years old, and on her deathbed, Julian received a series of
visions disclosing the suffering of Christ appeared to Julian. She wrote a manual known as
The Short Text to record those sixteen visions. Later, as she continued to reflect on their
meaning for redemption and renewal, she wrote a piece now known as The Long Text. While
the existence of both texts is important historically; it is also worth of pause to note the
distance in time passed between the two texts allowed for significant reflection, discernment
and interpretation of her experience with suffering and its salvific meaning.
Julian believed she could have understanding of redemption by grace:

I desired three graces by the gift of God. The first was to have recollection of
Christ’s passion. The second was a bodily sickness and the third was to have, of
God’s gift, three wounds . . . the wound of contrition, the wound of compassion,
and the wound of longing with my will for God.621
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For Julian, redemption is not abstract but available in the here and now, even amid real
suffering. Amy Laura Hall explains how Julian’s Revelations of Divine Love develop the
“grammar of grace” that Aquinas exposited.622 Julian’s characterization of suffering
describes how Christ’s body flows - into our bodies, the church body, the dismembered
social body of the world, and into all of creation itself. Hall sees in Julian’s work a
“bleeding together of boundaries”623 that are both physical and social. This imagery of
bleeding emerged from a moment when Julian, gazing on the cross, could at first only
cast her eye heavenward just above the cross. When she lowered her eye to the crucifix,
the flow of blood as a vision emerged.

Julian speaks out of bodily and cognitive

solidarity with the body of Christ as she herself requested three wounds and a bodily
illness so she could empathize.
Out of the intense unity Julian finds with Christ, she knows in that unity there is
salvation for all people. Her vision spoke in a revolutionary way to Julian’s troubled
time.

Blood was then seen as disordered creation.

Women were prevented from

receiving the ‘blood’ of the Eucharist. The plague and its aftermath had ostracized and
outcast the sick. Julian’s vision shows how body fragility can have generativity and not
be something to be scared or ashamed of when experienced.624 Of importance to note
here is how disability reshapes the body politic instead of social context and structures
shaping or defining who and what is disabled.
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Julian found safety in the flow of blood and tears unlike the rest of her society. Key
to Hall’s interpretation of Julian are the works of Mary Jo Iozzio and her nomenclature of
“radical dependence”625 to describe the relationship between Julian’s blood and the blood
of Christ, as well as the relationship of all humanity with Christ’s human incarnate
bleeding. Julian reminds us that Jesus says to us: “He did not say, ‘You shall not be
tormented, you shall not be troubled, you shall not be grieved,’ but he said, ‘You shall not
be overcome.’”626

Julian of Norwich predates the work of Burton Cooper, Jürgen

Moltmann and Nancy Eiesland, but her imagery of suffering, disablement and their
potential for broken bodies to inform and guide the body of Christ foreshadow their
work. Julian of Norwich is to be remembered for her empathy and suffering particularly
the depth to which she describes the sickness and wounds within her body.

Her

vulnerability to that reality, raw as it seems, was a counterpoint to other societal
narratives of her time that needed challenged.

3.3.3

Scholarship from 1500 to 1950 CE: Providential for one or Universal for all?
The conclusion of this section will probe a variety of tensions and themes in the

historical scholarship recognizing the diversity of thinkers across time. For now, in this
section we pay attention to the questions of disability as circumstance, providence or
existential state. Martin Luther leaned toward questions of morality in his assessment of
the disabled either as sinner or saint, monster or minister to the people. Kierkegaard, in
contrast, claimed disability as a universal existential state inclusive of all humanity. The
625
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questions of disordering continue, though more subtly, as do the concerns about the
effects of disorder on civic life and even, resurrection life.

3.3.3.1 Martin Luther
Luther’s view of disability can be understood through reflecting on his theology
of the cross which affirms that the only source of knowledge of God may be found at the
cross itself.

Luther’s direct discussion of disability is somewhat troubling in his

paradoxical views of disability as either monstrous or saintly.627 He is known and rightly
critiqued for a disturbing passage wherein he encouraged the suffocation of a twelveyear-old disabled boy with Prater-Wili syndrome who in Luther’s view who “did nothing
else but eat and excrete.”628 The Nazis assimilated this view into their program of
removal. However, a story also exists of Luther encouraging the mother of a young
disabled girl to go home and feed her and love her and for the mother to “put her trust in
God.”629

At best, Luther may be seen as viewing individuals in their particularity

becoming the medium for the message of God’s salvation story, as well as possessing the
ability to articulate that story as well.
Despite the deeply problematic ways that Luther speaks of disability at points in
his work, his overall anthropology has constructive potential for contemporary reflection
on disability. Luther’s anthropology is weak in the sense that he sees humanity being
transformed by God over time in the course of their lifespan. Luther sees true human
627
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being both at the cradle and at the cross; and so humanity’s call is always to the weak,
vulnerable and one might surmise, disabled.630 In so doing, Hans Reinders suggests
Luther would dismiss any “ethics of choice” toward disability; and instead, understand
the working of a providential God who chooses for us, not against us. Reinders also
stresses that for Luther God’s choice matters far more than anything we might choose
ourselves.631 Given the large corpus of Luther’s writings, his view of disability – as
disparate as his references to it may seem at times – must always be interested through
his theologia crucis which stands in contrast to a theologia gloriae.632 In both the light
and the shadow of the cross, God stands with the humble and the weak revealing an
alternate glory to the ways of the world. From this theologia crucis, all human beings are
to embody amor cruces, that is, the deep love of Christ offering compassion and humble
service to those in need.633

3.3.3.2 John Calvin
In our review of key scholars and their relationship to themes raised by disability
(theological anthropology, morality, sin and salvation, doctrines of creation and
resurrection)634 it is fascinating especially to understand disability through the
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embodiment of those who suffered in their bodily life. For example, John Calvin knew
suffering. His wife died only nine years into their marriage.635 All of his children died in
childbirth.636 In his own body he wrestled with “migraines, hemorrhoids, consumption,
gout, kidney stones and tuberculosis.”637 One must wonder, before entering his ethical
theological, and exegetical reflections, what a person who believed strongly in doctrines
of depravity and predestination would make of disability considering his own experience.
One letter Calvin wrote to a friend, Madam de Coligny, reveals an initial insight:
“Illnesses serve us as medicine, to purify us form the desires of this world and to cut
away what is superfluous in us. They are messengers of death and they can teach us to
free our feet so that we can depart from this life, whenever it pleases God.”638
Given the language of death and the doctrine of predestination, it is surprising to
see glimpses of other themes in his work. Deborah Creamer argues there are themes of
inclusion, equality, interdependence and the relevance of embodiment in this world
throughout his thought. She organizes his disparate corpus into four themes: an analysis
of ways he exegetes specific texts on disability,639 a look at church structure and
organization with an eye to his radical inclusion of those on the margins (see for example
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Draft Ecclesiastical Ordinances),640 bodily themes (i.e. the body is a prison),641 and his
use of metaphors that use disabling language.642 Some paths to follow in Calvin’s
thought would also include a study of inclusion in his discussion of the sacraments, his
view that knowledge of self is knowledge of God, and his wrestling with areas of
theodicy.643 Calvin can be called out for using language that is offensive and must be
reckoned with: i.e. “brute beasts”644 as language for physical impairment and “mad-men”
as problematic language for mental impairment. However, his overall thought should not
be quickly dismissed and his theological complexity should be wrestled with to find
deeper meaning and themes, particularly, I would argue for the purposes of this
argument, regarding Calvin’s doctrine of the incarnation.645 In Calvin’s commentary on
the Gospel of John, particularly verse 1:14 “And the Word was made flesh,”646 Calvin
suggests that Calvin uses “made flesh” rather than “made man” to present the limits God
would encounter entering into the new social context of human being. He writes,
In spite of the vast distance between the spiritual glory of the Word of God and
the stink of our filthy flesh, the Son of God stooped so low as to take upon
himself this same flesh which is subject to so many miseries. Flesh here means
not, as so often with Paul, our nature corrupted by sin, but mortal men in
general.647
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By putting on “flesh” God subjects God’s very own being to a new social context, and in
so doing, a new encounter with human limits.

Calvin predates a social model of

disability that will be extrapolated in the next chapter, and yet, we see his thought
straining to push beyond ideas of impairment and medicine, toward the intersection of
human creatures in social contexts. In so doing, whether intended or not, Calvin pushes
back on Platonic and Aristotelian notions that disability is disorder divined by the gods
which has repercussions for the civitas. Instead, it will be the city itself and the social
conventions within it that disable flesh.

3.3.3.3 Soren Kierkegaard
Two key themes from Soren Kierkegaard, Danish theologian of the nineteenth
century, play out in his work that can inform contemporary study of disability. First, all
people live with a “sickness unto death” which is a desire not to be one’s self. All of us
are disabled, in a way, by sin and by a general state of angst. Kierkegaard sees this as the
biggest problem of human existence that is more troubling than any particular state of
ability or disability. In response to that sickness, we take “a leap of faith.” All humanity,
including those with various abilities, must make millions of little leaps of faith every day
past their own insecurities, sins, abilities, disabilities. Kierkegaard helps us to critique
the societal norms of normalcy and he in particular does not rely on a universal standard
of normalcy. In contrast with the medical model of disability that will be developed after
Kierkegaard’s lifetime, Kierkegaard’s view of the sickness unto death helps us to see that
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all humanity is incomplete and suffering.648

In keeping with the social model of

disability (again, Kierkegaard predates these models but foreshadows their insight),
Kierkegaard saw how the social norms of his day created prejudices and stereotypes.649
One key aspect of his view of that sickness unto death is that the state that creates that
sickness is not just the internal or the physical, but that sickness is caused by a
relationship in the world by something other than one’s self. Kierkegaard viewed sin as
the ultimate disability; all else paled in comparison.650 Recognizing the existential angst
and dread in which Kierkegaard is so often known, Bill Hughes argues from a
Kierkegaardian perspective a reversal of thought from societal codes of normative bodies
suggesting instead: “What is required is a critical social ontology that problematizes nondisablement and exposes the forms of invalidation that lie at the heart of disabling
culture.”651 In making this suggestion, Hughes encourages a more generalized sociology
of impairment as the norm, rather than the outlier. One wonders if Kierkegaard could
have imagined such a world – where all, truly, are impaired – when he writes regarding
despair:
Just as a physician might say that there very likely is not one single living
human being who is completely healthy, so anyone who really knows mankind
might say that there is not one single living human being who does not despair a
little, who does not secretly harbor an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, an
anxiety about an unknown something or a something he does not dare to try to
know, an anxiety about some possibility in existence or an anxiety about
himself, so that, just as the physician speaks of going around with an illness in
the body, he walks around with a sickness, carries around a sickness of the spirit
that signals its presence at rare intervals in and through an anxiety he cannot
648
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explain. In any case, no human being ever lived and no one lives outside of
Christendom who has not despaired.652
While the disability scholar might cringe at the equation here between disability and
despair, Kierkegaard’s thought here is helpful in universalizing and normalizing
disability as a real possibility for all people across a spectrum of human permeability and
vulnerability over time. Much more examination of Kierkegaard’s vast, diverse and witty
corpus is needed within disability studies; his intellect is underused in this arena.

3.3.3.4 Karl Barth
Barth is a fascinating conversation partner in the field of disability and theology
and will be important later in chapter five as we understand the context in which Dietrich
Bonhoeffer developed his theological construct “the orders of creation.” In addition,
Barth will serve as a foil for understanding the importance of Bonhoeffer’s views on
finitude, natural law and revelation. For now, it is helpful to understand Barth’s working
conception of disability. Donald Wood, author of “This Ability: Barth on the Concrete
Freedom of Human Life,” recognizes that Barth is often seen as being removed from the
experience of the human with his focus on Christology, scripture and revelation.653 In
addition, Barth’s focus on the universality of the gospel makes suspect any attempt to
cordon off his thought for a particular sub-group. Wood recounts a story where Barth
and a friend Heinrich Vogel discuss resurrection and the disabled.654 Vogel believes his
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daughter will be freed from her impairment and will walk. Barth envisions her disability
being the very thing of which heaven is made and holds in high honor. She will sit at the
head of the banquet table and God will say to her, “I have loved: you.”655 Wood sees the
term “disability” as functioning in Barth’s thought to invite a conversation between “the
intersection of the individual and society.”656 And so we see in his thought a movement
from disability being defined as a medical impairment toward a more complicated
entanglement between the body and society.

That insight informs Barth’s view of

covenantal community. Because we are involved in a covenant community, we are
called to a life of ethical responsibility toward all people. Barth explains,
Responsibility [Verantwortung: the actual responding] does not need to be
advertised as an ethical programme, because 'responsibility' [Verantwortlichkeit]
marks human life as an elemental, non-negotiable phenomenon. As creatures
addressed by God, human beings cannot but exist 'in responsibility'
[Verantwortlichkeit]. We live in responsibility, which means that our being and
willing, what we do and what we do not do, is a continuous answer to the Word
of God spoken to us as a command.657
Human beings live with God as the centerpoint and full partnership of God in that
covenant with a responsibility to act and care for all others within that covenant
community. Given the beauty and possibility of the covenant community now, Barth
explores a very different approach to resurrection as he sees the resurrection not marking
a new epoch fleeing human history. Instead, resurrection is the “reverse” side of this
life.658 That reverse is now hidden from us but one day it will be revealed to us.
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Exploring this view of resurrection for disability theology would be helpful to further his
views on eschatological transformation and what that entails for bodily life.

3.3.

Themes and Tensions in the Historical Scholarship on Disability
As these varying models of disability are presented over time, some schematically

and others by piecing together work of scholars, several themes and tensions are
revealed. In Chapter Two, we explored the themes of morality, injury and disability
within the psychological literature on moral injury. In addition, through the theological
literature review we discovered themes of embodiment, social context and limits. All six
of these themes are evidenced in the historical literature on disability; however, they are
often revealed as tensions across varying viewpoints. In these historical accounts we see
the struggle to define, to discern disability’s relationship to the divine, to come to terms
with one’s own changing bodies, and differing accounts of disability depending on
whether they are accounts of bodies or minds. While a social analysis is not fully
developed in any of the scholarship, we begin to see the intersection between disabled
bodies and the social systems around them. Even more so, when attention is less focused
on the disabled body in this world, we see in the historical accounts a wrestling with
disability in the resurrection questioning whether there will be a return to a youthful
pattern or the preservation of ‘scars’ from this life. Here we will explore themes and
tensions in the historical scholarship on disability before turning to contemporary
scholarship and the way the legacy of these thinkers will be addressed in the future.
Consider for example the themes within the psychological literature of morality,
injury and disability. A historical analysis explicates a tension between morality as
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simplistic or complex.

Martin Luther’s account, not unlike the monstrosities in

Augustinian thought, appears to present a simplistic conceptualization: those who are
disabled are either monstrous or saintly.659

Perhaps Soren Kierkegaard offers a

counterpoint to this simplicity as he wrestles with the existential nature of the sickness
unto the death and the complexity that sickness plays out in our psyches, choices, moral
agencies and societies. This tension is of particular import for moral injury wherein
returning veterans are all too often categorized in dichotomous ways by a simplistic
societal diagnosis of “saint” or “sinner” rather than sustained attention to the complexity
of the moral situations from which they emerged.
With the theme of disability, as provoked by the psychological literature, insight is
gained by looking at the scholarship on disability and resurrection life. We see in the
historical conversation regarding disability there is the tension between disability as a
category that should be preserved even in the realm of resurrected life versus a disorder
that should be rejected. Even the scholars discussed here who preserve disability in this
life still maintain a view that disability will be rejected in the afterlife differing from the
Greco-Roman legacy, illumined by the story of Oedipus and Virgil’s The Aeneid, that
preserve disability the category of disability for eternity.
Regarding injury as a theme within the psychological literature, the historical
documentation of disability among theologians wrestles with exactly what kind of
“injury” disability is. There is a tension between the scholars of the injury as one that is
inflicted unduly by the gods versus an injury that provides an opportunity for vicarious
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suffering with God. Hildegaard of Bingen reveals the perception of affliction when she
writes:
If this torturing pain which I was suffering in my body had not come from God,
I would not have been able to live any longer. Although through all this I was
being punished, I still spoke, sang and wrote concerning the divine vision what
the Holy Spirit wished to announce through me.660
And we see in Tertullian’s account of Job the same kind of wrestling with affliction from
God that demands perseverance and becomes a test of obedience and faith. Julian of
Norwich offers a counter perspective with the view of an injury as a place for vicarious
suffering. The invitation to participate in the suffering of others became the prompt for
her prayer as she invited “every kind of pain.”661 Julian’s vicarious suffering offers an
important prompt for contemporary society that too easily compartmentalizes the
experience of veterans.

Her theological reflection on suffering and solidarity are

important considerations for a society that does not suffer vicariously with the experience
of veterans on their terms. These three themes: morality, disability and injury; and the
tensions they reveal: simplistic morality/complex reality, preservation of disability in the
resurrection/rejection of disability in the resurrection, and vicarious suffering with
God/inflicted suffering by God will be helpful to remember as we continue to deepen the
conversation between disability and moral injury.
The religious literature on moral injury exposited themes related to the need for
deeper conversation on the intricacies of embodiment and medicalization, social contexts
and the social construction of moral injury, and the implications of changing moral limits
across varied contexts. The historical review of disability reflections by philosophers and
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theologians ranging from Plato, to Julian of Norwich to Karl Barth, reveals tensions
related to these themes as well. With the question of embodiment, there is the tension
between perfection and transformation. Aristotle and Augustine, for example, highlight
themes of perfection in their hopes for disabled bodies to not disorder society and for
resurrected bodies to return to their youthful perfection. On the other hand, Aquinas and
Gregory of Nyssa speak to the possibility of transformation that exists when human
beings embrace the reality that their bodies will change and decay over time and invite
into that eschatological journey the possibility of divine knowledge and participation.
The historical literature on disability speaks with greater insight than might be
suspected to the complexities of disability and its relationship to society. The tension
here exists between disability as a societal impediment and disability as a societal
intersection. Plato, for example, viewed disability as an impediment to the good ordering
of society and Aristotle agreed, suggesting, perhaps the disabled could factor into a
society’s downfall if the disabled were allowed to live. Karl Barth offers an alternative
view, as perceived through the scholarship of Donald Wood, that disability is a revelation
of the intersection between an individual and the society in which they live. That
intersection invites reflection, responsibility and a renewed commitment to covenantal
community.
Finally, the third emphasis in the religious literature on moral injury explores the
lack of interest in the concept of “limits.” Without the recognition of limits in relation to
human experience, the category of moral injury fails to explain the complexity of
morality and its potential disabling within and across various social contexts.

The

implications of this issue are subtle, but still relevant and present within the review of the
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historical literature on disability. One tension here lies between limits as obstacles and
limits as opportunities. Consider, for example, Martin Luther’s view of the young man
with Prater-Wili syndrome. Luther’s simplistic conceptualization of him as someone
who “did nothing else but eat and excrete” fails to recognize the possibilities inherent
within this young man in certain contexts; and so, Luther perceives his disability solely as
an obstacle. John Calvin, offers an alternate position with some theological complexity,
as he sees the opportunity involved when certain limits are engaged with possibility. The
incarnation takes on limits within a certain context as God takes on flesh and in so doing,
takes upon God’s own being the possibility of decay and disability. These three themes:
embodiment, social constructs and limits within contexts reveal certain tensions in the
historical review of disability: perfection/transformation; impediment/intersection; and
obstacle/opportunity.
Across these themes and tensions, we begin to see the conceptualization of
disability as revelatory.662 The crux of the revelation may differ, but the deliver of the
message is still a transcendent God. The missive varies: a Judeo-Christian663 divine
judgment regarding sin,664 a Platonic response to a disordered world, a Pauline reminder
of our weakness and God’s strength, a Cappadocian reversal, or an opportunity to suffer
along with Christ as Julian of Norwich reminds us. Even if these views appear dated; it
is important to note two things: first, echoes of these views can resonate today and
second, new messages voiced are important to note. Across the scholarship, one message
662
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remains clear:

disability reveals "everyone's vulnerability to weakness, pain and

death"665 and societal implications for that vulnerability.

But perhaps, of most

importance, is the earliest explanation for that revelation given to disability in ancient
times by the Greeks. Disability was understood as disorder by the gods.666 Everyone in
that ancient society was subject to the potential for that disordering and the havoc it
would create for bodies and for society. Is it possible, that moral injury proves the
reverse to be true? Whether ancient Achilles or modern day Billy Lynn,667 is the morally
injured veteran deemed to be the former “god” who has now become fundamentally and
irreversibly disordered?668 Perhaps this is the reason for Boudreau’s knee-jerk reaction in
too easily categorizing moral injury as a disability. As disability scholarship progresses
across the centuries into more robust and sustained accounts, the disordering of disability
begins to shift from the work of the gods to the structures of civilizations.

3.4

Contemporary Scholarship on Disability
Against the background of these historical theologians, several of whom let

“disability be a sign of moral imperfection or divine retribution for sin,”669 contemporary
scholars in disability strive toward liberative models, even though they too upon occasion
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instrumentalize, demonize and/or valorize disability and its potential for suffering.670
These scholars are important for “conserving”671 the category of disability and
negotiating questions of embodiment, systemic societal structures and limits. A careful
overview of scholars Nancy Eiesland, Sharon V. Betcher, Jennie Wiess Block, Amos
Yong, Thomas Reynolds, Molly Haslam, Hans Reinders, Amy Laura Hall, Stanley
Hauerwas, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson will certainly orient us to the field, even if it
is not entirely comprehensive. After reviewing this scholarship here in Chapter Three, we
will examine in Chapter Four two key models of disability that emerge, and at times
blend, within these contemporary sources: a medical model of disability and, a social
(also known as the minority) model of disability.

Review of the strengths and

weaknesses of each model will then pave the way for an alternative model, the limit
model, presented by Deborah Creamer. In this discussion of disability scholarship and
key models for disability, it will be important to keep in mind the ongoing conversation
with moral injury and the potential scholarship on disability has for resourcing and
response.
To order this review, to continue to deepen the overall argument of this study,
and, to respect the representative voices of Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon; the
scholarship in this contemporary review will be organized into three categories:
scholarship that focuses on disability and the need for deeper engagement with liberation
theology, scholarship that wrestles with disability through an analysis of society, and
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scholarship that highlights particular theological doctrines and their importance for
disability studies.

Here we remember the second of our three options for drawing

disability into discussion with moral injury: the conceptual frameworks (not the precise
definition) of disability have something valuable to offer the field of moral injury.
To be clear, the ten scholars to be reviewed in the contemporary scholarship on
disability offer a small sample of the vast, excellent work achieved in this area since
Eiesland’s publication of The Disabled God in 1994 and Burton Cooper’s Theology
Today article “The Disabled God” in 1992. The past twenty-five years of scholarship is
rich with anthropological insight, theological complexity, and sociological challenge. The
conceptions presented here serve as a gleaning and point toward larger conversations
across the scholarship.

3.4.1

The Framework of Liberation and Disability: Eiesland, Block, Betcher
The first framework through which to examine disability scholarship in the

contemporary era is through the nexus of liberation. Liberation theology seeks to free
those entangled in just structures of economic, social, corporate life thereby releasing
those entangled within them from those “architectural and attitudinal”672 barriers that
function in meta, systemic and hyper-complex ways affecting individual human life.
Nancy Eiesland is to be credited with beginning this conversation in the scholarship of
disability and her legacy of liberation continues to this day.
3.4.1.1 Eiesland
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While Nancy Eiesland is credited with the powerful phrase “The Disabled God,”
she is indebted to two theologians that are worthy of note to set the stage for her
liberation framework. First, Burton Cooper published an essay “The Disabled God” in
Theology Today in 1992 prior to her publication of the eponymous book. The strength of
Cooper’s essay is his willingness to use disability as a lens through which to ask some of
the hardest theological questions: how do we understand God’s perfection? What sense
do we make of suffering? And, what does hope mean for disabled and nondisabled in
this life and the next?673 Cooper addresses the first question on perfection by suggesting
there are only two possibilities; either God is complete in eternity and perfect therein or
God’s perfection is made clear in Christ and his suffering.674 Cooper stands with Jürgen
Moltmann and Dietrich Bonheoffer who see God’s identity to be clarified in the cross of
Christ and the participation with the suffering of the world. With this, one might place
the metaphor of “disabled” upon God, but he notes that caution and care should be used
with this symbol.675
Regarding the question of suffering, one of the first theological issues that must
be untangled is whether or not suffering is a result of sin. Too often theodicy gets
entangled with these three basic elements: God is behind all events, God can overcome
all powers within these events, meaning can be found within suffering from the power of
God. In response to this, Cooper offers a fascinating counterpoint. What if God were not
the power beneath and behind all things?
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things”?676

That is, what if God called free human beings into the divine relationship

through ever-growing love and greater and greater creativity? Because of God’s everpresent care and concern in that luring one dimension we can understand of God’s
‘disability’ is through the concreteness677 of God’s love for the disabled person and the
suffering and empathy God feels in that moment of care. Cooper points to the Biblical
story of Matthew 25:31-46 and the great judgment to help us see God’s disabling in each
of the moments of poverty, hunger, estrangement, and might we add disability.678 God’s
ability comes not in a power that is able to do all, end all, be all. But instead, “ables”679
us to overcome suffering with meaning, power, purpose, creativity and compassion for
ourselves and for each other. Cooper’s response to the question of resurrection hope and
eternal life is that the full personality of the person enters into communion with God and
that personality has been shaped by a lifetime of living with a disability.680
A second theologian important to Eiesland is Jürgen Moltmann who envisioned a
“crucified God”681 that became central to Cooper and Eiesland’s vision of God who
understands pain, suffering, difference and disabling conditions. Moltmann contends that
when all of life is viewed as a gift, and vulnerability is accepted as a basic state of our
humanity made clear through the image of the crucified God, then clear lines of ability
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and disability recede.682 With an eye to liberation, Moltmann believes God is on the side
of the poor, but also, God will side as well with those who oppress the marginalized. It is
the work of the church to call that reconciliation into being as an act of hope for the
kingdom of God in this world.683
Nancy Eiesland offered the 1994 publication The Disabled God: Toward a
Liberatory Theology of Disability that became a groundbreaking piece in the field of
disability and theology. In that work, she does not draw directly on the eponymous essay
of Burton Cooper, though, it is listed in her bibliography. She does make explicit
reference to Moltmann’s eschatological image of a disabled Jesus that she contends calls
the church to “a communion of justice.”684 As the church struggles for justice, the body
of Christ becomes the proleptic image of the eschatological Christ.

She draws on

Moltmann who argued:
The one who is to come is then already present in an anticipatory sense in
history in the Spirit and the word, and in the miserable and the helpless. His
future ends the world’s history of suffering and completes the fragments and
anticipations of his kingdom which are called the church.685
For Moltmann, Eiesland and Cooper the disablement of God in Christ becomes a
prototype through which to reexamine all of the churches doctrines, practices, liturgies,
missions, scriptures, symbols and metaphors.686 The broken body is not just sacramental;
it is pastoral, it is a call to justice, it is eschatological. Here, the disability scholarship
682
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challenges current work in moral injury to consider the same. How are the morally
disrupted bodies, minds and spirits of returning veterans challenging the church to
reinterpet issues of justice, liturgy, and even eschatology? Eiesland offers first steps
forward, informed by her intellectual predecessors Moltmann and Cooper.
Prior to Eiesland’s work, scholarship in the field was often sporadic (as in the
case of the historical Christian scholarship on disability explored in the previous section),
exegetical,687 or pastoral.688 During her career, scholars such as Dawn Devries, Andrew
Purves and Stanley Hauerwas were just beginning to write more robust essays and books
on theological doctrine and their implications for disability.689 Eiesland stands out in the
field for her singular, extensive book on disability and theology informed by her personal
experience. She recognized two trends persistent in the conversation between disability
and theology in the historical tradition: first, the tendency to correlate the category of
tragedy to disability and second, the tendency to romanticize, and even heroize, those
with disabilities and their rise above suffering.690

Eiesland cautions against both

approaches in her seminal work The Disabled God. Following in the line of Jürgen
Moltmann’s “crucified God” and Burton Cooper’s Theology Today article “The Disabled
687
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God,”691 Eiesland speaks from her experience and draws on an emancipatory
methodology of liberation to carry out her project. After laying out a theological method
drawing on the work of Rebecca Chopp’s “critical praxis correlation,”692 she explains the
social construction of disability and suggests a liberatory theology of disability that will
ultimately pry open the constraints of the social construction. Eiesland relies on the
embodied stories of Diane DeVries693 and Nancy Mairs694 to compare and contrast
various “bodies of knowledge.”

These stories matter in Eiesland’s overall project

because they help empower the embodied voices of those living within various
circumstances. Both DeVries and Mairs disdain the tragic approach to disability, while
still maintaining the ability to grieve. Both see in their experiences the possibility of
creative knowledge and integral relationships as joys within their embodied experience.
Chapters three and four look at the structure of society and the structure of scriptures and
churches to unearth disabling tropes and boundaries and search for ways forward.
Eiesland laments how little the church has followed and responded to the Americans with
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Disabilities Act of 1990.695 Within the structure of the church, Eiesland laments the 1980
passing of the ALC’s statement “The Church and Persons with Handicaps: Unmasking a
Hidden Curriculum of the Christian Community”696 and then five years later barring as a
body people with significant physical or mental handicaps from ordination.
When Eiesland pictures a disabled God, this God does not fall into those tropes of
either tragic figure (consider from the historical review Augustine and Martin Luther) or
saint (consider Tertullian and Julian of Norwich).

Instead, this God is “not an

omnipotent, self-sufficient God, but neither a pitiable, suffering servant….I beheld God
as a survivor, unpitying and forthright.”697

Such an image of a disabled God has

profound theological implications as it de-centers the conversation and begins a
transformative process having initiated the working metaphor from “concrete
existence.”698 What would it look like, one must wonder, if the imago dei itself were not
as imagining ‘perfect’ Godhead, but a broken body? Eiesland’s vision of a disabled God
normalizes nonconventional bodies and calls the church to imagine new forms of justice.
Eiesland concludes with reflections on sacramental bodies and a concluding liturgy for
sacramental practice.699 The Eucharist is the ultimate broken body and “affirms our
existence as painstakingly, honestly and lovingly embodied beings.” The Eucharist calls
all within the church to be very attentive to our embodiment and the embodiment of God
in Christ.700
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3.4.1.2 Jennie Weiss Block
Catholic theologian Jennie Weiss Block envisions a “theology of access” that
draws on a model of liberation and offers critique to the church to be hospitable in
architecture and attitudes, liturgy and hymns, nearly a decade after Eiesland’s concerns
were raised from a liberation standpoint as well. Block’s work on theologies of liberation
and the view of “the accessible God”701 she presents in her 2002 work Copious Hosting:
A Theology of Access for People with Disabilities are noted by Deborah Creamer702 as
instructive along with Eiesland’s model of “the disabled God”703 and Kathy Black’s
model of “the interdependent God.”704
Block’s methodology is twofold: first, she draws on the revisionist/correlational
model of David Tracy.705 Second, she works with a theology of liberation.706 Both of
these help her to accomplish three tasks: to explain the disability movement to Christian
theologians, to examine Christian ‘texts’ (scripture, liturgy and Sacraments) from a
disability perspective and to present a theology of access that ultimately leads to

701

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 81-82. Creamer highlights Block’s notion that a God of
access demands liberatory action as a Christian mandate for justice and hospitality.
702
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 75-91. Creamer argues that disability is constructive to
theology. First, it can challenge traditional doctrines and their implications in theology. Second, disability
offers an experience of oppression that calls for liberation. These lead to the third step in her argument,
that theology needs disability in order to have real interaction with human limits in the face of the divine
(91).
703
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 85-87. Cremer sees Eiesland’s identification of the
disabled God as a moment of culmination as the God of access and the God of interdependence becomes
deeply visceral and embodied, making real the experience of disability with divine embodiment.
704
Kathy Black, A Healing Homiletic: Preaching and Disability (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1996):
37-38. See also: Creamer, Disability and the Christian Tradition, 83-84. Black’s work is vital and
informative in the study of disability. For the purposes of this dissertation, Eiesland and Block provide a
liberatory viewpoint in addition to the work of Sharon V. Betcher. Black is omitted only for the sake of
conciseness.
705
David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York, NY: Seabury Press,
1975): 43-48.
706
Block, Copious Hosting, 19-21.

194

vulnerability and friendship. The title of her book is a phrase from Edward Schillebeeckx
who described Jesus as a “copious gift of God.”707 Block believes the church can model
this kind of copious hosting where there is an abundant supply of all that is needed for
everyone at the table of Christ. Her theology of access provides an enlarged Christian
anthropology, a deepened theology of embodiment, and a new form of exegesis of the
Scripture texts that speak to disability, a greater hospitality within liturgy and sacrament,
a deepened spirituality and ultimately a liberatory response to the oppression of those
who are disabled.

She uses the language of Gustavo Gutierrez who describes the

“irruption of the poor”708 as those erased from history, now becoming a part of the story.
This too is the same for those with disabilities as this liberatory movement increases. She
critiques an “ableist” bias in scriptures as well as the “healing cult” within the Christian
tradition aiming to “fix” through faith healing.709 In fact, she makes clear to note the
‘disabling’ of Jesus that occurred before his death.710 Access, for Block, is a mystical and
moral necessity that can be heightened through deepened pneumatology and an
ecclesiology that is self-critical and willing to change.711
A theology of access reminds all that God is not present to us on our own terms
but instead in ways that invite our deepest hospitality and vulnerability.
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leverages new readings of traditional texts to find a deepened theology of access and a
broadened sense of copious inclusion.
3.4.1.3 Sharon V. Betcher
Theologian and disabled scholar Sharon V. Betcher serves as a counterpoint to
Eiesland and Block as she takes an alternative approach to a framework of disability and
liberation. She disagrees with Eiesland that a methodology of liberation is helpful for
disability arguing that the general public does not conceive disability in terms of
oppression and exclusion, but instead comprehends disability as impairment first and
foremost.713 For Betcher, ideas of normalcy and degeneracy, told within the miracle
stories of Scripture and preached through Christian missions, have become oppressors
rather than liberators throughout the history of colonization as they have been
operationalized.714 “Crip bodies,” Betcher contends, become objects of capitalist
economics, unjust systems and colonizing missions through the Christian tradition.715 As
her work in this area develops, bodies become for Betcher “the materializations of social
structures”716 while our flesh is “an ever-changing materialization of spirit in finitude.”717
Here, Betcher takes a slightly more positive view of flesh than does John Calvin,
however, her sentiments echo his. “Flesh” for John Calvin, implied that God would
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encounter limits within the social world of human beings.718 While our bodies might
become infused with unwelcome social judgments and barriers, our flesh invites
transcendent transformation for life in this world. This transformation of the flesh is
“ever-changing” and becomes a “materialization” of the effervescent spirit moving and
changing and evolving within the limits of finitude.
Betcher develops this distinction between flesh and body in her book Spirit and
the Politics of Disablement where she continues to untangle the nuances between flesh
and body.

Bodies, Betcher argues, are the “objectified form of our social

engagements.”719 In suggesting this conception of bodies, Betcher invites consideration
of the fossilization of social entanglements within our bodies: social structures,
environmental toxins,720 societal stereotypes, the gaze of the other, particular laws all
become embedded within our bodies. Her argument complicates any easy filtering of the
body into normalcy or not. Even more so, her conceptualization of the flesh beyond
bodies invites further complications in thinking. Flesh is the entanglement of our bodies,

718

John Calvin, Calvin Commentaries Translated and edited by Joseph Haroutunian and Louise Pettibone
Smith (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1958): 163.
719
Betcher, “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh,” 123.
720
Betcher’s views are seen as she applies these concepts in her essay, “Disability and the Garden State.”
Betcher adds ecology to the conversation between theology and disability. Herself an “eco-theologian” she
names the anthropocene as a “disabling environment,” critiques certain concepts of disability, examines the
concept of “social flesh” and claims herself as a self-called “crip” an “earth-assemblage” of sorts. She
builds first on the misnomer that human disability is an “individualized” problem rather than a communal
one. Her naming of the anthropocene as a disabling era relies on the work of Steingraber, Estabrook,
Robbins and Dracos all of whom provide statistics and stories that link disability to ecology. All of these
create new acts of injustice as this “slow violence” relocates dangerous industries across the globe causing
ecological damage and communal injustice. Betcher invites us to consider this “slow violence” as it passes
through the generations and “folds of flesh, releasing its unnecessary mutations.” This linking of ecology,
disability and theology helps theologians first and foremost to reconsider “flesh” as social, rather than
individual. Social disablement, by ecological terror, then falls into the structure of the dominant culture’s
medical and social views of disability. See: Sharon V. Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State”
Religious Studies News.
http://rsnonline.org/index47ae.html?option=com_content&view=article&id=1462:of-disability-and-thegarden-state&catid=25:spotlight-on-theo-educ&Itemid=1620. (Accessed October 10, 2014).

197

shaped by their encounters with the world, with something of the Spirit. Betcher’s
argument in her book points to the way that even the wonderful and holy notion of the
Holy Spirit can become politicized as the Spirit drives for an idealized “wholeness” that
is heralded within political structures and laws. Betcher accomplishes three tasks: flesh
complicates the idea of normalcy, flesh becomes a conversation point across disciplines,
and flesh invites a deeper conversation in the area of pain that is too often
compartmentalized to bodies alone and does not recognize the role of the spirit.721
Betcher works to normalize some disability by drawing on the words of
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson who says disability is “the transformation of the flesh as it
encounters world.”722 Betcher sees this social flesh materialize in her own body, as crip,
as an “earth assemblage.” Through this lens, Betcher herself becomes “social flesh.”
While Betcher’s essay may appear irrelevant at first glance to questions of disability and
moral injury, her reflections are surprisingly prescient as she describes an interaction
between body, flesh, society and spirit that can either enable, or disable. The colonizing,
oppressing and unjust effects of social flesh are worthy of consideration as we draw
moral injury into conversation with disability. Social flesh, for Betcher, is in need of the
liberatory work of an unpoliticized Holy Spirit.723 And, disability study is in need of
complex notions of the finitude and vulnerability of the flesh in the face of systems that
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work against bodies to oppress. She makes clear, “Disability is just something that
happens to flesh, that occasions our persistent negotiation with limits and finitude.”724
Eiesland, Block and Betcher pave the way through their frameworks of liberation from
unjust social structures toward considerations of disability that address directly questions
of social analysis, including medical critique and ethical response.

3.4.2 The Framework of Social Analysis and Critique: Reinders, Hall and Hauerwas
As scholarship in the field of disability continues to progress, the issues facing the
field are as futuristic as the potential for transhumanism and yet as ancient as those
questions facing Plato, Aristotle and Tertullian about the ethics of abortion amid the
possibility of disability. Scholars such as Hans Reinders, Amy Laura Hall and Stanley
Hauerwas contemplate issues of ethical norms, societal programs, and prenatal testing.
Their work conveys mastery of the discipline with the vulnerability of the human heart;
all three scholars offering wisdom, discernment and guidance to individuals and
institutions facing the complexity of human life in contemporary society.

3.4.2.1 Hans S. Reinders
Ethicist Hans S. Reinders invites in his analytical work The Future of the
Disabled in a Liberal Society: An Ethical Analysis a lingering reflection on the subtle,
and often blatant, discrimination at hand in prenatal testing, the diagnosis of disability
and state support for those who are disabled.725 His work provides a different angle then
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many examined here so far, but is worthy of note for the questions he raises regarding
care for the disabled, particularly care for the disabled when it is known prior to birth that
a child will come into this world with a disability. Reinders will prove to be a fascinating
conversation partner as we consider moral injury as a disability; and then, wrestle with
the consequences of societal responsibility. And, to make the point perfectly clear,
provide accountability for societal consequences when the military-industrial-complex
knows in advance the disabling of body, mind and spirit that can occur through the
weapons and mechanisms of war.
Reinders lives in the Netherlands where euthanasia is supported by the state as a
viable option for those in crisis.726 With this ‘liberal’ background to his study, we
become clear from his argument how detrimental this policy can be to those with
disabilities of all kinds. His concern with prenatal testing is how that moment can have a
trajectory over the lifespan of all people who might then receive a negative devaluation of
their own lives with the choices made after the testing.727

Reinders critiques the

utilitarian ends of such policies and their wider social implications. As selective abortion
post pre-natal testing becomes more widespread, then the consequences of parental
choice for those who choose otherwise become more complicated in a liberal society.728
If a parent ‘chooses’ to have a complicated child, where does the burden of support then
fall – onto the taxpayers or onto the parents who made the choice? There are dangerous
possibilities at play here that demand a finely tuned ethical eye to how policies play out
across a complex spectrum. Reinders pushes society to consider life as a gift in the midst
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of finitude.729 Instead of seeing only the need for societal responsibility, he invites social
relationality as full of possibility and wonder. He invites a more robust conversation
between theological resources and contemporary moral life. In the end, he pushes for a
more complex understanding of suffering that is not presumed by an outside society and
is upheld by religious resources for naming lament.730 Real concern remains for the
disabled, and those who “choose” disability in a liberal society. Because of this solidarity
is less and less possible, even though liberal societies herald inclusion, equal opportunity
and access. Jean Bethke Elshstain, in a review article, offers a helpful summary: “over
time our capacity to recognize, to welcome, to support, and to care for human persons
who lives seems to us entirely pointless and burdensome will collapse.”731 She surmises
and agrees with Reinders assessment that liberal society can at times corrode our “moral
intuitions.”732 As we continue to link disability to moral injury, the question of societal
responsibility and guilt will grow in importance. For now, it is important to remember
the phrase “limited horizon of choice”733 for veterans who make difficult moral choices
with few options. For a liberal society, where choice is “paragon,”734 how will society
reincorporate those who made difficult choices, choices so difficult that they had
disabling effects?

3.4.2.2 Amy Laura Hall

729

Reinders, The Future of the Disabled, 146.
Reinders, The Future of the Disabled, 159.
731
Jean Bethke Elshtain, “What Counts as a Person: Review of The Future of the Disabled in Liberal
Society: An Ethical Analysis,” Commonweal (September 28, 2001), 25.
732
Elshtain, “What Counts as a Person,” 25.
733
See fn. 403 and the conversation with veteran and theologian Brian S. Powers who uses this terminology
to describe the landscape within which moral injury occurs.
734
Elshtain, “What Counts as a Person,” 25.
730

201

Issues of genetic testing and pre-natal choice are areas of scholarship and interest
for Amy Laura Hall. She provides a thought provoking book review (Expecting Adam by
Martha Beck, Testing Women, Testing the Fetus by Rayna Rapp, The Future of the
Disabled in Liberal Society by Hans S. Reinders and Choosing Naia by Mitchell
Zuckoff) worthy of note here,735 illumined by the theological concept of hospitality. And
one theological step further, the concept of interruption as a real dynamic within
hospitality and also within raising children, particularly children with disabilities. She
begins by looking at Rapp’s work on “the social impact of amniocentesis in America”
that is calling upon women to be “moral pioneers”736 in the decisions they make. Rapp
probes deep in untangling the motives and methods available to these moral pioneers.
However, Hall asks her to go deeper by calling upon the possible “prophetic witness” of
women who make unconventional choices.737 Rapp’s anthropological approach belies
the testimonial nature of her work as well: Rapp has taken the tests and made tough
choices. Rapp draws on the language of another scholar who describes a “kinship of
affliction”738 for both children with disabilities such as Down Syndrome, and even for
their parents and families.
Hall notes that Reinders’ work examines the dilemma that arises in a society
when prenatal testing emerges in better and better forms in a society, so that, when
families choose whether or not to have a child with special needs there are then societal
735
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implications. He wonders whether societies will fund disability services, which is truly, a
question of hospitality. He hopes for a world where relationships and the responsibilities
they demand will be unconditional. This kind of hospitality and the prophetic witness it
demands is an act of a robust Christian imagination. In turn, Beck’s work Expecting
Adam is a testament to the inhospitable arena of an Ivy League graduate school, one that
is countered only by a myriad of “puppeteers” and “angels” who nudge her to truly
accept her Down Syndrome son-to-be Adam.

Hall highlights the inefficiency of

hospitality and all its interruptions over and against a “society bent on efficiency.”739 If
we want to make the courageous choice to expect and accept Adam, such moral pioneers
– moms, public witnesses, extended families, the society and the church – must work
against a world that all too often is determined to reject Adam.
Hall’s review offers surprising resources as we consider moral injury as a
potential disability; as well as accessing disability resources to strengthen our
conceptualization and care of the morally injured.

Just as Rapp recognizes “moral

pioneers”, one of the reasons for the state of the morally injured today is their venture
into territories of modern warfare heretofore been unexplored. Resources are not existent
for mapping the moral landscape they enter – both for the mother anticipating genetic
testing, and the soldier entering new arenas of conflict. Reinders reckons with the
choices those moral pioneers make and wonders whether society has the resources to live
with their choices. Again, an echo of the territory our morally injured veterans now find
themselves upon return home.

Beck’s work should not be taken lightly in this

conversation as well. Are we rejecting Lieutenant Adam upon return home because of
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our “society bent on efficiency,” or expecting Adam and the interruptions and
inefficiencies his new life will demand?

3.4.2.3 Stanley Hauerwas
Stanley Hauerwas has written extensively on the topic of disability, inclusion and
hospitality in the life of the church with an eye toward the beloved community of God in
Christ.740 Brief note will be made here of a short but significant essay, helpful for our
ongoing conversation regarding disability, moral injury and morality. In his essay, “Must
a Patient Be a Person to Be a Patient? Or, My Uncle Charlie Is Not Much of a Person
But He is Still My Uncle Charlie,”741 Hauerwas enters here a conversation that seems to
him to have suddenly come to light – what does it mean to be a person? He argues that
society is looking to a definition of personhood for health care, rather than see “what only
a substantive community and story can do.”742 He begins with looking to Paul Ramsey
who emphasizes that no person should be used toward the good of another person.
Hauerwas says this is Ramsey’s Kantian protection on what is all too utilitarian an
approach in medicine today.743 Perhaps, according to Hauerwas, the striving to define
personhood is mobilized by a permissive rather than a protective tendency; if someone is
not a person, then perhaps we are permitted to let the other have more rights rather than
protecting the one who is vulnerable and needs those rights saved. Hauerwas criticizes
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modern medicine for losing its “story” amid our society. There is a vacuum in consensus
when it comes to the collective moral beliefs of our society. Leaning toward story,
particularly the stories formed by faith communities, might mean a change in life span,
cure, and technology. But so doing, might ensure greater emphasis on “how we choose
to survive” rather than on our simple “survival.”744 So doing, may be a different plan for
Uncle Charlie because of his story and his community. Hauwerwas’ account challenges
our culture’s tendency toward medicalization while rejecting deeper views of
embodiment. He values story as a vehicle to move us forward where our morality might
be otherwise lacking. And, he provides a vision for alternative structures of society that
disallow disabling, and encourage enabling through story-formed community.745

3.4.3

The Framework of Theological Doctrine: Haslam, Yong and Reynolds
As we consider different frameworks for perceiving insight into disability today,

an important lens to explore disability is through deep engagement with theology and the
various doctrines presented throughout Christian history. Scholars like Molly Haslam,
Amos Yong and Thomas Reynolds compel accounts of disability that invite us to take
very seriously the claims made by Christian theology. Haslam asks us to consider our
theological anthropology with full knowledge of intellectual disability and its
repercussions for relationality.

A robust vision of pneumatology, is for Yong, a

kaleidoscopic lens through which to interpret disability with regard to the church.
Reynolds prompts consideration of human vulnerability with regard to the doctrines of
744
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creation and redemption. Each of these scholars invites us to do two things: first, to draw
disability into conversation with traditional theology to expose weaknesses within
particular doctrines; and second, to allow theology to more fully guide and shape our
wholehearted response to disability.

3.4.3.1 Molly C. Haslam
With so many scholars addressing primarily physical disabilities, theologian
Molly C. Haslam critiques the western bias toward ‘reason’ that reveals a bias toward
body and a neglect of those who are intellectually impaired in her book A Constrcutive
Theology of Intellectual Disability: Human Being as Mutuality and Response. When
humans are categorized by their abilities for ‘reasoning’ or even by their ability to
cognitively ‘be in relation’, there is a quiet exclusion of those with profound intellectual
disabilities that might not be able to participate in either of those categories of relating.
Haslam becomes a fascinating conversation partner, even hypothetically, with Nancy
Eiesland and her conception of the disabled God. Eiesland offers a portrait of God in a
sip-puff wheelchair; and yet, can we imagine the visceral metaphor continuing through
the lens of Haslam’s work to include a God who is intellectually disabled?
Haslam argues for an understanding of humanness as ‘responsiveness’ that does
not require a particular intellectual capacity.746 She suggests an avoidance of turning
‘inward’ toward a particular capacity such as reason and an avoidance of turning
‘outward’ toward a particular way of relating within a community. Instead, she moves
beyond these dualistic conceptions toward a holistic understanding of God and the world
746
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in a responsive relationship that takes a step forward in illuminating the impact of bodily
bias.747
Haslam hopes to renegotiate the legacy of Eiesland whose liberatory vision of
God in a “sip-puff wheelchair” unintentionally excludes disabled and non-disabled, by
proving God unrecognizable to the child with Down Syndrome, the autistic adult, the
currently non-impaired theologian, the schizophrenic young adult, the non-responsive
disabled child. Eiesland’s insight simultaneously embraces those who are ‘other’ while
unintentionally excluding yet another who feels removed from self-dignity and divine
creativity.

Haslam recognizes the strength and the weakness of Eiesland’s legacy.

Haslam appreciates Eiesland’s affirmation in naming “the paucity of theological
exploration of social, emotional and intellectual disabilities as scandalous”748 but she also
laments Eiesland’s reluctance to struggle with disabilities beyond those solely physical.
Recognizing this rift, Haslam’s work addresses the bias against intellectual disability and
attempts a theology rooted in mutuality749 and response, rather than a theology based in a
particular image of God’s physicality. Haslam advances the conversation in recognizing
the bias toward bodies and against intellectual and mental disabilities, her work is
important in creating the space alongside intellectual and mental disabilities for the
possibility of a disabling that occurs across social contexts when new limits of reason, or
lack thereof, are experienced.
747
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The anthropology of Martin Buber’s “I-Thou” relationship provides Haslam with
the resources she needs to move beyond being linked to capacity, metaphysics, intellect,
or language. Human being, for Buber and Haslam, is mutuality and response. This move
allows her to move beyond Gordon Kaufman’s conception of human being as
“intentional agent”750 and Gordon Lindbeck’s analysis of human being as a “language
user.”751 Using a phenomenological approach, Haslam strives to describe human being in
relational terms and concludes in the end imago dei is relational yearning, not rational
acquisition.752

3.4.3.2 Amos Yong
Throughout his book Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in
Late Modernity,753 Amos Yong examines a range of theological doctrines (creation,
salvation, eschatology, Christology) through a twofold lens of his Pentecostal background
and the particular disability of Down Syndrome. Yong’s theology is deeply personal,
informed by his Pentecostal faith background as well as the relationship with his brother
with Down Syndrome. As a Pentecostal theologian, Yong’s interests are in the healing
tradition of Pentecostalism and in the spirit-filled community Pentecostals are known for
750
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in their worship and fellowship. Yong imagines healing not of individual diseases, but of
systemic inability to be hospitable and inclusive.754 When this hospitality is gained
through healing then the possibility begins for that spirit-filled community to receive
hospitality back to itself through the gifts and Holy Spirit surprises of those with
disabilities.
Like several of the historical theologians, including Augustine and Barth,
Theologian Amos Yong also struggles with the relationship between disability and
resurrection. This is just one example of the many doctrines he wrestles with and
reconceives for late modernity. While that may seem removed from engaging deeply in
the reality before us, questions regarding the resurrection address very much our current
identity and the injuries we face in this life. Questions about disability and resurrection
press the deepest concerns and commitments of embodied life. Yong engages a historical
overview of resurrection and its relationship to disability. Augustine believed all bodies,
except those scars of the martyrs, would be perfect in heaven. All monstrosities would be
eliminated.755

The Augustinian view of personal identity along a continuum of

transformation through life is that the “flower” of one’s youthful body would be
resurrected.756 Aquinas shared a similar view of restoration in our bodies at resurrection.
In addition, Aquinas who believed in the pursuit of virtues, would have excluded those
with intellectual disabilities from this realm because the possibility of “perfect
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relationship with God” would be prevented by their lack of cognition.757 Even today,
such views persist so that ultimate freedom resides in the dismissal of disability in
eternity. More modern views fall across a spectrum of understanding – perhaps in
heaven, what matters most is the larger collective body fully present to the love of God.
Nancy Eiesland would not rid herself of her disability in heaven because “my disability
has taught me who I am and who God is.”

Hauerwas takes her viewpoint a step further,

“to eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject.”758
In light of these, Yong presents a “dynamic eschatology” to come alongside his
“dynamic anthropology.” He shapes this in light of a disability reading of 1 Corinthians
15 as well as the epectasis (eternal journey of the soul) in Gregory of Nyssa.759 Is it
possible, with these in mind, that a person might be both preserved and transformed over
time in eternity?760 Yong believes our viewpoint on resurrection and eschatology informs
and shapes current practices now. Sarah Coakley’s view of the eschaton shapes Yong,
where in a powerful point he says “the body itself finds its rest in the unending process of
being transformed by the glory of God in ways that overturn the binary dichotomies not
only of male/female but also of disabled/nondisabled.”761 Coakley’s argument that the
eschaton disrupts societal norms and advances Christian concepts of identity that allow
for fluidity, vulnerability and less dichotomy than certain cultural norms is helpful to
757

Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 264-265.
Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 270.
759
Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 271.
760
Disability Scholar Brian Brock offers a helpful note here in his review essay “Theology and Down
Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity,” Scottish Journal of Theology 65:3 (Aug. 2012):
370-372. He explains that Yong’s eschatological theology is never “expungement of human bodies and
identities,” but aims in the ongoing transformation of healing begun in earthly life and continued in the
eschaton.
761
Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 281. See: Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality,
Philosophy, and Gender (Malden, MA: Blackwell Press, 2002).
758

210

Yong who argues for a dynamism and ascent in the afterlife other than what is
experienced in this life. Yong’s argument is that individual disabilities will be preserved
in the eschaton and recognized as essential in the communion of saints and the “divine
scheme of things.”762 In addition to individual affirmation, there will be communal
reconciliation and restructuring of broken societal relationships. Yong uses the example
of Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav’s “Tale of the Seven Beggars” to illustrate a world
inhospitable and broken structurally that will be redeemed and well understood in
resurrection life.763 The seven beggars each are disabled and their disablements in the
story are intended to reveal two things: first, the broken nature of this world and second,
a signpost of the world to come that will mend what is broken. However, as much as this
appears to be a story of condemnation of disability and anticipation of a new world to
come, Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav made sure to convey in this story that what was most
broken was society’s inability to accept the beggars as they are. In fact, those unable to
see the wholeness of the beggars are in fact “deformed” as well.764 What we learn
through deep reading of Amos Yong is that his theology is poised to reverse the failure of
this morality tale. As Yong says, it is “an attempt to make sense of my brother.”765
3.4.3.3 Thomas E. Reynolds
Thomas E. Reynolds’ work Vulnerable Communion (2008) develops from his
commitment to relational ontology, but even more so, from Reynolds own experience as
a family within a church where his son Chris, host to a variety of unseen disabilities, was
762
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at first marginalized. He draws on Eiesland’s “two-way access”766 as a theological
method that mobilizes those with disabilities greater access into institutions while at the
same time provides the non-disabled with glimpses into the “social-symbolic world” of
those who do have disabilities. Such a two-way privileging of disability is not unlike
Gutierez’s “preferential option” and “irruption of the poor.” Reynolds works within the
ADA framework that defines disability in a threefold manner: as real impairment of
body or mind, as a record of that impairment, and/or as being regarded as having that
impairment.767

Reynolds sees the Apostle Paul as one of the first theologians of

disability whose “thorn in the flesh” becomes a Christological witness to the power of
Christ’s saving message at work within him.768 This is one example of the “metaphorical
reversal” that Reynolds will emphasize through this work as an overturn of the “cult of
normalcy.” Such a cult of normalcy has theological implication in the fact that it can
even effect a normalizing projection upon God. A hermeneutic of disability must avoid
trivialization or denigration of those who are disabled. While calling disability a tragedy,
it is not the impairment that is tragic but the social consequences that are. Questions of
theodicy can fall prey to the cult of normalcy. Reynolds encourages a conversation about
human vulnerability beyond those traps toward a deeper ecclesiology and systematic
theology.
Like Amos Yong, Reynolds offers thorough reviews of the doctrines of creation,
redemption and the imago dei and ecclesiology. Two points are key to Reynolds theology
of creation as a generous and ongoing gift of God. First, he believes in a knowledge of
766
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God that is a priori - inscribed as a strong sensibility on the human heart – rather than
knowledge of God that is a posteriori – learned from reasoning within the world. While
this may sound contradictory to a love of God that is “learned” in vulnerable communion,
Reynolds argues what is gained in that vulnerability is a justification of the longing we
have known all along. In addition, Reynolds stands behind the Reformed tradition’s tenet
of creation ex nihilo.769 The ex nihilo must not be neglected, Reynolds asserts this fact
alongside Tertullian, Irenaeus and Augustine who argued similarly to claim that creation
remains without form, absolute nothing, without God’s guiding presence. Even though
this is not specifically outlined in scripture, this tenet expresses our reliance upon God at
every moment – we are created ex nihilo – in vulnerable communion for all time.770
God’s creativity as gift in creation reminds us that we live in an “economy of
superabundant grace”771 rather than subsisting in the cult of normalcy and all that such a
cult entails. In this chapter Reynolds speaks to the “transformation” that can occur
through disability as vulnerability becomes embodied within a community. One response
to the fact that we are created in the imago dei is to then become imitators of that image –
or as Reynolds says – to model imitatio dei.772
It should be noted here that Reynolds does not venture into any theological
reflection here on the Trinity, which would be helpful. Instead, he focuses on the imago
dei as creativity, relationality and availability.773 These capacities – particularly the
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capacity for love – call us into the capax Dei (the capacity for God). Reynolds’ last
chapter begins with the lovely and often-quoted words of Gerard Manley Hopkins, but
read here within the framework of disability, “For Christ plays in ten thousand
places,/Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his/To the Father through the features of
men’s faces.”774 The kingdom, evidenced in the church, will welcome in these “out of
control” bodies that affront our sense of normalcy and yet through a metaphorical
reversal come to model the very body of Christ in our midst. The “power of inability” is
realized once and for all in the cross and it is the radical charge to the church that
demands modeling true vulnerability in the midst of that inability for God to meet us
here.775
Reynolds leans toward a model of disability that is less medical (he writes,
“disability is not a thing”776) and is instead something sociologically complex. Disability,
for Reynolds is “a range of physiologically rooted social performances, a series of
moments defined by relationships between human beings.

In a basic sense, the

distinction between ability and disability is built into the fabric of communal life.”777
When we learn Reynolds own son has Aspergers, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder,
Tourette’s Syndrome and Bipolar Disorder, this suggests that personal experience moved
him toward a more nuanced definition. Such a definition moves us toward an
understanding of our own identity that is shaped and reshaped amid many myriad
moments across social contexts. For Reynolds, a suffering and liberating God actively
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draws near to those who become disabled in those “physiologically rooted social
performances” and then works to liberate their oppression.778

3.4.4

Themes and Questions in the Contemporary Scholarship on Disability
The hope this chapter began with is that moral injury “needs” disability.

Recognizing the cautions raised by Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon, we drew moral injury
into conversation with these frameworks for interpreting disability: the framework of
liberation, the framework of social analysis and medical critique and the framework of
theological doctrine and its implications. Here, we will look at themes and tensions raised
within these frameworks with regard to the medicalization of bodies, the sociological
construct of disability, and limits encountered. While each of these themes explores
issues of human finitude, it will be in the next section as we interpret the work of
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson that their implications will be fully realized and then
suggested as a helpful third option for relating moral injury and disability.
Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone argues for a “corporeal turn”779 in
medicine to better respect the complexity and humanity of embodiment. Perhaps, she
recognizes like Garland-Thomson the situation of human finitude by understanding the
vitality and vulnerability of the human being. Nancy Eiesland adds to this corporeal turn
by dismissing notions of God as perfect in body; and recognizing not just the human but
also the divine with regard to complex notions of frailty and vulnerability.
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conceptualization of the disabled body of God complicates norms, expectations, ideals
and projections within human bodies. Thomas Reynolds pursues an alternative route, but
toward a similar end in complicating notions of disability. Disability, he argues, is “not a
thing.”780 In the western world of Cartesian dualisms, Reynolds refuses to enter the door
of easy dualisms and expects instead respect for the body not as a mechanism or easily
fixed or medicalized subject, but instead, a socially complex phenomenon. Betcher
demands the same respect for the complexity of human bodies amid the mechanics of the
medical world as she invites reflection on social bodies, spirited flesh, and the subtle
ways ecological changes can wreak havoc on human bodies. Medicine, in its treatment of
human illness and treatment of certain disabilities, must also pay attention to the societal
and ecological sources of those ailments and alterations of ability.
Contemporary scholarship on disability makes clear the social nature of disability
and the effects of social constructs and expectations on those of varying abilities.
Eiesland sought liberation for the disabled from unjust structures and her colleagues
continue her cry. Thomas Reynolds’ work in Vulnerable Communion assumes the social
construct of disability that Eiesland seeks liberation from by means of her disabled God.
Reynolds offers a provocative phrase, worthy of note and continued reflection.
Disability, he understands, is a “physiologically rooted social performance.” Such a
definition could easily be misunderstood as overly dramatic or even judgmental. But his
sentiment is wholly otherwise: what we perceive as disability is an enactment of greater
social norms, failures and projections. For our morally injured veterans, Reynolds words
both identify and challenge. It would be all too easy to focus on what is first presented
780
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(shame, distrust, isolation) rather than explore the deeper sociological influences. A
counterpoint is offered within Block’s exploration of Gutierrez’s notion of the “irruption
of the poor.” So much of the scholarship suggests that societies create disabilities
through inhospitable acts, unjust laws, and expectations of perfection. Block’s view
reveals the opposite; that is the capacity of those in minority groups to upset the status
quo and in so doing, to demand new social structures. Gutierrez envisioned an irruption
of the poor that Block commends.

Authors, theologians and veterans today are

demanding a similar “irruption of the veteran” to invite a complacent society to engage
the reality of war-torn and morally injured veterans. Block’s reflection echoes Yong’s
insight that there is a systemic disability within society to include the disabled, and this
too has consequences for those whose presenting disability is moral injury.
Certainly we see within the contemporary scholarship issues relevant to medical
and social models of disability that will be explored more fully in Chapter Four. Of
interest to this dissertation is the exploration of how different abilities within particular
bodies are revealed or hidden within and across various social constructs. The notion of
“limits” and its implication for bodies, morality, disability and society is a little explored
topic within the fields of morality, disability and moral injury.

The contemporary

scholarship on disability raises some interesting insights regarding the notion of changing
functionality and/or flourishing across varied contexts. Two contrasting views may be
seen in the work of Hans Reinders and Amos Yong. Reinders offers a real world cost
analysis of the societal implications of choosing disability. Reinders recognizes the ill
effects of a liberal society that will place limits on disabled people and those who choose
to bear the disabled into existence. This viewpoint presupposes judgments on those with
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varying abilities and their preconceived inability to function across various contexts.
Yong proposes an interesting counterpoint with his vision of a dynamic eschatology
imagining human beings take on a sacred journey of ascent that will naturally assume
decay and disability and transformation over time experiencing different limits across
different contexts but all the while maintaining the possibility of a particular kind of
flourishing. Perhaps it is Amy Laura Hall who explores a third way: new contexts and
new choices create the space for new moral decisions. When time and space between
collapse, those left in their wake must make difficult decisions as “moral pioneers.” A
moral pioneer, forced into new, unexpected and uncharted territory, will find themselves
at times ‘abled’ and ready to make difficult choices within a changing context. And yet
the opposite is also very true: at times the moral pioneer will become disabled – that is
limited – when context closes in and they are no longer able to function and make
decisions as they have in the past. Hall’s language of “moral pioneer” drawn from the
scholarship of Rayna Rapp certainly has implications for our morally injured veterans,
pushed to the limit to make difficult and pioneering moral choices in landscapes and
contexts no one could have ever imagined.

3.4.5

The Framework of Human Finitude: Garland-Thomson
These questions of medicalization, social construction and engagement with limits

all probe the depth of human finitude: what does it mean to be finite in the age of techne?
What does it mean to be finite as a socially constructed body? And what does it mean to
be finite as we encounter real limits in a complex and broken world? Rosemarie GarlandThomson invites direct engagement with those issues in her work. In so doing, she
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provides a helpful alternative for pairing disability and moral injury that does not rely on
definitions, or even frameworks, but instead a complex theological anthropology that
accounts for human frailty, failing and finitude in the face of the fall.781

3.4.5.1 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson
The academic field of disability studies provides a promising conversation partner
for engaging and reflecting on the complexities of moral injury. Individual and social
identity is at the heart of questions regarding impairment and disability. The problem
with understanding disability, according to disabled scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson
is that in our society we do not have a clear “collective notion…of what it means to be
disabled”782; in so asking, Garland-Thomson raises the question of human finitude.
Garland-Thomson laments the singular defining factor of disability by many in our
culture: “The one thing most people do know about being disabled is that they don’t want
to be that.”783 To begin to expand notions of disability, one step important to GarlandThomson is to invite others to consider the fluid and ever-changing nature of our own
bodies.

In so doing she invites reflection on disability as an experience all will

experience at some point in their own lifetime, even when they can’t imagine being
“that” – whatever “that” is for them. She explains, “The fact is, most of us will move in
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and out of disability in our lifetimes, whether we do so through illness, an injury or
merely the process of aging.”784
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson answers some of her own questions in a particularly
compelling definition of disability stating, “What we consider disability is the
transformation of flesh as it encounters world.”785

Impairment, as this definition

suggests, occurs as flesh – all flesh – encounters the world. As we consider moral injury,
and the particular wounds that occur during wartime, this definition becomes even more
compelling as one wonders how flesh, in all its dimensionality, is transformed as the warzone world is encountered. If “injury” is one of the disabling possibilities for all of us, is
it possible for us to imagine an injury that is moral and thereby disabling? One can
imagine the implications such a broadening to include morality might have then in
defining disability. When the American with Disabilities Act describes disability as “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities,”786 one must wonder if moral impairment (that touches a deeper place than
mental capacity) might be included.
Garland-Thomson notes our shared vulnerability given the “inherent dynamism of
the flesh”787 and its “movement through time and space in the process we call life.”788
Garland-Thomson’s work here is to “conserve” disability as a potential for “meaning-
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making” by finding within both impairment and disability a narrative resource, an
epistemic resource and an ethical resource.789

Garland-Thomson’s definition is

particularly helpful in honoring the full complexity of life, acknowledging human
suffering but also affirming the joy within which it is entangled.790 She understands the
intimate connection between flesh and world that is recognized in the World Health
Organization’s definition of disability that understands the complex interplay between
“features of a person’s body and features of the society in which he or she lives.”791 To
be clear, too often the features of society only acknowledge the contextual limitations
placed on a body in any given social context rather than acknowledging societal factors
that can contribute to mental, physical, and we will argue here moral, disabilities that
might occur through environment, wartime engagement and other disabling elements.
The definition put forth by Garland-Thomson is deceptively simple and yet utterly
compelling. As noted above, her words recognize the impact the collective social world
has on individual bodies, even to the point of injury. This impact creates a shared
vulnerability that calls us all into the spectrum of disability. But perhaps, her thirteen
word definition of disability creates a framework noting within her definition each of the
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models of disability: flesh acknowledges the medical model, world incorporates the
social model, and transformation points to the possibility a limit model and the
questioning of limits might enact. Before turning to explore these three models in full
later in this chapter, it is important to understand how Garland-Thomson engages
conversation amid the field of disability scholars.
In her New York Times essay, “Becoming Disabled,” Garland-Thomson sets the
foundation for a series of essays on disability by prominent scholars and activists in the
field. In her viewpoint, “becoming disabled” is a strength to live into no matter where
you are on the disabled spectrum. Becoming disabled, acknowledging the areas where
one is a “misfit between body and world” becomes then “an occasion for
resourcefulness.”792 Becoming disabled allows greater humanity, especially when one
considers the fluidity and fragility of life.793 Becoming disabled prevents a disabled
person from the persistent thought that society demands them to be other than their own
self with a particular mind and body. And, finally, “Becoming disabled means moving
from isolation to community, from ignorance to knowledge about who we are, from
exclusion to access, and from shame to pride.”794
This chapter on “Disability” began with arguments regarding disability’s need for
moral injury, and the reverse, moral injury’s need for disability. Garland-Thomson offers
a compelling argument for “conserving” disability not just as a category, but as a
resource both for individuals and institutions that creates knowledge, access and pride.
The language provided with deceptive insight and simplicity by Garland-Thomson that
792
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disability is the transformation that occurs as flesh encounters the world will prove to be
helpful lens through which to view Bonhoeffer’s scholarship in Chapter Five as well as a
critical tool for developing a revised limit model of disability that takes into account
varying contexts and “worlds.” Before turning to Bonhoeffer in Chapter Five, in Chapter
Four we will analyze and assess the medical and social models of disability, introduce
Deborah Creamer’s “limit” model as a new constructive model, and investigate the need
for a “revised limit model of disability” to address the weaknesses in her model for the
particular needs of returning veterans. The literature addressed in this chapter ranges
from scholarship that in the language of the Veterans’ Creed “abandoned” the disabled to
scholarship that offered resolute “support.” With an eye to deepening and strengthening
that support, the conversation between disability and moral injury will continue in the
next chapter and moves us toward the development of a revised limit model of disability
that recognizes human finitude in the face of limits.
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Chapter 4
Models of Disability and the Need for a Revised Limit Model

If I cannot carry them – I will call for help.
- The Veterans’ Creed795

4.1

Models of Disability and Socially Encoded Meanings
Our review of historical and contemporary scholarship on disability and the push

for interchange between the fields of disability and moral injury in chapter three aided in
recognizing the potential stigma inherent in the language of disability.796 Tyler Boudreau
and Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon invite resistance to the transfer of the stigmatizing label of
disability to moral injury. Disability and moral injury both provide an epistemology of
“destabilizing knowledge”797 that may not be immediately evidenced, but that I would
argue is rooted in a recognition of human vulnerability and finitude. However, the
stigmas and stereotypes evidenced in the historical accounts, social analyses, and even
theological doctrine reviewed in chapter three can at times prevent deeper engagement of
the epistemology and theological anthropology at stake.
Perhaps this is because disabled bodies, and the language of disability itself, carry
messages that have symbolic and cultural impact. Samuel Joeckel refers to disabled
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bodies as “having symbolic power embedded in cultural structures of meaning”798 that
can sometimes bear erroneous messages. For some, according to Joeckel, the message is
“divine disfavor”799 where a broken body is revelatory of a judgment by God.800 For
others, the message is a heroic overcoming of an obstacle revealing a strength that is
inspiring to others.801 Because of the “error” in those messages, disability scholars
continue to challenge problematic ideologies and offer constructive accounts of
disability. The messages of divine disfavor and heroic triumph may appear simplistic, but
their usage reflects and often reinscribes entrenched patterns of cultural interaction,
power relations and epistemological meaning. Bodies, according to Michel Foucault,
“emit signs”802 that reveal their complex relationship to power as well as injustices
embedded in particular ideologies and practices.
In this chapter, we will explore the traditional models of disability: the medical803
and the social models.804 In these models, as much as they aim for precision to describe
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a particular manifestation of disability, they still serve more as broad descriptors to
describe a “cluster of somewhat related experiences or situations.”805 After we outline
working dimensions of the medical model of disability and the social model of disability,
we will pay attention to the strengths and weaknesses of each. Finally, we will turn to the
work of Deborah Creamer who notes dissatisfaction with both models and offers instead
a “limit model of disability.” In our ongoing dialogue with moral injury, the medical and
social models of disability offer insight that is helpful and appropriate, even when
disability is most often deemed taboo in the military world. However, it is Deborah
Creamer’s “limit model” that is most compelling for focusing on the various experiences
of disabilities across contexts. This chapter will conclude with the suggestion we expand
Deborah Creamer’s limit model to take into account which limits are natural, and are to
be embraced, and which limits result from sin and should be challenged. We will note
how Creamer’s model begins the conversation but does not give enough clarity; therefore
it will be necessary in the next chapter to draw on Dietrich Bonhoeffer for an assessment
of the moral demands of each type of limit.

4.1.1

A Moral Model of Disability?
At this point in the conversation, we have seen attempts both wittingly and

unwittingly to connect disability to morality through both the historical and contemporary
Lennard J., (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2013): 263. Others note the development of the World
Health Organization’s 1980 classification system for identifying impairments, disabilities and handicaps.
See: WHO, International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps,1980.
804
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models. Some scholars argue that “a moral model of disability” is the oldest model
predating medical and social models.806 To be clear, standard practice is to name only
medical and social models of disability that will be outlined later in the chapter.
However, scholars noting the existence of a kind of “moral model of disability” are trying
to articulate and draw together nuances in thinking around disability that linked bodily
impairment to morality.

Consider for example, Robert Garland’s The Eye of the

Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World which is a historical
overview of deformity beginning with ancient Rome. Garland explores both the curious
as in the teraton agora ‘monster market’ in Rome to the concerning practice of
infanticide. He outlines a “physiognomic consciousness” that idealized the perfect body
and shamed those misshapen bodies as indicative of the soul’s “hidden energies”807
whose moral consequences are revealed in bodies. Nancy Eiesland fought fiercely to
retrieve Christian exegesis and tradition from the link between morality and disability.
She argued, Christian faith can no longer let “disability be a sign of moral imperfection or
divine retribution for sin.”808
In this kind of model, disability is seen as a punishment and leads to social
exclusion and a lowering of social status due to misdemeanors done by the individual or
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their family member.809 Here, bad action is presumed to result in a congenital disability.
Not unlike the doctrine of Karma, this implication of a moral model struggles with the
effects of sin and morality. Those who assumed a moral reason for the disability in the
body, often hid their disabled family member preventing them from engaging in society
and meaning making. Shame, self-hatred and social ostracism are key components of
this model.810 While this model contains many facets that are disturbing theologically
(disability as punishment, disability as moral failing, disability as challenge from God to
be overcome),811 for our purposes, the model fails to show what happens when morality
itself, that is, an individual’s participation in the moral community is disabled. Moving
forward would require a model of disability that moves beyond moral judgment toward a
more robust understanding of the disablement of moral agency through morally injurious
situations brought on by one’s self or by the failed person in authority. At the same time,
moving forward will require honest wrestling with the effects of sin and shame,
consequences and confession in the face of finitude that are at the heart of moral injury.
We need a model deeper than the mark of sara’at from the book of Leviticus that was a
stigmatizing tattoo of moral failure.812 What model might create a space beyond stigma
for theological reflection? What model might navigate a new landscape for those “moral
pioneers”813 where focus is less on morality, and more on the changing landscapes and
how that affects coping and embodiment and morality over time and space? Even prior
809

Kofi Amponsah-Bediako, “Relevance of Disability Models from the Perspective of a Developing
Country: An Analysis” Developing Country Studies, 3:11 (2013): 127.
810
Deborah Kaplan, “The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability Community” Journal of
Health Care Law and Policy 3:2:5. (2000): 353.
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol2/iss2/5 (Accessed October 14, 2016).
811
See: Rebecca P. Cameron “Honoring the Experience of Disability” Phi Beta Kappa 94.2 (2014), 17.
812
Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult: The Priestly Rationale for Exclusion,” 55.
813
Hall, “Put to the test,” 34. See: Rayna Rapp, “Moral pioneers: women, men and fetuses on a frontier of
reproductive technology” Women Health 13:1-2 (1987): 101-16.

228

to Nancy Eiesland recognizing disability as no longer a sign of “moral imperfection,”814
the medical model of disability was advanced to challenge the dominant underlying
conception of morality that informed earlier perceptions of disability.
4.1.2

The Medical Model of Disability
As we turn to a fuller description of the medical and social models of disability, it

is important to keep in mind that the medical model was an advance, in response to a
weakness from these earliest models and the judgments they exacerbated. As the first
recognized formal model, the medical model815 began as the medical world conceived
disability as bodily impairments that differ from the norm and studied “pathological
physiological conditions.”816 The medical model focuses on functioning versus nonfunctioning parts of the body and mind.817 In response to these ailments, service
industries employ their techne toward care for the disabled population and societies are
judged by their compassion, or not, toward them. These industries, according to Mitchell
and Snyder have “established their scientific and social credentials (as well as their
professional legitimacy) through the ‘humane’ study and provision of services to disabled
populations that are at the outermost margins of social interest and cultural value.”818 In
the medical model of disability, disability is a physical impairment shaped by the world
814
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of ‘perfection’ that invites societal norms for our bodies and then determines who is
impaired and who is not.
At stake in this model is a concern that disability is defined in terms that stress its
deviation from a norm or ideal version of human being. David Mitchell and Sharon
Snyder, professors in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the
University of Illinois, Chicago, describe this problem through the term “similitude”:
“Dreams of similitude underwrite the social debasement of disabled people.”819 Mitchell
and Snyder argue that this debasement of disability is evident even in academic efforts to
define disability: “Across the modern academy, entire research domains have been
devoted to the pathologization and, subsequently, normalization of disability as
deviance.”820 For the purposes of this dissertation it is particularly important to note the
Christian tradition is complicit in reinforcing norms that encourage the definition of
disability in terms that show its lack of similarity to the standard ideal body:
Variations on this thesis with respect to biblical narratives: gender ambiguity;
the likeness of humanity made in God’s image; the economically abject’s
location on the outskirts of biblical society; bodily incapacity as expression of
divine disapproval; the use of disabled people as a defensive frontline to ward
off intruders; disability as a marker of tainted priesthood or moral failing; mental
illness as satanic possession; the perfect body of Christ as the approximation of
godliness; physical disability as loss of claim to hereditary kingship; sexual
infidelity as source of childhood deformity; excessive vulnerability as the
definition of impairment; among others…. Their bodily, cognitive, and sensory
differences continue to provide opportunities for exclusion rather than
embrace.821
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The medical model of disability then designates bodies as disabled or abled through a
process of assessing consistency with an idealized norm. Any presenting bodily issue
that fails the similitude test is then subject to medical cure.
The effect of this assimilating norm can be seen in discussions on healing,
genetics and medical treatment. Under the medical model, those with disabilities are
considered broken people who require technology to assimilate toward a norm of
preconceived health and vitality. In his book A Theological Diagnosis: A New Direction
on Genetic Therapy, “Disability” and the Ethics of Healing, Matt Edmonds wrestles with
these issues. His central concern is the over-medicalization in response to disabilities
rather than reshaping civic structures toward greater inclusion, and even more, toward
grace and friendship.822

Radical medicalization leads to genetic options that are

untoward for Edmond as the field of genetics then becomes a curative resource for
disabilities.823 For Edmonds, problems occur when reducing the individual either in
globalizing theories of disability or in preventive genetic treatments. The way forward
beyond these easy reductions is to “enable each and every one of us to develop
friendship, life and love. By rescuing the individual from unnecessary categorization –
by giving the person a name.”824 While Edmonds’ ‘diagnosis’ and ‘treatment’ for the
problems inherent to the medical model may appear idealistic (civic engagement,
enablement and the exercise of ‘naming’ an individual), his suggestion is counterintuitive to the medical world. His argument recognizes the tendency to technologize
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healing and to dismiss the individual. Genetics becomes for Edmonds an avenue toward
preventive “healing” and “disability” is the object of that healing act. Such a move
objectifies an individual: both the existent individual who becomes the image of possible
disablement as well as the not-yet existent embryo who is being shaped technologically
toward a particular future.825
Medical ethicist Jeffrey Bishop sees the tendency within modern medicine to
“claim power”826 and objectification over bodies, so much so that it has become “The
standard bearer of western metaphysics.” Bishop works with Emmanuel Levinas here to
resituate the “other” from object of medicine to constituting subject.827 Bishop
appreciates the ethical demand of Levinas who argues that it is violent to totalize another
person by reducing them to our categories of comprehension.828 Instead, the medical
world needs to have what Levinas deems a “non-allergic relation with alterity.”829

All

too often, we have what Levinas defines as “a reduction of the other to the same.”830
Bishop’s argument suggests the need for the medical world to a new understanding of the
patient and discover within that person “the astonishing feat of containing more than it is
possible to contain.”831
Bishop also draws on the work of Jean Luc Marion’s theologies of the idol and
the icon. While an individual constitutes idols over and over again (creating a sense of
825
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utter exhaustion), an icon is what constitutes that person and gives life. For Marion, an
“idol” is that place where “the gaze has just stopped: the idol concretizes the stop”832
while the “icon” is that which envisages: the icon opens in a face that gazes at our gazes
in order to summon them to its depth.833

In the relationship between a health care

provider or physician and a person with disability, Bishop argues, the switch means a
reversal from the “constituting gaze of the doctor”834 to the one who is the “constituted
subject-physician.”835 This reversal places power back into the hands of the person who
had been deemed disabled. For Bishop, the disabled body is the one that does not
measure up to the idealized body of the false god of medicine.836 Bishop acknowledges
that objectification is a natural accompaniment to many of medicine’s strengths, but then
graciously pushes a reconsideration of reversals that might be helpful.837

Bishop

understands the “broken body” as simply a human being, one who longs to worship and
one who hopes to be reconstituted by the liturgical body through divine worship.838
Bishop concludes with a high calling to divine liturgy and worship to “re-constitute” the
physician through prayer, but it should be noted that Bishop is arguing for an ethical high
calling as well.

He looks to Levinas and Marion as two ethicist-theologians who

transcend Kant’s “categorical imperative”839 with a call to contextual responsibility that
will always be “so demanding that sin is necessary, and failure inevitable.”840
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The medical model has been subject to widespread and longstanding criticism
among scholars of disability. At its basest, the medical model sees the individual as a
person with errors that might be erased through the proper procedures. Humans then are
categorized into “curable” or “uncurable” dependent on whether or not technology exists
to fight the disabling condition. This model considers the disabled person alone as the
sole indicator of whether or not disablement is present, neglecting societal forces. In so
doing, the model minimizes the effect of culture and even though it has an eye toward the
individual, still manages to ignore the identity of the whole person, seeing instead only
ability or not.

In its drive toward rehabilitation, the medical model neglects the

subjectivity of persons with disabilities. The weakness of the medical model then is in its
tendency to judge humans themselves as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ based on their level of
abilities.
The strength of the medical model, first and foremost, is its advancement beyond
the moralistic judgments inherent to early observations of disability. The medical model,
as noted in the creed above, heard a certain “cry for help” within disability studies to
address the moralistic questions. As Joeckel notes divine disfavor and heroic triumph
were components of the earliest understanding of disability. Using these moralistic
formulations is evident in the texts of Ancient Rome841 and early Christian writings842
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where judgments regarding ability and the possibility of human flourishing are often
harsh, simplistic and reductionistic.843 Joeckel explains the importance that we might
otherwise take for granted:
While the other paradigms invest disability with a cosmic significance or
associate disability with the resiliency of the human spirit, the medical model
approaches disability as impairment to be medically ameliorated.844
The academic shift in language eliminated “the stare of wonder”845 that carried a message
of either judgment or providence and replaced the engagement with “a clinical gaze.”846
The socially encoded meaning of disability shifted at that point from messages of favor or
disability. The “double bind” they describe is that in “resisting ableism” one can easily fall into a pattern of
anti-Judaism. The two scholars work together in a risky move for an essay. They re-visit a sermon written,
preached and published by Morrison on the story of the bent over woman in Luke 13:10-17. The reader
can practically hear Morrison cringe in her use of the Dutch word for resurrection Opstanding as a theme
through the text. Belser, her partner in this essay is a disabled scholar whose mobility is provided by a
wheelchair. Belser helps Morrison to listen deeply to what Devorah Greenstein calls a “rhetoric of
affliction” that can plague sermons and preaching. While Morrison had hoped to witness to the dynamic
process of resurrection at work in ongoing lives, rather than a single event, her portrayal of the bent over
woman is problematic. Morrison imagines her in a miserable state rather than imagining the possibility this
woman might have lived in “resourcefulness and creativity, supporting and sustaining herself – and perhaps
others, as well.” Even in quoting Irenaeus in this sermon that “the glory of God is a human being fully
alive,” she speculated that the bent over woman was anything but fully alive. What Morrison and Belser
realize together is that changing this narrative can all too easily lead to the next step in the double bind
which would be criticizing the broken society in which the “bent over” woman lives.
843
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disfavor toward the distance of a clinical assessment. And so, an additional strength of
the medical model one might argue is its potentiality to strengthen existing skills when
medical treatment functions within a holistic view of humanity, one that acknowledges
the whole person and aims to enhance existing skills where medically possible. Such
advancements can be positive when oriented not to erase errors, but instead work to
fostering humanity with the best of technology. Living into this strength is fraught with
judgment and stereotype, one must consider the body, mind and spirit of the individual on
their own terms and with their own hopes realized rather than projected upon by others.
We will see as we move from the medical model to the social model, how that
advancement in scholarship was fueled by a need to better understand the intersection
between bodies and societies.

4.1.3 The Social Model of Disability
The social model of disability847 argues that disability is largely socially
constructed, deeply informed by worldly structures of institutions and stereotypes that
create a societal ‘disabling’ of an individual through restricting access or provoking
judgment.848 In the medical model, attention is focused on the embodiment of individual
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physicality. In the social model, attention is given to discrimination that occurs in the
world through societal structures that create minority groups through exclusion by the
physical and social nature of institutions.849 Sociologist Michael Oliver was instrumental
in establishing the social model in 1983 with his work Social Work with Disabled
People850 wherein he advocated for social justice and championed an approach through
which to see societal barriers otherwise taken for granted. The social model centers
critical attention on the way societal structures create disadvantages and cause restrictions
for people with diverse impairments.851
Three theologians offer insight into the social model of disability: Nancy
Eiesland, Stanley Hauerwas and Sharon V. Betcher. Eiesland invites liberation from
unjust societal structures.

Hauerwas asks demanding questions of the intersection

between intellectual capacity and social structures.

Sharon V. Betcher prompts

discussion between the environment and its potential to disable bodies through social
injustice. Nancy Eiesland advocates for the social model in her understanding of the
liberatory struggle those with disabilities face to overcome societal oppression, alienation
from particular norms, and stigmas promulgated by stereotypes.852 In the face of such
limitation Eiesland, like Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, experiences disability as disabling
interchanges between the world and one’s body through “architectural and attitudinal”853
barriers. While Eiesland wrestles with the societal dimensions of disablement in
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interactions with her own disabled body, Stanley Hauerwas adds to the conversation in
the social model the question of intellectual disablement wherein there is a social
construction of disability with regard to intellect and reason.854
Theologian Sharon V. Betcher adds dimension to the social model of disability by
inviting reflection on ecological devastation as a contributing factor for creating disability
rather than seeing disability as a natural phenomenon seen as an “individual tragedy.”855
The socialization of disability, for Betcher, is something that occurs prior to birth through
social contexts and devastations rather than after birth as a body enters a social context
inhospitable to their particular condition. For Betcher, the anthropocene856 itself is a
disabling social environment.

She explains, “Disability is not merely a ‘natural’

evolutionary mutation. In the Anthropocene era, as human activity drives and aggravates
planetary evolution, environmental disability is increasingly a form of human-on-human
injustice.”857 The effect of this societal injustice is what Betcher deems an “earthassemblage.”858 For Betcher, society disables in two ways: first, through our shared
“fleshy commons”859 which can create bodily disablement prior to birth; and, second, by
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the disabling that occurs after birth when the culture that created the particular disability
then continues to “marginalize and minoritize.”860 Here, there can be a move back
toward the medical model of disability when the society that both creates and perpetuates
disability then “conspires to fix, cure, and rehabilitate disability.”861 In the face of these
forces, both medical and social, “certain assumptions of normalcy”862 are heralded and in
so doing the disabled person’s “agency, autonomy and reason”863 are suppressed within
the system.
Betcher’s thesis is an important addition to understanding the many dimensions of
the social model of disability as she makes clear the ramifications of “unthought aftereffects of human historical processes”864 on an individual life existing within a greater
over-powering context such as the Anthropocene. Betcher’s willingness to challenge
current notions of the socializing effects of disability is helpful for this dissertation which
aims to understand the disabling effects of moral injury brought on by, in Betcher’s
words, the “unthought after-effects of human historical processes.” For our purposes, the
critical move is not from the disabling effects of dismissive social contexts to the creating
forces of the Anthropocene, as Betcher suggests, but from dismissive social contexts to
the disabling forces at play in the ongoing theatres of war.
Eiesland, Hauerwas and Betcher offer glimpses of the social model of disability
and its implication for disabled bodies. And yet, the social model bears significant
weaknesses. While the social model attempts to move the structures of disability beyond
860
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the impairment (or not) of an individual, the model is criticized for exactly that, as it
“undermines or underestimates both the pain and the distinctiveness of the impaired
body.”865 Additionally, a related weakness is in its attempt to demonstrate societal
limitations on an individual, the social model highlights what a body “ ‘cannot do’ . . .
[rather than] what they ‘can do.’ ”866 As much as the social model moves beyond binary
conceptualizations, hyper-individualization and the over-medicalization of the medical
model, the social model is still controversial.867 By focusing primarily on individual
interaction with social environment, the social model often assumes that the disabling
effect of society occurs consistently across societal structures. Here, disability becomes a
socio-political category rather than a medical determination.
The reason for distinguishing between medical and social categories may
originally have been an attempt to positively, rather than negatively describe disability.
Scholars Roy McCloughry and Wayne Morris explain the creation of this category by
saying, “In an attempt to address the fact that the medical model is a deficit model, the
social model can go so far as to elevate impairment to a place beyond regret.”868 In so
doing, the social model counteracts the problem of “ableism.” Ableism, according to Fred
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Pelka, is “the belief that people with disabilities are different from ‘normal’ people, and
that their lives are inherently less worthwhile than those of people without disabilities.”869
And yet, a problem with the social model (also called “minority group model”) is
that in its shift to societal structures, suffering that is real and inherent to some disabled
bodies may be minimized and neglected.870 Jewish scholar Julia Belser-Watts argues
there is a two-fold weakness of the social model. First, the social model is “ill-equipped
to handle the fluidity of disability,”871 and second, the social model has the potential to
“efface the significance of actual, physical difference or to ignore the sometimes negative
aspects of disability.”872 Certain disabling conditions are uniquely bearers of pain from
within that are not caused by societal barriers: consider, for example, fibromyalgia.873
The social model of disability aims to rescue the medical model from the binary
problem of “failed health.”874 In so doing, the model offers strengths worthy of note
here. One strength of the social model is the recognition that a body always exists within
a community, in fact, it might be argued that one might not exist without a “thou” to
acknowledge one’s own personhood. Certainly a strength; but also an inherent weakness
perhaps, is the social model’s naming of societal prejudice and stereotypes both in
attitudes and media, as well as in pervasive architecture. The shadow side of naming
869
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stereotypes is inherent in its potential to create stereotypes and thereby keep perpetuating
them. Despite its weaknesses, and even in spite of its strengths, the social model propels
society forward to consider inclusion as a fundamental moral issue.875 The social model
of disability finds strength in its ability to name the impact on the disabled of their
inability to reach personal goals and forward their future because of societal
limitations.876
When comparing the social and the medical models of disability, some scholars
have suggested the medical model might be seen as an “essentialist” approach to
impairment existing within the very essence of the person versus a “constructionist”
approach wherein society constructs disability.877 As we turn now to a new model of
disability offered by Deborah Creamer, we will encounter what we might deem an
“existentialist” account of disability as she wrestles with human limits before a limitless
God and the existential questions raised by those real and exacting limits. As we turn to
her account, we will integrate her analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each model
into our assessment and then review her constructive alternative.

4.2

The Limit Model of Disability
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Creamer’s powerful work Disability and Christian Theology Embodied Limits
and Constructive Possibilities critiques the dominant medical and social models878 of
disability and provides a constructive alternative of a “limit model of disability.” Her
recognition of the weaknesses of both models is helpful in our ongoing desire to draw
disability and moral injury together as helpful conversation partners. It became clear in
the review of both the psychological and theological literature on moral injury the
reservations regarding medicalization of the injury and the complexity of societal
involvement. While the medical and social models of disability provide helpful starting
points for assessing and refining the definition of moral injury, each model has
shortcomings that restrict its usefulness. Creamer’s limit model will lead us forward in
considering how disability, and perhaps even human morality itself, encounters limits in
varying spheres of life that can provoke disabling encounters.
Creamer’s work invigorates study in disability by depicting the unavoidable
limits879 of human embodiment and naming the equalizing power of this assertion for all
humanity. Creamer’s work is important because it addresses the real “limits” that studies
in disability probe and pursuits in theological method quickly meet. For Creamer, this
sense of “limit” is an integral part of being human, not simply a term that applies to those
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who currently experience a disabling condition. Her understanding of “limit” is positive:
limits are unsurprising, limits are intrinsic to existence, limits are good – not evil.880
By recasting limits in positive terms, Creamer erases some of the negativity
associated with limits and disablement and expands “limit” to suggest a particular
theological anthropology that touches all humanity. She uses the “limit-ness” of human
experience to offer a third way beyond the operative “medical” and “minority” models of
disability. For Creamer, the “medical” model of disability that understands disability as
intrinsic to an individual misses the larger social implications of societal constructions
that create their own impairment for a person who is “medically” disabled.881 Instead of
using the more standard term “the social model of disability,” Creamer instead refers to it
as the “minority” model of disability to overcome this dismissal. By renaming the model,
she offers a clear socio-political depiction of the way society fails to meet the physical
and vocational needs of disabled persons thereby creating minorities.882

Creamer’s

articulation of “limit-ness” as a model for both disability and theology clarifies the bias in
both that assumes “normal” bodies as the norm. A “limit” model for both disability and
theology reveals a fundamental aspect of human experience as bound by limitation.
Creamer’s model is a promising revision to the standard two models as she suggests the
particular way in which disability is not always a given, but emerges fluidly within
varying contexts.

880

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 94-96. Creamer will note later not all limits are good, but
her point is clear. Human beings react to limits and deem them negatively. She aims here to reverse this
reaction by claiming the overwhelming goodness of limits that humans encounter.
881
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 22.
882
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 25. In so doing, Creamer offers a reversal of the Platonic
“disorder of the gods” creating havoc in the civitas. Here, she reverses the dynamic and describes how the
civitas disorders the body, mind and spirit of ordinary citizens limiting abilities.

244

Creamer offers this third model as a “limit model” of disability to describe the
fluidity through which flesh encounters various worlds and discovers inconsistent
disabling since limits vary in various contexts. Though disability studies’ “social model”
of disability emphasizes the way that social structures and built environments “disabled”
particular individuals, this model does not does not adequately describe the “fluid” nature
of disability where disabilities do not occur in all social contexts, but in certain social
contexts when limits are encountered. Creamer argues that both the social and medical
models fail in five ways: their inability to take into account the fluidity of disablement
across social contexts883, the inability to embrace the great diversity of disability884, the
inability to wrestle with experiences of disability such as chronic pain, the actuality that
the state of disability is “more normal” than other states of being as we bear witness to
the universal experience of flesh changing over time885, and the inability to engage
certain areas of theological reflection886 beyond conversations key to the social model
such as liberation and social justice.887 In moving toward a limit model, Creamer hopes
to acknowledge “the prevalence of limits,”888 to avoid negative evaluations of a human
being. This threefold posture will allow Creamer to add “necessary complexity”889 to the
field of disability.
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The beneficial result of this “necessary complexity” is the possibility of a deeper
conversation across disability and theology, and even more so, between persons
regarding the depth of their theological reflection in light of their own experience. With
this shift, Creamer moves us from the medical world, through social contexts, into greater
theological reflection. To accomplish this task, Creamer critiques the societal tendency
to dismiss disability as an element of “the uninteresting randomness of life.”890 In so
doing, Creamer invites deepened creativity, deepened humanity and deepened
theology.891 However, it is possible the very name “limit model” is a misnomer for
exactly what Creamer hopes to convey. Perhaps, one might consider the suggested
“contextual limit model of disability” to better represent Creamer’s twofold thought
process: a person may be disabled in certain contexts when he or she encounters a limit;
and that limit then raises questions of depth and substance about their world and
relationships within that world.
Creamer’s contribution to the field is her ability to funnel these large
conversations regarding justice and liberation, crucifixion and resurrection, access and
exclusion as questions that deal with human limit. Her model is both radically inclusive,
in that all human beings face limits. Creamer recognizes the insights of social model
advocates that disability is informed, created and defined by social structures. Her
model, promising as it is, requires revision in order to acknowledge the depth of human
response to limit beyond her suggested affirmation that “limits are good” revealing
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instead the anger, shame and self-hatred that can results in the face of limits.892 In her
discussion of limits, Creamer would do well to elaborate on different kinds of limits
placing them along a spectrum of “goodness.” For example, some limits are a result of
being creatures with embodied finitude; some limits are inevitable as vulnerable creatures
living in God’s created universe; other limits stray from goodness when sinful human
choices are made or societal structures create sinful institutions and contingencies.
And yet, Creamer does not make these distinctions. Instead, for Creamer, her key
theological assertion framing her argument is that sin is the failure to acknowledge
limit.893

Building on the work of feminist Sallie McFague, Creamer adds a fourth

construction of limit in addition to McFague’s traditional threefold rubric of sin as a
violation against humans, creatures or nature.894 Creamer adds that sin can occur against
oneself: “Me versus Myself: living in a lie in relation to oneself.”895 Creamer explains,
“This lie recognizes that we tend to hold inaccurate self-representations, especially
insofar as we deny or depreciate our own limits.”896 Drawing limits into the theological
category of sin betters our ability to discuss the difficulty in societal discourse regarding
moral injury. When Creamer states, “From the limits perspective, sin might now be
redefined as an inappropriate attitude towards limits as we both exaggerate and also reject
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our own limits and the limits of others,”897 those of us interested in Moral Injury can
imagine then the sinful limits that exist within a society that all too easily chooses what it
wants to hear and what falls on deaf ears. Even more so, in discussing Creamer’s work,
Mary Elise Lowe suggests, “This dread of disability can be framed in theological terms
as the failure of the temporarily able-bodied to accept their limits as mortal, fragile,
embodied, and vulnerable creatures of God.”898 Perhaps the societal inability to discuss
Moral Injury is driven by much the same dread since the culture is unable to accept their
limits as moral (sic), “fragile, embodied and vulnerable creatures of God.”899
Creamer’s work represents several shifts in thinking. First, she offers a shift in
the world of disability scholarship by encouraging her peers to look beyond the medical
and social models toward a more fluid model that takes into account the diversity of
experiences of disability. Second, she, along with scholars like Sallie McFague, offers a
shift in theological reflection to consider the religious significance of our bodies and the
impact of embodiment on theological reflection. Third, and perhaps most important,
while the social model is a helpful step beyond the medical model moving from a
singular body to a social body, Creamer’s limit model engages a shift to a third sphere
beyond the singular and the social bodies to consider, in McFague’s language, “the body
of God.” While this shift sounds dramatic, and perhaps even impossible to consider, it is
helpful for our purposes to think of the relationship between disablement and spheres of
thinking beyond our own bodies and beyond the social body. Disablement, whether
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physical, mental or moral, intersects our ways of thinking about theological
anthropology900 and theology.901

4.2.1 Strengths of the Limit Model of Disability
Creamer’s argument widens the horizon of disability studies beyond the spheres
of the medical and the social to the theological.

Her work allows for greater

differentiation in the experience of disability then the social model and invites sustained
reflection on particular limits encountered and their effect on the body, mind, spirit of the
person who experienced them. Creamer claims the messiness of embodiment and its fluid
unfolding across time and space through the limit model to a degree that the medical and
social models do not acknowledge. She challenges existing dichotomies that draw lines
between “us and them”902 (that is, persons with and without disabilities) moving the
conversation regarding limit to a horizon other than the distance between two humans
and instead to the limits of finite humanity in the face of God. For example, Creamer
provides the example of two women meeting in wheelchairs. The first was paralayzed
since birth. The second was paralyzed late in life during a skiing accident. The medical
model would equate much of their experience. The social model would equate much of
their experience. The limit model succeeds in differentiating between their experiences
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and the limits they encounter.903 With these strengths, Creamer invites new possibilities
for perseverance, courage, strength, creativity, community, theological reflection,
interdependence and deepened conversations requiring honesty and self-reflection.904

4.2.2

Challenges of the Limit Model of Disability
Despite the great strengths of Creamer’s model and the advance the model

achieves in the scholarship, there are weaknesses that are important to note. The three
weaknesses that must be addressed are the lack of: depth in moral emotion, discernment
for knowing which limits are good and which limits are bad, and development of the
constructive model. First, does Creamer delve deep enough into human suffering in the
face of limits? A repeated mantra throughout her work is that “limits are good.” Creamer
does makes clear: “The limits model does not aim to dismiss or deny experiences of evil
or suffering, nor does it devalue efforts to overcome limits – it does not propose that all
limits are good or that we ought to embrace or accept them all.”905 While the assertion
helps clarify her thinking, the reader is still left wanting a deeper probe of the effect of
encountering limits on the experience of shame, despair and pain. Without attention to
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these moral emotions the power and possibility of their ability to “globalize”906 and affect
contexts beyond the individual are dramatically increased.
Second, Creamer’s weakness is her lack of discernment in acknowledging which
limits are good and which limits are not, as well as her lack of attention in guiding the
reader to make that discernment as well.907 In her review, Marilyn Martone makes clear
two points: first, she questions how one is to discern, given Creamer’s model, when
limits are good and when they are not. Martone invites further reflection on that element
of discernment. Second, Martone does understand Creamer of having a sense of human
finitude in the face of limits. Sin, for Creamer according to Martone, “is the refusal to
accept our proper place.” To be clear, that notion of sin is not linked to disability or
morality, but instead to the inability to acknowledge limit. Creamer begins to make the
distinctions between sin, finitude and limit; but as Martone acknowledges, she does not
go far enough in the discussion. Creamer recognizes finitude but doesn’t distinguish
finitude which is part of human nature from sin, which is not.
Third, reviews of her work have invited further development of a constructive
account of this limit model of disability rather than a deconstruction of previous
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models.908 Aaron Klink, for example, argues Creamer’s book takes “scant time
developing its own interesting constructive proposal.” Doing so would require
developing an account of limits that are beneficial, limits that are dangerous,909 and how
to discern between the two. In addition, doing so would develop an account of those
moral emotions, such as despair, in the face of limits. And, doing so would deepen a
depiction of God who willingly takes on a self-limitation in order to encounter human
beings in their own limitations.

Furthering that theological account would demand

further construction of theological doctrines such as the incarnation, crucifixion or
resurrection, as other scholars have helpfully accomplished.

Despite these few

weaknesses, Creamer’s scholarship is respected across the disciplines of disability and
theology to kindle creativity and invite new possibility for deeper engagement of the
limits we encounter.
For moral injury, questions then are raised as changing contexts and the limits of
morality within those spheres, prompt difficult reflection regarding one’s own moral
agency and self identity, relationships to both comrades and persons of authority, as well
as religious crises amid the moral void. In response to those questions, the limit model
offers possibilities. While Creamer’s initial presentation does not offer substantial depth
to the shame and guilt residing in moral injury, the questions of limits resonate. As we
turn in the next chapter to our own constructive alternative – that is, “a revised limit
model of disability” we will have to keep in mind the weaknesses of Creamer’s
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construction.

While Creamer needs further depth in the moral emotions; further

discernment in knowing which limits are natural and good and which limits are sinful and
bad; and further development in a constructive model; we will see in the theology of
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (that preceded Creamer’s work) helpful constructs which will aid her
work and ours.

4.3

Toward A Revised Limit Model of Disability
While Creamer’s “limit model” succeeds in expanding the conversation beyond

the standard medical and social models, her model benefits from further refinement as we
set forth a constructive “revised limit model of disability.” These benefits will include: a
recognition of limits changing fluidly across contexts, an assessment of how functioning
changes amid those differing fluid contexts, and, an account of moral emotions that
includes shame and despair in response to those limits. Certainly we have learned that
moral injury is deeper and more embodied than mechanized views of humanity and the
healing arts; moral injury is not captured within a medical model of disability. And we
have toured the contours of social issues that both contribute to and reverberate from
moral injury; and yet, the social model of disability is inadequate. Creamer’s model
offers promise by recasting disability in relation to an exploration of limits and the
repercussions those limits have for God, self and neighbor. In particular, Creamer’s
model is most helpful in showing how ‘disabling’ occurs in various spheres of life as
limits are met and grief ensues. However, more development on the depth of shame and
despair in human experience is needed in order to validate the depth of lament and loss a
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veteran experiences beyond the simple explanation Creamer offers that limits are not evil,
but a good and right part of being human.
Creamer draws on the scholarship of Sharon Betcher to refine her own work with
an eye to deepening awareness of the depth of pain experience when limits are
confronted. In response to Betcher’s critique, Creamer offers a threefold response.
Creamer argues first, that “limits” should be embraced as a challenge to the idea of a
more traditional normal. When limits are recognized, suddenly there is new space in
which to act and “to make and unmake issues of identity, relationality, space and
place.”910 Second, she argues that scholars should engage across disciplines of theology,
sociology and psychology.

The conversation can then serve to, “question and

complicate, to challenge and play, to propose and subvert, and to push continually toward
complexity.”911 And finally, she proposes what she deems “a pedagogy of pain.” Betcher
notes the tendency of physical pain to turn inward, mute and suppress.912 Creamer cites
the work of Elaine Scarry as well who argues, “physical pain does not simply resist
language but actively destroys it.”913 If the physical pain of the body is inexpressible,
how then can the reverberating pain of the spirit entangled with flesh find words? Even
more so, Creamer acknowledges that unexpressed pain, pain that is turned inward for
lack of words, only increases.914 Most poignantly for the purposes of our overarching
conversation regarding Moral Injury, Creamer takes note: “Cultures of privilege need
910
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such a pedagogy of pain.”915 Pain, for Creamer, becomes one of the impetuses for a new
model of disability that can transcend the predisposition to bodily “errors” of the medical
model and the prejudices and stereotypes of the social model of disability.916

The

scholarly conversation between Creamer and Betcher reveal openness by Creamer for
further engagement and refinement.

In the same spirit, I will draw on these three

deepened points to present a revised limit model of disability.
To be clear, a revised limit model of disability is needed to make space in the
discourse for moral injury to be considered a “disability.” This terminology allows us to
reject a conception of disability as taboo and instead to resource the depth and breadth of
disability discourse. Here, I suggest seven reasons why a revised limit model of disability
is essential for moral injury. First, a revised limit model of disability makes a claim upon
the scholarship of moral injury and invites collaboration with the field of disability
studies. Jonathan Shay revealed in his lectures at Chautauqua the many ways in which
moral injury is a disabling condition.917 Second, a revised limit model of disability
acknowledges “the limited horizon of choice” in which veterans are forced to make
decisions thereby causing at times, and in ways big and small,918 disablement. When
those limits are confronted and choices are made or invalidated; the potential exists for
the disabling of body, mind and spirit. Third, a revised limit model of disability allows
for the complexity of morality across varying spheres of life – acknowledging that
different moral codes exist in the warzone, the bedroom and the boardroom. Each of
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Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 127.
Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 127.
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Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”
918
Again, an important nuance of this is described in Tyler Boudreau’s essay “The Morally Injured.”
916
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these changing contexts presents rules of morality that might face different limits in an
alternative context. Fourth, a revised limit model of disability reveals the reduced coping
that occurs when a limit is transgressed in a particular context. The limited horizon of
choice919 and its assault of past moral codes affect embodiment and the ability to cope
where functioning and flourishing once occurred with ease.

One might wonder if

morality then truly becomes limited further due to the reduced coping, the stress on
embodiment, and the questions raised of God, self and other.

Can changing flesh

contribute directly to a changing morality? Fifth, a revised limit model of disability
challenges previously held beliefs of God, self and neighbor. Veteran Michael Yandell
explains,
This is what moral injury is—the winds that blow when all the laws, all the
understood ways of relating to other human beings have been laid flat. For when
we release the terms good and evil and start applying those terms to human
beings and whole groups of people, we allow ourselves the capacity to lay flat
any moral qualms in order to pursue the enemy to the ends of the earth.920
In this brief reflection we hear the challenges to God (good and evil), others (ways of
relating) and self (we allow ourselves…). Sixth, a revised limit model of disability will
travel the distance beyond Creamer’s easy acceptance that “limits are good”921 to a more
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The language of “moral horizon” is critical to the work of Theologian Sarah Bachelard. In her book
Resurrection and the Moral Imagination, our moral imagination is conceiving the resurrection as a new
reality, a new world possible within this world, provides a “new horizon” (2) against which to act. The
Christian moral agent does not live solely with laws or commands within the complexities of this world,
instead, the Christian moral agent acts within this new horizon the resurrection provides. Bachelard’s view
stands in contrast to Oliver O’Donovan’s Resurrection and the Moral Order. For Bachelard, resurrection
creates a “new world” over and against the world broken by the fall. For O’Donovan, resurrection provides
justification for the current created order. Bachelard’s believes the church has a responsibility to speak
from this new horizon, with non-religious language (185), in order to reach those who do not present an
explicit religious belonging. Her willingness to risk religious language, though fundamentally grounded in
a theology of the resurrection, echoes Bonhoeffer’s often quoted advocacy of a “religionless Christianity”
in a “world come of age” (183). See: Sarah Bachelard, Resurrection and the Moral Imagination:
Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014).
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Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 96.

256

nuanced engagement with a kind of Kierkegaardian angst that engagement with limits
create an existential crisis and we might even become in that moment “sick unto death.”
To create space for the shame and anguish experienced by our vets will be an essential
component of a revised limit model. Finally, a revised limit model of disability draws the
conversation regarding moral injury beyond the lone injured vet into a larger societal
conversation regarding the limits all creatures encounter. Could this be in the vein of
Guttierrez, an “irruption of the poor” for the twenty-first century? In no way should this
element of the model negate the unique and wounded experience of our returning
veterans.

Instead, a reflection on creaturely limits might shape a theological

anthropology worthy of self-reflection and societal complicity for all.922
Here, then, are seven reasons why a revised limit model of disability is needed for
our veterans to gain some empowerment in recognizing moral injury as a disabling
experience. Above all these reasons, however, I would herald one more. It is time that
the mark of sara’at, that stigmatizing tattoo of moral failure,923 is removed from the
shoulders of our veterans. Instead, a mantle of responsibility for all needs to be claimed,
understood and addressed for our complicit cooperation in the forces that create and
sustain the potential for moral injury. A revised limit model of disability makes space for
individuals and institutions to understand the limits within which we live and move and

922
See for example: John Macquarrie, “Theological Reflections on Disability,” Religion and Disability:
Essays in Scripture, Theology and Ethics, ed. Marilyn E. Bishop (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward Press,
1995): 30-32. Macquarrie’s essay is an extended discussion on what it means to be human. A “thing,” as
Macquarrie describes has a certain number of fixed properties. A “human” on the other hand, is comprised
of limitless possibilities that “may or may not be realized.” A human being then is an ironic mix of
limitation and possibility; we are finite but attracted to the infinite. However, Macquarrie looks to
theologian David Pailin to claim that within this mix there is no definite set of features that necessitate full
humanity. Herein, texts like Romans 8:22-23 “we groan inwardly…as we await the redemption of our
bodies” and Mark 10:27 “with God all things are possible” make sense
923
Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult,” 55.
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have our being, and how structures of societal injustice create a limited horizon of choice
causing moral injury to be inflicted in traumatic, nuanced and subtle ways on larger
populations of people than we might ever imagine.924

4.4

Next Steps Toward a New Model of Disability to Address Moral Injury
Given the demand for the revised limit model, what then is needed to proceed

forward? Rosemarie Garland-Thomson says, “Disability is the transformation that occurs
as flesh encounters the world.”925 Her account of disability as a transformation of the
human along a spectrum of life926 that acknowledges finitude, vulnerability and limits is
an attempt to de-stigmatize the language of disability. The dynamic theological
anthropology of her definition creates a conceptual space where “the world” limits, again
and again, over the course of a lifetime.

However, her language creates room for

imagining the possibility of transformation within those encounters. Using GarlandThomson’s definition as a lens through which to engage the theology of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer will allow us to “revise” Creamer’s “limit model” to explore the depth of
despair when human agency encounters real-world limits thereby encountering worldshattering trauma.927
924

Rita Nakashima Brock in her essay “Sophie’s Choice” articulates an inclusive stance on moral injury
that argues for a much larger societal depth and breadth to moral injury than originally intended when the
term was first designated for veterans of war.
925
Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342.
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David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have been instrumental in naming the construction of a continuum
that places disability along a value spectrum between ill and healthy. See: David T. Mitchell and Sharon L.
Snyder, eds., The Body and Physical Difference, 1.
927
See: Ronnie Janoff-Bulman: Shattered Assumptions: Toward a New Psychology of Trauma (New York,
NY: Free Press, 2002). We will continue in the upcoming chapters to deepen the language of trauma
within the revised limit model of disability to include notions such as Janoff-Bulman’s that when the
“assumptive world” in which a human lives is shattered, the only language in response is the language of
trauma. Key assumptions we maintain are: the world is good, the world and our lives within it have
meaning, and my self has worth (6). When these assumptions are fragmented, the self does as well.
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Drawing on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s view of limit will prove to be a helpful
corrective and guide to deepen our conception of human limit by addressing these
weaknesses and therefore, probe human suffering in the face of limit, explore further an
aspect of the theological doctrine of sin as a failure to recognize finitude, and engage
sustained theological reflection on theological anthropology, Christology and theology.
This movement toward Bonhoeffer to strengthen Creamer’s limit model will aid in our
probe for a “revised limit model” for moral injury. Garland-Thomson’s definition will
allow us to look at Bonhoeffer’s theology through the lens of “world” (creation), “flesh”
(creatures), “encounters” (the fall, and the continual fall), and “transformation” (the
orders of preservation). Bonhoeffer’s exposition will deepen and revise Creamer’s
conceptualization of grenze (limit); but even more so, Bonhoeffer acknowledges limits
and encounters across varying spheres of life through his description of the “mandates of
creation” and “the order of preservation” within those spheres once a limit has been
crossed and shame ensues so that there may be functioning and flourishing in both the
life of the individual and the affected society.
Recognizing the weaknesses in Creamer’s account (the depth of moral emotion,
the need for discernment of dangerous versus advantageous limits, and the further
development of the details of a constructive model) will aid our discussion of Bonhoeffer
and guide our assessment of his account of finite creatures within creation, his assessment
of human sin, and his hope for redemption through the orders of preservation and the
mandates of creation. Bonhoeffer’s development of these areas will directly address the
weaknesses in Creamer’s presentation. Even more so, Bonhoeffer will be helpful in
discerning limits that are natural, and thus advantageous to humanity, versus limits that
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are sinful, and thus can be dangerous to humanity. In so doing, Bonhoeffer proves
helpful in evaluating the moral demands of each kind of limit.

Chapter 5
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BONHOEFFER’S VIEW OF LIMIT
When I struggle with my own pain, my veteran teammates will support me;
and I will reach out of the darkness and grasp their helping hands.
- The Veterans’ Creed928
5.1

Introduction
In chapter three we established that drawing moral injury into conversation with

disability might happen in any of three ways: by way of definition, by way of an
operational framework such as social analysis, or by way of a deeper theological
anthropology shaped by a robust concept of human finitude. We also recognized the
potential of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s account of disability to draw us deeper into
that sense of finitude. In chapter four, we continued our exploration into models of
disability by analyzing the medical and social models, noting their strengths and
advancements of scholarly conversation, while also clearly conveying their weaknesses.
Then we turned to Deborah Creamer who saw the need for a model of disability that
recognized human finitude and so presented “the limit model of disability.” While that
model advances the conversation, and provides helpful insight for moral injury, her
model does not address the globalizing emotion of human shame and despair when
confronted with those limits that raise questions about God, self and other. Nor does
Creamer differentiate among different types of limits and their moral implications. We
noted the need for “a revised limit model of disability” that would take into account those
concerns. This chapter furthers the advancement of that revised model by drawing

928

Veterans’ Creed written by Judge John C. Reed, III.
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Creamer into conversation with Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his conceptualization of “limit”
as a necessary part of human finitude.
To comprehend Bonhoeffer’s view of limits and finitude, it will be necessary to
present a contextualization and schematization of Bonhoeffer’s Genesis 1-3 lectures now
published by the title Creation and Fall.929 These lectures offer, as Genesis 1 does, a
sweeping view of creation (world) and God’s act in that ongoing creation. Genesis 2
presents, instead of that sweeping view of creation, a more personal introduction to two
creatures, Adam and Eve (flesh). Within that broad overview of both creation (world)
and creature (flesh), it will be helpful to focus on several significant terms important to
Bonhoeffer in these lectures: circle, middle, limit, other, tob/ra, shame and preservation.
We will see, as we analyze Bonhoeffer’s text, that Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s
definition of disability as “the transformation of the flesh as it encounters world”930
proves to be a helpful lens through which to read and understand Bonhoeffer’s accounts
of creation, fall and redemption as we draw those doctrines alongside GarlandThomson’s language of “world”, “flesh”, “encounter” and “transformation”.931

929

The life, theology, teaching and public witness of Bonhoeffer’s are described in two recent biographies.
See: Charles Marsh, Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf,
2014) and Eric Metaxas, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2010.)
Also of note is the account of Bonhoeffer’s dear friend Eberhard Bethge. See: Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer: A Biography, trans. Eric Mosbacher et al., revised edition (Minneapolis, MN.: Fortress Press,
2000). After Bonhoeffer’s death, Bethge is credited with encouraging review and publication of
Bonhoeffer’s work.
930
Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342. See also: Nirmala Erevelles, Disability
and Difference in Global Contexts, 26-27. Erevelles argues disability is “not a condition of being, but of
becoming, and this becoming is a historical event, it is its material context that is critical in the theorizing
of disabled bodies/subjectivities” (26). Also see: Robert McRuer, Crip theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness
and Disability (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006): 207. Robert McRuer questions, “What
might it mean to welcome the disability to come, to desire it?” (207). In so asking McRuer, according to
Ervelles, “celebrates the transformative potential of disability” (27).
931
To be clear, all care will be taken not to read Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s schema of world, flesh,
encounter and transformation into Bonhoeffer’s text. Instead, a thorough review of his exegetical work will
allow us to see how his text presents his particular view of world, flesh, encounter and transformation. This

262

Bonhoeffer presents a unique interpretation of the Biblical fall account as a certain kind
of “transformation of the flesh” as Adam and Eve encounter other-than-God experiences.
Exploring this crucial terminology and its implications for morality will then allow a
probe into the overarching theme for Bonhoeffer of “the orders of preservation,” a central
dimension of Bonhoeffer’s theology of creation. The orders of preservation are a saving
force, in the face of the fall, a mode of divine activity through which flesh that encounters
the fallen world is preserved and upheld by Christ. In his later work the “Ethics”
Bonhoeffer expands his account of the orders of preservation, associating this
preservation in Christ more broadly within the very structures of society Bonhoeffer
deems “the mandates of creation.”932
Throughout this exposition and exploration, important to keep in mind are three
vital themes to which Bonhoeffer speaks: bodily life, morality and disability. Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson’s definition provides exegetical clarity after reading Bonhoeffer. The
terms, themes and theological exposition Bonhoeffer uses resonate with GarlandThomson’s language of flesh, world, encounter and transformation. These words matter
for Bonhoeffer’s account of bodily life and divine preservation. Bodily life, in all its
brokenness after the fall, has direct consequences for Bonhoeffer’s account of morality.
Because we are finite, vulnerable beings living in a complex world, concrete reality will
demand ethical responsibility that is faithful and contextual. Encounters with those
worldly demands will affect, and potentially disable, flesh; and yet, Garland-Thomson
language will prove helpful for us to consider these themes in Bonhoeffer: creation (world and flesh), the
fall and sin (encounter) and redemption. Perhaps it is in this last step where we must be careful not to read
Garland-Thomson into Bonhoeffer. While she uses the language of “transformation,” he uses the language
of the orders of preservation to explain Christ’s ongoing redemptive work.
932
See: Robin W. Lovin, “The Mandates in an Age of Globalization” in Ontology and Ethics. 19-31. And:
Markus Franz, “The Conversion of Social Life: Bonhoeffer’s Mandates as Theological Dispositifs, “ 133149.
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and Bonhoeffer both hope for divine transformation beyond the initial pain of change.
This chapter concludes with an exploration of the themes of bodily life, morality and
disability in Bonhoeffer and their significance for our study given the theological
anthropology, Christology and soteriology Bonhoeffer develops. The conclusions
Bonhoeffer draws in these three theological areas will aid our venture to present a revised
limit model of disability to respond to Moral Injury. One might argue, the whole of
“Creation and Fall” is an attempt to create such a model; to present an account of human
being, transformed as flesh encounters world,933 confronted with questions regarding the
limits of God, self and other, heightened by a debilitating moral crisis. While Creamer
fails to distinguish between natural and sinful limits across a spectrum of social contexts
and the different moral demands of those varied limits, Bonhoeffer offers such resources
in his exegetical and theological work.

5.2

Creation and Fall
Bonhoeffer’s biblical exegesis of Genesis 1-3 from Tuesday, November 8, 1932

to Tuesday, February 21, 1933 at the University of Berlin on the subject “Creation and
Sin” (Schopfung und Sunde) became the book later titled “Creation and Fall.”934 In these
lectures, Bonhoeffer strove to be scholarly while using the methods of exegesis. But
933

Biblical scholar Paul Cho offered an insight worthy of note here. For those who have experienced
trauma, the notion that flesh encounters world does not adequately describe the devastation of traumatic
experience. He notes the scholarship of Ronnie Janof-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Toward a New
Psychology of Trauma (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992). Janof-Bulman makes clear extreme life
events are greater than simple ‘encounter,’ instead; they are earth-shattering and world-changing (4). This
strengthens our need for Bonhoeffer who argued there must be a move beyond ‘encounter.’ The divine
presence through the orders of preservation and the mandates of creation is at work transforming the world.
934
Christine Schliesser, Everyone Who Acts Responsibly Becomes Guilty: Bonhoeffer’s Concept of
Accepting Guilt (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 55. Schliesser makes clear that
upon request of Bonhoeffer’s students for the lectures to be published, he was no longer able to use the
original title because of the publication of a 1931 book by Emanuel Hirsch entitled Creation and Sin.
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instead of delivering the lectures in typical academic oration, his lecture style was that of
kerygma (proclamation).935 This shift in oratory style coincided with a broader shift in
audience,936 and perhaps a personal turning point as well, where Bonhoeffer moved from
the academic exercises of works like “Sanctorum Communio” (Sanctorum Communio:
eine Dogmatische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche) and “Act and Being” (Akt
und Sein) to more pastoral works such as “The Cost of Discipleship” (Nachfolge) and
“Life Together” (Gemeinsames Leben). 937 Throughout his reflections on Genesis 1-3,
Bonhoeffer reiterated the question, “How can these words live?”938

One attendee

described the profound impact of his theological discourse: “In these lectures this
extraordinary man, Bonhoeffer, exploded everything I had taken for granted as custom or
tradition in theology/the church, the state/politics, academic scholarship/research and so
on.”939 Even Bonhoeffer himself, reflecting back on this period of teaching, seemed
surprised by the impact of these lectures not on his students, but on his own thinking: “I
came to the Bible for the first time.”940
Creation and Fall is the corpus of Bonhoeffer’s teaching to students at the
University of Berlin during that winter of 1933. As we well know in retrospect, this
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, ed. l.W. de Gruchy; trans. D.S. Bax (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1996), (=DB WE 3), 5.
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See for example, Clifford J. Green’s chapter “From the Phraseological to the Real: 1932” in his book
Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality. Here, he notes a 1932 letter from Bonhoeffer to Edward Bethge:
“There are people who change, and many who can scarcely change at all. I don’t think I have ever changed
very much, except perhaps at the time of my first impressions abroad and under the first conscious
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Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999),
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season was a time of disorienting unrest.941 Historian John A. Moses describes 1933 as a
pivotal year when Germany was transitioning from the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) to
the National Socialist Dictatorship of Hitler.942 Amid many changes, one of note was the
passing of the Enabling Bill on March 23, 1933, just a few months after the completion of
Bonhoeffer’s lectures that allowed the Chancellor complete power, eliminating all other
political parties so that the Chancellor could make authoritarian decisions without
opposition.943 The unrestricted power of the new German chancellor developed in
response to the flailing power of the German parliament and their inability to move
forward on key elements of national life such as the economy. These shifting power
dynamics – from flailing to full-fledged authoritarianism – are worthy of note in
relationship to Bonhoeffer’s kerygmatic lectures. Bonhoeffer, as well as some of his
students, came to understand again the provocative power of scripture and its
proclamation as a challenge to other powers that be, even when those powers included
the state Lutheran church.
Scholars have noted the prescient timing of Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation.944
Theologian Wayne Floyd, Jr. argues Bonhoeffer seemed to know, “not only how these
themes could again become compelling for theology, but also when these specific themes
941

Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 1.
John A. Moses, “Bonhoeffer’s Germany: The Political Context” in The Cambridge Companion to
Dietrich Bonhoeffer ed. by John W. deGruchy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3.
943
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Brian Brock notes that we are called to reflect on the doctrine of creation at moments of “estrangement”
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Alongside the doctrine of creation we are compelled to reexamine our Christology as well to sense Christ
as the origin and the end of all things (433). See: Brian Brock, “On Becoming Creatures: Being Called to
Presence in a Distracted World,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18:4 (October 2016): 432452.
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should come forth with prophetic vigor.”945 In addition, Bonhoeffer’s friend Ebehard
Bethge noted how Bonhoeffer managed to do two difficult tasks given the challenge of
the social mileu of the time. Bonhoeffer possessed an “arcane tact” when needed and
knew those moments were a “possible silence” was needed.946 To be clear, tact and
silence were needed to preserve the power of the church speaking in a compelling way to
the needs of the world so that the church was not a noisy gong or clanging symbol, but an
institution that would speak the truth in love acting toward justice. With this context in
mind, we proceed to analyze Bonhoeffer’s doctrines of creation, fall and redemption
through the language of world, flesh, encounter and transformation.

5.2.2 WORLD: God’s Creation in Genesis
We will examine Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation in two sections: focusing first
on the created world as a whole and then on human beings specifically. Our exploration
of “world” centers on four movements within Bonhoeffer’s thought. First, we note the
attention Bonhoeffer gives to human anxiety and circularity in thinking in trying to
comprehend the divine act in creation. Second, we consider the notion Bonhoeffer has of
the world’s creation ex nihilo as an unrestrained act of God’s freedom.947 Third, we turn
to Bonhoeffer’s development of creation from days one through six through the schema
of what is “fixed” and what is “alive.” And fourth, we consider Bonhoeffer’s theological
945
Wayne Floyd, Jr., “Christ, Concreteness, and Creation in the Early Bonhoeffer,” Union Seminary
Quarterly Review, 39:1-2 (1984): 101.
946
Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York: Harper and Row, 1977): 186, 786, 882.
947
Niels Henrik Gregerson, “The Mysteries of Christ and Creation: “Center” and “Limit” in Bonhoeffer’s
Creation and Fall and Christology Lectures,” Mysteries in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A
Copenhagen Bonhoeffer Symposium ed. by Christiane Kirsten Tietz, Busch Nielsen, Ulrik Nissen
(Copenhagen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007):141. Gregorson argues that Bonhoeffer too unconditionally
accepts standard theology of the day regarding creation ex nihilo instead of allowing himself to probe
philosophical questions regarding the mind of God prior to the moment of creation.
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conviction that God is at work prior to the fall upholding the created world in goodness.
One insight that should be noted as we continued is how Bonhoeffer shifts from language
regarding the order (Ordnung) of creation to create a theological framework other than
the problematic theology Bonhoeffer was experiencing in his day regarding “the order of
creation” that he believed legitimized the Nazi regime.948 We will hear in Bonhoeffer’s
account the doxology and liturgy evident in the Genesis account of creation but with
emphases on theological nuances different than “order.”
Bonhoeffer’s lectures begin by addressing human anxiety caused by the human
predicament of being caught in a “circle” of thinking. Despite this anxiety, Bonhoeffer
begins poetically:

“The place where the Bible begins is one where our own most

impassioned waves of thinking break, as thrown back upon themselves, and lose their
strength in spray and foam.”949 This first statement makes clear that Bonhoeffer’s biblical
exposition of Genesis 1 will be more than a description of God’s act of creation, instead,
Bonhoeffer begins with a pair of unexpected claims beyond the act of creating itself.
First, as we can see from the opening words, Bonhoeffer begins with a philosophical
explanation of the conundrum in which human beings find themselves. Our very asking
“Why” regarding all the probing questions we might ask regarding the beginning of
creation is simply “an expression…of thinking that lacks a beginning.”950 All of those
whys implode upon the abyss of the deep and get tossed within the strength of the spray
and foam that is there. Because human thinking can never conceive the beginning, their
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conundrum is living in the middle951 between the beginning and the end encircled then,
by the anxiety, of all those “Whys?” Anyone then who would claim knowledge of the
beginning, will be deemed by others either a “liar” or a “savior” and in the act of making
truth claims about the beginning will ultimately be killed by their peers.952 Bonhoeffer’s
opening prose may seem startling, but in light of Job 38:4 this Biblical exposition makes
sense: Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me, if you are so
clever!953 Because of this epistemological paradox, the creature who lives in the anxious
middle suffers a difficult plight.

That plight, the human condition, evidenced by

Bonhoeffer in Genesis 1 in the face of the ֙( ו ֔ ָֹבהוּ תֹ֨ הוּtohu wa bohu)954 is unforeseen given
that creatures have not yet been created at this point in the story. It is here, in the
circularity of human thinking breaking on the spray and foam, wherein his reflection
becomes Christological: “Our thinking, that is, the thinking of those who have to turn to
Christ to know about God, the thinking of fallen humankind, lacks a beginning because it
is a circle. We think in a circle, but we also feel and will in a circle. We exist in a
circle.”955
Before delving into Bonhoeffer’s exposition of Genesis itself, it is important to
stress a claim central to his Genesis exegesis: human beings exist in a circle and God’s
word meets them in the circle. Bonhoeffer presents this claim as prelude to God’s act of
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creation. Because human beings are incomplete in their knowledge of God, themselves,
and creation, Bonhoeffer argues their thought process lacks a beginning.956 And because
knowledge of the future is just as incomplete, human thinking lacks an ending. Within
this conundrum, since there is no beginning and no end, humans “Think in a circle. But
we also feel and will in a circle. We exist in a circle.”957 Because of this conundrum in
all its circularity, humans get trapped within a predicament of circuitous argument that
bares ongoing fault and error and so is a “circulus vitiosus.”958
As he turns to the text itself, Bonhoeffer links the thinking that “pounds itself to
pieces on the beginning”959 with the imagery of the spray and foam at the beginning of
creation as the spirit hovers over the deep. He suggests that the waters over which God
hovers exhibit the tensions we experience as creatures: “The place where the Bible begins
is one where our own most impassioned waves of thinking break, are thrown back upon
themselves, and lose their strength in spray and foam.”960 Being caught within the
circularity creates anxiety from “being in the middle.”961 Meeting us in the middle of that
anxiety is the Word of God that “comes alive for us here in the middle, not as a distant,
eternal being in repose but as the Creator.”962
If the first limitation placed on the human agent is the very fact of being caught in
the middle of a circle, the second limitation arrives with the Word of God. The arrival of
God’s Word helps to create the very individuality of the human being as “The word
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brings into relief; it outlines and limits the individual.”963 God’s Word reveals a limit.
To be clear, this limit is good. The limit exists here to clarify our existence as creatures
and our status as vulnerable and dependent human beings. At the same time, God’s
Word also reveals our fallen character, suggesting that Bonhoeffer understands limit both
as empowering as creatures and as revelatory of our imperfection as creatures.
Bonhoeffer associates the fall not solely in the Genesis story of Adam and Eve in the
garden, but more generally recognizes the fall in humanity’s inability to comprehend the
unity of God’s activity in the created world. When speaking of Genesis 1:3 “And God
said, ‘Let there be light’ and there was light” Bonhoeffer explains, “Our complete
inability to hold the indicative and the imperative together in our minds shows that we no
longer live in the unity of the active word of God but are fallen.”964 Humans then, find
themselves in the center of this story – the very Word of God – with the inability to see
forward or backward. Eden is that picture of the circle that places limits upon human
existence, the circle in which humans find themselves, disabled.
The second assertion made by Bonhoeffer is that God created freely ex nihilo.
Within that circle, by the grace of God’s revealed word, humanity comes to understand
several key assertions: In the beginning, God created.965 In the beginning, God created
freely.966 And in the beginning, God created freely out of nothing [das nichts].967 With
these three statements, Bonhoeffer attempts to negate any reckoning of these concepts as
expressing temporality or causality. God exists beyond time and thereby creation must
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not be viewed as an unfolding of temporal events.968 Temporality, causality and freedom
are linked terms as Bonhoeffer presents a God who creates freely, beyond cause and
effect, beyond time, ex nihilo, in order to depict the utter distinction between Creator and
creature. Freedom, for Bonhoeffer, is an important theme both for emphasizing that
distinction between God and creation, but also for maintaining God’s freedom in
resurrecting Christ from the dead. Creation ex nihilo is an affirmation Bonhoeffer makes
regarding both creation and resurrection:
The fact that Christ was dead did not provide the possibility of his resurrection
but its impossibility; it was nothing itself, it was the nihil negativum. There is
absolutely no transition, no continuum between the dead Christ and the
resurrected Christ, but the freedom of God that in the beginning created God’s
work out of nothing.969
The creator who fashions creation and resurrection in absolute freedom is the one who is
“Lord [over nonbeing]” and has “power to rise up again.”970

These two qualities,

“Lordship over nonbeing” and “rising up again power”, create the capacity for God’s two
actions in relationship to creation. First, God is the one who “wrests” creation out of
nonbeing and then “upholds” creation to affirm being, even when being is under threat.971
Prior to the fall, these two actions are held together within a singular movement. After
the fall, the unity of these two acts (creation and preservation) will be split.
The third point worthy of note is the way in which Bonhoeffer presents each act
of creation from day two through day six by that which is “fixed” and that which is
“alive.” These unfold after the establishment of light on the first day. The world God
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creates is full of light. Light functions to “awaken the darkness to its own being”972 and
in this awareness “form becomes aware of existing over against something else.”973
When the creation then,

“sees the Creator’s light”974 there is gratitude, praise and

thanksgiving on behalf of creation. With the separation of light from the darkness, day
and night are wrested into being. Bonhoeffer laments the inability of creatures to the
wonder and power and gift of any given day. Technology exhausts creatures from the
possibility of daily appreciation.975 The world rests in the “rhythms” of “God’s daily
works”976 which involves the “give and take” of God’s resting and movement over the
course of a day.
Bonhoeffer collapses God’s creative acts of the second day (firmament, earth and
sea) and the fourth day (stars, sun and moon) in his chapter “That Which is Firmly
Fixed,” his exposition of Genesis 1:6-10 and 14-19. His reason for advancing in the
narrative appears to be a desire to explore what is “fixed” before he examines “that which
lives” in Genesis 1:11-13 and 20-25.

The fixed nature of the firmament, and the

fixedness of the stars are beyond human existence. They are not changed by human
power and freedom. Humans, however, function within the world of “what is fixed”
because they “know numbers.”977

Numbers come into play for Bonhoeffer with the

“days, years and epochs of time” that “happen with complete regularity and without
change.”978 Here, what was once formless becomes “fixed” and “bound to form.”979 A
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noteworthy moment of foreshadowing that occurs within this exposition is Bonhoeffer’s
connection between what is fixed, the numbering of creation and God’s “law.” He
concludes that the connection between numbers and law are both upheld by God even
when the fallen creation can no longer comprehend their power or live within their
rhythms and structure.
With a dramatic turn, Bonhoeffer moves from the world of what is fixed to “that
which lives”; he writes, “Like a waterfall that plunges from the heights down into a alley,
creation moves from on high down to do its final work.”

The movements in the

unfolding of creation are from what is formless, to “form in rhythm”, to a form that is
revealed in “law and in numbers.”980 As creation gains more and more form, it continues
to gain “distinction from the form of the Creator.”981 In the movement from what is
fixed, to what bears life (grass, plants, trees, birds, wild animals, reptiles) God in freedom
“does not will to be Lord of a dead, eternally unchangeable, subservient world; instead
God wills to be Lord of life with its infinite variety of forms.”982 What was once “dead
stone” becomes instead, “alive and fruitful.”983 Now that both “law”984 and “life” have
been created, Bonhoeffer makes clear neither of these, but only God alone, are worthy of
praise and adoration.985
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The fourth point Bonhoeffer makes regarding creation is that God is at work
upholding the goodness of creation prior to the fall. There is a joyous refrain that ripples
through Genesis “and God saw that it was good.” Goodness is not intrinsic to what is
fixed or alive, but only because the God who created these elements is bursting with
goodness. Goodness, then, is a sign of God wresting creation freely into being and
upholding that creation, preserving its integrity all within a singular act prior to the fall.
Before turning from creation to creature in Bonhoeffer’s reflections on “The
Image of God on Earth” in Genesis 1:26-27, it is important to make clear, in our effort to
bring Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s definition of disability into conversation with
Bonhoeffer, what Bonhoeffer might understand as “world.” Doing so requires taking a
few steps forward in the Genesis text beyond Genesis 1 and 2. The exegesis of these
claims by Bonhoeffer will be developed in the upcoming sections. First, “the world is
created for God, for God’s honor alone.”986 Second, the world is fallen. The state of
being, for humanity, within this fallen world is a state of estrangement. Humans think
they are to have dominion and to be good stewards of the world, but instead “we are
ruled.”987 Bonhoeffer explains further, “The world rules humankind; humankind is a
prisoner, a slave, of the world, and its dominion is an illusion. Technology is the power
with which the earth seizes hold of humankind and masters it.”988 As the story unfolds,
once flesh is created and fall occurs, human beings are “allowed to live in this world”989
and they will not be deprived of God’s relationship with them through the Word. Third,
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human beings after the fall survive in the world “under a curse.”990 Bonhoeffer makes a
poignant point at this juncture, because the world is under God’s curse, not just any curse,
therefore “the world is not wholly God-forsaken; instead it is a world that even under
God’s curse is blessed and in its enmity, pain, and work is pacified, a world where life is
upheld and preserved.”991 God’s curse is both, strangely, an affirmation, human beings
get what they want in this world to be “like God” and, God’s curse is also preservation
because humans are “allowed” to live within this world.992
The curse and the promise that occur after the fall (to be discussed later in this
chapter), reveal a creator God who in freedom chooses to preserve the world. God’s
world is upheld. In this world, God will provide “restraint and order [Ordnung]”993 to
guide fallen humanity. Here then is a fundamental insight: this twofold restraining and
ordering is a particular way God engages creation after the fall. Bonhoeffer explains,
“God’s way of acting to preserve the world is to affirm the sinful world and to show it its
limits by means of order.”994

Limits then, are both revealed and healed within a

particular ordering of creation that is intended by God to “uphold or preserve life.”995 We
will explore these orders, and the limits they both reveal and heal, later in this chapter.
And, it will become clear how limits are related to Bonhoeffer’s theological conception
990
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of finitude as an important aspect of his doctrine of creation and will become central to
his ethical theory.996
For now, it is important to note that God takes a new action within the world to
uphold what has fallen. The world we now live in, for Bonhoeffer, is “the old world.”997
Prior to his exposition of Genesis, Bonhoeffer begins the very first paragraph of his
introduction with the claim: “The church speaks within the old world about the new
world. And because it is surer of the new world than of anything else, it sees the old
world in in the light of the new world.”998 Implied within this deceptively simple phrase
are three critical claims. The first is Christological: Christ will reveal through the church
a new world. The second is anthropological: human beings dwell in a fallen world. The
third is soteriological: there is the need for salvation and redemption of this fallen world
into newness in the end that seems illusive from the middle.

The good news for

Bonhoeffer, even in the very beginning of Genesis, is that “the God of Israel and of Jesus
Christ is always in the midst of the world and can only be encountered there.”999 For
Bonhoeffer, this is good news for all the world, perhaps what one might call his gospel of
Genesis.

5.2.3

FLESH: Creature in the Created World
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With the affirmation of God in Genesis 1:26, “Let us make humankind in our
image, according to our likeness” Bonhoeffer explains ““Something altogether original,
is about to happen.”1000 The originality of this creation is that creatures are not fashioned
from nonbeing as all that has gone before, both “the fixed” and “that which lives.”
Instead, creatures are made with “significance and sublimity”1001 through a new form of
God’s planning derived from God’s image. At this moment in Genesis, suddenly “the
narrative is about us.”1002
Within Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation, he presents a theological anthropology
that is derived from both the Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 accounts. Bonhoeffer explores the
story of Adam and Eve created in the imago dei in absolute freedom by God dividing the
study into five short chapters:

“The Image of God on Earth” (Genesis 1:26-27),

“Blessing and Completion” (Genesis 1:28-31, Genesis 2:1-4a), “The Human Being of
Earth and Spirit” (Genesis 2:7), “The Center of the Earth” (Genesis 2:8-17) and “The
Power of the Other” (Genesis 2:18-25) with a brief interlude between Genesis 1 and 2
entitled “The Other Side.”
To understand Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology it is necessary to: delineate
two aspects of freedom for the creature and two aspects of relationality; outline three
possible states of being human (blessed, cursed, resting); distinguish between the
Yawhist and Elohim accounts of being human; and finally, notice the distinction
Bonhoeffer makes between being human and becoming flesh. We will conclude in this
section by analyzing Bonhoeffer through the lens of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and
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Deborah Creamer’s concepts of flesh, limit and finitude. In so doing, important to keep in
mind is what happens when flesh encounters limits? Bonhoeffer aids in the development
of Creamer’s limit model by recognizing the moral emotions stirred by limits and the
moral demands made by limits that can be either natural or sinful.
First, Bonhoeffer makes two critical statements regarding freedom for the human
being and two crucial statements regarding relationality. Regarding freedom, Bonhoeffer
posits that the creature, like God, is free. Bonhoeffer notes the constraints on that
freedom: freedom is constrained within the bounds of the created universe, freedom is
revealed through the word of God, freedom is aimed toward worship of the Creator who
fashioned both the universe and the unique individual.1003

Second, because of the

variables of these limitations, freedom contains a certain paradox. Bonhoeffer explains,
“Freedom is not something that people have for themselves but something they have for
others.”1004

Freedom exists then only in the state of relationality with another.1005

Because of this freedom isn’t something that simply exists, instead it is something that
happens over time as a relationship develops “being-free-for-the-other.”1006
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With regard to relationality, Bonhoeffer claims, first, the “likeness” reflecting the
image of God in humanity is relationality and this is not an ontological state of being, but
of relating.1007 Bonhoeffer emphasizes this distinction very clearly when he says: this is
not an analogia entis but instead, an analogia relationis.1008 The depth and breadth of
this relating between humans, and their mirroring the very image of God: “Human beings
exist in duality…. that can be defined in simply no other way than in terms of the
existence of human beings over-against-one-another, with-one-another, and independence-upon-one-another [nicht anders zu bestimmen als in dem Gegen€uberMiteinander-Aufeinander-angewiesen-sein der Menschen]’.1009 Created in the imago dei
human beings are created with the hope of “being-free-for” relationship. And second,
while human beings are in a state of “being-free-for” relationship with God and other
human beings, humans are in a state of “being-free-from” the rest of God’s created order.
Bonhoeffer derives this difference from God’s call in Genesis for the ones created in
God’s image to have “dominion” over the rest of the earth. The difficulty is that in “the
world” these two states are less idealized and more conflated. Others, to whom the
1007
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individual is bound, can affect the creatures that the individual is free from.

So

Bonhoeffer makes a statement which appears paradoxical: “In my whole being, in my
creatureliness, I belong wholly to this world: it bears me, nurtures me, holds me.”1010 He
continues, “The thing, the world, rules humankind; humankind is a prisoner, a slave, of
the world.”1011 Implied here, is the fact that even in their freedom for God and others,
human beings lose some of the power of that freedom within a world where collective
creatures impact one another creating things like “technology” that “seizes hold of
humankind and masters it”1012 even despite a human being’s freedom. Despite these
constraints, in their ideal representations, states, “being-free-for” and “being-free-from”
express the likeness and image of God within human beings.1013
Second, in the next section, Bonhoeffer briefly describes three particular states of
being human: being blessed, being cursed, and finding rest. It is unexpected, at this
juncture in the Genesis story, where a “curse” is not yet mentioned that Bonhoeffer
would introduce the concept. However, blessing and curse are interrelated concepts, one
cannot be comprehended without the other. They are both “burdens that God lays upon
humankind.”1014 What is critical to understand regarding Bonhoeffer’s exposition of the
blessing that Genesis 28-31 introduces is greater than the “behold, it was very good” that
the text itself pronounces. Instead, blessing – in all its dimensions to bear fruit, to
increase, to serve the earth, and to subdue it – are key to a greater insight linking creature,
in freedom, to the created world: “This blessing…affirms humankind wholly within the
1010
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world of the living in which it is placed. It is humankind’s whole empirical existence that
is blessed here, its creatureliness, its worldliness, its earthliness.”1015 What might seem
more appropriate than the blessing/curse relationship is the dynamic that occurs in this
section between blessing and resting. If blessing means wholly being within the world,
rest is an opportunity to retreat from the world’s demands. However, instead of making
this connection Bonhoeffer links blessing to curse, both ‘burdens’ from God; and then,
links rest to a foreshadowing of the resurrection hope of the Gospels, though seemingly
far removed from the God of Genesis. But for Bonhoeffer, the relationship is clear. A
strong theology of resurrection hope will find its origins in the creation. Here, the day of
resurrection is also the day of rest. 1016
The third point begins with the interlude that occurs here in “Creation and Fall” is
the juncture between the first creation story of Genesis 1 and the second creation story of
Genesis 2. While Bonhoeffer lists points of contrast between the two stories (frame of
reference, the character of God, the order of creation), the contrast that matters most for
our understanding of human beings is this: “The first account is about humankind-forGod, the second about God-for-humankind.”1017 Hence, he titles the section “The Other
Side.”

According to Bonhoeffer, we need both depictions as necessary, not

“arbitrary”1018 dimensions of the whole.

Certainly, there are implications from the

remaining list of contrasting points that impact creaturely life: is God removed or
relatively close at hand, is God more abstract or anthropomorphic, is God creating
humanity last or first and how does that impact our understanding of humanity’s
1015
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importance in God’s created world?

Bonhoeffer accepts the paradox of all these

affirmations in tension with one another, but particularly the tension between God and
humanity. Humans, in Genesis 1 are created for God – to worship, to reflect God’s
image, to share dominion. God, in Genesis 2, is there for humankind – in proximity, in
presence, even, in planting there in the garden. While we might experience these two
statements as conflicting truths, Bonhoeffer understands them as “representations
[Darstellungen]”1019 showing the same thing from two separate sides.
The creator God of Genesis 2 is no longer the distant Elohim of Genesis 1, but the
breathy and spirited God close at hand and down to earth named Yahweh in Genesis 2.
Three significant assertions structure this chapter: first, our bodies come from the earth.
Second, those bodies come to life through the breath of God. And third, within our
enlivened bodies blessed by the very breath of God we become “the image of God.”1020
To ground and develop these three claims, Bonhoeffer presents a theology of the body:

It is from God’s earth out of which humankind is taken. From it human beings
have their bodies. The body belongs to a person’s essence. The body is not the
prison, the shell, the exterior of a human being; instead a human being is a
human body. A human being does not ‘have’ a body or ‘have’ a soul; instead a
human being ‘is’ body and soul. The human being in the beginning really is the
body, is one – just as Christ is wholly his body and the church is the body of
Christ. People who reject their bodies reject their existence before God the
Creator. What is to be taken seriously about human existence is its bond with
mother earth, its being as body. 1021
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This body, comes to life, from its previous “state of nestling [Hingeschmiegstein]”1022 by
the breath of God which animates. The creator God breathes spirit into the dust, the
earth, the human who had only known nestling, and becomes a human being. God’s
glory, therefore, then shines through the body – first, through human being, second,
through the body of Christ and third, through the sacraments.1023
Fourth and finally, the section of Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology “The
Power of the Other” is the exegesis of Genesis 2:18-25. Until this point, creaturely life
has been introduced as “human kind”, “Adam”, and “bodies”, but it is not until the
Genesis text introduces the word “flesh.” The Genesis text progresses from the state of
being human to the state of being in relationship as flesh. The creation of Eve draws
Adam into the life of flesh as the first social construct of intimacy and relationship is
formed. To be clear, Bonhoeffer does not introduce the word “flesh” to his description of
creaturely life until scripture itself does so in the second creation story of Genesis 2.
Now, this creature is ‘flesh’ fashioned when God, in Genesis 2:21 grabbed hold of
Adam’s rib and “filled out its place with flesh.”1024 Adam as human being is not alone for
long, we learn from the Biblical story, and quickly our understanding of flesh unfolds
with the first words Adam speaks to Eve, “This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of
my flesh.” In their flesh, though both are naked, there is no shame.1025 With this language
Bonhoeffer acknowledges three ramifications of life in the flesh: flesh is the gift of the
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other as suddenly a human being becomes a social being,1026 flesh creates space for
relational intimacy and unity, and flesh delineates a new limit for Adam.
The first connotation of flesh is that it is “God’s gift.”1027 Adam, who had been
“alone,”1028 even in the presence of animal life, is in need of a companion, a
‘helpmate’1029, a partner who shares in the work and in the experience of being a human
in God’s created order. In this chapter, there is only a singular use by Bonhoeffer of the
terminology “flesh” outside of any direct quotation of scripture. That instance is utilized
in the description of the relationship between the newly formed Eve and Adam: “Thus
Adam understands the uniqueness of this creature that God has shaped with the
contribution Adam has made, out of human flesh, but Adam sees what Adam has done
for the other wholly in the light of God’s gift.”1030 Flesh is used then, to describe the
substance of the other, to whom Adam is called into relationship and all its complexity
but who ultimately, as the text makes clear, is “gift.” Bonhoeffer’s rendering of the
Genesis account is that “flesh” is the substance they share: “They have from their origin
been one, and only in becoming one do they return to their origin.”1031 Flesh then is both
a reminder of union and division, something that has been torn apart and something that
will one day be united.1032
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Here begins the second connotation of flesh: flesh allows the possibility of deep
union to take place. To be clear, Bonhoeffer makes vivid the fact that union does not
negate the individuality of the unique creature. Instead, he maintains diversity within
their ultimate unity: “This becoming one never means the merging of the two or the
abolition of their creatureliness as individuals. It actualizes to the highest possible degree
their belonging to each other, which is based precisely on their being different from each
other.”1033 In the beginning, Adam and Eve share flesh as Adam recognizes “This at last
is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.”1034 And, that unity will be regained when
Adam leaves his mother and father and cleaves to Eve and “they will be one flesh.”1035
So, flesh is a shared substance that still maintains the essential difference between two
freely created beings who share the dust of the earth and the breath of God’s spirit, but it
is also the shared hope of returning in sexual union and intimacy.1036
Third, and most important for our thesis, is the fact that flesh is a denotation of
Adam’s limit.1037

Flesh, then, becomes what Bonhoeffer understands as the

“embodiment of Adam’s limit”1038; herein, lies both the possibility for both desire and
hatred. Limit then becomes for Adam, both the center of his existence in the garden, and

1033

Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 98.
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 97.
1035
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 100.
1036
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 100.
1037
Clifford Green explains: ““The other person is a real Grenze to the I, a limit to the dominating
ambitions of the self; the other person is also, as embodying the Word of forgiveness ab extra, the promise
and possibility of the self’s liberation into a new existence.... It is only because Christ is present as person
that the self acknowledges the other as a genuine person and not as an entity or merely extant thing.” See:
Clifford j. Green, Bonhoeffer. A Theology of Sociality, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmanns
Publishing, 1999), 89.
1038
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 98.
1034

286

another limit that is met and engaged and different points in the circle as limit “takes on
form”1039 through Eve.
Bonhoeffer’s view of flesh differs from the account of Garland-Thomson in his
notion that flesh emerges from relationship. For Bonhoeffer, flesh is what happens to the
human being when they are called into relationship with another human being. For
Garland-Thomson, flesh is a dynamic and changing entity that is shaped in “its
movement through time and space in the process we call life.”1040 For Bonhoeffer, flesh
is embodied limit that is a helpful gift, a hoped-for union, and an occasionally resented
limit.

Garland-Thomson maintains a vitalistic conception of flesh as “inherent

dynamism” at play within the world.1041
In her work Disability and Christian Theology Creamer focuses more on the
language of embodiment rather than making a distinction between flesh and body. For
Bonhoeffer, a body becomes flesh when a limit is encountered through the gift of another
human being. It could be argued that this moment is precisely when the first “moral
injury” occurs since that human being, gift of God that she is, will make a moral choice
“other” than what her partner might make. In so doing there is the potential for a moral
injury.

Creamer maintains a focus on embodiment as a neglected epistemological

resource for theology and disability.1042 When she speaks of flesh, she denotes moments
when a human being can more fully engage the fleshly nature of sensory existence within
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the world, as well as the potential depth and struggle of human being.1043 Bonhoeffer’s
emphasis on flesh as “other” more fully allows space for the demands and emotions the
limitation another human being creates simply by being alive. Bonhoeffer aids in
nuancing Creamer’s account of limit through his account of the flesh by teasing out limits
that can unite in love, as well as the flip side of those limits that can when human love is
“obliterated” cause the creature to “hate the limit.”1044 In so doing, Bonhoeffer agrees
with Cremer’s assessment that limits are “inherent in the experience of humanity”1045 and
engage “the complexity of experiences”1046 of human being. And he appears to agree
with Creamer who acknowledges that some limits “enable” while others “make difficult”
our embodied lives.1047 But Bonhoeffer takes steps beyond Creamer’s notion of limit as
he irreducibly links limits both to the center of existence, as well as the very nature of
existing in the flesh. At this point in the exegesis, Bonhoeffer has not yet begun to
exponentially increase the dynamics of flesh as relationships are encountered beyond the
two-some of Adam and Eve. But that will soon happen as the two encounter a snake in
the garden.

5.2.4 ENCOUNTER: The Fall
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Having outlined Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation, and his theological
anthropology, we turn in this section to an exploration of Bonhoeffer’s account of sin and
the construct of the fall. Here, we use the language of “encounter” as presented by
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson. As cautioned earlier, it would not be helpful to distort
Bonhoeffer’s account by unconditionally using Garland-Thomson’s language. And yet,
“encounter” provides a surprisingly appropriate framework within which to appropriate
Bonhoeffer’s account of the Fall. The creator God has created human being in the image
of God with a particular hope. Bonhoeffer writes, “It is the very God…who chooses to
encounter [zu begegnen] the creature as its Creator.”1048 God freely chooses to create
human beings with the ultimate hope of meaningful and intimate encounter; and yet, the
human being chooses otherwise.
To be clear, the singular time Bonhoeffer uses the word “encounter” is in
relationship to the hope God has for relationship with human beings. It is the series of
actions that unfold in Genesis 3 that warp and negate the initial possibility for that
encounter. One might argue then, that for Bonhoeffer, sin is characterized by rejecting or
resisting a possible encounter with God, and then, choosing over and over again otherthan-God encounters. Brian Brock explains this state of sin by saying of Bonhoeffer’s
account, “In their fallen state they continue to be entrapped by the dynamics of their
flight from God – becoming centripetal and dissatisfied creatures who are uneasy with
themselves and their limits.”1049 In the exposition that follows, we will see how
Bonhoeffer develops that account as human beings continue to choose encounter after
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encounter that takes them away from God and the limits at the center of their existence.
To do so we will explore five alternative “encounters” Bonhoeffer highlights culminating
in his account of the fall. In conclusion of this section, we will briefly compare and
contrast aspects of Bonhoeffer’s account with Creamer’s and Garland-Thomson’s.
Despite all the beauty and possibility and gift of being a creature, of being created
in the flesh for the world, humankind exists in a particular state of “not-wanting-to-be-acreature [Nicht-Gesch€opf-sein-wollen].”1050 Laden in that restlessness is the possibility
of encountering the world in a “not-wanting-to-be-a-creature” state of being. Over half
of the “Creation and Fall” lectures are devoted to the fall and the series of encounters that
precipitate the fall: the placement of Adam in the center of Eden, the creation of Eve in
relationship to Adam, the interaction with the Serpent, the taste of the fruit, and the
reckoning with God in the aftermath. Within the framework of this ancient text,
Bonhoeffer understands some of the difficulties of bringing meaning from “the old
picture language of the magical world into the new picture language of the technical
world.”1051 In this section, we will explore Bonhoeffer’s exposition of the “limit” met in
these encounters, as the flesh of Adam meets both the prohibition and possibility within
the world.
In the first other-than-God encounter, described within the chapter “The Center of
the Earth,” God places Adam within the Garden of Eve wherein two trees – the tree of
knowledge and the tree of good and evil – stand at the center of the Garden. Bonhoeffer
makes clear, Adam himself is not at the center; however, his entire orientation is to the
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center because this is where the life that comes only from God is grounded.1052 With
Adam’s point of reference and entire circumference of being shaped by this center, Adam
knows at this stage in the encounter only “unbroken obedience to the creator.”1053 The
tree of life, the center of divine life, represents the life that allows Adam to live and move
and have his very being. Even more so, the possibility for life with God at the center is
one of freedom and flourishing. The life represented by this tree, in all of its potential for
fullness and flourishing, may only be threatened by the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil.1054 Yahweh points out to Adam both trees, but it is only with the second tree that
God attaches a very particular prohibition: “You shall not eat; for on the day you eat
from it you shall die.”1055 Herein, is the possibility of a new kind of encounter one that
will move from “unbroken obedience” to the possibility of death. In naming this reality,
a singular prohibition stated by God who envisions so much more for Adam to live
“sumptuously and with delight,”1056 God points out for the very first time “Adam’s limit
[Grenze].”1057
Encounter, then, within this garden is full of latent possibility, but also a clear and
defined limit.

Crossing this limit will have consequences.

The footnotes reveal

Bonhoeffer’s intent that “limit” is “a creaturely limit that cannot be surpassed.”1058
Bonhoeffer’s

text

provides

two

synonyms

as

well:

“boundedness”

and

“creatureliness.”1059 In a surprising turn, drawing on the Genesis text, Bonhoeffer reveals
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the limit of humanity is not at the edges, but at “the center of human existence.”1060 Here,
several affirmations are made regarding the limit. First, “life is possible only because of
the limit.”1061 Second, “the limit is grace.” Limit, then, in its first iteration is full of life
and grace, and so implied in these affirmations is the potential for life-giving and gracefilled encounter. Third, the limit is at “the center”, not the edge, of human existence.1062
And fourth, knowledge of the limit is experienced within an “internal” framework
revealing an “internal limit.”1063
For now, it is only possible for Adam who lives in “unbroken obedience” to
understand the limit as God’s very presence with him at the center, even though the text
states and we hear clear prohibition. Because Adam is oriented solely to God at the
center, “Adam cannot conceive of the breaking apart of that knowledge into good and
evil.”1064 The remainder of this chapter explores however, what this good and evil might
come to represent and exude within Adam’s world. To be clear, Adam has made no
transgression; he lives in “unbroken obedience.” And yet, the possibility of “a moral
split” is articulated by Bonhoeffer to foreshadow what will come in the garden. “Tob”
and “ra” speak to the good and evil yet unleashed, but when released will have the effect
of “splitting apart” what once has been unbroken, whether it is Adam himself, or the
world in which he lives. Here, Bonhoeffer appears to get ahead of himself in the Genesis
story, but his point in introducing the possibility of a “split apart”1065 world is to show
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what is germinating in the garden with the elements of “life, knowledge and death.”1066
Nothing, until now, has been lost. “Tob” and “Ra” are united, not unlike Adam’s
“unbroken obedience” in the tree of knowledge of good and evil. They are inseparable,
always appearing in a pair. They represent something greater than a simple moral code,
but instead express the complicated good and evil of what is “pleasurable” and
“painful.”1067 And, “tob” and “ra” in their inseparability strangely always enhance the
other. These three assertions witness to what is at play and will come to pass as the
“ultimate split [Zwiespalt] in the world of humankind.”1068 Encounter, the reader of both
the Bible and Bonhoeffer will become aware, is poised to rupture and break both the
human being and the world itself. Foreshadowed here is “the state of being divided or
torn apart into tob and ra in the world and in humankind.”1069 Tob and ra, both evil and
goodness, will become burdens for the human being to bear. Life will no longer be gift,
but instead a commandment.

Why a command? Because, according to Bonhoeffer

knowledge of death will be a burden on life giving life itself the sense of “to-have-tolive”1070 rather than willingly received gift. Any splitting apart of flesh or world, due to a
shaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, will directly affect and ultimately
harm the precious gift of the tree of life. Encounter, given Bonhoeffer’s exposition of
Genesis 2:8-17 is intended to pulse with life and gift and grace, and yet, dormant even
within the garden is the possibility of “an ultimate split.”1071
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Bonhoeffer’s description of a second other-than-God encounter is revealed in his
exposition of Genesis 2:18-25 in “The Power of the Other,” which explains further the
paradox described above wherein both the “limit and life” at “the inviolable, inaccessible
center of paradise around which Adam’s life circles.”1072 So it is interesting to note, that
the creation of Eve described in this chapter is not solely to be a companion so that Adam
will not be alone with himself, but also so that Adam will have a partner with whom to
share the limit he new faces.1073 Prior to the fall, Adam receives this companion, not in
pride or remorse, but with deep gratitude1074 for the load she will share. The limit at the
center of the Garden takes on “embodiment” as Eve becomes Adam’s limit. In this,
Bonhoeffer sees an early witness to the church as “two persons in community” bear
witness to the limit of life at the center of human existence.1075 Lisa Dahill makes clear
the possibility inherent in this encounter which, though “other-than-God,” still has the
potential to bear witness to God’s presence as the human being matures through this
relationship with the other:
[Bonhoeffer] insists that it is in our encounter with the barrier or limit created by
some “other” that persons mature and responsible agents, selves, “I’s” before
God – are formed. His theology of the formative role of such an encounter, in
which the other mediates the ultimate alterity of God working to create and recreate persons, remains in place here in Creation and Fall; but not this “other” is
an actual person with a name.1076
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Bonhoeffer’s theology presents a case that once God realizes intimate encounters with the
divine might be neglected by humanity, offers a new possibility for divine intimacy
through human encounters with the limits of another.
At this point in the Genesis story, before the ultimate other-than-God encounter
of the fall, this encounter between Adam and Eve is one where shame does not yet exist:
“And they were both naked, the man and his woman, and they were not ashamed.”1077
However, Bonhoeffer uses this moment to introduce the concept of shame as one that
will express a person’s sense of “divideness” (Entzweiung)1078 both internally within
their own spirit, as well as an expression of their external encounters with a divided
world. Shame, when it manifests will become a certain kind of “cover” within which a
person may hide.1079 The Biblical story, Bonhoeffer foreshadows, will introduce shame
within three spheres of life in the “split-apart-world.”1080 Shame is taken on as a cover
when one encounters the limit of knowledge, the limit of death and the limit of
sexuality.1081
The third other-than-God encounter, for Bonhoeffer, is explored in the chapter
“The Pious Question” in which the serpent tempts Adam and Eve. Here, the limit that
was once experienced as grace and life-giving to Adam, now instead, becomes
provocation and law-abiding.1082 Of note from this chapter is Bonhoeffer’s wrestling with
theodicy and the problem of evil. He argues that the Genesis text does not describe “the
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origin of evil,”1083 instead, the text illumines guilt and the burden human beings carry
because of that guilt. The serpent succeeds in this story, even before the physical
manifestation of the fall, by leveraging a distance between Adam and God.
The fourth other-than-God encounter describes the moment the serpent said to
Eve: “You will not die at all. Instead God knows that on the day you eat from it your
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, and know what good and evil is.”1084 The
crucial instance the serpent describes is the moment Adam and Eve would suddenly “be
like God,” that is, become second gods or “Sicut Deus” as Bonhoeffer deems. In the face
of becoming “like” God the “limit” suddenly becomes “unlimitedness”1085 as the serpent
pushes the boundary that God has presented. And yet, Bonhoeffer provides a gracious
reading of the text as he suggests Adam’s desire to “sicut deus” not as a desire to become
a God, but instead as an invitation to more – “more pious, more obedient.”1086 The next
encounter will reveal how flawed in thinking Adam was in envisioning “more.”
The fifth other-than-God encounter describes the moment of “the fall.” In that
encounter, Adam loses his limit. The serpent, shoved his way into the center crowding in
on the boundary; but ironically, leaving Adam and Eve paradoxically alone.

For

Bonhoeffer, the fall starts the day that humanity begins to live without God at the center.
Instead the human creature lives by its own resources, apart from God and without
limits.1087 Humankind lives with their eyes wide open to the static – that tob and ra, good
and evil of creation. Bonhoeffer’s language for this is breaking–apart [Entzweiung]. The
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two are no longer a unity, but always at odds with each other in duality.

In this

“breaking–apart” world, the original picture of unity and beauty of creation is lost. What
is left is, “now covered in a veil; it is silent and lacking explanation, opaque and
enigmatic.”1088

This “breaking-apart world” may seem like the starting point of

theological reflection. But for Bonhoeffer, where the work of theology is aimed, is not at
the “why” of fallen creation or the origin of any kind of evil in the world. Instead, “The
theological question is…about the actual overcoming of evil on the cross.”1089 Such a
statement radically redefines the work of theology and the stewarding of theological
questions away from the “why” of creation and fall, and instead toward the “who”; that
is, the one who will be at work preserving what is left of the good.
Bonhoeffer describes the new existential state of Adam after the fall in terms of
the absence of limits: “Adam as limitless” (Der grenzenlose Adam).1090

The

consequences of this grenzenlose are exponential. Bonhoeffer makes here several key
points regarding the ongoing consequences of this implosion of limits: first, the act is
both inconceivable and inexcusable;1091 second, the act is final;1092 third, the resulting
guilt is infinite;1093 fourth, the act creates a “continual fall;”1094 and finally, the act
demands a theological reorientation regarding the question of evil. Bonhoeffer explains,
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“the theological question is not a question about the origin of evil but one about the actual
overcoming of evil on the cross.”1095
Limits then, once at the center, have now imploded causing internal and external
consequences with continual ramifications and deep theological questions. In this series
of encounters we see the development of “limit” (grenze) as a key theological category.
Limits, in Eden, were: central, in the middle, internal, life-affirming, grace-providing,
revealed in relationships. In contrast, limits, after the fall, are: continual, everywhere,
external, shame-invoking, guilt-producing, and a source of infinite burden.1096 Moving
forward with a revised limit model of disability, one wonders if it is possible to
acknowledge all the dimensions, pre and post fall, of Bonhoeffer’s exposition of grenze
and grenzenlose.
In Bonhoeffer’s account of the fall, three things became clear: first, God’s original
hope for the relationship between Creator and creature was the possibility of real
encounter [begegnen]; second, creatures continue to choose “other-than-God” encounters
with increasingly drastic consequences; and third, central to God’s vision for creation
was the notion of “limit” at the center of human experience that could help guide possible
encounters in human life. For Bonhoeffer, encounter is the founding hope God has for a
relationship with humanity; but results instead in the theological crisis known as “the
fall.” For Garland-Thomson, encounter is the hinge moment between world and flesh
when disabling occurs through encounter – those encounters might be physically
1095
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impairing of embodiment as world damages flesh, but it also may be a sociological
impairment as world negates certain types of flesh thereby creating a social construction
of disablement. For Creamer, in turn, that encounter is a limit as world limits flesh.
Encounter, then, is a nexus for these disparate thinkers in the field of Theology and
Disability.
Moral Injury is a particular form of disabling encounter as a crisis of morality
occurs between flesh and world that causes a traumatic injury. We turned to Bonhoeffer
to deepen Deborah Creamer’s notions of limits and the complex theological anthropology
in the face of those limits, and yet, we are reminded by the literature of trauma that
Bonhoeffer still does not go deep enough. At this point, it will be helpful to call to mind
the framework of scholarship in the field of trauma mentioned briefly in chapter two.
The language and scholarship of trauma necessitates taking into account “encounters”
that are shattering,1097 shaming1098 and silencing.1099 As we develop in the next chapter “a
crucial limit model of disability” we will take into account the explosive potential when
flesh encounters world in traumatic ways that silence, shame and shatter. In developing
that new model, what must be taken into account is not just the cumulative effects of
fallen “encounters” in this world and their effect on flesh, but also the devastating
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potential of traumatic encounters that create “shattered knowledge.”1100 Jonathan Shay
explains, “Severe trauma explodes the cohesion of consciousness.”1101 What can be left in
their wake is “the ruins of character.”1102 A revised limit model must take into account
Bonhoeffer’s view of the critical effect of all the world’s encounters with moments other
than God and then ask questions of the moral emotions encountered in the face of trauma
and the moral demands required. For now, we turn to Bonhoeffer’s account of God’s
response to the fall as we explore his doctrine of redemption as presented in Creation and
Fall.

5.2.5 TRANSFORMATION: Creation Upheld through Preservation in Christ
After the fall, Bonhoeffer recognizes through the scriptural account in Genesis
that a new and redemptive action must take place to preserve and uphold the fallen world.
As Creation and Fall continues its exegesis of Genesis, the last chapters describe this
redemptive work as “preservation” in Christ.

We have been following Rosemarie

Garland-Thomson’s schema to highlight Bonhoeffer’s doctrines of creation (world and
flesh), sin (encounter) and now, redemption. In this next step, I must be clear that the use
of Garland-Thomson’s language is a stretch. While she speaks of “transformation,”
Bonhoeffer instead speaks of “preservation.” Once we have unpacked in this section
Bonhoeffer’s concept and construct of “preservation in Christ,” we will note implications
of the difference between the two. For now, the disparate language is held together by
the shared theological conviction that in the midst of human finitude God acts. This
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section

will

outline

Bonhoeffer’s

view

on

“the

orders

of

preservation”

[Erhaltungsordnungen] and show how it differs from the more traditional account in his
day of “the orders of creation” [Schöpfungsordnungen]. We will examine Bonhoeffer’s
critique of those orders and his constructive presentation of redemption through
preservation. In addition, we will make clear theological nuances Bonhoeffer draws on
to achieve his insight. From there, we will journey beyond Creation and Fall to see how
Bonhoeffer’s new concept of preservation becomes the theological basis for his Ethics
and the structure he begins to lay out in his ethics for “the mandates of creation.”
The previous section introduced the argument that for Bonhoeffer, limits are
polyvalent: limits are at the center (not the edge) of human life, limits are a unique way
God provides grace, limits are intimately connected to our relationships, limits cause us
to be ‘second gods’, limits invoke wrath, and limits can provoke shame as our human and
divine limitations are acknowledged.1103 Humanity experiences those limits over and over
again within the created universe. Limits function paradoxically in a twofold manner:
first, as the response of humanity to the withdrawn creator, and second, as the creator’s
response to humanity as a reminder of their creaturehood. As a revised limit model
begins to take shape, we see how crucial “limits” are for Bonhoeffer’s anthropological,
Christological and soteriological convictions.

The orders of preservation, a unique

theological response to an issue of Bonhoeffer’s day, are built on those very limits. For
Bonhoeffer, the day that humanity begins to live without God ‘at the center’ becomes a
place where moral injury is possible.
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resources, apart from God and without limits.1104 Because of that predicament, protection
is needed and since God does care for humanity, despite their shortcomings, the creator
God offers preservation.1105
In response to this linked chain of “other-than-God” encounters culminating in the
fall examined in the previous section, Bonhoeffer makes a remarkable claim regarding
“God’s New Action”1106 in the world. A transformation, of sorts, is possible within this
schema.

Bonhoeffer makes that clear with these words: “The creator is now the

preserver; the created world is now the fallen but preserved world.”1107 This gracious and
generous response to humanity is a distinctive trait of God alone who “made them
cloaks”1108 as an act of preservation rather than retribution. Once their eyes have been
opened to good and evil, to the inherent nakedness of their own being and of the world
around them, God will not leave them in that vulnerability but clothes them, cloaks them,
robes them with garments of restraint.1109

This is good news, as night comes and

humankind remains in the twilight. God’s new action, with this clothing, will be to,
“preserve humankind in its fallen world, in its fallen orders, for death – for the
resurrection, for the new creation, for Christ.”1110 Until then, humanity will remain in the
twilight of tob and ra, but God will uphold and preserve humankind in just this place.
The terminology of “cloak” is particularly prescient given Jonathan Shay’s account of
1104
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themis, Homer’s language for “what is right.”1111 Themis is, according to Shay, “the
cloak of safety”1112 we wear in our day-to-day social morality operating within a
framework of what is collectively known to be moral and right. Bonhoeffer’s choice of
words is comforting given Shay’s implication that combat trauma removes that cloak of
safety leaving the soldier vulnerable in the world.
To understand this act of “transformation” through preservation several steps are
needed.

To comprehend the new theological language Bonhoeffer is using regarding

“the orders of preservation” it is necessary to describe the prevailing theology of his day
regarding “the orders of creation” and the context within which those orders became
perverted. Then, it will be possible to better understand the framework Bonhoeffer’s
presents deeming “the orders of preservation” as an intentional alternative with notable
political and moral implications. Crucial at this juncture will be understanding
Bonhoeffer’s theological context regarding the orders and the ways in which his view of
“the orders of preservation” makes particular commitments regarding natural law.
Finally, in this section, it will be important to consider the relationship between
Bonhoeffer’s orders of preservation and “the mandates of creation” a phrase Bonhoeffer
uses in his later work to describe requirements of the ethical life.
In the decades immediately preceding Bonhoeffer’s “Creation and Fall” lectures
during the winter of 1933, German Christians relied heavily on a phrase “the orders of
creation,”1113 (Schöpfungsordnungen) to undergird concepts of Volk and “blood and soil”
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that were ultimately used to legitimize the German National Socialist Movement.1114
Prior to this co-opting of Lutheran theology, Martin Luther developed the orders of
creation to account for human relationships in the home, the church and the state after the
fall. For Luther, the orders of creation are the common structures of existence created by
God through which humans can relate to each other and serve one another. However, the
faithful see within the orders the divine command of God.1115 The language of “orders”
describes the household, the government and the church.1116 Luther explains,
Thus Psalm 127:1 says that there are only two temporal governments on earth,
that of the city and that of the home. “Unless the Lord builds the House: unless
the Lord watches over the city.” The first government is that of the home, from
which the people come; the second is that of the city, meaning the country, the
people, princes and lords, which we call the secular government. These
embrace everything – children, property, money, animals, etc. The home must
produce, whereas the city must guard, protect and defend. Then follows the
third, God’s own home and city, that is, the church, which must obtain people
from the home and protection and defense from the city. These are the three
hierarchies ordained by God, and we need no more indeed, we have enough and
more than enough to do in living aright and resisting the devil in these three.1117
In Luther’s own exegesis of Genesis in 1535, he outlines these orders of creation. The
first order is that of the human being embraced by God and called to the ecclesial order of
the church. The second is the order of the household, where marriage is a blessing, and,
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work a necessity. The third order, necessary because of the fall, is the order of the state
created by God to maintain civility.1118
Through these structures of creation, as Luther explains them, God orders human
life and provides a law all humanity may perceive and abide by through natural
sensibilities. Ethicist Richard Higginson explains the problem that can be raised in
conceptions of “the orders of creation”: “The notion of certain God-given ‘orders’ or
areas of life, meanwhile, inculcated a rather static, compartmentalized view of existence,
one which allowed little scope for a critical assessment of the existing state of affairs.”1119
While this may be a risk, it is not inevitability. For the purposes of this dissertation,
understanding the attempt to describe different social contexts and one’s agency, or lack
of agency, within those contexts will be helpful as we move toward a revised limit model.
An example of the use of “orders of creation” in Nazi Germany can be found in
the “Guiding Principles” of the German Christian Faith Movement1120 published in June
of 1932. This document presents the orders of creation described in this manner:
We see in race, folk, and nation, orders of existence granted and entrusted to us
by God. God's law for us is that we look to the preservation of these orders.
Consequently miscegenation is to be opposed. For a long time German Foreign
Missions, on the basis of its experience, has been calling to the German people:
"Keep your race pure;' and tells us that faith in Christ does not destroy one's race
but deepens and sanctifies it.1121
Bonhoeffer challenged this understanding of creation directly in a paper he presented at
the Youth Peace Conference in Czechoslovakia on July 26, 1932 entitled “Towards a
Theological Foundation of the World Alliance [for Promoting International Friendship
1118
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through the Churches].”1122

He argued that no consistent theology existed for the

growing ecumenical movement seeking to stand in opposition to a growing synchronicity
between church and state.1123 He argues that the orders of creation cannot serve as a
resource because the church misuses them.1124 He notes the problem once again of trying
to sort out the fallen from the good in the orders of creation,
Because certain orders are evident in creation, one should not rebel against
them, but simply accept them….Now there is a special danger in this argument;
and because it is the one most used at the moment, it must be given special
attention. The danger of the argument lies in the fact that just about everything
can be defended by it. One need only hold out something to be God–willed and
God–created for it to be vindicated for ever, the division of (man) into nations,
national struggles, war, class struggle, the exploitation of the weak by the strong,
the cutthroat competition of economics….But the mistake lies in the fact that
…creation and sin are so bound up together that no human eye can any longer
separate the one from the other, that each human order is an order of the fallen
world and not an order of creation.1125
Worthy of note here is the problem Bonhoeffer names that addresses one of the
weaknesses in Creamer’s limit model of disability: “Creation and sin are so bound up
together that no human eye can any longer separate the one from the other.”
As the address continues to unfold, Bonhoeffer introduces the concept that will
replace “the orders of creation” in his theological thinking. He offers instead, “the orders
of preservation” (Erhaltungsordnungen) as the third and final command to justify and
direct the church in the world after the fall. He writes,
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All the orders of the world only exist in that they are directed toward Christ,
they all stand under the preservation of God as long as they are still open for
Christ, they are orders of preservation, not orders of creation.1126
While Protestant theologians used “the orders of creation” to describe the structure of
reality within the divine universe differentiating from Catholic theologians who upheld
natural law as a fundamental structuring of reality, Bonhoeffer was angered by the
“uncritical” acceptance of “the orders of creation.”1127 The 1932 lecture prompted by
ecumenical necessity paved the way for the exegetical work Bonhoeffer engaged in the
winter of 1933 on the book of Genesis as he provided theological argumentation for “the
orders of preservation” as preferential to the preexisting “orders of creation.” According
to Jordan Ballor, Karl Barth rejected both the orders of creation and the orders of
preservation. Emil Brunner affirmed both. Bonhoeffer, in response, rejected the orders of
creation and yet affirmed the orders of preservation. 1128 This distinction is important to
note within the Protestant tradition wherein Barth’s approach is often heralded.
Following Barth’s rejection of both orders, one would come to the conclusion that God
cannot reveal Godself through either creation or anything preserved within the creation.
For Barth, God’s revelation would only occur through an infusion of that revelation into
the natural world.

Protestant affirmation of this approach is so thorough that

Bonhoeffer’s work is often interpreted in the same vein as Barth’s in an assumed
rejecting of both.

Bonhoeffer however, is a middle ground between Catholic and

Protestant thought.
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Several challenges emerge for Bonhoeffer in this reenvisioning of what had been a
central theological notion within Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran tradition and the broader
Protestant witness. James Burtness describes the task Bonhoeffer must tackle:
The problem is how to recast and transform the distorted and misused doctrine
of the orders of creation, taking into account sin and grace, the fact that the
creation is fallen, and that Jesus Christ is now present. The task is to restructure
this notion so that it is dynamic rather than static, redemptive rather than
repressive, oriented to the future rather than to the past.1129
Bonhoeffer’s prelude to full development of his thoughts on the orders occurred during
those talks for peace at the Youth Peace Conference in July of 1932. The orders of
preservation emerged from a question that had distinct implications for the work of
theology in practical ministry: “How can the Gospel and how can the commandment of
the church be preached with authority, i.e. in quite concrete form?”1130 While he answers
his rhetorical question only briefly at this point with the orders of preservation, he
develops the concept more fully toward the end of Creation and Fall:
The Creator is now the preserver; the created world is now the fallen but
preserved world. In the world between curse and promise, between tob and ra,
good and evil, God deals with humankind in a distinctive way. “He made them
cloaks,” says the Bible. That means that God accepts human beings for what
they are…1131
Two points are worthy of note regarding Bonhoeffer’s development of “the orders of
preservation.” First, they are God’s ongoing work to uphold and preserve what is good
within a creation that is fallen and reality within that creation is a difficult complexity
within which to function. No outside revelation is necessary, instead, the possibility of
preservation is present within Christ.

Second, in a move differing from traditional
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Catholic theologies of natural law, the orders of preservation acknowledge the fact that
the original order in creation no longer exists. What can be identified after the fall is
what has been preserved toward Christ.1132 God’s work now will be to preserve now that
creation is complete.1133 While humanity lost its center at the fall, Christ becomes the
new center for beginning, living and ending all of human life. Bonhoeffer’s theology on
the nature of Christ is so radical that Christ “exists” only in relationship.
For a fallen creation, where brokenness reigns over all relations; here is the
possibility not just for a new creation but also for a new relationship. There is a radical
social aspect to the Christology presented by Bonhoeffer. He writes, “Christ can never be
thought of as being for himself, but only in relation to me.”1134 For the humanity who
has only known the duality of tob and ra, in Christ a new possibility for unity is revealed.
Life is preserved in Christ, and in response to that preservation, the church functioning
within a fallen world witnesses to the preservation of Christ. The transformation that
occurs is God’s new action, not in retribution to the fall, but working in preservation in
spite of the fall. Bonhoeffer makes clear: “God’s way of acting to preserve the world is
to affirm the sinful world and to show it is limits by means of order.”1135 That order is
not “orders of creation” but God’s new action, “the order of preservation.” Bonhoeffer
makes a strategic theological shift regarding the limit that stands at the center of human
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existence. While at first two trees marked the center, the cross of Christ1136 replaces that
center so human life, ideally, is oriented toward that new center.
“Where does he stand? He stands pro me. He stands there in my place (Stelle),
where I should stand, but cannot. He stands on the boundary (Grenze) of my
existence, yet for me. That brings out clearly that ‘I’ am separated from my ‘I’,
which I should be, by a boundary that I am unable to cross. The boundary lies
between me and me, the old and the new ‘I’. It is in the encounter with this
boundary that I shall be judged. At this place stands Christ, between me and me,
the old and new existence. Thus Christ is at one and the same time, my
boundary and my rediscovered center. He is the center, between ‘I’ and ‘I’, and
between ‘I’ and God”1137
We remember here in Creation and Fall, how Christ the mediator [mittler] reclaims the
center [mitte]1138 in a pinnacle moment of transformation. Christ is both the new center
as well as the ultimate limit.
Bonhoeffer adds another dimension in later work that both complements and
complicates his concept of “the orders of preservation.” Bonhoeffer utilizes the term
“mandates of creation” to describe the way Christ relates to the world through concrete
structures connecting to what has been preserved of the good. Now that Christ is the
center of existence, one of the ways human life within the world is drawn into
relationship with Christ is through the mandates through whom, “the relation of the world
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to Christ becomes concrete.”1139 The mandates are labor, marriage, government and the
church.1140 These are the spheres in which the preservation of the good will point toward
specific purposes in the world drawing on their strength in Christ. To add “for the sake
of Christ” would be a helpful descriptive for each of the mandates. Humanity labors for
the sake of Christ, marries for the sake of Christ, governs for the sake of Christ and is the
church for the sake of Christ. Human vocation in these areas seeks to work alongside the
“Creator and Preserver of life” by seeking preservation over destruction.
The mandates become, therefore, a way of giving a spirited structuring to human
life together after the fall. The mandates are not static or unchanging, as the orders of
creation were perceived to be within the dominant Lutheran theology and the greater
German context. Instead, the mandates are according to Larry Rasmussen “dynamic
historical forms, structures of time and place that give form to ongoing responsibility and
act as the media of moral formation itself.”1141 Bonhoeffer’s critique of the unchanging
and static “orders of creation” was their lack of reference to greater relationships. The
mandates, instead, structure all of reality toward relationship with one another. When
those arenas of work and government, family and culture fail to nourish life beyond one’s
self for the other, they are no longer God’s mandates but human endeavors.1142 God’s
new action within a fallen creation offers transformation not just as humans are
transformed by Christ with the orders of preservation, but humanity is transformed
toward a new way of living, moving and having meaningful being within the world as
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they work within the mandates of creation. For our purposes, the mandates of creation
are helpful for recognizing different levels of functionality, morality and disability across
social contexts where each presents its own limitations at varying points within its
structure.
Bonhoeffer’s account of creation suggests that the limit at the center of existence
prior to the fall is an essential aspect of being finite human beings. Both “the orders of
preservation” and “the mandates of creation” are Bonhoeffer’s attempt to improve
functioning within those broken relationships amid the real and concrete limits of the
world after the fall. In light of the limit model of disability, these notions of Bonhoeffer
offer insight into how finite creatures might be cloaked with preservation in order to
function and flourish across fluid and varied contexts.

5.3

Themes in Bonhoeffer
Having completed a thorough review of Bonhoeffer’s exegesis of Creation and

Fall by analyzing his lectures and paying attention to the development of his doctrines of
creation, sin and redemption, it is now helpful to explore themes in this work related to
bodily life, disability and morality and their relationship to vulnerable finite beings in the
concrete and complex reality of a broken world. In both the scholarship on moral injury
and the scholarship in disability, we noted weaknesses in the areas of medicalization,
social analysis and the idea of limits and their effects. And we made clear that perhaps
the most helpful lens through which to draw together moral injury and disability is not by
way of definition or analytical framework, but through a deepened theological
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anthropology of human finitude in the face of limits. Three themes in Bonhoeffer’s
development of Creation and Fall speak to these issues: his notion of bodily life, his idea
of morality, and the ways he speaks to issues of disability even prior to its
conceptualization as a locus of scholarly analysis. In this section we will explore these
issues and the implications they have for comprehending finitude and constructing in the
next chapter a revised limit model of disability.

5.3.2 Bodily Life and Bonhoeffer
The overarching whole of Bonhoeffer’s corpus from his doctoral dissertation
Sanctorum Communio to his collected Ethics may be read through the crux of bodily
life.1143 In the face of Nazi socialism’s idolization of “ideal” bodies and rejection of
“less-than-ideal” bodies, Bonhoeffer bore witness to a complex view of bodily life for
individuals and communities as complex in their “interdependent vulnerability.”1144 His
view of bodily life critiqued mechanization and its utilitarian emphases as well as
critiqued societal norms. “Sanctorum Communio,” Bonhoeffer’s doctoral thesis, argues
for a Christian social philosophy to replace the “idealist philosophy of immanent
Geist.”1145 Doing so, required a complex conceptualization of bodily life as a person
whose primal state is sin can only be saved through the revelation of the incarnate one
who calls each broken body into the greater social body of the body of Christ. This body
of Christ, for Bonhoeffer, is not idealized, abstracted or removed. Instead, this body of
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Christ is radically present and realized fully in human history as the church.1146 While
“Sanctorum Communio” is often read as an ecclesiological defense, recent scholarship
encourages Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology to be seen within the greater context of bodily life,
and God’s relationship to individuals through the incarnate one, as a more comprehensive
“theology of sociality.”1147 Just as human life can not be idealized, again a radical
concept in Bonhoeffer’s context, neither can the greater body of the church be idealized:
“Genuine love for the church will bear and love its impurity and imperfections too; for it
is in fact this empirical church in whose womb grows God’s sacred treasure.”1148 This
body, the church, exists and is realized now within human history not in an idealized
projection in the future, nor in a purified presumption in the present.1149
After the completion of Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer needed to produce his
Habilitationsschrift, a post-doctorate qualification that ensured his ability to teach in
Germany at the University level. His work, “Act and Being” (Akt und Sein), is the most
complex, debated, least understood and least debated of all Bonhoeffer’s works. Scholars
debate whether the work is concerned with: theological epistemology, revelation,
ontology, methodology, philosophy, or ecclesiology.1150 Amid this debate, Clifford Green
argues that “Act and Being” is ultimately concerned with the body as it develops a
theological anthropology concerned with “the isolated, self-imprisoned I, violating social
relationships in its knowing and its intellectual power.”1151 Inherent to this thesis, is for
Bonhoeffer, a greater soteriological problem that he does not solve in his analysis, but
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will continue to devote his intellectual and practical pursuits to as he continues his
scholarship and ministry.1152 The development of this scholarship, both in the answers he
presents and the questions still to be pursued, unfolds against the growing tyranny over
bodies within the Nationalist Socialist party and their ideations of “healthy bodies” and
“healthy societies.”1153
It is at this juncture when Bonhoeffer moves from the “phraseological to the
real”1154 with his Genesis lectures that pursue both a deepened, and less abstract,
theological anthropology and an initial venture into the soteriological question at the
heart of bodily life. To be clear, “Creation and Fall” as a theological exposition of
scripture has at its heart profound implications for humanity and sociality, all situated
within this unfolding paradigm of bodily life. While the winter lectures at the University
of Berlin were on “Creation and Fall,” Bonhoeffer moved to the subject of Christology in
the summer of 1933. Evident in these lectures with Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the body is
the temptation to become abstracted from the body even with the very theological
doctrine that insists on the importance of the body. “The incarnation” can become too
phraseological. Instead, at the heart of Christianity is the real, the incarnate one, the
incarnate one not being an abstraction but a full-bodied presence. Bonhoeffer explains,
“If we speak of God, we may not say of him that he is the representative of an idea of
God, which possesses the characteristics of omniscience and omnipotence; rather we
must speak of his weakness, his manger, his cross. This man is no abstract God. Strictly
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speaking we should not talk of the incarnation, but of the incarnate one.”1155 Seeing this
emphasis in the summer, after the winter lectures on Genesis, helps to make clear
Bonhoeffer’s Christological reading of the Old Testament text of Genesis.
Bodies, then, are at the center of Bonhoeffer’s theology and ethics. Care for
bodies and justice amid our “interdependent vulnerability”1156 is what necessitates the
conversations at play in Bonhoeffer’s “Ethics.” Bonhoeffer witnessed two extremes
within bodily life in his context: the notion of a nihilistic vitalism1157 and the possibility
of an absolutized mechanization.1158 Together, “Vitalism and mechanization…equally
express a perhaps unconscious despair about natural life, an enmity to life, a weariness of
life, an incapacity for life.”1159 Between these extremes Bonhoeffer situated “natural
life.”1160 Life is not a means to an end, but the end itself, as realized in Christ’s life and
all its “createdness.”1161 All ethical acts emerge not from the extremes of vitalism and
mechanization, but instead from the very created-ness of Jesus Christ and his call to care
and justice for all bodies with an eye toward preservation.
Just as bodies inform Bonhoeffer’s ethics, so do they likewise inform
Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology as presented in Life Together and Discipleship. Life Together
invites radical praise for the other, another bodily life, even when life together is difficult
or even impossible. Bonhoeffer makes clear, “A human being is created as a body; the
1155
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Son of God appeared on earth in the body and was raised in the body. In the sacrament
the believer receives the Lord Christ in the body, and the resurrection of the dead will
bring about the perfected community of God’s spiritual-physical creatures. Therefore the
believer praises the Creator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer, God the Father, Son and
Holy Spirit, for the bodily presence of the other Christian.”1162 The complex gathering of
these “other Christians” becomes the church and is an absolute necessity in light of the
incarnate, crucified and risen body of Christ. The risen body of Christ, after death, needs
then a particular body in which to dwell. Thus, the church becomes the community of
believers [Nachfolgeigemeinde] who are now his body. Bonhoeffer explains, “It is thus
in the body of Christ that the disciples have community. They live and suffer in bodily
community with Jesus. By being in community with the body of Jesus they are placed
under the burden of the cross.”1163 The cross then, makes clear, this community of
disciples is not an idealized body – but a suffering, broken, crucified body. This body,
both in its individual members and collective state, is a disabled body.
Bonhoeffer’s overarching theology is one intimately concerned with bodily life,
and even more so, it should be noted for the purposes of this dissertation that bodily life
for Bonhoeffer – whether Christ, or the individual Christian, or the collective church – is
fundamentally disabled. In an August 1933 letter to his grandmother, Julie Bonhoeffer,
written following Bonhoeffer’s winter lectures on “Creation and Fall” and summer
lectures on “Christology”, he speaks in the language of conversion having experienced
the bodily suffering of epileptics at the Bethel clinics in the Westphalia region. He
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writes, “It is said of the Buddha that he was converted by a meeting with a man who was
gravely ill. It is sheer madness to believe, as is done today, that the sick can and ought to
be legally eliminated. It is virtually the same as building a tower of Babel, and is bound
to bring its own revenge.”1164 For Bonhoeffer, this kind of conversion in the face of
bodily suffering, secured his belief not in any gnostic escape, but instead in the
radicalness of the gospel realized in human form and human weakness. Bodily life
undergoes transformation as “flesh encounters world” as disabilityson attests, but that
does not disable life for Bonhoeffer.1165 Instead, new ways of considering responsibility
and morality unfold.

5.3.3

Morality and Bonhoeffer
The brief excursus above on Bonhoeffer’s overarching theme of “the body”

within his theology is important for locating Bonhoeffer within the field of disability
studies. Even prior to the development of the field, we see in his work the struggle to
move beyond the mechanization or ideation of the body that is the weakness of “the
medical model” of disability. And, we see in his work the struggle over and against
social conceptualizations of the body, as “the social model of disability” aspires to do.
But as his theological anthropology reveals, there is the sense of human limit before God,
self and neighbor that tugs at his theological quest. Herein, we see the precursor of “the
limit model” of disability. While these confluences are helpful for the purposes of this
1164
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dissertation, the focus on body could all too easily emphasize the “injury” of Moral
Injury at the expense of considering “morality” as an equal part of the equation. In
developing our revised limit model of disability, it is beneficial briefly to consider
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of morality as a dimension of his theological anthropology.
For Bonhoeffer, morality is defined in relation to three concrete areas: the reality
of human life, responsibility of the individual in the face of that reality, and the
restructuring of human life amid our sinful structures for the purposes of a future
generation. Bonhoeffer believed “the moral ground”1166 of his age was obliterated. In
the face of that destruction, morality and its human implications is radically redefined.
Because of this, morality becomes for Bonhoeffer what Wannenwetsch deems a “vexed”
moral notion.1167 Responsibility, in the face of the concrete and complex real, becomes
the new moral category.
Wannewetsch sets forth a helpful schema drawing Bonhoeffer into conversation
with traditional moral categories to illumine “responsibility” as the new moral category
for Bonhoeffer. The question asked by the consequentialist is “What shall I do?” The
question asked by the deontological agent is “What ought I do?” The question asked by
Niebuhr’s “responsible self” is “What is going on?”

The problem with Niebuhr’s

question is that it invites self-justification rather than the justification of God.
Bonhoeffer’s critique poses then a different question in response to God and neighbor, “Is
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this helpful?” His question probes whether an action is responsible in light of the very
‘real’ situation at hand.1168
Bonhoeffer understood the hazy disparity of tob and ra of life in the real world.
Because of this Bonhoeffer encouraged conformation toward the form of Christ.
Bonhoeffer’s relational view of Christ invites not an internal process of self-reflection,
but instead an external assessment of one’s relationships and connections. Joshua Kaiser
explains, “Discernment is not an isolated spiritual activity, divorced from the reality of
the natural world, but as a human activity fully embedded in the world”1169 The shift
Bonhoeffer makes is that Christians act finally not from a responsible self, but from a
discerned response to neighbor in the real and complex reality of the world. We then are
responsible to each other, in Christ, not to our own moral and responsible self.1170 The
language Bonhoeffer uses to describe this transition attests to a shattering of past
understanding:
The boundary of vocation has been broken open not only vertically, that is,
through Christ, but also horizontally, with regard to the extent of
responsibility…Vocation is responsibility, and responsibility is the whole
response of the whole person to reality as a whole.1171
In this chapter from his Ethics Bonhoeffer returns to the experience of “encounter.” In
this moment of responsibility to which a person is called, “The call of Jesus Christ is the
call to belong to Christ completely; it is Christ’s address and claim at the place at which
this call encounters me.”1172
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Bonhoeffer’s views on reality and responsibility then shape the hope he has for
restructuring the broken moral world.1173 The way reality and responsibility are reshaped
is is ultimately sacramental. The static of real life becomes sacramental when we tune
into Christ in the real world filled with all sorts of surprising abilities and disabilities for
all people. Bonhoeffer calls this reality “the sacrament of [the ethical] command.”1174
His words here make the reader pause: Reality is the sacrament of the ethical. What
Bonhoeffer asks us to consider is this. What is broken open as sacrament is the real. The
real is the lived lives – the broken–open, not perfect, tob/ra, abled/disabled – realities of
living human beings. Sacrament then is not a sacred other: sacrament is this life, this
world, this broken reality.

Bonhoeffer inadvertently anticipates Eiesland in this

incredible tenet.1175 God’s reality is most realized in the midst of this breaking–apart life.
Bonhoeffer might even use that word ‘twilight’ here to offer that ‘twilight’ is the
sacrament of the ethical. The ethical, the command to love God and neighbor, is drawn
into this ‘breaking–apart’ life and met with the sacramental love of a God who makes
Godself known in this tob/ra world. It is here that reality becomes the sacrament of the
ethical and that the ultimate restructuring of reality begins.
Bonhoeffer’s move from “orders of creation” to “orders of preservation” names a
foundation for ethics. To start an ethical conversation from the Doctrine of Creation is
impossible because “creation and sin are so bound up together that no human eye can any
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longer separate the one from the other.”1176 A starting point of creation would lead to the
same misrepresentation drawn by other sectors of Protestant theology who used the
orders of creation to rationalize division, war and segregation. For Bonhoeffer, the
starting point of ethics is preservation. What has been preserved, that is good and of God
and pointed to Christ, within this fallen world? Discussions from the starting point of
creation, then, leave the theologian with static. Turning to preservation instead, is not
only the foundation for ethical discourse, but even more so, reality becomes the
sacrament of ethics.
This view is refreshing in that reality is filled with static. Reality is broken. But
so too are the sacraments. Ethics, with its starting place in Christ knows the brokenness
of “this cross, this blood, this broken body”.1177 What is preserved within reality may
appear broken, but this is the brokenness of and for and toward the one who by breaking
his body breaks open his love for the world. With this high view, reality as sacrament of
the ethical may sound disconcerting and perhaps even blasphemous. But in the area of
theology and disability, reality is real situations where expectations have fallen short.
The ethical is a call to live into a high calling response to what in the past could have
been construed as only an unreal possibility. Sacrament then, is the way that God breaks
through, blessing the situation. James Burtness offers this explanation,
It seems incongruous to place the words “sacrament” and “ethical” together.
“Sacrament” refers to a purely gracious act of God. “Ethical” refers to a purely
human act. “Sacrament of the ethical” is a surprising, even a strange, phrase.1178
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Ethics is intimately connected to the reality of creation as well as to what has been
preserved within that creation. The gracious acts of God are perceived not only in the
bread and wine, but also in human acts broken open as they model the forgiveness of
Christ, preserving that salvific act of his through their own vocation. The ethicist then
works toward a specific purpose. Bonhoeffer states this very specifically, “In the sphere
of Christian ethics it is not what ought to be that effects what is, but what is that effects
what ought to be.”1179 What is is Christ. Human perception of morality then changes
from “ought” to “is” reframing the picture by naming the good that already exists and
inviting society to see that goodness preserved in Christ and to be restructured to that end.

5.3.4 Disability and Bonhoeffer
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson asserts: “Disability is the transformation of the flesh
as it encounters world,” and certainly what we deem Bonhoeffer’s “Gospel of Genesis”
reveals the possibility of a certain form of disability in the face of the fall. To be clear,
the nuance here is not a link between original sin and disability; but instead, a certain
kind of disabling that emerges in response to flesh encountering world and the limits
those “other-than-God” encounters provoke. When we outlined possibilities for the
relationship between moral injury and disability in chapter three, we considered the effect
of transmitting the definition from one field to the other, we outlined possibilities for
utilizing different frameworks through which to perceive the other, and then we reflected
on the option of looking at disability and moral injury through the lens of finitude.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Deborah Creamer and Dietrich Bonhoeffer each in their
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own way add to the configuration of finitude as an important aspect of our theological
anthropology for considering disability, moral injury and the limits inherent within them
that raise questions of theological importance. In this section we will briefly explore the
context of Bonhoeffer’s life that may have shaped his understanding of disability and we
will review the content of Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology as shaped by a
comprehension of finitude.
Bernd Wannenwetsch appears to be the first theologian to bring Bonhoeffer into
the discourse of theology and ‘disability’.1180 In his essay, “’My Strength is Made Perfect
in Weakness’: Bonhoeffer and the War over Disabled Life” 1181, he explores the language
of strength and weakness to understand Bonhoeffer’s claims on the disabled life. Even
more so, he situates Bonhoeffer’s understanding of disability through the legacy of his
father and the community at Bethel.

Wannenwetsch argues that the dignity of the

disabled is a key them to all of Bonhoeffer’s theology wherein all life is created,
preserved and redeemed by God.

Wannewetsch uses a comparison of Bethel, a

community supporting disabled life, versus Buchenwald, a concentration camp that
disposes of the disabled. Bonhoeffer is realistic about Bethel that still is a ghetto of sorts
as it creates a separate place for the disabled. However, Bonhoeffer is a place of
ecclesiological community wherein all life is respected. A key question Bonhoeffer asks
revolves around the theme, “What is the meaning of weakness in the world?”1182 In the
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face of weakness, people must find the courage to resist the urge to distance themselves
from others because of a deep theological conviction that:
God is weak and powerless in the world, and that is exactly the way, the only
way in which he can be with us and help us. Matthew 8:17 makes it crystal clear
that it is not by his omnipotence that Christ helps us, but by his weakness and
his suffering...only a suffering God can help.1183
Bonhoeffer critiques what might look like the virtue of benevolence deeming it an act of
condescension rather than true neighborly love that is humble.1184 Our political vocation
in this world is not to “dully look on”1185 but to be a vicarious representative of Jesus the
Christ who is the “origin, essence and goal of life”1186 and thereby restructures reality
through the ongoing work of preservation.
When we read Bonhoeffer, as Wannenwetsch has, critically and even viscerally,
we begin to sense the concreteness and readiness of Bonhoeffer’s theology. This is not
abstract, but realized and readied for the here and now. Michael Mawson attributes this
sensibility to Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology that is grounded in a relational
anthropology of creatureliness rather than a doctrine regarding the persons of the
Trinity.1187 Mawson critiques scholars who base their relational personhood solely on
Trinitarian conceptions of personhood in community (such as Young and Reinders)
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because it disavows the “concrete and embodied”1188 nature of human being. Bonhoeffer
does not ground his relational anthropology within a Trinitarian framework and instead
presents a view of human being that encounters finitude through “the others as a bodily
limit.”1189 For Mawson, this insight allows relationship with those of varying abilities
within the concrete limits of the human experience rather than awaiting ecstatic
transformation or the ideal community of the Trinity.1190 Finitude, then, is essential to
divine encounter not disposable as other opportunities are anticipated.

5.4

Implications and Next Steps
In our aim to develop a “revised limit model of disability” that pays attention to

human finitude as a construct of our theological anthropology, we have drawn Dietrich
Bonhoeffer alongside Deborah Creamer to offer deepened accounts of creation,
theological anthropology, sin and redemption to develop her model. Creamer, in her
account, moves from the “what happens” (we encounter limits) to the “why questions”
those encounters provoke. For Creamer, particular limiting contexts evoke questions of
faith. Bonhoeffer, one might argue, functions in reverse by moving from the “why
questions” of creation he explores through Creation and Fall to the “what happens” when
limits are experienced. Key aspects of “what happens” for Bonhoeffer are the orders of
preservation, through which we are cloaked with new garments and upheld in Christ, the
mandates of creation through which we function anew. While Bonhoeffer offers a
constructive lens through which to further Creamer’s model, particularly in exploring the
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depth of angst, despair and shame experienced within those limiting encounters, still he
does not go far enough.
Bonhoeffer’s account adds depth to the lines focused upon in this chapter from
The Veterans’ Creed: When I struggle with my own pain, my veteran teammates will
support me; and I will reach out of the darkness and grasp their helping hands.1191 And
yet for as far as Bonhoeffer’s accounts of creation, sin and redemption resonate with the
depth of struggle, pain, darkness and grasping expressed in this creed; there is one aspect
that goes unnoticed – the silence of shattering trauma, experienced as moral injury, that
remains unexpressed.1192 In order to attend to the disabling potential of finitude in the
face of limits, we will construct a revised limit model in the next chapter that holds at its
center the unexpressed silence and the need for an integrated narrative through which to
move onward.
As we have drawn together Garland-Thomson, Creamer and Bonhoeffer to
provide resources for a deepened account of finitude for the scholarship of moral injury
we have held onto the phrase of Garland-Thomson: Disability is the transformation of the
flesh as it encounters world. At this point in the project, it is helpful to consider how
Creamer might frame her argument for limits in light of that definition. Perhaps, we
could argue, Creamer would suggest: Disability is the limiting of the flesh as it
encounters world.

And, we could argue Bonhoeffer offers a theological nuance:

Redemption is the preservation of the flesh as it has “other-than-God” encounters with
the fallen world. As we return to moral injury in the next chapter to develop a revised
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limit model of disability that will address some of those questions of medicalization,
social grief, and changing limits raised in chapter two, perhaps we can keep this variation
of Garland-Thomson’s definition in mind: Moral injury is the shattering of the moral
world and its traumatic encodement in flesh as flesh encounters world.
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Chapter 6
A Crucial Limit Model of Disability
I will never quit.
I will never give up.
I will never accept defeat.
- The Veterans’ Creed1193
6.1

Constructing a Crucial Limit Model of Disability
Having recognized the need for a revised model of disability, taking into account

human finitude to address needs in the scholarship of moral injury, in this chapter we
construct a crucial limit model of disability. To be clear, a crucial limit model of
disability will hold steadfast to particular contexts, individual moral agents, and the
unique interplay that occurs between the two as limits are encountered and shame ensues.
While Bonhoeffer does not introduce a model of disability, nor does he utilize the term
“crucial” at length, Bonhoeffer concludes his Genesis lecture with these words: “The tree
of life, the cross of Christ, the center of God’s world (Der baum des lebens, das kreuz
Christi, das zentrum von Gottes welt) that is fallen but upheld and preserved – that is
what the end of the story about paradise is for us.”1194 In so doing, it is appropriate for us
to derive from the centrality the cross (kreuz) and the cruciality of limits in Bonhoeffer,
the language of “crucial” for our new model. A crucial limit model of disability, in turn,
begins with an account of human finitude, encountered again and again1195 in complex
social contexts, wherein moral agents experience deep shame (necessitating traumatic
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embodied silence and having globalizing effects on the larger world). Important to this
model is the possibility of real world redemption even when limited horizons of choice
cause morally injurious decisions to be made. The real world redemption is a response
not to traditional notions of “enslavement to sin” and a conception of redemption as
freedom from that enslavement,1196 but instead, an awareness for Bonhoeffer that sin is
less of a “bind” and more a problematic limitlessness that requires new order and
redemptive action.
Throughout this study on moral injury we have aimed to draw moral injury into
the field of disability studies with an eye to “the limit model of disability” developed by
Deborah Creamer.

Our search for a “revised limit model” is intended to deepen,

strengthen and extend her model as a resource for reflecting on moral injury. We have
made use of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s exegetical attention to “limit” in Creation and Fall,
where he allows a distinction between limits that are natural from limits that are sinful.
Bonhoeffer emphasizes the deep sense of shame when a limit is transgressed and the
continual, lifelong burden that life without limits can be. For Bonhoeffer, the story of
Genesis is a lingering exploration of Grenze (limit) and the moral emotions the shame of
transgressed limits generates. The dialogue between Bonhoeffer and Creamer allows us
to develop a “crucial limit model of disability” wherein agency becomes disabled in
diverse and unexpected contexts when “psycho-bio-social-moral-existential”1197 limits
are crossed in a manner that raises deep questions regarding God, self and the humanity
of others.
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In this chapter I will present a “Crucial Limit Model of Disability” and explain its
relevance for moral injury. To do so, it is necessary to engage three critical conversations
before presenting the twelve essential components of the model. First, we will analyze
the etymological roots of “crucial” and explore various definitions and connotations of
the word itself. Second, we will look at the four-fold development of Bonhoeffer’s
notion of “limit” highlighting key points from chapter five and clarifying their import for
the revised model. Third, we will glean insights from the scholarship of disability
presented by Rosemarie Garland Thomson and Deborah Creamer related to human
finitude in the face of limit. Once that groundwork has been established, twelve essential
components of the crucial limit model of disability will be outlined. Finally, after
outlining this model and its relationship to human finitude, social contexts, moral agents
and concrete redemption, we will assess the impact of the model for moral injury,
disability and moral theory. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the strengths
and weaknesses of the model.
The Veterans’ Creed reminds us the commitment each soldier makes: I will never
quit. I will never give up. I will never accept defeat. And yet, the persistence of moral
injury makes clear the tragic consequences when a soldier draws near to the limits of
betrayal, disavowal, and moral implosion. Addressing this societal crisis demands an
account of crucial limits and their disabling potential that wrestles with the complex
realities of human finitude and the problematic limitlessness of sin. For vets who are at
that crucial limit of quitting, giving up and ultimate defeat, the crucial limit model of
disability acknowledges the despair in that reckoning as moral codes implode and
questioning of self and society begins.
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6.2

Etymology of “Crucial”: Definitions and Implications
The etymology of the word “crucial” reveals a fascinating legacy dating back to

the eighteenth century and derived from both the Old Norse kross and the Latin crux
meaning cross-shaped. First, there is a medical dimension to “crucial” with its French
roots conveying an image of the ligaments of the knee that cross each other. These
cruciate ligaments composed of the anterior and posterior cruciate ligaments, run
diagonally in the middle of the knee and create the juncture wherein a knee can move
back and forth allowing a large range of motion because of their unique design.1198 This
definition reminds us both of our intricate embodiment as well as the possibility of joints
and ligaments becoming disabled over time or due to injury. To be clear, the tear of a
cruciate ligament is deemed to carry excruciating pain. Second, there is a social
connotation within the etymology of “crucial” as one might imagine society at a
crossroads, a literal fork in the road, with a signpost to deliberate and choose the course
to follow. Francis Bacon utilized the phrase instantia crucis (a crucial instant) drawing
on the imagery of the fork in the road to describe how within an experiment there might
be a critical moment that gives direction to one hypothesis or another.1199 This intimation
of “crucial” compels us to remember our social setting: the four cardinal points on the
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cross of a compass, constellation of the Southern Cross underneath Centaurus in the sky,
the four winds, the four seasons, the four elements that compose our world. Third, the
definition of the word “crucial” compels the hearer to imagine a crisis, a limit reached,
which commands a decisive action and perhaps, raises existential questions that can be
severe and trying. This definition invites realistic assessment of decision-making: both
the actions that prove helpful, the actions that are sinful, and perhaps even, the actions
that are unavoidable. Fourth, crucial can designate the form of a cross where a horizontal
axis intersects a vertical one. This definition carries both the symbolism of the form of
the cross as well as the metaphorical weight of existential crisis where torture causes
agonizing pain and troubles all who bear witness to the event.
As we examine the implications of the crucial limit model for conceptualizing
disability, these four connotations of the definition ground our model and its implications.
We will see, as we turn now to Bonhoeffer, his recognition of the cross-event as the
critical and decisive moment in human history as the cross becomes the new limit for
humanity. And yet, we will also see how all four definitions and nuances of “crucial” are
implied across his theology.

6.3

Anthropology, Sin and Crucial Limits: Revisiting Bonhoeffer
When faced with looming genocide,1200 Bonhoeffer turned to Genesis for

guidance. In his work Creation and Fall, he wrestled with the concepts of grenze (limit)
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and grezenlose (limitlessness) to develop both a theological anthropology and the
foundation of his view of moral responsibility.

In this section, we will explore

Bonhoeffer’s account of limits in four critical moments in his exegesis of Genesis. These
insights will become critical as we present the importance of his four-fold delineation of
limits for our crucial limit model. Then, we will engage briefly the interplay Bonhoeffer
develops between context and moral agent. Finally, we will consider how limits shape
Bonhoeffer’s doctrines of creation, sin and redemption. The interplay between sin and
anthropology in Bonhoeffer’s work is foundational for articulating the contours and depth
of a crucial limit model of disability. This section will help us to assess Bonhoeffer’s
four-fold conceptualization of “limit” (that is, the theological concept utilized in the
model) and the implication it has for context and agent guided by Bonhoeffer’s
theological doctrines of creation, sin and redemption (that is, the theological foundation
for the model).

6.3.1

Bonhoeffer’s Fourfold Account of Limit in Creation and Fall
Four critical moments in Bonhoeffer’s exegesis are worthy of note here: his

prelapsarian account of limits, his postlapsarian account of limits, his notion of
preservation in the face of limits, and his conception of the cross for human limits. As
examined in chapter five, at the center of Creation, prior to fall, in the series of otherthan-God encounters that ultimately culminated. In this discussion of the fall we saw that

Bonhoeffer (355) – not the ghetto it was intended to be. Bonhoeffer wrote a letter to his Grandmother Julie
explaining the beauty and truth he saw in disabled existence (354). This experience became the basis for
the Bethel Confession that was the founding document of the Confessing Church. Unfortunately,
Bonhoeffer did not agree with the final draft of the document and didn’t sign it.
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“limits” were: central,1201 in the middle not on the margin of life,1202 internal,1203 lifegiving,1204 grace-providing,1205and revealed even more fully in relationships.1206 While
the limit reveals: “life, knowledge, death”1207; there is still goodness and grace amid those
limits. In the face of that limit, Bonhoeffer explains, “What Adam knows is that the
secret of humankind’s limit, of the life of the human being, is in God’s keeping.”1208
Prior to the fall, within the confines of Eden, Bonhoeffer recognizes what I call “the
crucial limit” at the center of human existence.
The second context in which Bonhoeffer developed his particular understanding
of the term “limit” is in the aftermath of the fall. Here, sin breaks into creation and the
“limit” that was at the center of Eden is broken and consequently, “humankind stands in
the middle, with no limit.”1209 The human being is then alone, limitless, and with out
divine resources.1210 Human beings, created originally in the imago dei become instead
sicut deus.1211 The limit that had been grace is usurped.1212 The impact of the lost limit
has a divine repercussion (grace becomes guilt) as well as relational ramifications (love
becomes grudge.) Eve, who was to be grace to Adam as well, is now the human

1201

Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86. See also: 98-99. Bonhoeffer explains: “Limit and life constitute the
inviolable, inaccessible center of paradise around which Adam’s life circles. This center takes on form…”
1202
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86.
1203
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86.
1204
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 87.
1205
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 87.
1206
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 99.
1207
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 83.
1208
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 93.
1209
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115.
1210
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115.
1211
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 116. In a play on words in the German, “Gotze” (which resembles
Grenze) is “False God.” Adam as Sicut Deus is caught between God and a false God in his loss of limit.
See also: 114.
1212
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 118.
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experience of “God’s wrath, God’s hatred, God’s begrudging.”1213 So in contrast to
prelapsarian limits, limits, after the fall, are: continual,1214 everywhere,1215 external,1216
shame-invoking,1217 guilt-producing,1218 and a source of infinite burden.1219 After the
fall, the crucial limit of human existence has been transgressed and the result is twofold:
creation exists in the aftermath of this “fallen-falling world”1220 and creatures live with
the aftershocks of a “continual fall” without limits “dropping into a bottomless abyss.”1221
Life in this world without limits is overwhelmed with shame.1222
The third movement occurs through the redeeming work God begins in Genesis
and continues until the full knowledge of the meaning of the cross is revealed. In the face
of the limitlessness of sin, God’s response, according to Bonhoeffer in his account of
Genesis, is threefold. First, God “makes them cloaks”1223 to address their shame and
nakedness, first and foremost, but even more so to acknowledge that “God affirms them

1213

Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 122. Jonathan Shay provides an account of soldiers in relationship to
their military and political authorities deemed “REMFS” referring to their status in the “rear echelon” even
though they were of higher authority. For the soldiers, the gods’ wrath, hatred and begrudging was
manifested in the “heartless, crooked, shallow, and self indulgent REMFS.” Shay, Achilles in Vietnam,
154-161. It should be noted that Shay points out Homer’s willingness to engage both sides of the gods.
Homer’s portrayal depicts Zeus who has men near to his heart. See: Homer, Iliad, trans. by Robert
Fitzgerald (New York, NY: Anchor-Doubleday, 1974): 20:24ff.
1214
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120. Of note here, is the language of continual fall: “From now on that
world has been robbed of its creatureliness and drops blindly into infinite space, like a meteor that has torn
itself away from the core to which it once belonged. It is of this fallen-falling world that we must now
speak.”
1215
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall,
1216
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 144.
1217
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 117.
1218
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 119.
1219
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120.
1220
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120.
1221
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120.
1222
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 124. Jean Bethke Elshtain offers a fascinating account of the antithesis
of shame that Bonhoeffer recognized in the National Socialist regime. She understood that for Bonhoeffer,
shame preserves human dignity and acknowledges the divided self; while shamelessness disrespects both.
She writes, “One of the reasons Dietrich Bonhoeffer was so repulsed by Nazism was precisely because of
its aberrant shamelessness.” See Elshtain, “Shame and Public Life,” 18.
1223
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. Bonhoeffer envisions here Genesis 3:21.
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in their fallenness.”1224 Second, God’s action continues “to affirm the sinful world and to
show it its limits by means of order”1225 through the orders of preservation.1226 Human
beings are called to work in the fallen creation through the boundaries instituted by the
mandates of creation.1227
The fourth movement consummates at the cross and in the presence of
resurrection life. God remembers the tree of life that once was at the center (mitte) of
human existence and replaces that tree with the cross of Christ who becomes the mediator
(mittler) between humans and God, thereby becoming “the source of life.”1228
Bonhoeffer concludes his lecture on Genesis with this: “The tree of life, the cross of
Christ, the center of God’s world (Der baum des lebens, das kreuz Christi, das zentrum
von Gottes welt) that is fallen but upheld and preserved – that is what the end of the story
about paradise is for us.”1229 For Bonhoeffer, the ultimate traumatic event that occurred
in the crisis of the cross now becomes the center of existence and the redefining narrative
not just for the Bible, but for all time and space.

1224

Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139.
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139.
1226
Bonhoeffer continues use of the language of preservation even in his letters from Prison. For example,
see: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison: The Enlarged Edition (London: SCM, 1971), 3.
Here he writes, “It is not with the beyond that we are concerned, but with this world as created and
preserved, subjected to laws, reconciled and restored.”
1227
Rita Nakashima Brock shared the vision of the sentinel now guarding the garden in Soul Repair.
Bonhoeffer relies on this image as well to describe Adam’s ongoing encounter with the new limit that
assails him again and again from the world as he now exists between the garden and the cross. As Adam
tries to return from those trials to the peace of the garden and the tree of life he violated, he experiences “a
constant attack on the kingdom from which he is shutout, a desperate raging again and again against the
sentinels who keep watch.” Bonhoeffer, Creaton and Fall, 144.
1228
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 165.
1229
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 146. See also: Brian Gregor, “Shame and the Other: Bonhoeffer and
Levinas on Human Dignity and Ethical Responsibility,” Ontology and Ethics, 72-85. Brian Gregor notes
the role of shame, not only of Christ, at work in preserving us. He writes, Bonhoeffer’s “Christological
ontology allows us to understand the burden of divided being and the role of shame in preserving us, but
also our ultimate source of hope for the healing of being in Christ,” 85.
1225
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Bonhoeffer’s exposition of Genesis certainly provides a “limit” account of human
existence both preceding and complementing Debrorah Creamer’s limit model of
disability. While they share elements of similarity insofar as both affirm “limits are
good,” Bonhoeffer’s conceptualization broadens and deepens Creamer’s model. Most
significantly, Bonhoeffer offers a construct for prelapsarian moments when “limits are
good,” but makes room for a post-lapsarian lament where limits create shame and
displacement. Bonhoeffer returns to the claim “limits are good” and are needed to rectify
our limitless condition, echoing Creamer once again, but doing so in a fashion that makes
clear the breadth and depth of human emotion and divine consequence in relation to those
limits.
To be clear, Bonhoeffer’s exegesis and excursus is not complete – even in
Genesis – without the cross (French: Crux, German: Kreuz) of Christ at the center of
humanity. Bonhoeffer wrote to his best friend Eberhard Bethge on July 16, 1944 that,
“God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross.”1230 While this displacement
sounds initially like a rejection of the world, for Bonhoeffer, that sentiment is untrue.
Instead of fleeing the world, God in Christ takes a firm stance at the center, in the middle
of reality, amid the complexities of the context of this world and stands firm there.
Bonhoeffer makes clear as he continues, “He is weak and powerless in the world, and
that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps us.”1231
In the midst of failing bodies, with society at a crossroads, the decisive action by
God is to place the cross at the center of human existence. After the cross event, the
church will then stand at the center of complex human existence claiming the middle, not
1230
1231

Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 360.
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 360.
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the edge. Bonhoeffer’s fourfold account of “limit” – culminating in the cross event – is
formative for the crucial limit model of disability. As we turn now to Bonhoeffer’s
accounts of context and agent and their implications for ethics, as well as his doctrines of
creation, sin and redemption, we will briefly explore critical elements that will be
foundational for our crucial limit model of disability.

6.3.2

Bonhoeffer’s Account of Context and Agent: Implications for Ethics
The import of Bonhoeffer’s notion of Christ’s weakness and powerlessness in the

world highlights two critical aspects of Bonhoeffer’s sense of ethical responsibility.
First, context matters.1232 Certainly Deborah Creamer understands: contexts are central
to human existence and can affect human agency.1233 Even more so, moral responsibility
cannot be abstracted from context as some moral theories have postulated;1234 but must
find its ground within reality.1235 Second, agency matters.1236 And yet the human agent is

1232

In 1958, G.E.M. Anscombe argued for a retrieval of virtue ethics building on character, rather than
ethical theories built on legislative “oughts” or universal “shoulds.” In so doing, she suggested a transition
from a legislative view of morality to an ethical approach that honored moral psychology, virtue and an
account of the good where contexts matter beyond all “oughts” and “shoulds.” See: G. E. M. Anscombe,
“Modern Moral Philosophy” Philosophy 33:124 (1958): 1 – 19.
1233
Ethical models vary tremendously on whether contexts should be considered or dismissed. Context
based ethical systems include notions of virtue, while law-based ethics tend to emphasize norms and oughts
that should be upheld regardless of context. G.E.M. Anscombe criticized the turn in ethics to rule based
ethics in her 1958 work
Anscombe outlines the problem of normative theories such as utilitarianism,
social contract and deontological ethics – describing them as either vile, dishonest or incoherent. She
criticizes these ‘law-based’ concepts of ethics that deal with obligation and duty and blames this legacy on
the Judeo-Christian heritage and the vision of a divine law-bearing God. “Ought”, for Anscombe, is a word
that may be used but with only great care and consideration (5). Too often, “ought” is a word thrown about
and heard with “mere mesmeric force” (8). See: G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,”
Philosophy, 33:124 (1958): 1 – 19.
1234
See: Jeffrey Bishop’s critique of Kant and his recommendation of Levinas and Marion for ethical
theory grounded in the contextual and the relational. Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 223.
1235
For example, Martha Nussbaum makes the argument that a “thick vague theory of the good”” (214)
allows for flexibility and adaptability in moral response across various contexts rather than specified should
or perceived outcomes. See: Martha Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of
Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory, 20:2 (May, 1992): 202-246.
1236
To be clear, the key notion in virtue ethics is that agents and contexts matter more than rules.
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shaped by particular contexts. Again, Deborah Creamer makes this the central claim of
her limit model of disability. And yet, not all moral theories take into account reality and
context, and instead, focus on abstracted constructions and hypothetical situations.1237 A
crucial limit model will hold steadfast to particular contexts, individual moral agents, and
the unique interplay that occurs between the two in the reality of a given situation.1238
To understand this point, it is helpful to note an example from Bonhoeffer’s
writings before more fully developing the model. This example is drawn not from
Bonhoeffer’s early Creation and Fall, but from his writings, Letters and Papers from
Prison, collected after his death. In prison, Bonhoeffer penned what became one of his
most memorable, quotable and perhaps least understood phrases regarding a world come
of age.1239 For Bonhoeffer, a world that has come of age is a world in its complexity and
maturity requires the complexity and maturity of human beings to meet the ethical
demands amid the realities the world presents. The world demands more than doctrine
1237

See: Charles R. Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Press, 2002). Charles Pinches describes a problem in ethics wherein theory can too
often neglect both the agent and the context. At stake here is a twofold loss: neglect of the agent and
extraction from the context (182).
1238
Stanley Hauerwas believes this kind of specificity and individuality is the key element often missing in
discussions of disability. Hauerwas’ essay “The church and Mentally Handicapped Persons: A Continuing
Challenge to the Imagination” invites us to consider our stereotypes and roadblocks to knowing and loving
disabled people. We are called to a deepened discipline of Christian imagination. Quoting theologian
Garret Green, Hauerwas conceives the imagination as something that helps us conceive what would
otherwise go unnoticed. This kind of imagination is never abstracted from reality and it must always be
fully embodied. Such an imagination energizes ecclesial life. See: Stanley Hauweras, "The Church and
Mentally Handicapped Persons: The Continuing Challenge to the Imagination." Religion and Disability:
Essays in Scripture, Theology and Ethics, ed. Marilyn E. Bishop, (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1995):
46-64.
1239
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 342. The full quote from a letter of June 30, 1944 reads:
“Let me just summarize briefly what I am concerned about – the claim of a world that has come of age by
Jesus Christ.” The German for “the world that is of age” is die mundige Welt and speaks of the Mundigkeit
of the world. The etymology of the German is important for deeper connotations. Peter Selby makes this
clear in his essay, “Christianity in a World Come of Age.” Mund means ‘mouth’ and refers to a person who
can speak for herself. Bonhoeffer employs this nuance to depict how humans in this age can speak without
reference to a dependence upon God. See: Peter Selby, “Christianity in a World Come of Age,” The
Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. by John W. deGruchy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1999): 238-239.
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and dogma, but instead invites the devoted to respond in freedom with the depth and
breadth of the Gospel.1240 While much has been discussed regarding the importance, and
also perhaps misreading of this phrase,1241 for the purposes of this discussion it is critical
to note how Bonhoeffer’s notion recognizes a context where a crucial limit has been
surpassed. Something has changed in this particular world that affects and disables a
previously ‘able’ agency. The hope Bonhoeffer expresses at this juncture is anything but
a deus ex machina fix,1242 and instead, a more radical claim to live and stand firm within
“this-world.”1243 In committing to “this world”, a human being informed by Christ
allows certain dying and rising again, or, one might argue, a disabling and re-enabling
within the context of the given world. Bonhoeffer explains:
During the last year or so I’ve come to know and understand more and more the
profound this-worldiness of Christianity. The Christian is not a homo
religiousus, but simply a man, as Jesus was a man – in contrast, shall we say,
with John the Baptist. I don’t mean the shallow and banal this-worldliness of
the enlightened, the busy, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound
this-worldiness, characterized by discipline and the constant knowledge of death
and resurrection.1244
God, in Christ, does not flee the given context. Nor does the moral agent become
impotent. Instead, radical commitment to the given reality necessitates “a God who is
truly a suffering participant within the life of the world.”1245 Agency yields to the reality

1240

It should be noted an interesting turn of phrase used by Bonhoeffer at this juncture. He writes that
religion cannot be a flimsy “garment of Christianity.” The phrase appears at first to echo Bonhoeffer’s
imagery of the “cloak of preservation.” However, Bonhoeffer elaborates here to argue for a Christianity
that is deep and complex and attuned to the realities of a broken world rather than an idealized eternity.
See: Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 280.
1241
See: Selby, “Christianity in a World Come of Age,” 226-245.
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Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 361.
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Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 369.
1244
Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 369. It should be noted here that Bonhoeffer highlights
Martin Luther as an exemplar of the “this-world” life Bonhoeffer commends.
1245
Selby, “Christianity in a World Come of Age,” 235.
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at hand with the knowledge there will be a dying, and rising again.1246 The phrase “ a
world come of age” and the scenario it depicts helps us to understand the starting point of
a crucial limit model of disability. Similar to Bonhoeffer’s “orders of preservation” and
“mandates of creation,” a crucial limit acknowledges the framework of a particular
context in which a limit has been surpassed and the effect that limit has, even
despairingly so, on a moral agent.

6.3.3

Bonhoeffer’s Accounts of Creation, Sin and Redemption
It is important to note how Bonhoeffer informs three critical elements of the

model that are helpful for moral injury. First, Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation1247
claims limits as central, natural and good for humanity. In a positive sense, limits are
crucial for human existence. Theologian Clifford Green explains, “In the primal state
Grenze does not mean any deprivation or restriction of the creature’s humanity. On the
contrary, it is that which guarantees the creature’s genuine human identity.”1248 Crucial
limits, then, are a good and God-given entity.

There is, however, one “negative

connotation” at this stage according to Clifford Green.1249 The human being is warned
“that he should not try to be boundless, unlimited, infinite: that he should not pretend to
aseitas; that he should not be tempted to become sicut Deus. To do so would be to forfeit

1246

See: Sarah Bachelard, Resurrection and the Moral Imagination: Transcending Boundaries in
Philosophy and Theology (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014).
1247
Clifford J. Green offers a helpful basis for Bonhoeffer’s implicit doctrine of creation. See: Clifford J.
Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 45-48, 185-205.
1248
Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 194.
1249
Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 196.
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his true humanity.”1250 True humanity, then, for Bonhoeffer, is intimately connected to
finitude.
Second, Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of sin acknowledges the depth and despair of
human estrangement from God, self and others.

Given Bonhoeffer’s “theology of

sociality” that Green highlights, sin rips the fabric of human existence. When the crucial
limit at the center, mitte, of existence is displaced by sin the rupture is radical and
irreparable. The other human being, intended for relationship and infused with grenze (as
the gift of limit to the self), becomes a burden and place of embodied brokenness. A
crucial limit then, moves from an entity of grace and providence, to the implosion of
relationships within a certain context that has a continual effect on reality where the
residual aftershocks keep ripping one’s relationship with the world apart. Alienation,
estrangement and the tendency toward a “despotic ego”1251 are the marks of life when
crucial limits – intended for good - are transgressed. This is the depth missed by Deborah
Creamer in her account of limits. Bonhoeffer returns to the goodness in limits that
Creamer attests to when he rectifies the problem of limitlessness (grezenlose) by
reimposing the cross as a limit that preserves and restructures human existence: Christ as
Mittler (mediator) reclaims the mitte. Redemption occurs through a new crucial limit
wherein Christ reclaims the center that was lost, acts to preserve creation, and provides
mandates for living within those limits in various spheres of life.1252

6.4

Revisiting Disability: Finitude, Flesh and Transformation
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Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 196.
Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 202.
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See: Larry Rasmussen, “The Ethics of Responsible Action,” The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, 220-222.
1251
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The etymological consideration of “crucial” and Bonhoeffer’s notion of “limits”
are key component of our crucial limit model of disability. In this section, we will revisit
the scholarship on disability to accomplish two things.

First, to reconsider the

weaknesses of Creamer’s model and, second to take into account Rosemarie GarlandThomson’s definition of disability as one that embraces the theological idea of finitude.
Together, these comments will aid the analysis of “disability” presented in our crucial
limit model of disability.
Our review of the literature in disability studies covered similar themes as three
models of disability were presented: the medical, social and limit models of disability.
Deborah Creamer’s “limit model of disability” offers a particularly helpful resource for
moral injury as it accomplishes several things: honors and integrates prior models of
disability acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of the medical and social models
while striving for a construct that moves beyond traditional models, names and explores
varying social contexts as ‘abling’ for some and ‘disabling’ for others, addresses and
examines theological questions raised when limits are encountered. The limit model of
disability, in its original form, is deeply contextual. The social critique of the limit
experienced in each context then raises existential questions of God, self and humanity.
Disability, according to the limit model, is created when flesh encounters various ‘social’
worlds and limits are met. Where the limit model falls short is in probing the depth of
the moral emotions, such as shame, that occurs from the meeting of those limits. The
crucial limit model of disability builds on Creamer’s construct by assuming varied
contexts and divine questions; and yet, deepens the emotional consequence of
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experiencing those limits with shame and the “global evaluations of self” that can then
ensue.
Creamer’s model is constructive and takes the field of disability studies into new
territory; however, two modifications can improve her model. First, her creed that “limits
are good” is intended to affirm the questions introduced when those limits are
experienced. Humans are finite creatures and those limitations make us aware, in the
language of Alasdair MacIntyre that we are more “dependent rational animals” then we
are Sicut Deus. This growing sense of vulnerability, finitude and crucial limit between
creature and creator is what prompts Creamer to deem limits as good. For those caught
in the tension between that limiting experience and the shame and despair those contexts
can create, the language of limits’ “goodness” can appear dismissive. Bonhoeffer adds a
helpful layer of understanding through his extended meditation on creature, creation and
Creator in his exegesis of Genesis in “Creation and Fall.” Limits, in the beginning are not
only good, but they are central to human existence. When Eve is introduced to Adam,
reiterating the limit of humanity in the face of the other, the goodness of this limiting
relationship is existentially evidenced. After the fall, limits provoke shame, wrath and
anger as creatures long to be Sicut Deus and the ongoing, continual abyss of limitless life
wreaks turmoil on creature, creation and perhaps even, the Creator. When limits are
reintroduced, as “cloaks” of protection, as the orders of preservation and through the
mandates of creation; there is a deeper sense of the goodness and providence present in
those limits. Even more so, the cross of Christ takes hold of the center of creation once
again, depicting a vision of salvation and redemption that become clear through the
introduction of this new crucial limit.
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Second, Creamer’s model may be too static. Alongside a new and more robust
rendering of goodness, her account can also be enhanced by a larger awareness of the
fluidity of changing limits. Though Creamer allows for shifts in limits as an individual
encounters different contexts (for example: a person who is deaf may be deaf only within
a broad sense of society, but not within a particular deaf community);1253 her model does
not establish a space for wide-ranging fluidity. There needs to be a model that provides
allowance for bodies that are continually on a spectrum of change, as well as
communities and contexts on a spectrum of change. A “revised limit model” would
provide space for: the limits, the questions they provoke and the moral implications of
that experience when there is a crucial intersection between creature and context. In that
moment when a creature (with the changing contours of her body, mind and spirit along a
continuum of ability and disability) crosses into a context (with the possibility intrinsic
within that world where she may be limited or maybe not) there is the chance that she
will experience a limit, the limit will raise crucial questions, and the sudden impact of
that intersection may have moral implications. But to be clear, it is also possible in that
moment the creature does not encounter a limit. The revised limit model of disability
establishes space within the model for arbitrary encounters that can create sudden and
despairing angst.
Both Creamer and Garland-Thomson draw us into a conversation about disability
rooted in a theological account of human finitude that takes into account concrete limits
and the realized impact of their encounters. While it could be argued that Boudreau and
Wiinikka-Lydon found definitions and frameworks regarding disability threatening to
1253
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 97-103. This example is key in Creamer’s final chapter
“Limits and Disability Theology” for explaining her concept of a limit model of disability.
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their experience of moral injury, a probe of human finitude begun by Creamer, GarlandThomson and Bonhoeffer becomes a helpful starting place for moral injury to deepen its
accounts of morality, injury and disability. Garland Thomson makes clear that finitude is
at the heart of her understanding of disability, not as a definition, nor as a model or
framework, but instead is the reality of human being:
Put more poetically, disabilities are the etchings left on flesh as it encounters
world. So whereas disability is certainly an index of capability in context, it is
also a witness to our inherent susceptibility or receptiveness to being shaped by
the particular journey through the world that we call our life. Although our
modern collective cultural consciousness denies vulnerability, contingency, and
mortality, disability insists that our bodies are dynamic, constantly reformed by
the call and response between flesh and world. In this way, we evolve into
disability. Our bodies need care; we need assistance to live; we are fragile,
limited, and pliable in the face of life itself. Disability is thus inherent in our
being: What we call disability is perhaps the essential characteristic of being
human.1254
Disability and moral injury share in that essential characteristic of being human as flesh
knows the limits of finitude.
In “the Medical Model” of Disability,1255 focus is on the “flesh” as the location of
disablement as a human being is medically impaired and subjected both to societal norms
of perfection in bodies, as well as subjected to the techne of modern medicine. Encounter
with the world then becomes a place where potential injuries might occur to body or
mind causing impairment. The implication of the medical model for morally injured
veterans is that they are either ‘fixable’ if psychiatry yields potential healing, or,
‘unfixable’ if techne fails. Historic models of disability, even Biblical texts, are most
revealing regarding engrained views of the medical model and its affect on humans and
societies transfixed by norms of perfection.
1254
1255

Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342.
For a comparison chart of the four models of disability see Appendix I.
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Within “the Social Model” of Disability, focus shifts from flesh to “world” as the
setting where disablement occurs. Flesh is socially constructed, and becomes more and
more disabled when social norms or boundaries are encountered. The implication for
veterans is that society is broken, and needs fixed. Here, theologies of liberation are
helpful to lament and name the problem as well as to seek solutions from oppression.
Nancy Eiesland’s The Disabled God is a pinnacle work in this field that was
revolutionary in her day and continues to be today.
Deborah Creamer, in response to these models, sets forth “the Limit Model” of
Disability where she focuses on ‘encounters’ as the nexus of disability. Not all bodies are
disabled at all times. Not all contexts are disabling contexts. Instead, she allows a sense
of fluidity to explain how some bodies become disabled in some contexts. When that
disabling occurs through that particular encounter, the situation becomes an
epistemological source for theological questions about the nature of being human and the
providence of God. Transformation occurs when a deep embrace of those theological
and anthropological questions creates a deeper view of humanity amid those limitations
that have occurred. The implication of this model for veterans is that space is suddenly
created for asking questions of God, self and others in the face of limits. Constructive
work continues in response to Deborah Creamer’s Disability and Christian Tradition as
scholars explore further ramifications of her work.
A revised limit model, presented here as “the Crucial Limit Model” of Disability,
builds on the previous three models by acknowledging and integrating nuances of the
medical, social and limit models. This model appreciates Creamer’s understanding of
shifting abilities across various contexts; and yet, seeks to deepen the shame experienced
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in response to those moments of disablement and to widen the arbitrary occurrence of
those encounters. Potentially disabling limits present themselves in various contexts to a
variety of human moral agents at unexpected, arbitrary, unpredictable and unparalleled
moments. The moment when an implosion of the moral code occurs might defy moral
norms and codes resisting easy definition or expectation. A crucial limit is positive in
that it recognizes limits as necessary for humanity before God to honor moral codes and
to prevent despotic egos.1256 A crucial limit acknowledges the possibility of a dying, and
rising again, in response to the loss within a given context of an important moral code.
Transformation is possible when the crucial limit first, acknowledges the depth of human
shame and descends to that nexus,1257 and then, offers restoration through the cross of
Christ at the center of existence wherein the offer for preservation is extended to all, but
particularly to those disabled and fraying at their limits. While some moral theories
present abstract constructs neglecting real agents and real contexts, the crucial limit
model of disability claims both within the particularities of their worlds all preserved
through the lens of Christ. James Burtness explains,
Bonhoeffer is certainly an ethical “situationist” in that he opposes ethical
absolutes of all kinds and emphasizes concrete times and places. Yet to label
him a situationist without qualifying that term is to misconstrue him completely.
The Jesus Christ of time and history is also the one in whom the reality of God
and the reality of the world come together. Reality, always on the move, is
structured by Jesus Christ. Thus the Bonhoeffer who asked who Jesus is for us
today, and who wanted to know what Jesus means, was as interested in
structures as he was in situations, and worked his entire life a the intersection of
the two.1258
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While the situations of this world might lead humanity to the difficult side of a crucial
limit; it is Jesus who reveals through the cross his structuring of reality the positive and
redemptive dimension of crucial limits.
This section reminds us of Creamer’s twofold weakness. First, limits are not
always good; they in fact, can evoke shame and silence. Second, limits are more than
contextual; they in fact, can be fluid, arbitrary and capricious. Awareness of these
weaknesses informs the components of a revised limit model.

In addition, we are

reminded through Garland-Thomson that disability occurs through the interaction of
flesh, encounters and world. She too assumes an optimistic conception that the ultimate
“transformation” will be positive and redemptive. In so doing, she like Creamer fails to
probe the depth of emotion that is met within that transformative moment. We will draw
on Garland-Thomson’s terminology to outline the components of our model, but in doing
so, we will divide “transformation” into two critical moments: first, the depth of despair
that must be met and acknowledged and second, the possibility of a new narrative for
what was otherwise silenced and shamed.

6.5

A Crucial Limit Model of Disability: Essential Components
Given the need for a revised limit model, the crucial limit model of disability

extends Creamer’s construct by developing four essential components that attend to
human finitude, moral agents, social context and real-world redemption. These four
components will each be nuanced with insights from the etymology of “crucial”, the
theology of “limit” in Bonhoeffer, and the components of “disability” in Garland-
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Thomson.1259 Each of these four essential components contain three key nuances related
to the crucial limit model of disability: the crucial implications of moral decisions at the
heart of human existence, the effect of limits and the depth of experience encountered at
their edge, and the disabling potential of those crucial limits. These four themes, and their
individual threefold nuances regarding cruciality, limited agency and disability, together
give rise to twelve essential components of the crucial limit model. Rosemarie GarlandThomson’s definition of disability continues to be appropriate and helpful: disability is
the transformation of the flesh as it encounters world. The crucial limit model adds a
nuance to her definition as well: Disability is the transformation (shame and redemption)
of the flesh (human finitude) as it encounters (moral agents) worlds (social contexts). In
the following four sections we will extrapolate twelve essential components of the crucial
limit model of disability shaped by human finitude, social contexts, moral agents and
concrete redemption.1260
6.5.1

Human Finitude and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability
The first essential component of the crucial limit model is rooted in the etymology

and definition of “crucial.” The cruciate ligaments remind us of our embodiment as well
as the potential for excruciating pain when we as embodied creatures are injured in body,
mind or spirit. Second, Bonhoeffer’s first insight into “limit” is the notion that limits,
from the beginning of creation, are at the very center of human being. Acknowledging
1259
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the limit at the center of our existence, as well as the limit that meets us in every
relational encounter, reminds us of human finitude which God intended for good. Third,
Garland-Thomson frames flesh as finitude that is subject to encounter and there has the
potential for a disabling to occur. This component prompts recognition that disability is
inevitable for all humanity because we are finite creatures and this is a natural process of
creation. The theological anthropology of human finitude, that we are MacIntyre’s
“dependent rational animals,” highlights human vulnerability amid the natural and good
limits we encounter.

6.5.2 Social Contexts and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability
The fourth component of the crucial limit model of disability is a nuance of the
definition of “crux” and recognizes the crucial and critical ways our society is at a
crossroads. The crucial limit model of disability for moral injury must rework the notion
that soldiers alone are culpable of moral failure and instead broaden the sense of societal
complicity to acknowledge that soldiers find themselves in a moral crucible while at war.
A crucible names that situation where a severe trial transmutes diverse elements; giving
birth to a phrase such as “their relationship was forged in the crucible of war.” Fifth, an
essential component of the new model is the fact recognized by Bonhoeffer that in the
social context of the fall, shaped by the relationships of snake, Adam, and Eve, human
beings lost all sense of limit as human beings become for a moment sicut deus. After the
fall, limits are lost to human sin and that problematic limitlessness affects all social
contexts with abysmal depth, perpetual loss and infinite burden. Sixth, the crucial limit
model of disability takes into account the fact that encounters between flesh and world
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are fluid, complex, capricious, ambiguous and ever-changing.

There is a complex

interplay of the disabling that occurs across social contexts as flesh encounters limits
again and again. A social context that limits and temporarily or permanently ‘disables’
one person in one situation at one particular time, may or may not do the same at any
other moment or to any other person. Social contexts can dramatically affect, interact
with and create “psycho-bio-social-moral-existential”1261 disabilities in fluid, subtle and
unpredictable ways.

Here, there exists a spectrum of social contexts across the human

experience recognizing the unique limit both at the center of each context and in the
human encounters within those contexts that have the potential to disable. The crucial
limit model takes seriously the impact of shifting limits and the real impact their
unpredictability can have on a soldier’s psyche, moral agency and moral identity and
allows space for the apparent unpredictability of violations and the critical impact those
violations have on the moral agent causing disability as Jonathan Shay makes clear.1262

6.5.3

Moral Agents and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability
The seventh component of the model reminds us of the severe and decisive

nuances of the word “crucial.” Since moral responsibility in any given social context can
be complex, the language of cruciality reminds us of the existential depth of the questions
asked by the moral agent in the face of that complexity as limits raise questions regarding
God, self and other; and, as those limits demand decisive, critical, crucial actions in key
moments of decision-making. Bonhoeffer’s third connotation of limit shapes the eighth
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component of our model. Recognizing the depth of shame, the level of vulnerability and
the despair of moral agents poised to make choices without limits, God acts to affirm
fallen humanity, cloak them in protective garments and work perpetually to preserve and
uphold them. In the midst of limitlessness, God upholds and preserves.
The ninth component of the crucial limit model of disability occurs at the
intersection of moral agency and disability resulting in moral injury. Shame, despair,
silence, distrust and the inability to imagine a future are some of the disabling effects of
moral injury. The crucial limit model, taking a step beyond Creamer’s limit model,
acknowledges the depth of despair and sorrow at this juncture. Garland-Thomson
recognizes there the possibility of “transformation” but that transformation is impossible
without descending to the depths of despair to reside with the silence of a moral agent
whose failures, whether supposed or realized, are too much to bear and have a disabling
effect.

6.5.4

Concrete Redemption and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability
The last critical theme in this revised model is the topic of “concrete redemption.”

Before outlining the last three essential components of our model, it is important here to
explain the language of “concrete” redemption. We noted in chapter two in a discussion
on sin that sin can occur in “concrete acts” as noted in the Compendium of the social
doctrine of the Church: The consequences of sin perpetuate the structures of sin. These
institutional structures of sin are rooted in personal sin and therefore, are always
connected to concrete acts of the individuals who commit them, consolidate them and
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make it difficult to remove them.1263 And yet, we noted in the theology of Bonhoeffer in
chapter five an emphasis on ethical responsibility that is always rooted in concrete reality
and not abstracted by theory. For Bonhoeffer, concrete reality is that sacramental
breaking open of the ethical command. Bonhoeffer’s ethical theory becomes realized in
concrete form as he envisions the mandates of creation as concrete places for responsible
life where “the relation of the world to Christ becomes concrete.”1264
Bonhoeffer offered an example of concrete redemption by drawing on the skills
and responsibilities of the vocation of a medical doctor. Bonhoeffer offers a surprisingly
risky vision for that doctor beyond what might be considered an acceptable standard of
care. Risk and responsibility, for Bonhoeffer, are cyclically linked elements of any given
vocation that have a telos of concrete redemption:
If, for example, I am a physician, then in the concrete instance I serve not only
my patients but also medical science and with it science and the knowledge of
truth in general. Although in practice I perform this service at my concrete
position, for example at the bedside of a patient, yet I am continuously aware of
my responsibility for the whole, and it is only in this that I fulfill my calling.
Furthermore, it may happen that I, as a physician, am obliged to recognize and
fulfill my concrete responsibility no longer by the sick-bed but, for example, in
taking public action against some measure which constitutes a threat to medical
science or to human life or to science as such. Vocation is responsibility and
responsibility is a total response of the whole man to the whole of reality; for
this very reason there can be no petty and pedantic restricting of one’s interests
to one’s professional duties in the narrowest sense. Any such restriction would
be irresponsibility. The essential character of free responsibility makes it
impossible to establish laws defining when and to what extent such a departure
from the “limited field of accomplishments” forms part of a man’s calling and of
his responsibility towards men. Such a departure can be undertaken only after a
serious weighing up of the vocational duty which is directly given, of the
dangers of interface in the responsibility of others, and finally of the totality of
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the question involved; when this is done I shall be guided in the one direction or
the other by a free responsibility …1265
The risk urged by Bonhoeffer in this extended quote is for the individual in any given
vocation to respond concretely to “the whole of reality” that presents itself within
episodic and disabling ways in their vocational tasks. For the doctor, no sickness is
healed unless the greater “whole of reality” causing that sickness is addressed.
In the scholarship on disability, Nancy Eiesland utilizes the language of
concreteness to describe disabled life as “concrete existence”1266 and draws on that
knowledge for her image of God as disabled as well, while Burton Cooper speaks of the
“concreteness” of God’s care for disabled life.1267 The metaphor of “concrete existence”
speaks to the ground under our feet, the horizon upon which we live and move and have
our being, the complicated nature of social reality and the occasional limitations of
disabled life; perhaps it is that place where the cross meets the garden at the center of
existence. A crucial limit model of disability is grounded in both the vulnerability of
finitude and the potential for sin in concrete existence for both individuals and
institutions. Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology demands exploration of how moral
agency can face disability in concrete situations when limits are met, even when a moral
agent is acting with responsibility. Ethicist Jeffrey Bishop, Emmanuel Levinas and
Dietrich Bonhoeffer agree there can be a call to concrete, contextual responsibility “so
demanding that sin is necessary, and failure inevitable.”1268
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With these thoughts on “concrete redemption” in mind, the tenth essential
component of our model takes into account the “cross-shaped” connotation of the
definition of “crucial.” Here is where God’s power and transcendence descend and
intersect the horizons of our concrete existence. The eleventh component, influenced by
Bonhoeffer’s fourth and last conception of limit, is that the cross replaces the center of
human life becoming the new limit. With that knowledge, humanity is commissioned to
ethical responsibility in concrete places knowing that limits will be met, but informed by
the knowledge of the dying and rising again at the cross in this world rather than a
heavenly ascent into a world beyond. Finally, the transformation that occurs, even when
disabling has occurred, is a new creation formed in the crucible of this world. That
transformation to new ability is possible only after the depth of shame, silence, trauma
and despair have been met and honored. Originally a crucible was not a melting pot nor
cauldron, but a night lamp hung by a crucifix. Here is the place where a new narrative
begins.1269
With these four broad areas of focus of human finitude, social contexts, moral
agents and concrete redemption, and the nuances for them shaped by the language of
cruciality, the fluidity of limits, and the spectrum of disability, we see the contours of a
1269
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crucial limit model of disability. This model acknowledges and integrates the strengths
and weaknesses of the prior models: medical, social and limit; and at the same time
acknowledges the depth of the moral experience of shame, broadens societal complicity,
widens the spectrum of shifting limits across social contexts, and heightens the
complexity of questioning at the heart of human existence in the face of those crucial
limits. Even as we move to address the strengths and weaknesses in this model; we can
quickly see this model is helpful for the fields of moral injury, disability studies and
theology. The crucial limit of disability creates space within the field of moral injury to
discuss disability as a necessary, helpful and liberative component of “injury” and moral
theory as a spectrum of conversation key to the “moral” of moral injury. Even more so,
the crucial limit model helps us to engage a conversation regarding the intersection of the
two and the possibility for moral implosion when changing bodies engage a limited moral
horizon. Given the considerations of moral agency, social contexts, fluid realities and
human finitude presented here, as well as their nuances for constructing a crucial limit
model of disability, we can see the import of this conversation for moral theory, disability
and moral injury.

6.6

The Crucial Limit Model: Implications for Moral Injury
In the introduction to this dissertation, I noted the particular problem of moral

injury as distinct from PTSD and explored the impact of moral injury on soldier and
society today. Situating moral injury within the larger field of trauma studies, the crucial
limit model bears witness to critical events in the past that can “limit” human endeavors
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in the present and the future unless attention, therapy and healing are engaged.1270 While
such trauma may have medical and social dimensions, neither medical treatment nor
social analysis is enough to address the issues at hand. The argument presented in chapter
one made clear that treating moral injury through the techne of medicine creates a litany
of issues: moral injury becomes a problem to be solved, patients with visible injuries
receive prioritized care, medical treatment is unable to plumb the depths of moral
emotions, and the issue of moral injury is depoliticized. The medicalization of moral
injury fails to address the crucial limits of greater enfleshed embodiment and the
“psycho-bio-social-moral-existential” dimensions of the injury. A crucial limit model of
disability demands exploration of the crux of the human person in a given society beyond
a given medical diagnosis.
In addition, assessing moral injury invites deep attention given to: the profundity
of moral emotions such as anxiety, shame, fear and guilt1271, the alterations in identity
due to “global evaluations of the self,”1272 the fluidity of moral injury across varying
contexts, the questions of agency, and finally, the ambiguity of moral injury. A crucial
limit model of disability recognizes the debilitating moral emotion of shame; this is an
important counterpoint to Creamer’s limit model of disability wherein she states
somewhat too blithely that, “limits are good”1273 without leaving room for the more
complex moral emotions of shame, betrayal and grief that often exist at the center of
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moral injury. The crucial limit model creates a construct where the shaming global
evaluation of “self” projects on the greater world those same global evaluations causing
an internal and external implosion.

Shame, as a critical limit, wreaks havoc on

perception, self-identity and potential neurosis.

Thereby, the crucial limit model

addresses the issues of profundity and identity. With regard to fluidity of injury across
social contexts, the crucial limit model acknowledges the potential for disabling across a
spectrum of social contexts across the human experience recognizing the unique limit at
the center of each context. Each individual bears a unique inward limit with regard to an
exponential number of human experiences; when that limit is crossed, the cruciality of
that limit is recognized. The crucial limit model of disability honors the affect those
apparently random limits have on human agency, the depth of grief in response to that
loss of agency, and the disconcerting ambiguity and inability to predict when those
crucial limits will be met. Tyler Boudreau lamented the shovel, the farmhouse search, and
the hug as crucial limits transgressed during his service.1274 The jeremiads shared by
soldiers, trauma specialists, psychologists, societal critics and the biblical author of
Jeremiah lament the societal woes and the soldiers’ wounds at work in moral injury. Each
voice, from Jeremiah’s prophetic “they have treated the wound of my people carelessly”
(Jeremiah 6:14, NRSV)1275 to David Wood’s op-ed naming moral injury as “the signature
wound of this generation”1276 emphasizes just how crucial this new landscape of moral
injury is. The crucial limit matters for both the war within the conscience of the enlisted
soldier and the war without in the societal matrix. The crucial limit model of disability
1274
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accounts for the complex interaction between the human condition, social conventions,
moral formation and assymetrical power dynamics that instigate moral injury.
The review of the psychological literature reveals issues related to morality, injury
and disability; but perhaps most poignantly provided an opportunity to ask whether
scholarship has adequately explored notions of morality in relationship to moral injury.
Shay explores Nussbaum’s concept of “moral luck” and Litz briefly engages Kohlberg
and Freud. The shrinkage of the moral horizon evidenced in moral injury and the
resulting implosion of the moral code demand further attention to issues of morality, the
fluidity of morality across various social contexts (ie. civilian life, the war arena, church
and state), and the limits of morality when social conventions and moral codes are
transgressed. A crucial limit model of disability comprehends the diminished capacity
for morality not simply from the perspective of sin and acts of commission, but also from
the perspective of human finitude in a fallen creation. When agency becomes disabled
due to any number of limits encountered, studies of morality must take into account
diminished capacity for virtue due to changes in embodiment. Morality exists within a
complex web of moral codes, nomos, social conventions and complex societal systems;
and yet, changes in the moral code can erupt when crucial personal limits are encountered
that defy tradition or convention. The crucial limit model of disability allows space for
unpredictability of violations and the critical impact those violations have on the agent.
The review of the theological literature explored issues of Cartesian dualism in
medicine, social contexts, and shifting limits. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone argues for a more
complex view of human embodiment rather than a radically simplified Cartesian
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dualism.1277 Instead of pursuing techne to respond to “injury”, Sheets-Johnstone
advocates the possibility of “invocation” to an alternative telos rather than the “ingestion”
of a simple fix.1278 In the study of disability, such techne becomes a “modernist craving
for ontological security”1279 as disablement is aimed toward a fix. A crucial limit model
of disability shifts focus from an injury to be ‘fixed’, toward a deeper embodiment to be
honored and healed. When techne is removed, the injured veteran1280 can then wrestle
with that “inability to contextualize”1281 and the effect of that deep grief upon
embodiment.
The theological literature also revealed the need for deeper exploration of the
relationship between a soldier’s moral injury and societal implications; shifting the focus
from the individual soldier and his or her moral accountability to the wider societal
institutions and their complicity.1282 Through an analysis of socially constituted bodies,
the social ordering (or disordering) of the good, social trauma and the ability (or inability)
of a society to grieve; the theological literature on moral injury reveals a society on the
precipice. A crucial limit model of disability recognizes that precipice and the role it
1277
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plays in placing the individual soldier into morally compromising situations with those
“limited horizons of choice.” The focus moves from the individual to the individual; and
there demands societal accountability for those crucial decisions with grave
consequences, as well as societal rituals for grieving and processing when such a difficult
choice must be made.
Additionally, the theological literature could further explain the variability,
fluidity and absurdity of shifting limits. Tyler Boudreau grieved the inexplicability of
knowing when a “crucial limit” might be met; seeing a limit might exist at one point one
day, and then shift to a completely different critical limit on another.1283 Once that limit
is met, wherever it has since shifted, the soldier experiences disablement of agency and
identity. Author Wendell Berry, in his short story “Making It Home” tells the story of
World War II Veteran Arthur Rowanberry journeying home to his small farm community
after three years at war. His account speaks to the centrality and fluidity of limits as
Veteran Rowanberry begins to see his village after days of walking home:
He had arrived, as he had arrived again and again during the healing of his
wound, at the apprehension of a pure emptiness, as if at the center of an
explosion – as if, without changing at all, he and the town ahead of him and the
village around him and all the long way behind him had been taken up into a
dream in which every creature and every thing sat…in the dead center of the
possibility of its disappearance.1284
Berry draws on the same sensibility of Bonhoeffer who recognized the limits at the “dead
center” of human existence – without Christ, there is emptiness and the potential for
disappearance at that center. One senses in this short story the internal implosion of
emptiness alongside the external explosion that occurred within the war arena; both now
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casting a shadow across what had otherwise been taken for granted. The limits of
Veteran Rowanberry’s moral, spiritual and bodily existence have shifted. His war
experience is the new center-point of his life and its potential to cast a new framework on
his experience is fluid and unpredictable. The crucial limit model of disability takes
seriously these shifting limits and the real impact their unpredictability can have on a
soldier’s psyche.

6.7

Impact of the Crucial Limit Model for Disability and Moral Theory
When the field of disability draws into conversation models of moral theory,1285

we discover that agent and context are of the utmost importance. Certainly recent
conversations in feminist ethics of care and virtue ethics take context and embodiment
seriously. The next step in these conversations is to take deepen room within ethics for
the effects on embodiment of trauma, suffering, disability, and moral injury.

It is

possible that some ethical theories assume “normalized” perceptions of human being.
Moral theory needs to take into account deeper views on the enfleshment of being
human. In addition, moral theory needs to take into account wider views of changing
worlds and the limits experienced when those contexts are encountered. Those contexts,
and their moral implications, can appear fluid, arbitrary, and unpredictable. The ongoing
intersections of flesh and world are not simply moments of ability and/or disability; they
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are also instances where moral agency can be abled or disabled. Each engagement with
limit is an occurrence when the capacity for virtue is diminished or enhanced. Morality is
affected more than is often credited with the ongoing effects and interaction with
changing embodiment.
While much of Protestant theology aims to express morality in the language of
sin, both acts of commission and acts of omission, a revised limit model of disability
takes into account the persistence of finitude as a dimension of human existence. Moral
theory proves problematic when it presumes that humans are disembodied wills who
make choices detached from concrete reality. What is needed is an attentiveness to
human being that takes context and material existence, our embodiment, seriously.
Bonhoeffer proves helpful in his positive reckoning of creature and creation anchored by
an uncanny reliance on natural law that is surprising for a Protestant theologian. Unlike
Martin Luther, the forefather of Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran tradition, who argued the natural
world was so wholly tainted by sin that no positive account of creature and creation could
be given; Bonhoeffer creates a space for moral responsibility in a complicated world that
can be established and upheld through a recognition of finitude and limits.
Drawing these conversations regarding disability and moral theory to the field of
moral injury facilitates deeper accounts of the morality at stake in moral injury as well as
the body and its potential for an injury that prompts an instance of disability. If disability
is the transformation of the flesh as it encounters world, then moral injury is a unique
form of that transformation when flesh meets the limits of a particular world and a
disabling occurs that has moral implications. The impact of that intersection might
reverberate in the moment, or it might take years to come to the surface. Moral injury
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can be particularly acute, when in the language of Jonathan Shay, there is the “shrinkage
of the social and moral horizon.”1286 World, then, becomes further limited which in turn
fashions more dynamics and increases the potential for encounters of limitation that can
have disabling repercussions. In that space of the “limited horizon of choice” there is
increased probability of limitations that have moral and physical dimensions.

6.8

Strengths and Challenges of the Crucial Limit Model
Theologian Brian Powers suggested an Augustinian framework of internal

distortion and external disorder as fallen humanity pursues disordered goods.1287 A
strength of the crucial limit model for those morally injured is the recognition of this
pathology in the face of power, where, critical internal limits are twisted and disordered
in response to the disordering of crucial societal limits – once good and right – now,
gravely disrupted. The preceding list of fifteen key points regarding the crucial limit
model of disability points to the internal and external implications of that disordering.
Internally, there is shame, the global evaluation of self, and the search for a response
beyond medical technique to the inner despair. Externally, there is a broadening of
responsibility from a soldier’s impossible moral dilemma to the larger military-industrial
complex that shapes society and limits moral choice.1288 Moral choices, in this complex
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Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 23. Brian S. Powers uses similar language when he speaks of a “limited
horizon of choice.”
1287
Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 325.
1288
Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120. For Bonhoeffer, the Fall is bigger than a “moral lapse,” it is “the
destruction of creation by the creature.”
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landscape, do not always fit within societal mores, norms or conventions. Instead, there
is a fluidity and unpredictability across various moral worlds. 1289
Several additional strengths should be noted beyond these bounds. For example,
a crucial limit model of disability as a resource not only to “conserve” as Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson espounds, but even more so, a possible place of creative1290
reckoning1291 and release. Deborah Creamer makes clear that “limit” can become a
resource for theological reflection allowing a dynamic response to the divine even in the
face of limitations.1292 Robert McRuer asked, “Within what social conditions might we
welcome the disability to come, to desire it?”1293 In so asking, McRuer’s desiring of
disability is a request for an existential creative awakening in the face of crucial limits.
To be clear, this strength is acknowledged reluctantly and with unwavering recognition of
the debilitating effects of moral injury. And yet, a crucial limit can be a generative
resource for soldiers and societies alike. Certainly this is the hope of Brian Doerries and
his “Theater of War” passion to push audiences to the limit and to discover insight there.
An additional strength, worthy of note, is the shift that occurs in moral formation
and reflection with the crucial limit model. Nussbaum notes that limits are necessary, she
makes clear: “Human cognitive limits circumscribe and limit ethical knowledge and

1289

See for example, Wendell Berry’s short story “Making It Home” wherein Veteran Art Rowanberry
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discourse; and an important topic within ethical discourse must be the determination of an
appropriate human attitude toward those limits.”1294 However, perhaps she could take the
concept of crucial limits to refine her framework of “moral luck.” Nussbaum advanced
the concept of “moral luck” arguing that luck can make an unpredictable moral difference
and deeply affect character formation. In fact, by means of moral luck an arguably
“good” moral agent might change in response to a case of “bad luck.” A crucial limit
model would shift the randomness and “luck” of life’s circumstances, ie. getting a dealt a
bad hand, and would instead increase the potential variables that could come into play in
any given moral situation. An injury to morality would occur not from “luck”, but
instead from a complex and unpredictable response to reaching a limit that might defy
normal societal conventions but reaches a crucial limit within both the confines of a given
context and the contours of a human heart.
While the strengths of the crucial limit model are many; there are a few
challenges and limitations. First and foremost, while much work has been done in the
field of disability studies to universalize disability,1295 so doing comes with a great risk.
Creamer, Erevelles, Garland-Thomson and others strive to broaden the spectrum to
humanize, universalize, and equalize the potential for disability among all people
Certainly there are strengths in this approach, but it should be made perfectly clear, this
approach is not intended to disclaim the unique experience of veterans. Disability studies
works to “conserve” disability as a vital resource, not just in a broadening of humanity
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Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, 8.
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sense, but also in a deep protection of each person’s individual experience in the face of
disability. Nirmalla Erevelles may remind us, “disability is the most universal of human
conditions,” and yet we must remember that moral injury is a unique and particular
human condition that must be preserved in its integrity. Second, it would be inexcusable
to rationalize and/or justify certain moral actions as reasonable choices given a fallen
world. Scrutiny of moral choice is important for assessment, confession and redirection
both for individual soldiers’ and the ranks in which they serve. Third, a possible
shortcoming of the Crucial Limit Model of Disability might be its Christological
undertones for a secular world.1296 And yet, Bonhoeffer aimed at the end of his life to
present a “religionless Christianity”1297 that had relevance for the contemporary dilemmas
of his age.
As we move to the conclusion, the seventh chapter will apply the insights and
components of this model for individual soldiers and larger societal institutions. We will
look to two models, the administration of County Veterans’ Courts across the country and
the imagination evoked by Brian Doerries in his “Theatre of War” project. Both help
veterans and societies move from the complexity and complicity of moral injury toward
restorative ventures that help all to imagine new futures. Both mobilize those poised in
defeat, ready to quit or give up, toward new moral horizons and personal narratives that
honor the trauma and yet, restore hope. The crucial limit model is not just a construct,
but an applicable concept to be used in concrete and complex situations. In order to
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apply our model in the next chapter, we turn to the theological ethics of John Paul
Lederach who proposes responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk in order to move
forward.

Chapter 7
Conclusion: Implications and Possibilities of a Crucial Limit Model
I now stand ready to serve my veteran teammates.1298
- The Veterans’ Creed
1298

The Veterans’ Creed written by Judge John C. Reed, III.
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7.1

Moral Horizons and Human Vertigo: The Crux of the Matter
At the heart of the Veterans’ Creed is the statement: I now stand ready to serve

my veteran teammates. And yet, the traumatic intersection of limited horizons of choice
with human moral vertigo in the swirl of those limited choices, makes “standing ready”
an impossible ideal at times. In this section, we will look briefly again at that intersection
of limited horizons of choice and moral agency distorted by human vertigo as an example
of the sociological moment the crucial limit model of disability must examine. As the
chapter continues, we will introduce Jon Paul Lederach’s conception of the moral
imagination as a helpful practice that can be employed when the crucial limit is reached.
Once his construct is outlined, we will assess the application of the moral imagination in
two contexts informed by the mandates of creation proposed by Bonhoeffer. Finally, we
will offer next steps for scholarship and offer concluding remarks.
Bonhoeffer uses the language of the horizontal and vertical axes in a critical text
on vocation and responsibility in his Ethics: “The boundary of vocation has been broken
open not only vertically, that is, through Christ, but also horizontally, with regard to the
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extent of responsibility.”1299 The horizon of the horizontal axis of the cross reminds us of
the importance of context. Here is that space of “world” where limits are possible and
encounters unavoidable. Shay and Powers’ language of the shrinkage of that horizon,
where there is a limited horizon of choice,1300 sets the stage for moral injury’s impending
potential. The second axis, the vertical one, reminds us of our creatureliness. Here is that
space of embodiment, agency, and flesh. A vertical line draws us from the vertex at its
height to the center of the earth in its depth where we are grounded. Bonhoeffer’s notion
of creatures in creation as those who once knew the center as limit, and now know the
center as the cross of Christ, is helpful in that Christ replaces the broken center. In the
midst of changing worlds and contexts, when agency becomes disoriented by
circumstance and the intersection of limits, vertigo (from the Latin vertere meaning
“whirling” or “to turn”) sets in making it impossible to stand tall and firm.
Is it possible that the cognitive dissonance at the intersection creates a form of
vertigo disrupting both the body and morality? In that lecture series at Chautauqua, in the
summer of 2016, Shay made the following five claims: first, moral injury disables a
person’s ability to “show up to an appointed time and place in a crowd of people one
doesn’t know well.”1301 Second, moral injury disables a veteran’s ability to “experience
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words as trustworthy”1302 and in so doing, to not automatically discount words and
statements as deceitful jargon. Third, with this failure of words, moral injury disables a
veteran’s ability to “see the possibilities in persuasion, negotiation, compromise and
concession essential to democratic functioning.”1303 Fourth, moral injury disables “the
possibility of winning a struggle without killing and of losing a struggle without
dying.”1304 And fifth, perhaps most destructively, moral injury disables a soldier’s ability
to “see the future as real.”1305 Vertigo, in other words, takes hold of the moral agent and
disrupts their ability to function causing disability to their agency, the greater democracy,
and perhaps, even having an impact on their eschatology.
The response to those who have found themselves at the crux of their limits in
agency, democracy and eschatology will require a vibrant moral imagination that grounds
and guides. Jon Paul Lederach offers a vision and application of the moral imagination
that might be employed for those at the crucial limit to help re-orient when the
problematic limitlessness of sin and the experience of human finitude confound. We will
draw on Lederach’s construct to offer re-orienting within two of Bonhoeffer’s four
mandates of creation (focusing on government and culture) for those who have reached
the crucial limit within those spheres of life. The specific examples are the Mercer
County Veterans’ Court of Western Pennsylvania and Brian Doerries’ Theater of War
project. Then, we will offer a challenge to the church as a third mandate of creation to
live into the moral imagination challenged by Lederach.
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Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”
Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”
1304
Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”
1305
Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”
1303

373

7.2

The Moral Imagination and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability
Professor of International Peace-building at Notre Dame University, John Paul

Lederach in his work, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace,
invites similar acts to promote social change when limits have been transgressed that
invoke violence and require new pathways to peace.1306 Lederach develops four steps
toward provoking the moral imagination: responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk.1307
Responsibility requires the twofold step of accepting personal responsibility, “I am a part
of this pattern”1308 and discovering the meaning of that responsibility for relational
mutuality.1309 Once that recognition of responsibility occurs, Lederach believes the only
path beyond violence is an internal valuation that has a confessional quality at its root.1310
Curiosity is both a learned skill and art that must be sustained once that initial sense of
responsibility is obtained.1311 Curiosity moves us beyond easy polarizations (i.e. right and
wrong) toward an extended attentiveness to constructive care and healing from there.1312
Creativity is a counter-cultural opposition to violence. Violence can “imagine” no other
way, according to Lederach, but the creative acts and the responses they provoke can.1313
Lederach highlights creative approaches to violence by Somali women, Columbian
campesinos, and Tajiki poets. Chicago based CreatiVets is an arts based healing program
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for veterans experiencing moral injury and/or PTSD to explore songwriting, ceramics,
painting, wood crafting and printmaking.1314 Finally, Lederach suggests risk as the fourth
element necessary for transcending the violence that occurs when moral limits are
crossed and healing is needed. Risk invites participation in the mystery at the heart of
human existence without a fixed focus on outcome, but an organic engagement of process
guided by a renewed moral imagination. While the violence and perceived immorality of
the past is the known entity, the unknown invites risk and an invitation to journey to a
new comprehension of moral life in a complicated universe.1315
Lederach’s four-fold model allows us to apply them to the mandates of
government, culture, church and family; so that the veteran who has reached the crucial
limit might then function with new ability within that realm. For those who have known
the vulnerability, fluidity and unpredictability of transgressed moral limits, Lederach’s
practice of the moral imagination aims to honor, guide and heal beyond the pain, silence
and trauma experienced. Knowing that Garland-Thomson’s “encounters” are not always
positive and can at times be world-shattering moments of trauma, Lederach’s approach
proceeds sensitively and with great respect for what has been endured. And yet, the hope
of the moral imagination is that new encounters – through responsibility, curiosity,
creativity, and risk – can both honor the crucial limit and guide onward. This practice
allows us to build strength within societal structures for soldiers to stand their ground and
reclaim their balance after moral injuries have occurred.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s definition of disability, “Disability is the
transformation that occurs as flesh encounters world,” provided a lens through which to
1314
1315
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analyze the theological anthropology (i.e. “flesh”), doctrine of creation (i.e. “world”) and
understanding of the fall (i.e. “encounters”) presented in the theology of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer.

In so doing, Bonhoeffer provides an account of creature, Creator and

creation. In addition, Bonhoeffer provides a robust conception of soteriology as he
describes “preservation” in Christ through renewed limits manifested in the mandates of
creation.

While Bonhoeffer, speaks of preservation, the “transformation” Garland-

Thomson envisions is left wanting. If we understand those “encounters” as the
engagement of crucial limits that occur again and again, we are left in need of a stronger
conception of transformation. Lederach aids this discussion by providing a model for
engagement that is transformative. In addition, for the secular world of the military and
returning veterans, his language provides a resource that is usable and salient.
Bonhoeffer’s view of the responsible life presented in his Ethics echoes Lederach’s
concept of responsibility and the steps responsibility can take through curiosity,
creativity, and risk toward transformation.
The challenge for the individual who has transgressed (or been betrayed at) a
crucial limit and therein encountered a disabling condition of injury or morality is to
reclaim functioning in that context and beyond. Garland-Thomson weaves into her
definition of disability a conception of “transformation” that does not only create
disability when flesh encounters world. Transformation, within disability scholarship,
can be liberative and powerfully enabling when disability is claimed as a resource as
suggested by Garland-Thomson in her essay “Conserving Disability.” Functioning and
flourishing, at that crucial limit, can be gained in a transformative way when Lederach’s
moral imagination is accessed through the steps of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and
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risk. Responsibility lays claim to the crucial limit experienced by the veteran, or even by
the civitas. Curiosity explores the affect on functioning as well as steps toward moving
forward. Creativity employs the work of moral re-ordering through an imaginative,
constructive and perhaps even playful process. Risk, the final step, pushes the individual
or the institution at that crucial limit to engage new methods toward renewed vitality and
functioning.
In this section, Lederach’s formation provides a helpful lens through which to
increase moral functioning for soldiers, societies and religious institutions. Given our
conception of “a crucial limit model of disability,” Lederach’s four steps provide a way
to enable functioning when the disabling crucial limit has been crossed and transgressed.
Certainly it is the hope of the author that these steps will encourage further conversation
for scholars in theology, psychology and sociology to employ their own moral
imagination through the work and challenge of their own fields to continue and deepen
aid for both veterans and the wider context in which they live and move and have their
being.

7.3

Moral Imagination and the Mandate of Government: Veterans’ Court
A context for exploring the first mandate of creation – government – is the model

of the County Veteran Court Treatment Program for Veterans of the Armed Forces. This
model is designed for veterans who are facing criminal charges or who have been
charged with violating the terms of their probation or parole. The court is presided over
by the local Judge who looks to a team of psychologists, treatment providers and other
professionals to be a circle of support for the individual veteran. If a veteran is brought
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under the auspices of the court, he or she will be assigned a Veteran mentor who
maintains frequent contact and guides the veteran through the program which includes:
required group counseling sessions, required recovery meetings for substance abuse,
community service, and a series of writing assignments over a two year period. While
courts and their procedures vary from county to county, for the purposes of this
dissertation I am drawing on resources from the Mercer Country Veterans’ Court.1316
Three specifics are worthy of note from the Mercer County Veterans’ Court.
First, the court takes seriously “physical-psycho-social-spiritual health” inviting routine
measurement, assessment and treatment for physical health, psychological health, social
health, and spiritual health. In addition, the treatment necessitates sustained reflection on
identifying triggers that cause the veteran to stray from optimum “physical-psychosocial-spiritual health.” Once those triggers have been named and noted, the veteran and
his or her mentor develop a “trigger action plan” in case one of the triggers occurs and
dislodges the veteran from their ideal course.
Second, the Mercer County Veterans’ Court demands twenty-four essays every
month over the course of a two-year period. These essays include line-by-line reflections
on the Veterans’ Creed, reports on relapses and triggers, narratives about personal
“totems” (symbols of strength and hope carried with the veteran), descriptions and
analyses of community service activities, reports on deficiencies in “physical-psychosocial-spiritual health”, and testimonies about the impact of the Veterans’ Court on their
recovery. At the monthly court sessions, Veterans in the program at every stage read
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their written narratives before the court.

The writing prompts engage the moral

imagination of the returned veteran and provide an opportunity to share a part of their
story before a community of people in the court who honor the testimony and bear
witness to the grief. Kansas City poet and veteran H.C. Palmer reminds us, “The trauma
won’t go away, but as my Muslim friend, Dr. Amir Hussain, so wisely said, telling our
stories helps us negotiate the trauma, and that gives us hope.”1317
Third, the Veterans’ Court has at its core the Veterans’ Creed that is recited at
each court session and carried by each veteran in their personal wallet. Eleven statements
within the creed are presented to each veteran in the program as a writing prompt inviting
reflection on its meaning and challenge to them as individuals. These testimonies are
read before the court and honored with silence and mutual support. The creed bears
witness to shattering events within the course of a veterans journey, and while it does not
name moral injury within the creed, there is a traumatic silence evidenced and honored at
the heart of this communal narrative.

7.3.1

Government, Moral Imagination and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability
Veteran Zach Moon, in his dissertation upon return from war entitled (Re)Turning

Warriors: A Practical Theology of Military Moral Stress invites soldiers, and the military
culture, to get curious about “moral identity”1318 due to inadequate instruction,
conception, and reconstruction after deployment. His scholarship asks both soldier and
military to deepen their curiosity regarding a soldier’s matrix of “moral orienting
1317

Thomas G. McGuire, “Feet of the Messenger: A Conversation with H.C. Palmer,” War, Literature, &
the Arts An International Journal of the Humanities 27 (2017): 12.
1318
Dissertation by Zach Moon, (Re)Turning Warriors: A Practical Theology of Military Moral Stress, 5.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1149/. (Accessed January 14, 2018).

379

systems” prior to, during and after wartime service.1319 Moon’s suggestion of “moral
orienting systems”1320 takes into account how a moral self, the individual soldier,
functions within “larger systems of power including patriarchy, white supremacy, and
hetero-normativity”1321 that cause entanglement, assymetrical dynamics, and hamper
relational mutuality. The model of the Veterans’ Court helps to reimagine moral identity
and societal responsibility after a soldier has become disoriented and morally wounded
having reached the crucial limit within war through the mandate of a disciplined and
structure Veterans’ Court within the local government.
Jon Paul Lederach’s four-fold practice of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and
risk is evidenced in the Veterans’ Court model.

The manual makes clear the

responsibility of Veterans’ within the court to adjust to the disciple and structure of the
court as a healing treatment program. And, the model demands responsibility of local
governments to faithfully engage and respond veterans who are struggling with moral
injury, PTSD, anxiety, addiction or anger management issues. And yet, the Mercer
County Veterans’ Court model engages moral terrain beyond responsibility by inviting
curiosity, creativity and risk through community service, written narratives, partnership
through mentors, and the circle of support through a treatment team.1322 The Veterans’
1319
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Court is one of many models across the country, though the Mercer County Veterans’
Court is uniquely crafted to its context by the leadership and veterans involved.

7.4

Moral Imagination and the Mandate of Culture: Doerries’ Theatre of War
From Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam to Martha Nussbaum’s exploration of

“moral luck” to Robert Meagher’s exegesis of the Greek word meignumi from the
Ancient Greek tragedies, our study of moral injury continues a cultural conversation
begun centuries ago in ancient Athens by poets such as Sophocles, Aeschylus and Homer
regarding the moral implications, impossible dilemmas and lingering lifetime effects of
war. Drawing on this rich tradition, and even more so, understanding the power of
tragedy to tug humanity toward the limit of human experience, contemporary playwright
Brian Doerries developed “The Theater of War” to present ancient Greek tragedies to
audiences of civilians and military corps across a spectrum of rank. Doerries shares the
mission of his project:
By presenting these plays to military and civilian audiences, our hope is to destigmatize psychological injury, increase awareness of post-deployment
psychological health issues, disseminate information regarding available
resources, and foster greater family, community, and troop resilience.1323
Since its conception, over 80,000 audience members have viewed productions of
Sophocles’ Ajax and Philoctetes. After the production, Doerries invites conversation of
audience members even when those discussions become “arresting, emotionally charged

systems: identification of eligible participants, definitions of eligibility, administration of teams and
meetings, alternative options for various program tracks, assessment of clients and data, the establishment
of mentors for each veteran. See: Anne S. Douds, Eileen M. Ahlin, Daniel Howard, and Sarah Stigerwalt,
“Varieties of Veterans’ Courts: A Statewide Assessment of Veterans’ Treatment Court Components,”
Criminal Justice Policy Review, 28:8 (2017): 746.
1323
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events.”1324 In Doerries’ view, ancient Greek tragedies were utilized during their day to
develop compassion, create a shared language, grieve the anguish of war, and welcome
home through an “elaborate ritual” soldiers returning to civilian life.1325 The Theater of
War project is an excellent example of drawing the moral imagination to the mandate of
societal culture to explore crucial limits for soldiers; and, perhaps, to draw citizens to the
brink of the crucial limit.
Brian Doerries understands the concept of “crucial limit” in his aim to address the
moral injuries of veterans pushed to impossible limits as well as his frustration with a
society who cannot handle the inward moral probe those injuries ask of a civitas. Because
of our unwillingness to plumb the depth, not just of emotions but also of civic culpability,
Doerries welcomes those uncomfortable moments when audiences are carried to that
crucial limit. He explains,
Tragedies don’t mean anything. They do something—physically, biochemically,
spiritually—to us. They move us out of our heads and into our guts. They frame
our response to ethical issues with emotions that help us to see more than one
perspective. They make us profoundly uncomfortable in the presence of others,
thereby forging a new way of connecting and relating with people who may not
typically share our views.1326
To hear Doerries explain the scholarship behind his work is compelling: the tragedies
allow a space for communal grief, existential wrestling and palpable relief.1327 The
tragedies explore civic limits, as well as the consequences of their transgression and the
potentially disabling repercussions in that lapse. The tragedies explore martial limits and
the moral dilemmas and devastating betrayals. The tragedies, at best, explore human
1324
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limits. Doerries explains the purpose of the tragedies, “To acknowledge our fallibility
and collective responsibility for the suffering. To dispense with judgment and moral
superiority.”1328 Leading audiences to those crucial limits is the aim of Doerries’ project
that tugs provocatively at the moral imagination and invites spectators to the crux of the
matter: what happens when new moral horizons create human vertigo? Doerries would
argue such an experience creates empathy, awareness and a drive to respond otherwise
than before.
Doerries’ provides a model of engaging the moral imagination that takes
audiences to the crucial limit and invites deep reflection, empathic response, shared
responsibility and social change. Certainly Doerries’ model participates in these four
steps of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk-taking. In so doing, he reveals these
four steps at the heart of Greek tragic theatre as well. The very moment of theatre-going,
then and now, creates a space for the moral imagination to be engaged developing
empathy at those crucial limits as a learned skill, an art to be practiced, and an empathy to
be enacted. As a response to the crucial limit model of disability, Doerries considers the
elements of the crucial limit model outlined earlier. As we begin to imagine how Doerries
activates the moral imagination through responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk, we
see how the cultural experience provides new agency through the crucial limit model, for
soldier and society alike and we can begin to imagine how such a construct might be
employed in other areas of society.

7.4.1
1328

Culture, Moral Imagination and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability

McGuire, “Bryan Doerries Discusses the Theater of War,” 19.
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Much of this project explores the moral injury of individual soldiers; however, a
few scholars have prompted greater exploration into the moral injury of the greater
culture of our society. Lederach’s invitation to the moral imagination demands societies
to take responsibility, engage curiosity, kindle creativity, and respond with risk-taking. A
responsible society is tasked with an honest reckoning of complicity and accountability
for war-time trauma.1329 Movies like Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk invite that kind of
moral reckoning of societal complicity, but are far less popular than films easily heroizing service members.1330 Societal responsibility will not only re-evaluate complicity,
but will also take responsibility for social contributions to trauma. Often, trauma studies
including moral injury, focus on the acute event of the traumatic experience rather than
the larger context.1331 Peter Levine’s work on trauma asks questions and pushes
responsibility for trauma to larger socio-environmental conditions than singular acute
events.1332

Based on statistics that as much as seventy percent of the general

population1333 has experienced a traumatic event in their lifetime, trauma expert Dr.

1329

See, for example: Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic
Abuse to Political Terror (New York: Basic, 2007). Herman argues here society ebbs and flows in
response and needs instead sustained attention. The first act of responsibility is to sustain society’s gaze.
1330
Interesting to note here Nancy Eiesland’s reflection in The Disabled God: “The Christian interpretation
of disability has run the gamut from symbolizing sin to representing an occasion for supererogation. The
persistent thread within the Christian tradition has been that disability denotes an unusual relationship with
God and that the person with disabilities is either divinely blessed or damned: the defiled evildoer or the
spiritual superhero,” 70. Soldiers upon return from war may be challenged with a similar dualism: defiled
evildoer or military superhero? Again, moral injury can benefit from conversation with disability that has
long addressed these kinds of questions in its scholarship.
1331
Zach Moon, (Re)Turning Warriors, 22. Moon believes Litz’s adaptive disclosure method focuses too
much on the acute event of trauma rather than the larger societal context.
1332
See: Peter Levine, Trauma and Memory: Brain and Body in a Search for the Living Past. (Berkeley,
CA: North Atlantic Books, 2015).
1333
The Sidran Institute for Traumatic Stress Education and Advocacy estimates that 70% of Americans
have experienced a traumatic event within their lifespan and 20% of Americans, regardless of whether or
not they are veterans, will have that trauma develop into full-fledged PTSD.
See:
www.sidran.org/resources/for-survivors-and-loved-ones/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-fact-sheet/
(Accessed March 13, 2018). To be clear, this website does not distinguish between PTSD and moral
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Bessel van der Kolk maintains, “Trauma is now our most pressing public health
issue.”1334 One must then ask, in taking responsibility, if trauma invokes trauma.1335
Addressing the larger public health issue of trauma and latent moral injury at play within
society is not intended to discredit in any way the unique traumatic events contributing to
a veteran’s moral injury. Instead, attention to trauma is suggested in order to bring
healing to a society in order to both prevent and bring healing to those whom the society
deploys.
Lederach’s construct for taking responsibility requires the twofold step of
accepting personal responsibility, “I am a part of this pattern”1336 and discovering the
meaning of that responsibility for relational mutuality.1337 Consider, for example, how
Augustine compelled his society to Lederarch’s transformative peace-making task of
responsibility by highlighting the story of Lucretia’s suicide. Lucretia, unable to deal
with the shame of her situation after being raped and finding no mechanism within
suicide through which to grieve and heal, chose to commit suicide as the only viable
opportunity for her given the shame she perceived from her society.1338 Augustine
explained,

injury. Further study would be helpful for assessing accurate statistics between the two for American
society today.
1334
Van der Kolk, When the Body Keeps the Score, 358. Van der Kolk’s prologue begins, “One does not
have to be a combat soldier…to experience trauma. Trauma happens to us, our friends, our families, our
neighbors,” 1. Goes on to show the extent and prevalence of trauma, “Research by the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention has shown that one in five Americans was sexually molested as a child; one in four
was beaten by a parent to the point of a mark being left on their body; and one in three couples engages in
physical violence. A quarter of us grew up with alcoholic relatives, and one out of eight witnessed their
mother being beaten or hit.”
1335
See for example: Grace M. Cho, Haunting the Korean Diaspora (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota, 2008) who explores the concept of trans-generational trauma that is perpetuated over time and
across generations which she deems “trans-generational haunting” (11).
1336
Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 16.
1337
Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 16.
1338
Kiess, “Augustine and the Politics of Mourning,” 217.
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If she remained alive she would be thought to have enjoyed suffering the
violence that she had suffered when she lived. Hence, she judged that she must
use self-punishment to exhibit the state of her mind to the eyes of men to whom
she could not show her conscience.1339
Societies must take responsibility regarding their culpability even in what appears at first
to be such an individualized choice.

Augustine’s description of Lucretia’s suicide

assumes a society unable to mourn. Without mourning that society is unable to move
forward to justice. Lederach makes clear ever act of responsibility carries with it a
confessional challenge that scholars from Bernard Verkamp to Warren Kinghorn have
acknowledged as essential to the healing process.

Responsibility requires a

comprehension of “relational mutuality” that both undergirds ethical choice, but also
creates a frame of reference for understanding the societal entanglement within which a
soldier might find herself where justice, power, and choice might be weighted and veiled
with what Bonhoeffer would deem the tob/ra (or “twilight”) of this world.
Curiosity and creativity, then, must be harkened and used to morally re-imagine
alternative possibilities. Certainly Brian Doerries’ Theater of War project aspires toward
new societal responsibility, accountability and creativity. And, Brock and Lettini’s “Truth
Commission on Conscience in War” is a radically creative response given that the dozens
of somewhat similar commissions explored by ethicist Patricia Β. Hayner in her book
Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 1340
that highlighted nations divided by civil war that sought healing post-war through such

1339

Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. by R.W. Dyson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1998): 1:19.
1340
Patricia B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions
(London, UK: Routledge Press, 2010).
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commissions. Brock and Lettini’s is the only example, not highlighted in the book that
explores a societal reckoning for a nation not in normatized civil disarray.
What is at stake for societies at this crucial limit are new forms of public
reckoning that address culpability, name laments, provides rituals for grief and then, in
response, explores new alternatives for the underlying issues that contribute to moral
injury. Creativity compels a recognition that since limits are fluid, contexts may vary,
moral functioning can fluctuate, and time and space allow varied spectrums for
recognition of moral injury; then “culture specific pathways to healing”1341 will offer
varied paths depending on the agent and the context. While Bonhoeffer’s mandates set
forth specific limits within different sections of the created world, a crucial limit model
will conceive those limits differently and with culturally specific pathways. The risk
societies must take is to learn anew from what the communities of biblical Israel and
ancient Greece and make adaptations for a twenty-first century global world. Learning
from Verkamp’s assessment prevents nostalgia and instead demands action for rituals of
lament, acts of confession, and public accounting of war-born grief. Certainly it is in the
best interest of society to heal moral injury of returning soldiers to prevent violence.1342
Even more so, it is in the best interest of society to heal moral injury latent within
its own landscape in order to prevent perpetuating violence. The challenge, however, is
that trauma not only begets trauma, but also trauma hinders the imagination. According
to Van Der Kolk, trauma while it births courage in certain situations; also has the effect
1341

John P. Wilson, “Culture Specific Pathways to Healing and Transformation for War Veterans
Suffering PTSD,” Healing War Trauma: A Handbook of Creative Approaches, ed. by Raymond Monsour
Scurfield and Katherine Theresa Platoni, (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2012): 47-67.
1342
Herbert Moyo, for example, studied moral injury within the culture of Zimbabwe. See: Herbert Moyo,
“Pastoral Care in the Healing of Moral Injury: A Case of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War
Veterans,” Hervormde Teologiese Studies 71:2 (2015): 1-11.
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on a trauma survivor to “shut down their inner compass and rob them of their
imagination.”1343 The moral imagination needed to heal and address moral injury faces a
multitude of roadblocks given the aftermath of trauma and its cycles of repetition. Van
Der Kolk’s insight suggests the possibility that society has transgressed a crucial limit. If
so, the only hope of the civitas is to take responsibility, explore repercussions with
curiosity, respond with creativity and also with the kind of risk Brian Doerries invites
within his repertoire of Greek tragedies performed for modern audiences.
7.5

Moral Imagination and Crucial Limits: A Challenge to the Church
This dissertation on moral injury began with a question raised for churches by the

National Congregations’ Study. Question #465 of the National Congregations’ Survey
revealed the neglect of religious institutions in responding to veterans and their families.
The question asked, “Within the past twelve months have there been any groups or
meetings or classes or events specifically focused on the following purposes or activities?
Support for veterans and their families?” Of 1330 congregations analyzed, 967 churches
said ‘no’ with a percentage ranking 72.7% of the nation’s churches failing to respond to
this pressing need. Of those interviewed, 27.3% or 363 institutions (of the 1300) offered
support.1344 The previous two sections explored creative and risky applications of moral
imagination for those at the crucial limit through the mandates of government and
culture. One hope of this dissertation is a prompt for churches and religious institutions
to assess their theology, practices, history and hospitality to be more accessible to
veterans and their families.
1343

Van der Kolk, When the Body Keeps the Score, 98.
National Congregations Study Cumulative Data Set (1998, 2006-2007, 2012). The discouraging
response to this question labeled “VETSUPPT” is even more chilling when viewed as a pie chart wherein
three-quarters of the circle depicts the absence of response from religious institutions.

1344
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The work of scholar Joseph McDonald certainly takes a key step forward in
accepting the perpetuation of moral injury by assessing moral injury in sacred texts
within the Jewish,

1345

Christian, Buddhist, Muslim,1346 and American civil religious

traditions.1347 The essays in McDonald’s book explore moral identity and culpability as
shaped by traditional interpretation and application of a wide array of religious texts and
invite instead deeper readings and exegetical work that can be shared in religious
communities. Perhaps the next step in responsibility, begun by scholars such as Erica
Ann Jeschke and Tobias Winwright is whether or not just war theory in and of itself has
reached a crucial limit of accountability.1348
Perhaps it is at this point where the curiosity of our religious institutions must be
piqued in order to address the compelling doctrinal, exegetical, spiritual and practical
legacies that have promulgated war and its aftermath of moral injury. Shelly Rambo, in a
recent article for Theology Today argues for a reckoning with war that must emerge from
our religious institutions. Her encouragement is to get curious regarding the existing
theological discourse that has proved itself insufficient for contemporary issues and must
be reassessed. Her analysis proposes three new angles through which to view theological
discourse: the angle of trauma, the angle of interreligious dialogue, and the angle of
aesthetics.1349 Rambo is drawn to these angles because they move past the passive

1345

See: David R. Blumenthal, “Soul Repair: A Jewish View,” Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts, 33-

46.
1346

See: Amir Hussain, “’The Most Beautiful of Stories’: A Muslim Reflection on the Qur’an and Moral
Injury,” Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts, 69-82.
1347
See: Daniel C. Maguire, “Civil Religion and the Moral Wounds of War,” Exploring Moral Injury in
Sacred Texts, 103-110.
1348
Tobias Winright and E. Ann Jeschke, “Combat and Confession: Just War and Moral Injury” in Can
War Be Just in the 21st Century, 169-187.
1349
Rambo argues in her essay that there have been weak theological and philosophical responses to war in
the 21st century. She makes the claim that three angles on war are overworked and of less value: the angle
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distance of critique, the dichotomy of stance, and the medicalization of care. Each of the
new angles provides pathways toward deeper conceptions of embodiment as a human
being (flesh) and as a human being within a social context (world). Given our concerns
from the field of disability regarding the obstacles of a medical model of disability and
the social model of disability, Rambo recognizes the limits of “critique, stance and cure”
and compels new initiatives for a path forward. Trauma, for Rambo, is an under-observed
societal and individual phenomenon with profound repercussions for bodies, abilities, and
memories that can disable not only individuals, but also generations over time.1350 Interreligious work is a necessity amid the globalization and entanglement of twenty-first
century life, as well as a necessity given the changing notions of warfare from battles of
networks instead of nations.1351 The aesthetic angle invites critique of how war is
“framed”1352 by media, culture, politicians and marketers and then presented to the
public. The aesthetic, ironically, invites critique of the aesthetic ways in which war is
sold and deemed either palatable or unpalatable by the public. In addition, Rambo sees
the strength of an aesthetic approach to move past polarizing modes of discourse toward
deeper pathways to peace.1353

Throughout her article, Rambo nudges theological

curiosity to move beyond critique, stance and care toward new angles of engagement our
religious institutions might accomplish. Bonhoeffer’s notions of “preservation” and the

of critique, the angle of critical stance, and the angle of care. Rambo argues for alternatives and suggests
instead: the traumatic, the interreligious and the aesthetic. See: Shelly Rambo, “Changing the
Conversation: Theologizing War in the Twenty-First Century,” Theology Today 69:4 (2013): 441-462.
1350
Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 448.
1351
Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 455. See: Susan Brooks Thiselthwaite, ed., Interfaith Just
Peacemaking: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives on the New Paradigm of Peace and War (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011): 1.
1352
Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 451. See also: Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life
Grievable? (London, UK: Verso, 2009).
1353
Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 454.
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replacement of the tree of life by the cross at the center of human existence are creative
theological tools to encourage human flourishing and functioning in the face of
transgressed limits. The creative work of religious institutions today will need to engage,
like Bonhoeffer, everything from reconceptualized doctrinal work to deepened exegesis
to creative and accessible spiritual practices.1354
Veteran Zachary Moon continues to draw attention to the responsibility, curiosity,
creativity and risk for religious communities in his ongoing work to better equip religious
communities for returning war veterans after his own deployment. He highlights the
risky work of the Church of the Resurrection in Kansas City, Missouri for their initial
mission of reaching non-churched individuals in their community, and then realizing
within that initial outreach the number of disconnected veterans. RezVets1355 is now a
vital and active mission of The Church of the Resurrection that provides education,
pastoral care, counseling, mentoring and spiritual formation for veterans.
Perhaps the greatest risk for communities of faith is the ongoing push toward the
exploration of the deeper emotions1356 in the constellation of moral life. Warren Kinghorn
imagines thick conceptions of human flourishing; but that hope assumes a twofold
premise. First, for humans to flourish there must be a realistic assessment of human sin,
finitude and moral failure followed by an integration of those shortcomings into a
personal narrative of hope and resilience. Certainly Pope Francis’ famous quote about
1354
See for example: Elizabeth Liebert,“Accessible spiritual practices to aid in recovery from moral
injury,” Pastoral Psychology, (forthcoming). Material originally presented by Liebert: “Accessible
Spiritual Practices to Aid in Recovery from Moral Injury,” Workshop for Pathways to Hope for Moral
Injury and Other Invisible Wounds: National Conference on Moral Injury and Mental Health: Kansas City,
October 28-30.
1355
See, for example: the Resurrection Veterans’ Ministry in Leawood, KS.
http://archive.cor.org/ministries/care-and-support/veterans/index.html (Accessed January 11, 2017).
1356
Zachary Moon, “’Turn Now, My Vindication is at Stake’: Military Moral Injury and Communities of
Faith,” Pastoral Psychology, (November, 2017): 1-13.
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the church today should be considered as both a challenge and a confession. Pope
Francis said,
The thing the church needs most today is the ability to heal wounds and to warm
the hearts of the faithful; it needs nearnesss, proximity. I see the church as a
field hospital after battle. It is useless to ask a seriously injured person if he has
high cholesterol and about the level of his blood sugars! You have to heal his
wounds. Then we can talk about everything else. Heal the wounds, heal the
wounds. You have to start from the ground up.1357
The challenge to the church is to heal the wounds as a field hospital after battle would do.
The confession the church must make is its inability to step beyond the walls of the
church to reach those who are to injured – bodily, morally, spiritually – and there bring
healing. And, the church must confess its complicity in allowing real wars to occur
without greater theological reckoning and political accountability. Bonhoeffer reminds
us, again and again, the church is called to stand in the middle of a complex reality, not
the outer edge.

7.6

Suggestions for Further Scholarship
Brett Litz encourages cross-disciplinary conversation in order to attend to the

breadth, depth and exponentially growing extent of moral injury. Future work across
disciplines with an eye to morality should include probes into moral identity, moral
theory and beyond to better assess, describe and evaluate the morality at the heart of
moral injury. For example, even when the breadth of embodiment is included in a

1357

Pope Francis, “A Big Heart Open to God,” America Magazine (Sept. 19, 2013).
https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2013/09/30/big-heart-open-god-interview-pope-francis
(Accessed: February 24, 2018).
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description such as “the psycho-bio-social-spiritual disturbance”1358 that moral injury
entails, the moral dimension is missing from the equation.

The polyvalence and

prevalence of moral injury across disciplines should include work in moral injury across
vocational lines including police compassion fatigue,1359 moral injury amid child
protection services,1360 and the greater societal moral injury considered by scholars such
as Brock and Moon. In addition, greater explanations of embodiment and its effect on
morality will be helpful to explore beyond feminist accounts and virtue ethicists.
Future work across disciplines with an eye to disability should continue to build
on the provocative work of Deborah Creamer offering ongoing refinement and insight to
her limit model of disability. As stated repeatedly through this study, Creamer’s greatest
weakness is her failure to take seriously the emotions beyond “goodness” of our
encounter with limits.

In addition, disability studies should take seriously ongoing

conversations with moral theory. It is understandable the respectable distance which
disability has given moral theory considering its damaging legacy for those with
disabilities. And yet fascinating questions remain regarding the effect of limits on moral
choices and the crippling effect those consequences might have for body, mind and spirit.
The ongoing work of Rita Nakashima Brock, one of the first voices in the field of
theology and moral injury is to deepen the attention of theology to trauma studies with
the belief that the effects of trauma disable much of society. Certainly there is a danger

1358

See: Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. Litz originates the phrase
“longstanding pyscho-bio-social impairment.” For the purposes of this study, I invite adding additional
modes of impairment including spiritual and moral.
1359
See, for example: Konstantinos Papazoglou1 and Brian Chopko, “The Role of Moral Suffering (Moral
Distress and Moral Injury) in Police Compassion Fatigue and PTSD: An Unexplored Topic,” Frontiers in
Psychology 8 (November, 2017): 1-5.
1360
See, for example: Haight, W., Sugrue, E., Calhoun, M. & Black, J., “A scoping study of moral injury:
Identifying directions for future research,” Children and Youth Services Review, 70 (2016): 190- 200.
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to dismissing the experiences of soldiers in order to widen the circle of inclusion; but
there is also recognition that making wise societal choices in the future depends upon a
public that is fully healed, functioning and aware of the trauma that they have personally
survived.

7.7

Concluding Remarks on the Crucial Limit Model of Disability
This project aims to provide a new model of disability that can take into account

the complex phenomenon of Moral Injury as moral agents experience implosions of past
moral codes through varied encounters that range from acts of omission, acts of
commission, acts of betrayal, and also, the experience of unjust and asymmetric
dynamics of power and oppression in a given situation. To accomplish this task, we
began by setting forth in chapter one a thorough statement of the problem facing soldiers
and societies today as moral injury presents itself in an array of symptoms different than
the more commonly known, but equally distressing, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. A
triad of issues for moral injury including trust, shame, and despair (wholly different than
PTSD’s fear-based triggers) are the presenting injuries requiring triage. Chapter two
examines the literature of responding care from both the fields of Psychology and
Theology. While both fields advance the discussion and take seriously the impact of
moral injury on soldiers and societies, noted within the chapter are weaknesses in both
approaches including notions of embodiment, complexities of societal complicity, varied
limits across contexts, and the failure to take seriously robust accounts of morality.
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Drawing on the literature of disability studies, Chapter three invites moral injury to
dismiss the military taboo of disability and to consider the possibilities within the field of
disability that has wrestled with many of the same questions regarding embodiment,
impairment, social contexts and limitations. A thorough review of both historical and
contemporary models of disability, as well as an exploration of current models such as
the medical and social model of disability, laid the groundwork for imparting Deborah
Creamer’s “limit model of disability” in Chapter four as compelling conversation partner
to the field of moral injury. Chapter five turns from the literature of disability to the
exegetical and theological work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer to deepen and widen Creamer’s
limit model of disability by looking at notions of goodness, finitude, and limit in
Bonhoeffer’s accounts of creature, creation and Creator in Genesis. These chapters
culminate here in chapter six as a revised limit model - a crucial limit model of disability
- is constructed and analyzed. This crucial limit model takes seriously agent and context
as well as the dynamic and often unpredictable ways in which encounter with limits can
have implications not just for disability, but also for morality.
Having outlined the twelve essential elements of a crucial limit model of
disability, reviewed the impact of those elements for disability, moral theory and moral
injury, and assessed the cognitive dissonance that occurs at the intersection of limited
moral horizons and the vertigo of human choice; we concluded with the moral
imagination of Brian Doerries who leads audiences of civilians and soldiers to a “crucial
limit” by way of dramatizing the Greek epic war tragedies for modern audiences. In so
doing, he explores complex emotions of veterans, stresses civic culpability and invites
shared communal grief. His model, though not a perfect illustration of the crucial limit
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model of disability, when brought into conversation with Garland-Thomson, Creamer,
Bonhoeffer and Lederach, encourages discussion for soldiers, societies and the soul of the
church to provoke moral imagination and reflect on crucial limits within these cultures..
The Veterans’ Creed has at its heart, “I now stand ready to serve my veteran
teammates” and certainly that conclusion compels individual veterans, and in particular
morally injured veterans, to stand ready and responsive to their team. Military service, in
many ways, compels Lederach’s projectile of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk
as soldiers serve their country, care for their team, and seek pathways toward peace in
far-flung war-torn places. And yet, it is the hope of this project to expand that circle of
those “standing ready” to include greater circles of support in society: the soldiers’
families, the greater society, and the religious institutions where soldiers venture for soulsearching. Moral Injury, the disabling condition that it is, can hamper those circles of
support because, as Veteran Tim O’Brien poignantly reminds us, “A true war story is
never moral.”1361 Even more so, these circles are often complicit in allowing morally
injurious situations to transpire as well as preventing complex analysis the moral horizons
at play in a given situation. My hope is that the scholarship in this dissertation will help
the morally injured soldier, pushed to that crucial limit, recover from vertigo and stand
ready once again.

1361

Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried (New York, NY: Viking Penguin, 1990), 76.
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APPENDIX 1:
MODELS OF DISABILITY: MEDICAL, SOCIAL, LIMIT AND CRUCIAL
MEDICAL
MODEL

SOCIAL
MODEL

LIMIT
MODEL

Disability

Focus on “flesh”
as location of
disablement

Focus on
“world” as
location of
disablement

Focus on
“encounters” as
location of
disablement

Flesh

Medically
impaired

Constructed
socially

Becomes an
epistemological
source for divine
and human
questioning

Encounters

When world is
encountered,
potential injuries
might occur to
body or mind.

World

Place of potential
medical
impairment
to body

When social
norms and/or
boundaries are
encountered
agency can be
disabled.
Place of potential
disablement
through social
structures

When limits are
encountered,
theological
questions are
raised of God,
self, others.
Place of
potentially
disabling limits
in certain
contexts
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CRUCIAL
LIMIT
MODEL
Focus on
“transformation”
as potential for
crucial
information in
the face of
disablement
Global
evaluation of
shame within
flesh of self is
projected on
social flesh
When crucial
limits are
encountered,
shame and
despair are
present.
Place of
potentially
disabling limits
through arbitrary,
competing and
unpredictable
forces that defy
moral norms and
codes.

Transformation

Aim of techne to
adjust broken
bodies and minds
to normative
view of human
being

Goal of social
change brings
liberation to
human beings
and the societies
in which they
live

Embrace of
theological and
anthropological
questions creates
deeper view of
humanity amid
limitations
before God

Implication for
Veterans

My body needs
fixed.

Society needs
fixed.

God needs fixed.

Crucial limit of
human life is the
cross of Christ at
the center of
existence and
offers
preservation to
those at the
crucial limit.
My despair
regarding body,
society and the
divine needs
acknowledged.

APPENDIX 2:
ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF A CRUCIAL LIMIT MODEL OF DISABILITY

HUMAN
FINITUDE

SOCIAL
CONTEXTS

MORAL
AGENTS

Crucial

Limit

Disability

Recognizes the crucial
nature of embodiment
– potential for power
and pain.

Identifies the natural
limits at the center of
human existence: in the
middle of the garden and
at the edge in
relationships.

Understands human
finitude as a critical
element of fleshly
existence.

Recognizes the crucial
intersections when
society is at a
crossroads where social
contexts matter and
decisions therein.

Identifies the limits lost
by sinful human action in
varied social contexts by
other-than=god
encounters.
In the aftermath, the fall
affects humanity and
society through the
problematic limitlessness
of sin.

Understands as flesh
meets world in varied
encounters there will
be a continual and
fluid encounter of
limits. These
encounters are fluid,
subtle, unpredictable
and vulnerable
interactions.

Recognizes the crucial
act of decision making
by moral agents
acknowledging limits,
and the questions

Identifies the fact that in
the midst of limitlessness,
God affirms fallen
humanity and sends into
moral agents back into

Understands the
debilitating affect of
shame, trauma,
silence and despair on
moral agents who
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raised by
critical situations.

the world cloaked and
preserved.

become disabled by
perceived failure.

.

CONCRETE
REDEMPTION Recognizes the crossshaped.intersection
where the vertical
dimension of God’s
redemptive action
meets our limited
horizon of choice in
concrete moments.

Identifies the new reality
as God acts decisively
and redemptively by
placing the cross as the
new center of existence
where there will be dying
and rising again in
concrete situations.
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Understands need
for transformative
redemption in
concrete reality
through presence,
narrative, and
renewed moral
imagination.
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